Fredrickson v. MAW

227 P.2d 772, 119 Utah 385, 1951 Utah LEXIS 135
CourtUtah Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 20, 1951
Docket7452
StatusPublished
Cited by32 cases

This text of 227 P.2d 772 (Fredrickson v. MAW) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Utah Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fredrickson v. MAW, 227 P.2d 772, 119 Utah 385, 1951 Utah LEXIS 135 (Utah 1951).

Opinion

LATIMER, Justice.

*387 This is an appeal by the defendants from a judgment entered against them in an action for damages alleged to have been sustained by plaintiff as a result of the carelessness and negligence of the defendant, Dr. Raymond B. Maw, in performing a tonsillectomy. We shall designate the parties as they appeared in the court below and proceed in the opinion as though the action was against Dr. Maw individually. The charge of negligence was that the defendant carelessly left gauze, dressings, threads, and sutures in the tonsil cavity; negligently permitted the incision to close with materials remaining therein; and negligently discharged the plaintiff as healed without discovering the presence of the foreign substances.

The principal error complained of on this appeal is that the trial judge improperly overruled defendant’s motion for a nonsuit and a directed verdict for the reason that there was no evidence to establish that the defendant was negligent in the manner alleged, or at all.

In view of the nature of the evidence, before summarizing it to establish negligence or lack of negligence, we desire to discuss the principles of law dealing with the evidence necessary to establish malpractice of the alleged type.

The better-reasoned cases announce a rule of law to the effect that in those cases which depend upon knowledge of the scientific effect of medicine, the results of surgery, or whether the attending physician exercised the ordinary care, skill and knowledge required of doctors in the community which he serves, must ordinarily be established by the testimony of physicians and surgeons. There is, however, another well-recognized rule holding that when facts may be ascertained by the ordinary use of the senses of lay witnesses, it is not necessary that expert testimony be produced and relied upon.

Included within the latter rule are those cases which are similar to this one, namely, those actions involving negli *388 gence in leaving instruments, needles, sponges, bandages, gauze or foreign particles in incisions, wounds, or open cavities. So far as establishing negligence on the part of the doctor in this type of case is concerned, it would appear to be a matter of common knowledge that due care is lacking if surgical instruments, sponges, or medical supplies are not removed before an incision is closed or the wound heals; and lack of direct evidence of the failure to remove is not fatal to plaintiff’s case when there is evidence from which an inference to that effect may legitimately be drawn.

The rule is stated in the case of Wharton v. Warner, 1913, 75 Wash. 470, 135 P. 235, 237, in the following language:

“It, is argued on behalf of the respondent Warner (1) That whether a surgical operation was unskillfully performed is a question of science, and is to be determined by the opinion evidence of surgeons; and (2) in effect that a bad result standing alone is no evidence of unskillful surgery. From these postulates it is argued that there is no evidence to sustain the verdict. Both propositions are sound when soundly applied. The reason is that in most cases a layman can have no knowledge whether the proper medicine was administered or the proper surgical treatment given. Whether a surgical operation was unskillfully or skillfully performed is a scientific question. If, however, a surgeon should lose the instrument with which he operates in the incision which he makes in his patient, it would seem as a matter of common sense that scientfic opinion could throw little light on the subject. So, in this case, where a surgeon loses a metallic spring about 12 inches in length, and about one-sixteenth of an inch in width, in the body of his patient, and fails to discover and remove it, it would seem that a jury would have abundant justification for inferring negligence without the aid of expert testimony.”

With these principles in mind, we summarize the material testimony of the witnesses, taking into consideration that plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of the evidence and inferences favorable to her as the jury rendered a verdict against the defendant.

Mrs. Fredrickson testified that prior to the 6th day of July, 1945, she was in good health, except a stiffness of one knee caused by arthritis; that on that date she went to the Intermountain Clinic, operated by a partnership of which *389 the defendant was one partner; that the purpose of her visit was to seek relief for her arthritic affliction; that she was given a physical examination and was then directed to the defendant; that he examined her throat and recommended the removal of her tonsils as the right one was diseased; that she was informed that their removal might help relieve the arthritic condition; that she concluded to have her tonsils removed, received an appointment with the defendant, and on July 17, 1945, reported for the operation; that she was given a local anesthetic and the tonsils were removed by the defendant; that the operation consumed about an hour’s time and it was necessary that the doctor use gauze sponges; that after the operation was complete she was permitted to leave the clinic and was told to return in about three weeks for a check-up.

She further testified that during this three-week period her throat was sore and she had considerable difficulty swallowing; that she returned within the period as directed but the defendant was on his vacation and so the nurse examined her throat; that she informed the nurse of her difficulty in swallowing and explained that it felt like she had a lump in her throat; that the nurse replied it was the ties on the vessels in the tonsil area which were causing the difficulty; that she was not directed to return, but due to the fact that her throat was giving her considerable difficulty, towards the latter part of August, 1945, she called on the phone and asked to talk to the defendant, but was informed he was busy; that she talked with the nurse and in this telephone conversation she informed the nurse her throat was sore; that she overheard the nurse tell the defendant that she, the nurse, had observed an ulcer in her throat and she heard the defendant reply to the nurse to have plaintiff return for further treatment; that the defendant examined her throat, told plaintiff there was a little drainage from the head and tonsil area which wag causing her throat irritation, treated her sinuses and pre *390 scribed a mouth wash; that she was not instructed to return, but about every three or four weeks after that for a period of about a year and a half she went to see the defendant; that in October, 1947, she had an ulcer on the side of her tongue which was medicated and defendant had a blood sample taken for analysis for possible cancer; that during the three-year period of time her throat was sore and she was treated largely for sinus trouble, although prior to the operation she had never had any sinus disorder; that the last time she went to the clinic for treatment was on June 29, 1948.

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Bluebook (online)
227 P.2d 772, 119 Utah 385, 1951 Utah LEXIS 135, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fredrickson-v-maw-utah-1951.