Fredricks v. NINAMARIE FOLLACARO

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedFebruary 9, 2021
Docket1:21-cv-00553
StatusUnknown

This text of Fredricks v. NINAMARIE FOLLACARO (Fredricks v. NINAMARIE FOLLACARO) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fredricks v. NINAMARIE FOLLACARO, (S.D.N.Y. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK NIGEL NAGUAN FREDERICKS, Plaintiff, 21-CV-00553 (LLS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND JOHN DOES; JOHN DOES, Defendants. LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge: Plaintiff, currently incarcerated in the Manhattan Detention Complex (MDC), brings this pro se action under the Court’s federal question jurisdiction, alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights. By order dated January 22, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (IFP).1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret

them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing

the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff alleges that he entered the custody of the New York City Department of Correction (DOC) on August 2, 2019. Although Plaintiff made multiple requests to see a dentist, he did not see one until January 5, 2021. It is not clear what if any treatment was provided at that time. Plaintiff alleges that he has a “hole” in his wisdom tooth, which “doesn’t bother” him currently but “will at some point eventually.” (ECF 2 ¶ V.) According to Plaintiff, a female member of the dental staff told him that she had “been trying to call [him] to dental because she [had] been receiving [his] sick call requests.” (ECF 2 ¶¶ 2, 5, 11.) Plaintiff further asserts that

since entering DOC custody he has not had a checkup or had bloodwork done, and he is “having trouble . . . getting the proper treatment” he is requesting. (Id. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff asserts that he needs discovery to identify the proper defendants to name. Plaintiff seeks money damages. DISCUSSION The Court construes the complaint as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). A. Medical Care Claim If Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the time of the events giving rise to his claims, his claims arise under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. If he was a convicted

prisoner, his claims arise under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 n.16 (1979); Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017). Whether Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or convicted prisoner, he must satisfy two elements to state such a claim: (1) an “objective” element, which requires a showing that the challenged conditions are sufficiently serious, and (2) a “mental” element, which requires a showing that the officer acted with at least deliberate indifference to the challenged conditions. Darnell, 849 F.3d at 29. The objective element of a deliberate indifference claim is the same for pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners – “the inmate must show that the conditions, either alone or in combination, pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health” or safety, which “includes the risk of serious damage to ‘physical and mental soundness.’” Id. at 30 (internal citations omitted); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994) (“A prison official’s ‘deliberate indifference’ to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth

Amendment.”). “[P]rison officials violate the Constitution when they deprive an inmate of his basic human needs such as food, clothing, medical care, and safe and sanitary living conditions.” Walker v, Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 125 (2d Cir, 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). The second element – the “subjective” or “mental” element – varies depending on whether a plaintiff is a pretrial detainee or convicted prisoner.

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Related

Bell v. Wolfish
441 U.S. 520 (Supreme Court, 1979)
Daniels v. Williams
474 U.S. 327 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Davidson v. Cannon
474 U.S. 344 (Supreme Court, 1986)
West v. Atkins
487 U.S. 42 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Walker v. Schult
717 F.3d 119 (Second Circuit, 2013)
Farmer v. Brennan
511 U.S. 825 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Darnell v. City of New York
849 F.3d 17 (Second Circuit, 2017)
Cuoco v. Moritsugu
222 F.3d 99 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Abbas v. Dixon
480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Dean v. Coughlin
804 F.2d 207 (Second Circuit, 1986)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)

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Bluebook (online)
Fredricks v. NINAMARIE FOLLACARO, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fredricks-v-ninamarie-follacaro-nysd-2021.