Freeman v. Borough of Winton

56 Pa. D. & C. 512, 1946 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 73
CourtPennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Lackawanna County
DecidedFebruary 6, 1946
DocketNo. 1152
StatusPublished

This text of 56 Pa. D. & C. 512 (Freeman v. Borough of Winton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Lackawanna County primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Freeman v. Borough of Winton, 56 Pa. D. & C. 512, 1946 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 73 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1946).

Opinion

Eagen, J.,

This is an action in assumpsit, which by agreement was tried before the writer without a jury.

Certain sewer improvement bonds were issued on April 17,1917, by the Borough of Winton to one Dennis Lawler. They were in registered form and each bond provides on its face: “This bond is duly registered and [513]*513is only transferable in the office of the Borough Clerk of the Borough of Winton.”

Dennis Lawler died and in due course letters testamentary issued in his estate naming Lucy Lawler executrix thereof. At the date of death the bonds in question were not found among his effects but were found to be in the vault of the Miners Savings Bank and Trust Company of Olyphant.

Subsequently this action was instituted by the Secretary of Banking of the Commonwealth, as receiver of the above mentioned bank to recover from the municipality the proceeds of the bonds. In the statement of claim filed it is stated that the bonds “were duly sold and transferred by the said Dennis Lawler to the Miners Savings Bank and Trust Company of Olyphant for value received”. Thereupon, the executrix of the estate of Dennis Lawler filed a petition of intervention alleging that decedent had not transferred or assigned said bonds in his lifetime and denying any ownership or right therein on the part of the bank.

At the hearing counsel agreed that the issue presented is the ownership of the securities.

No direct testimony was offered to show how the bank came into their possession. No evidence was offered to •show that the registered owner of the bonds ever executed any assignment or transfer of title. On the reverse side of each bond printed forms are provided for the entry of an assignment. These are blank. As far as we know the bank holds no note, contract or other obligation of Dennis Lawler. The bonds were never transferred in the office of the borough clerk and are still registered in the name of Dennis Lawler. Nor are there any entries to indicate any other intention.

The burden of establishing that the bank had title to the bonds as a result of sale, as alleged in the statement of claim rested upon plaintiff. No satisfactory proof to sustain this contention was presented. The evidence offered to prove the bank’s ownership sustained only [514]*514one thing, that the bank had possession of the bonds at the time of the death of the registered owner. This in our opinion was not enough. For us to conclude on the record before us that the bonds had been assigned to the bank during decedent’s lifetime would be a pure guess.

In 22 C. J. 90, 91, the general principles of law are enumerated as follows:

“Where it is shown that certain property belongs to a particular person, the law presumes that the ownership remains unchanged until the contrary appears,

This presumption is stronger than the presumption of title or ownership arising from another’s mere possession of the property, as the mere parting with the possession does not even raise a presumption of a change of title.

In Hartman v. Pittsburgh Incline Plane Co., 11 Pa. Superior Ct. 438, the court says:

“Having proved . . . that the structure was erected and maintained by it (the defendant) ... it might well be presumed, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, that it continued to be the responsible owner of it. . . . When a person is shown to have been the owner of property, such ownership is ordinarily presumed to continue until some change or alienation is shown.”

In Ebert v. Kaufmann, 17 Dist. R. 156, 158, Judge Moschzisker said:

“There is a certain class of facts which, when proved to have existed at a given time, are presumed to continue in statu quo until the contrary is shown, and we believe the fact in question (ownership of property) to be within that class.”

In Magee v. Scott, 9 Cush. (Mass.), 148; 55 Am. Dec. 49, the court said:

“The plaintiff is proved to be the owner of the (personal) property, and that right of property will con[515]*515tinue until a change proved as by sale, lien, or voluntary loan. Whoever relies on such change must prove it; the proof lies on him. All that appears in the present case is, that the property came into the possession of the defendant, with the plaintiff’s consent.

“. . . We are then called on to consider the directions given by the judge on the trial.

“The first was, that presumption of ownership continues until some alienation is shown. This is correct. A party having this ownership does not lose it, by permitting another to be in possession. The ordinary mode of proving property is, proving that it was purchased and paid for, and it will be deemed in law to be the purchasers’ until something is shown to change the title, and merely parting with the possession affords no conclusive evidence of such change.”

See also Zwisler v. Storts et al., 30 Mo. A. 163, Sawyer v. Spofford, 58 Mass. 598, and Jennings v. Brooklyn Hts. R. Co., 121 App. Div. 587, 106 N. Y. Supp 279.

While the point was not raised, we think the executrix of decedent’s estate had the legal right to intervene herein. In Bily v. Allegheny County Board, 353 Pa. 49, it is held:

“The right of intervention in pending litigation should be accorded to anyone having title to property which is the subject of the litigation, provided that his rights will be substantially affected by the direct legal operation and effect of the decision, and provided also that it is reasonably necessary for him to safeguard an interest of his own which no other party on the record is interested in protecting.”"

Findings of fact

1. On April 17, 1917, Dennis Lawler, for value received became the owner and possessor of the bonds of the Borough of Winton involved in this case.

2. Said bonds were registered in the name of Dennis Lawler and each bond provides on its face: “This bond [516]*516is duly registered and is only transferable in the office of the Borough Clerk of the Borough of Winton.”

8.These bonds were never transferred in the office of the borough clerk of the Borough of Winton either by Dennis Lawler or by anyone else.

4. These bonds still appear on the record of the office of the borough clerk of the Borough of Winton as the property of Dennis Lawler as the registered owner thereof.

5. On the back of each bond, the spaces provided for the record of assignments or transfers are all blank.

6. Dennis Lawler is now dead and the letters testamentary on his estate are held by Lucy Lawler, the in-tervenor in this case.

7. Said bonds were not found among the effects of Dennis Lawler at his death but were found in the vault of the Miners Savings Bank and Trust Company of Olyphant at or shortly after the appointment of a re-receiver for said bank.

8. There is no direct testimony as to how the bonds came to be in the vault of said bank.

9. The receiver holds no assignment or transfer of said bonds or other document of title thereto signed by Dennis Lawler nor is there any testimony that any such document ever existed.

10. The receiver holds no note, contract or other obligation of Dennis Lawler.

11.

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Related

Bily v. Allegheny County Board of Property Assessment, Appeals & Review
44 A.2d 250 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1945)
Jennings v. Brooklyn Heights Railroad
121 A.D. 587 (Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, 1907)
Hartman v. Pittsburg Incline Plane Co.
11 Pa. Super. 438 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1899)
Sawyer v. Spofford
58 Mass. 598 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1849)

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Bluebook (online)
56 Pa. D. & C. 512, 1946 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 73, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/freeman-v-borough-of-winton-pactcompllackaw-1946.