Freedman v. Value Health, Inc.

190 F.R.D. 33, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17146, 1999 WL 1037167
CourtDistrict Court, D. Connecticut
DecidedFebruary 19, 1999
DocketNo. CIV. A. 3:95-CV-2038(JC)
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 190 F.R.D. 33 (Freedman v. Value Health, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Freedman v. Value Health, Inc., 190 F.R.D. 33, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17146, 1999 WL 1037167 (D. Conn. 1999).

Opinion

RULING ON MOTIONS FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION [DKT.# s 135 & 137]

HALL, District Judge.

These two consolidated cases, Freedman v. Value Health, Inc. and Bash v. Value Health, Inc., arise from events surrounding a merger on July 28, 1995 between Value Health, Inc. and Diagnostek, Inc. Plaintiffs in both actions allege that corporate and individual defendants made a series of false and misleading statements about the two companies and their impending merger, and that defendants failed to disclose material information in the registration statement filed in connection with the merger.

The Freedman plaintiffs have moved to certify a class of all persons, with the exception of defendants and their families, who acquired Value Health common stock between April 3, 1995 and Sept. 19, 1995, including a sub-class of people who received shares of Value Health in exchange for their shares of Diagnostek, Inc. The Bash plaintiffs have moved to certify a class consisting of: (a) former Diagnostek shareholders who acquired shares of Value Health in the merger; (b) people who purchased shares of Diag-nostek on the open market between March 27, 1995 and July 28, 1995; and (c) people who purchased shares of Value Health on the open market between March 27, 1995 and November 7, 1995. Both sets of plaintiffs have also moved to certify their counsel as class counsel.

Defendants in both actions have opposed class certification, primarily on the ground that plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the “adequacy” requirement of Rule 23(a)(4). They argue that plaintiffs would be inadequate class representatives both because an inherent conflict of interest exists among the different groups of plaintiffs and because plaintiffs are ignorant about the litigation. In addition, the individual defendants argue that they have improperly been excluded from the class proposed by the Freedman plaintiffs. Lastly, both defendants have presented arguments concerning the dates of the class period.

For the following reasons, plaintiffs’ motions for class certification are hereby granted.

I. DISCUSSION

A. Adequacy of class representatives

Under Rule 23(a)(4), a class action can exist only when “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(4). The adequacy inquiry under this Rule “serves to uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the class they seek to represent.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 2250, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997). When the members of a proposed class “have interests that are ‘antagonistic’ to one another,” Rule 23(a)(4) prevents certification. In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 960 F.2d 285, 291 (2d Cir.1992). In the specific context of securities litigation, courts have certified classes despite adequacy objections when “[e]very class member shares an overriding common interest in establishing the existence and materiality of misrepresentations.” Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 909 (9th Cir.1975); see also In re Olsten Sec. Litig., 3 F.Supp.2d 286, 296 (E.D.N.Y.1998) (granting certification where all plaintiffs had “overriding common interest in showing the maximum extent of inflation in [defendant’s] stock [35]*35at every point”); Desimone v. Industrial Bio-Test Labs., 80 F.R.D. 112, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (denying certification when plaintiffs claims were potentially antagonistic to those of other members of proposed class).

In the two actions at bar, plaintiffs’ counsel have identified three different groups of plaintiffs: (1) people who purchased Value Health shares on the open market during the class period; (2) former Diagnostek shareholders who acquired their Value Health shares through the merger; and (3) people who purchased Diagnostek shares on the open market during the class period. The proposed Freedman class consists of Groups 1 and 2, while the proposed Bash class consists of all three groups.

Defendants contend that the three groups have interests that are adverse to one another. Their argument is as follows: People in Group 1 would want to argue that the market price of Value Health stock was artificially inflated during the class period by material misstatements on the part of both Value Health and Diagnostek regarding their future business prospects. By presenting alternate bases to support a finding that Value Health’s price was inflated, the Group 1 members could maximize their chances of obtaining a verdict in their favor. People in Group 2, however, would want to argue that any inflation in the price of Value Health was attributable solely to misstatements by Value Health. Any finding of liability on behalf of Diagnostek would work against their interests rather than in favor of them. Such liability would help prove defendants’ contention that people who received their Value Health stock in the merger suffered no damage because they paid for the stock with Diagnostek stock that was itself artificially inflated. Meanwhile, people in Group 3 would want to argue precisely the opposite of people in Group 2. In their view, it was Diagnostek’s share price, not Value Health’s, that was artificially inflated.

It is the conclusion of this court that defendants have not demonstrated any conflict of interest among the members of either proposed class. Defendants’ argument fails because of the way that damages are calculated under § 11 of the Securities Act of 1933. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e). In short, the interests of the three groups are not adverse because the damages measure takes into account the true “value” of the securities purchased by a plaintiff but not the “value” of the currency used to purchase those securities. A plaintiff who has purchased securities at an artificially inflated price is entitled to recover the difference between the “amount paid” to purchase the securities and either the value of the securities at the time the suit was brought, the amount for which the securities were sold before suit, or the amount for which the securities were sold after the suit was commenced if that amount is not greater than the value of the securities at the time the suit was started. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e). Defendants’ argument that, in the context of a stock-for-stock merger, “amount paid” refers to the intrinsic value of the shares exchanged, as opposed to the shares’ market price, is without merit. As has been noted by the Second Circuit, the terms “amount paid” and “value” have distinct and different meanings under § 11(e). See McMahan & Co. v. Wherehouse Entertainment, Inc., 65 F.3d 1044, 1048-49 (2d Cir. 1995). In construing § 11(e), the court stated that “Congress’s use of the term ‘value,’ as distinguished from the terms ‘amount paid’ and ‘price’ indicates that, under certain circumstances, the market price may not adequately reflect the security’s value.” Id.

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190 F.R.D. 33, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17146, 1999 WL 1037167, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/freedman-v-value-health-inc-ctd-1999.