Freedman v. Department of Social & Health Services
This text of 530 P.2d 1344 (Freedman v. Department of Social & Health Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Plaintiff appeals from a judgment in favor of the defendant, Washington State Department of Social [599]*599and Health Services (hereinafter DSHS) denying his eligibility to receive financial assistance under the Federal Aid and Medical Care Only (FAMCO) program.
On May 2, 1973, petitioner applied for medical aid in the amount of $240 under the FAMCO program. The local office of DSHS denied his application because he possessed a travel trailer, which placed him outside the eligibility formula. Pursuant to RCW 74.08.070-.080, he requested a departmental hearing; the examiner concluded his claim was properly denied because he possessed a nonexempt item of personal property, the trailer, valued at approximately $300. The Superior Court affirmed that decision.
Plaintiff is an unassigned, unpaid, ordained minister, disabled by spinal arthritis, whose family consists of himself, his wife, and three children. His monthly income is derived from three disability pensions. He voluntarily occupies a lay position as extension superintendent of his church. In 1964, while employed in the teaching profession, he acquired a travel trailer. He lived in it while attending college for three quarters, has used the trailer while attending an annual 2-week Bible camp, as a study adjacent to his home, and once took it on a vacation to the Olympic Peninsula where he counseled some people in a religious context.
Standards for judicial review of administrative decisions in contested cases are contained in the administrative procedure act, codified in RCW 34.04. The pertinent provision here is RCW 34.04.130 (6) ;1 plaintiff’s assignments of error [600]*600relate principally to subsections (a), (b), (d) and (f).
The plaintiff’s first contention is that the departmental ruling is in violation of his First Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and article 1, section 11, amendment 34 of the Constitution of the State of Washington; the latter provides in part:
Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment, belief and worship, shall be guaranteed to every individual, and no one‘shall be molested or disturbed in person or property on account of religion;
We disagree.
Petitioner’s use of this trailer for religious purposes is so sporadic and fortuitous we conclude that the action of the DSHS does not constitute an infringement of these constitutional guaranties. He retains an absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment, belief and worship. The department’s act does not disturb him or his property in his religious beliefs, or because of his religion.
Plaintiff next claims that the regulations promulgated by the department, WAC 388-28-430(1) and (2)2 are unconsti[601]*601tutional, as to him, because they impede the observance of his religious activities, beliefs or duties. We disagree. Our review of the record convinces us that plaintiff’s contention, based upon the evidence he introduced, is not well taken.
The issue of the constitutionality of these regulations was not raised below. Finding of fact No. 10, which is not assigned as error, states:
At the Fair Hearing, the parties stipulated that the only issue to be considered was whether the travel trailer is a non-exempt resource as contended by the Department under WAC 388-28-430 (1).
Nor is error assigned to the court’s conclusion of law that DSHS correctly determined this trailer not to be within the exemptions set forth in WAC 388-28-430 (1). Paragraph (2) was not considered below; the issue was limited by the stipulation. As a general rule, “objections or questions which have not been raised or urged in the proceedings before the administrative agency or body will not be considered by the court on review of the order or such agency or body” is applicable here. Leschi Improvement Council v. State Highway Comm’n, 84 Wn.2d 271, 274, 525 P.2d 774 (1974). The exceptions to that rule as set forth in Maynard Inv. Co. v. McCann, 77 Wn.2d 616, 621, 465 P.2d 657 (1970)3 [602]*602and Puget Sound Marina, Inc. v. Jorgensen, 3 Wn. App. 476, 480-81, 475 P.2d 919 (1970), are not applicable.
Petitioner next claims that WAC 388-28-430(1) and (2) are inconsistent with the statutory authorization of RCW 74.04.005(11)4 Admittedly, this contention was not [603]*603made, argued or ruled upon below. This assignment need not be considered. Snohomish County Builders Ass’n v. Snohomish Health Dist., 8 Wn. App. 589, 593, 508 P.2d 617 (1973).
Lastly, plaintiff contends that the decision of the hearing examiner is arbitrary and capricious. We disagree. It is the insufficiency of plaintiff’s evidence which caused the examiner to reach the result he did. The issue was restricted by stipulation to an interpretation of that portion of WAC 388-28-430(1) allowing an exemption for “personal property of ‘great sentimental value.’ ” Such property may be exempted when the “applicant establishes the circumstances and conditions which give it this value.” In the absence of a history of emotional attachment of sufficient magnitude to convince the trier of fact that sentimental value was shown, it will not be inferred. We find no error.
Judgment is affirmed.
Green, C.J., and McInturff, J., concur.
Petition for rehearing denied February 24, 1975.
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530 P.2d 1344, 12 Wash. App. 598, 1975 Wash. App. LEXIS 1207, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/freedman-v-department-of-social-health-services-washctapp-1975.