Freddie D. Smith v. Griffin Bell, Individually and as Attorney General of the United States

Fifth Circuit

Freddie D. Smith v. Griffin Bell, Individually and as Attorney General of the United States

588 F.2d 169, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 17492

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

DecidedJanuary 18, 1979

Docket78-2741

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 588 F.2d 169 (Freddie D. Smith v. Griffin Bell, Individually and as Attorney General of the United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Freddie D. Smith v. Griffin Bell, Individually and as Attorney General of the United States, 588 F.2d 169, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 17492 (5th Cir. 1979).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Appellant, Freddie D. Smith, attacks a denial of parole on a number of grounds. Appellant alleges that the Parole Commission and its officials improperly denied his release on parole by: (1) not giving reasons for such a denial and a summary of the information relied upon; (2) failing to release him in May of 1977, his “presumptive parole date” as set by a parole panel in May, 1975; (3) failing to follow the directives of the sentencing court; and, (4) subjecting him to double jeopardy. In addition, appellant complains of prejudice by the United States Magistrate to whom the matter was referred for recommendations. On June 30, 1978, Judge Robert Hill adopted, modified and supplemented the recommendations of the magistrate. In this order denying the relief sought, Judge Hill dealt with the issues presented. For the reasons stated therein, we affirm. See 462 F.Supp. 55 (D.C.1978).

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PER CURIAM:

Appellant, Freddie D. Smith, attacks a denial of parole on a number of grounds. Appellant alleges that the Parole Commission and its officials improperly denied his release on parole by: (1) not giving reasons for such a denial and a summary of the information relied upon; (2) failing to release him in May of 1977, his “presumptive parole date” as set by a parole panel in May, 1975; (3) failing to follow the directives of the sentencing court; and, (4) subjecting him to double jeopardy. In addition, appellant complains of prejudice by the United States Magistrate to whom the matter was referred for recommendations. On June 30, 1978, Judge Robert Hill adopted, modified and supplemented the recommendations of the magistrate. In this order denying the relief sought, Judge Hill dealt with the issues presented. For the reasons stated therein, we affirm. See 462 F.Supp. 55 (D.C.1978).

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588 F.2d 169, 1979 U.S. App. LEXIS 17492, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/freddie-d-smith-v-griffin-bell-individually-and-as-attorney-general-of-ca5-1979.

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