Case: 18-12037 Date Filed: 04/23/2019 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 18-12037 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cv-24758-MGC
FREDDIE LEE WILSON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, STATE OF FLORIDA ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondents-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ________________________
(April 23, 2019)
Before WILSON, NEWSOM, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 18-12037 Date Filed: 04/23/2019 Page: 2 of 7
Freddie Lee Wilson, a Florida state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging
his conviction for second-degree murder and sentence of 35 years’ imprisonment.
Wilson’s § 2254 petition states four grounds for relief, alleging that his trial
counsel provided ineffective representation in failing to: (1) obtain a second
medical examiner’s opinion regarding the victim’s cause of death; (2) inform
Wilson of defenses to the charge against him, rendering his guilty plea involuntary;
(3) argue any defenses on Wilson’s behalf; and (4) argue that, because the killing
occurred in the “heat of passion,” Wilson was guilty only of manslaughter.
When reviewing a district court’s denial of a § 2254 petition, we review de
novo mixed questions of law and fact—including claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel. Pardo v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 587 F.3d 1093, 1098 (11th Cir.
2009) (citations omitted). But de novo does not mean without deference. For one
thing, as explained in Strickland v. Washington, our analysis of Wilson’s
ineffectiveness claim is “highly deferential” and includes a “strong presumption”
that counsel provided reasonable professional assistance. 466 U.S. 668, 689
(1984). For another, because the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 applies to Wilson’s petition, we may not grant relief unless the state court’s
conclusions (1) were contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly
established federal law or (2) resulted in a decision based on an unreasonable
2 Case: 18-12037 Date Filed: 04/23/2019 Page: 3 of 7
determination of the facts given the evidence presented in the state court
proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Here as well, our review is “highly deferential.”
Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7 (1997). Thus, the Supreme Court has said
that when a Strickland claim is part of a dispute subject to the AEDPA, our review
is “doubly” deferential. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011). It will
therefore be a “rare case” in which an ineffective-assistance claim, denied on the
merits in state court, is found to warrant relief in a federal habeas proceeding.
Gissendaner v. Seabolt, 735 F.3d 1311, 1323 (11th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).
This is not such a case. To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, Williams
must show not only that his attorney made errors so serious that she ceased to
function as the counsel that the Sixth Amendment guarantees, but also that the
errors prejudiced his defense. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985);
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.1
One last point before turning to the merits: because the final state court
opinion does not explain that court’s rationale for affirming the prior opinion, we
“look through” its decision to the “last reasoned opinion” and assume that the final
state court adopted the lower court’s reasoning. Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188,
1192, 1194 (2018). When we do so, we conclude that the state court reasonably
1 If Williams makes an insufficient showing on the prejudice prong, we need not address the performance prong, and vice versa. Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). 3 Case: 18-12037 Date Filed: 04/23/2019 Page: 4 of 7
assessed the facts relating to each of Wilson’s ineffectiveness of assistance claims
and reasonably applied federal law in deciding that Williams failed to carry his
burden of proof. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
I
Addressing Wilson’s first claim—that his attorney was ineffective in failing
to obtain the testimony of another medical examiner—the state court found that
Wilson did not indicate how a second medical examiner’s testimony would have
demonstrated that he was guilty of manslaughter rather than second-degree murder.
This determination was reasonable in light of the facts before the court; it was also
consistent with federal law. Although Wilson gestures toward the possibility of his
victim having a pre-existing condition, he offered the state court no evidence
showing why another medical examiner would review the evidence from the
incident—which indicated that the victim had been kicked and punched in the
chest, bled out internally, and been left dead for several days—and reach a
different conclusion than the first medical examiner. As for federal law,
ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be proven via conclusory assertion—see,
e.g., Boyd v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 697 F.3d 1320, 1333–34 (11th Cir.
2012)—but that is all Wilson offered. The federal district court was therefore
correct in upholding the state court’s determination.
4 Case: 18-12037 Date Filed: 04/23/2019 Page: 5 of 7
The state court consolidated its discussion of Wilson’s second and third
claims. This was reasonable, because both claims argued that Wilson’s counsel
was ineffective for failing to reveal to him, or raise at trial, various defenses to
Wilson’s charge of second-degree murder. Wilson asserts that had he known of
these defenses, he would not have pleaded guilty.
The state court responded that it was incumbent on Wilson to provide his
attorney with adequate information to enable her to identify feasible defenses. On
the one hand, this is not necessarily how we would have chosen to address
Wilson’s claims. After all, Wilson has also stated that counsel told him that none
of his possible defenses would be meritorious—indicating that his attorney did not
stonewall Wilson so much as recognize and communicate to him the likely futility
of any defenses. On the other hand, and more importantly, our preferred approach
is just that—a preference. Wilson must show that the state court made an error that
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Case: 18-12037 Date Filed: 04/23/2019 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 18-12037 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cv-24758-MGC
FREDDIE LEE WILSON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, STATE OF FLORIDA ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondents-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ________________________
(April 23, 2019)
Before WILSON, NEWSOM, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 18-12037 Date Filed: 04/23/2019 Page: 2 of 7
Freddie Lee Wilson, a Florida state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the
district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging
his conviction for second-degree murder and sentence of 35 years’ imprisonment.
Wilson’s § 2254 petition states four grounds for relief, alleging that his trial
counsel provided ineffective representation in failing to: (1) obtain a second
medical examiner’s opinion regarding the victim’s cause of death; (2) inform
Wilson of defenses to the charge against him, rendering his guilty plea involuntary;
(3) argue any defenses on Wilson’s behalf; and (4) argue that, because the killing
occurred in the “heat of passion,” Wilson was guilty only of manslaughter.
When reviewing a district court’s denial of a § 2254 petition, we review de
novo mixed questions of law and fact—including claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel. Pardo v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 587 F.3d 1093, 1098 (11th Cir.
2009) (citations omitted). But de novo does not mean without deference. For one
thing, as explained in Strickland v. Washington, our analysis of Wilson’s
ineffectiveness claim is “highly deferential” and includes a “strong presumption”
that counsel provided reasonable professional assistance. 466 U.S. 668, 689
(1984). For another, because the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 applies to Wilson’s petition, we may not grant relief unless the state court’s
conclusions (1) were contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly
established federal law or (2) resulted in a decision based on an unreasonable
2 Case: 18-12037 Date Filed: 04/23/2019 Page: 3 of 7
determination of the facts given the evidence presented in the state court
proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Here as well, our review is “highly deferential.”
Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7 (1997). Thus, the Supreme Court has said
that when a Strickland claim is part of a dispute subject to the AEDPA, our review
is “doubly” deferential. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011). It will
therefore be a “rare case” in which an ineffective-assistance claim, denied on the
merits in state court, is found to warrant relief in a federal habeas proceeding.
Gissendaner v. Seabolt, 735 F.3d 1311, 1323 (11th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).
This is not such a case. To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, Williams
must show not only that his attorney made errors so serious that she ceased to
function as the counsel that the Sixth Amendment guarantees, but also that the
errors prejudiced his defense. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985);
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.1
One last point before turning to the merits: because the final state court
opinion does not explain that court’s rationale for affirming the prior opinion, we
“look through” its decision to the “last reasoned opinion” and assume that the final
state court adopted the lower court’s reasoning. Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188,
1192, 1194 (2018). When we do so, we conclude that the state court reasonably
1 If Williams makes an insufficient showing on the prejudice prong, we need not address the performance prong, and vice versa. Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). 3 Case: 18-12037 Date Filed: 04/23/2019 Page: 4 of 7
assessed the facts relating to each of Wilson’s ineffectiveness of assistance claims
and reasonably applied federal law in deciding that Williams failed to carry his
burden of proof. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
I
Addressing Wilson’s first claim—that his attorney was ineffective in failing
to obtain the testimony of another medical examiner—the state court found that
Wilson did not indicate how a second medical examiner’s testimony would have
demonstrated that he was guilty of manslaughter rather than second-degree murder.
This determination was reasonable in light of the facts before the court; it was also
consistent with federal law. Although Wilson gestures toward the possibility of his
victim having a pre-existing condition, he offered the state court no evidence
showing why another medical examiner would review the evidence from the
incident—which indicated that the victim had been kicked and punched in the
chest, bled out internally, and been left dead for several days—and reach a
different conclusion than the first medical examiner. As for federal law,
ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be proven via conclusory assertion—see,
e.g., Boyd v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 697 F.3d 1320, 1333–34 (11th Cir.
2012)—but that is all Wilson offered. The federal district court was therefore
correct in upholding the state court’s determination.
4 Case: 18-12037 Date Filed: 04/23/2019 Page: 5 of 7
The state court consolidated its discussion of Wilson’s second and third
claims. This was reasonable, because both claims argued that Wilson’s counsel
was ineffective for failing to reveal to him, or raise at trial, various defenses to
Wilson’s charge of second-degree murder. Wilson asserts that had he known of
these defenses, he would not have pleaded guilty.
The state court responded that it was incumbent on Wilson to provide his
attorney with adequate information to enable her to identify feasible defenses. On
the one hand, this is not necessarily how we would have chosen to address
Wilson’s claims. After all, Wilson has also stated that counsel told him that none
of his possible defenses would be meritorious—indicating that his attorney did not
stonewall Wilson so much as recognize and communicate to him the likely futility
of any defenses. On the other hand, and more importantly, our preferred approach
is just that—a preference. Wilson must show that the state court made an error that
“was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and
comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded
disagreement.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103. And a difference in approach hardly
amounts to an indisputable error. In addition, and in any case, Wilson’s second
and third claims are as conclusory as the first. Wilson does not indicate how or
why these defenses could have weakened the evidence against him—we are simply
told that they would. Therefore, even if we were to agree that his counsel was
5 Case: 18-12037 Date Filed: 04/23/2019 Page: 6 of 7
insufficiently communicative, Wilson will still have failed to meet his burden of
demonstrating prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The district court was again
correct to uphold the state court’s decision.
Finally, Wilson’s fourth claim concentrates on the particular defense of
“heat of passion.” Wilson contends that his counsel was ineffective in failing to
raise this mitigating defense. The state court rejected this claim because, during
Wilson’s plea colloquy, he stated that he had adequate time to discuss his case with
his attorney and understood the nature and consequences of the plea agreement.
The state court also noted that Wilson faced life imprisonment as a Prison Release
Reoffender when he chose to accept the plea agreement.
Wilson has not shown why the “heat of passion” defense would have been
viable given the evidence before the state court, or why the state court’s
determination was contrary to federal law. He identifies cases in which we have
found that a counsel’s poor advice amounted to deficient performance, but does not
provide adequate facts to support the contention that his counsel’s advice was
similarly lacking. We do not doubt, for example, that Wilson and the victim had a
“turbulent relationship,” Doc. 13 at 23, but that fact alone does not demonstrate the
viability of a “heat of passion” defense, and Wilson provides no further
information that would suggest his counsel erred in recommending he avoid
risking life imprisonment. The state court’s decision was therefore neither
6 Case: 18-12037 Date Filed: 04/23/2019 Page: 7 of 7
contrary to federal law nor an unreasonable application of that law in light of the
evidence presented, as the district court correctly concluded.
II
The district court here correctly determined that Wilson was not eligible for
habeas relief because the state court reasonably assessed the facts, and reasonably
applied federal law applicable to Wilson’s ineffective assistance claims. Under
AEDPA, the district court’s denial of Wilson’s petition was therefore proper. See
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.