Frederick Pitchford v. John E. Potter

Eighth Circuit

Frederick Pitchford v. John E. Potter

72 F. App'x 506

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

DecidedAugust 7, 2003

Docket03-1282

StatusUnpublished

This text of 72 F. App'x 506 (Frederick Pitchford v. John E. Potter) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Frederick Pitchford v. John E. Potter, 72 F. App'x 506 (8th Cir. 2003).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Frederick L. Pitchford appeals the district court’s 1 adverse grant of summary judgment in his employment-discrimination action, in which he alleged that the United States Postal Service (USPS) retaliated against him for previous protected activity and discriminated against him because of his race by reducing his work hours and by not converting a full-time position into two part-time positions. We affirm.

We review de novo the grant of summary judgment, viewing the record in the light most favorable to Pitchford. See Jacob-Mua v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 517, 520 (8th Cir.2002). We conclude that Pitch-ford failed to establish a prima facie case of either race discrimination or retaliation. See Taylor v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 251 F.3d 735, 740 (8th Cir.2001) (elements of race-discrimination claim); Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1134, 1136 (8th Cir.) (elements of retaliation claim), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 818, 120 S.Ct. 59,145 L.Ed.2d 51 (1999). His reduction of hours did not constitute an adverse employment action, given that he had refused offers of other work that would have provided him with the same number of hours. See Jones v. Fitzgerald, 285 F.3d 705, 714 (8th Cir.2002) (transfer or reassignment that involves only minor changes in working conditions and does not involve reduction in pay or benefits is not adverse action). Further, as to the race-discrimination claim, Pitchford failed to show that similarly situated employees who were not members of the protected group were treated differently; and as to the retaliation claim, Pitchford failed to show a causal connection between his protected activity and the reduction of his hours. Even if Pitchford established prima facie cases, he offered no evidence that USPS’s reason for reducing his hours — complying with the 1996 budget — was untrue and that race discrimination or retaliation was the real reason. See Rose-Maston v. NME Hosp., Inc., 133 F.3d 1104, 1108 (8th Cir.1998) (plaintiff *508 may prove pretext by showing that employer was more likely motivated by discriminatory reason or that employer’s explanation is not worthy of credence).

Accordingly, we affirm.

1

. The Honorable James M. Moody, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas.

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PER CURIAM.

Frederick L. Pitchford appeals the district court’s 1 adverse grant of summary judgment in his employment-discrimination action, in which he alleged that the United States Postal Service (USPS) retaliated against him for previous protected activity and discriminated against him because of his race by reducing his work hours and by not converting a full-time position into two part-time positions. We affirm.

We review de novo the grant of summary judgment, viewing the record in the light most favorable to Pitchford. See Jacob-Mua v. Veneman, 289 F.3d 517, 520 (8th Cir.2002). We conclude that Pitch-ford failed to establish a prima facie case of either race discrimination or retaliation. See Taylor v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 251 F.3d 735, 740 (8th Cir.2001) (elements of race-discrimination claim); Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1134, 1136 (8th Cir.) (elements of retaliation claim), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 818, 120 S.Ct. 59,145 L.Ed.2d 51 (1999). His reduction of hours did not constitute an adverse employment action, given that he had refused offers of other work that would have provided him with the same number of hours. See Jones v. Fitzgerald, 285 F.3d 705, 714 (8th Cir.2002) (transfer or reassignment that involves only minor changes in working conditions and does not involve reduction in pay or benefits is not adverse action). Further, as to the race-discrimination claim, Pitchford failed to show that similarly situated employees who were not members of the protected group were treated differently; and as to the retaliation claim, Pitchford failed to show a causal connection between his protected activity and the reduction of his hours. Even if Pitchford established prima facie cases, he offered no evidence that USPS’s reason for reducing his hours — complying with the 1996 budget — was untrue and that race discrimination or retaliation was the real reason. See Rose-Maston v. NME Hosp., Inc., 133 F.3d 1104, 1108 (8th Cir.1998) (plaintiff *508 may prove pretext by showing that employer was more likely motivated by discriminatory reason or that employer’s explanation is not worthy of credence).

Accordingly, we affirm.

1

. The Honorable James M. Moody, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas.

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72 F. App'x 506, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/frederick-pitchford-v-john-e-potter-ca8-2003.

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