Freedom Medical, Inc. v. Sewpersaud

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedNovember 3, 2020
Docket6:20-cv-00771
StatusUnknown

This text of Freedom Medical, Inc. v. Sewpersaud (Freedom Medical, Inc. v. Sewpersaud) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Freedom Medical, Inc. v. Sewpersaud, (M.D. Fla. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA ORLANDO DIVISION

FREEDOM MEDICAL, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 6:20-cv-771-Orl-37GJK

MAHESHWAR SEWPERSAUD; and USINE ROTEC, INC.,

Defendants.

ORDER The Court ordered Defendants Maheshwar Sewpersaud (“Sewpersaud”) and Usine Rotec, Inc. (“Rotec”) to show cause why they should not be held in civil contempt for violating the Court’s orders. (Doc. 149.) The Court held a hearing on the matter.1 (Doc. 157.) On review, the Court holds Defendants in civil contempt. I. BACKGROUND2 Plaintiff Freedom Medical, Inc. (“Freedom”) rents and sells medical equipment to hospitals, nursing homes, and other healthcare providers. (Doc. 1, ¶ 9.) Shortly after

1 After the hearing, the Court directed the parties to meet and confer on objections to any exhibits presented. (See Doc. 158.) After prompting, Freedom then filed a number of notices that still failed to fully comply with the Court’s orders, but that did present the exhibits and objections. (Docs. 159–162.) To the extent there are any objections to referenced exhibits in this Order, the Court overrules them and admits the exhibits. And the Court will discharge its November 2, 2020 order to show cause in light of Freedom’s response. (Id.) 2 More details on the facts of this case can be found in the Court’s Preliminary Injunction Order. (Doc. 73.) -1- Sewpersaud left his job as branch manager of Freedom’s Orlando Office to work for 3M on November 8, 2019, something seemed amiss to Freedom. (See id. ¶¶ 16, 36–37; Doc. 1-

6; Doc. 61-4, ¶ 26.) A large bed sale to the Orlando VA that Sewpersaud had been working on, one that Sewpersaud had repeatedly assured Freedom was a done deal, never materialized. (Doc. 61-4, ¶¶ 19, 23, 27–28, pp. 17, 20.) So Freedom reached out to the Orlando VA to ask about the bed sale only to find the contract had been awarded to one of their competitor’s, Interior Fusion. (Id. ¶¶ 28–31.) With that revelation, Sewpersaud’s house of cards tumbled.

After investigating, Freedom learned Sewpersaud hadn’t just been concealing the loss of the Orlando VA contract from Freedom—he had been actively assisting Interior Fusion in obtaining the bid while sabotaging Freedom’s bid. (Doc. 115-4, pp. 51–87; see also Doc. 56-2, pp. 21–22; Doc. 61-4, pp. 66–67.) All while outwardly working for Freedom. (See Doc. 1-6.) Sewpersaud’s reason for departure was also a lie. He wasn’t going to work

for 3M—he was going to work for another one of Freedom’s competitors, medical bed manufacturer Rotec. (Doc. 56-1, ¶ 28; Doc. 61-4, ¶ 26) And the timing of his new job wasn’t a coincidence—Rotec was supplying beds to Interior Fusion for the Orlando VA contract, and Sewpersaud helped coordinate the whole thing. (See Doc. 115-4, pp. 51–87.) Increasingly concerned about the misappropriation of its trade secrets, Freedom sued

Sewpersaud and sought an injunction enforcing the restrictive covenant in Sewpersaud’s employment agreement. (Docs. 1, 2; Doc. 1-1 (“Agreement”).) The Agreement says: [Y]ou will not, during the term of your employment and for a period of one (1) year after the termination of your employment . . . (i) engage in any -2- business or perform any service . . . in competition with, similar to or the same as the business of [Freedom] [or] (ii) solicit, aid in the solicitation, or service in any way . . . any current or prospective client, customer or account, who has been solicited or serviced by [Freedom] within one (1) year prior to the termination of your employment.

[You] will not, during the term of your employment . . . for your own account or for the benefit of any person, solicit, divert or induce any of Freedom Medical Inc’s customers, employees or consultants to leave the engagement of Freedom Medical, Inc. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 17–19; Doc. 1-1, p. 3.) After reviewing Freedom’s evidence, the Court entered a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”), on May 6, 2020, enjoining Sewpersaud from “[s]oliciting, doing business with, selling to, renting to, or servicing any current or prospective client, customer, or account, who has been solicited or served by Freedom Medical . . . within one (1) year prior to the termination of his employment.” (Doc. 11, p. 11.) The TRO also required Sewpersaud to “preserve all documents and information in whatever form it exists relevant to the claims in the Verified Complaint (Doc. 1) including . . . communications . . . relating to Rotec, KAP Medical, or Interior Fusion.” (Id. at 11–12.) The Court then held a hearing on the matter. (Doc. 69.) At the hearing, the Court made clear to Sewpersaud’s counsel, in Sewpersaud’s presence, that “he needs to understand that it’s critical that [relevant information on his electronic devices] be retained and that he’ll need to make those devices available for some reasonable period of time.” (Doc. 84, pp. 122:24–123:1.) The Court then converted the TRO into a preliminary injunction (“PI”) on June 23, 2020. (Doc. 73.) In the PI, the Court found the Agreement was necessary to protect Freedom’s -3- confidential information and legitimate business interests, as required by Florida law. (See id. at 10–11.) And the Agreement reasonably prohibited Sewpersaud from disclosing

confidential information and soliciting Freedom’s current and prospective customers, as Sewpersaud conceded. (Id. at 12.) While the Agreement was limited in time to one year, the restrictive covenant in the Agreement, which prohibited Sewpersaud from working in any capacity for a competitor, contained no geographic limitation. (See id.) So the Court found it reasonable to restrict the geographic scope of the non-compete agreement to Sewpersaud’s former sales territory since, at the time, Freedom failed to present evidence

a global injunction was appropriate. (Id. at 11.) Sewpersaud was again enjoined from “[s]oliciting, doing business with, selling to, renting to, or servicing any current or prospective” customer of Freedom’s but he was permitted to continue working for Rotec, provided he performed no work for Rotec “in any capacity in his former Freedom [] Sales Territory.” (Id. at 16–17.)

Two months later, Freedom moved for an order to show cause arguing Sewpersaud, acting in concert with Rotec, violated the TRO and PI. (Doc. 115 (“Show Cause Motion”).) Freedom also moved for the approval of lists detailing the current and prospective customers of Freedom that Sewpersaud was enjoined from servicing under the PI (“Customer Lists”).3 (Doc. 95 (“Customer List Motion”).) Both Sewpersaud and

Rotec responded to the motions, but before the Court could hold a hearing, Sewpersaud

3 The Court had directed the parties to confer on creating these lists, but the parties were unable to reach an agreement. (Doc. 73, p. 16; Doc. 120.) -4- filed for bankruptcy. (Docs. 106, 121–22, 134.) After briefing, the Court reset the show cause hearing for October 27, 2020 and clarified that, while the case would be stayed as

to Sewpersaud generally, the Court would continue to exercise its injunctive powers to ensure that all parties—Sewpersaud included—obeyed this Court’s orders. (Doc. 149.) After a hearing and briefing (Docs. 115, 121, 122, 157), these matters are ripe. II. LEGAL STANDARDS A party seeking civil contempt must show by “clear and convincing evidence that the alleged contemnor has violated an outstanding court order.” Commodity Futures

Trading Comm’n v. Wellington Precious Metals, Inc., 950 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). The burden then shifts to the alleged contemnor, who can “defend his failure on the grounds that he was unable to comply.” Id. Upon a proper defense, the burden shifts back to the party seeking contempt to show “ability to comply.” Id.

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Freedom Medical, Inc. v. Sewpersaud, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/freedom-medical-inc-v-sewpersaud-flmd-2020.