Fredericks v. Louisiana Farm Bureau

534 So. 2d 139, 1988 La. App. LEXIS 2340, 1988 WL 119037
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedNovember 9, 1988
DocketNo. 87-832
StatusPublished

This text of 534 So. 2d 139 (Fredericks v. Louisiana Farm Bureau) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fredericks v. Louisiana Farm Bureau, 534 So. 2d 139, 1988 La. App. LEXIS 2340, 1988 WL 119037 (La. Ct. App. 1988).

Opinion

DOUCET, Judge.

Plaintiffs on this appeal, Fred Frederick and Elizabeth Smith Frederick, assert that the amount of general damages awarded by the jury is manifestly inadequate. Defendant, Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, maintains that the jury did not abuse its discretion in determining the award. Defendants admitted liability; therefore, liability is not an issue before us on appeal. After trial, the jury awarded $32,500 in general damages to Mrs. Frederick. We find no abuse of discretion by the jury and affirm its award.

The plaintiffs filed this suit against Ralph Hardy and the Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company for damages arising from an automobile accident which occurred on August 11,1984 on Louisiana Highway 165 near Iowa, in Jefferson Davis Parish. Fred Frederick was driving an automobile south on Highway 165, and [140]*140his wife, Elizabeth Smith Frederick, was a passenger in the right front seat. A pickup truck being driven north on the same highway by Myron Hardy, minor son of Ralph Hardy, abruptly made a left turn into a private drive directly in front of the Frederick vehicle, causing an accident in which the Fredericks were injured.

At trial, Louisiana Farm Bureau stipulated to liability and to coverage in favor of Ralph Hardy, and the lawsuit was dismissed against Ralph Hardy personally, and proceeded to be tried against Louisiana Farm Bureau on the issue of quantum only.

The jury rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The judgment was read and signed in Chambers on April 15, 1987. Since that time, all judgments have been satisfied except the judgment in favor of Mrs. Frederick.

The jury awarded Mrs. Frederick $14,-120.00 in special damages which included $12,820.00 in outstanding medical bills, $1,000.00 for travel expenses, and $300.00 for future medical expenses. The jury also awarded her $32,500.00 for general damages. From this award of general damages, the plaintiffs perfected this appeal, asserting that these damages are manifestly inadequate.

Plaintiffs assert in their specification of error that the jury award of general damages to Mrs. Frederick was so low and contrary to the evidence that it constituted an abuse of discretion. We disagree.

LSA-C.C. art. 2324.1 provides:

“In assessment of damages in cases of offenses, quasi offenses, and quasi contracts, much discretion must be left to the judge or jury.”

The standard to be applied by a Court of Appeal in reviewing a damage award of a trial court is clearly set out in the case of Taylor v. Dupree, 484 So.2d 986 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1986) writ denied 488 So.2d 201, in which this court stated:

“It is well established that before a reviewing court can disturb an award made by a trial court, the record must clearly show that the trier of fact abused its discretion in making its award. Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc., 341 So.2d 332 (La.1976); Reck v. Stevens, 373 So.2d 498 (La.1979). In Coco, the Supreme Court stated:
“Only after making the finding that the record supports that the lower court abused its much discretion can the appellate court disturb the award, and then only to the extent of lowering it (or raising it) to the highest (or lowest) point which is reasonably within the discretion afforded that court. [Citations omitted.] It is never appropriate for a Court of Appeal, having found that the trial court has abused its discretion, simply to decide what it considers an appropriate award on the basis of the evidence.
Since the-jury does have great discretion in setting damages, the proper test for whether a quantum award can be upheld revolves around a determination of whether the facts and circumstances peculiar to this case and this individual, interpreted in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, reasonably support the jury’s decision. Schexnayder v. Carpenter, 346 So.2d 196 (La.1977); Reck, supra.”

Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, we find no abuse of discretion by the jury in its award of $32,-500.00 in general damages for injuries sustained by Mrs. Frederick as a result of the automobile accident in question.

The accident occurred early in the evening on August 11, 1984. Mrs. Frederick was unconscious for several minutes after the accident and was taken to the hospital by ambulance, arriving at 6:30 p.m. that evening. She was hospitalized overnight, released from the hospital the next morning, and was back at her home by 11:00 a.m.

Dr. Paul Comeaux, the plaintiffs’ family physician, examined Mrs. Frederick at the hospital on August 12, 1984 and diagnosed her as having multiple contusions, cervical strain, mild concussion, amnesia regarding the accident, and some muscle spasm at the [141]*141C6-7 level of the spine. He also examined her in his office on August 13, 1984 and found that she “was feeling a lot better.” He saw her again on August 15, 1984 and stated that she complained of memory loss for the accident itself, some dizziness, some soreness of the right neck, headaches, and some nausea from prescribed medication. He further stated that, at that time, he did not expect her tp have any permanent disability.

Mrs. Frederick was again hospitalized from August 17, 1984 through August 19, 1984. A CAT scan was done on her at that time and she was examined by Dr. John Raggio, a neurosurgeon. He stated by way of deposition that her neurological examination and her CAT scan were both normal, and that he thought there was a possibility of a cerebral contusion. He saw her again on August 27, 1984 and found her neurological exam on that day to be normal. She was seen again on September 7, 1984 and her neurological exam was again found to be normal. On that date Dr. Raggio diagnosed her as having a cerebral contusion, or bruising of the brain. He stated that Mrs. Frederick also complained of generalized aches and pains. At that time Dr. Raggio didn’t think she would suffer any residual permanent disability.

A Myelogram was performed on Mrs. Frederick on October 7, 1986, and Dr. Rag-gio reviewed the film of the Myelogram and felt it was within the normal range for a woman of that age (35 years old). He also stated that in his experience, cervical surgery was “90 to 95 percent effective at relieving symptoms.”

Dr. Stanley Kordisch, Mrs. Frederick’s obstetrician and gynecologist, testified by way of deposition that Mrs. Frederick had been his patient since April 28, 1983. He examined her on October 17, 1984 (about two months after the accident), and at that time she complained of some occasional stiffness in her neck and some decreased short term memory as a result of the accident. He referred her to Dr. Shamieh, a neurologist.

Dr. Kordisch further testified that Mrs. Frederick became pregnant in January of 1985 and that he examined her many times throughout the pregnancy until the birth of her child in September of 1985. He stated that he had no record or recollection of her complaining about neck pain during the entire term of her pregnancy.

The deposition of Dr. Fayez Shamieh, a neurologist, was read into the record. Dr. Shamieh first saw Mrs. Frederick on November 8, 1984. He performed a neurological examination of her which he stated did not reveal anything significent except “some tenderness over the neck muscles and discomfort with movement.” Dr. Shamieh prescribed medication for Mrs.

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Related

Toups v. TG & Y. STORES CO.
488 So. 2d 296 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1986)
Taylor v. Dupree
484 So. 2d 986 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1986)
Roy v. Commercial Union Ins. Co.
486 So. 2d 251 (Louisiana Court of Appeal, 1986)
Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc.
341 So. 2d 332 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1977)
Schexnayder v. Carpenter
346 So. 2d 196 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1977)
Reck v. Stevens
373 So. 2d 498 (Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1979)

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534 So. 2d 139, 1988 La. App. LEXIS 2340, 1988 WL 119037, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fredericks-v-louisiana-farm-bureau-lactapp-1988.