Fred Taylor v. Mark Walker

2017 ME 218

• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
• Decided: November 28, 2017
• Status: Published

Opinion

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2017 ME 218 Docket: And-17-16 Submitted On Briefs: June 29, 2017 Decided: November 28, 2017

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. Majority: SAUFLEY, C.J., and MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. Concurrence/ Dissent: ALEXANDER, J.

FRED TAYLOR et al.

v.

MARK WALKER

JABAR, J.

[¶1] Fred and Eleanor Taylor appeal from a judgment of the Superior

Court (Androscoggin County, MG Kennedy, J.) vacating the District Court’s

(Lewiston, Oram, J.) order denying Mark Walker’s motion to set aside a small

claims judgment entered in the District Court (Ende, J.). Although the appeal is

interlocutory, given the legislative direction that small claims matters proceed

expeditiously, see 14 M.R.S. § 7481 (2016); M.R.S.C.P. 1, we address the appeal

pursuant to the judicial economy exception and remand for further

proceedings. 2

I. BACKGROUND

[¶2] The following facts are set forth in the record. See M.R. Civ. P. 76F(a).

The Taylors are homeowners residing in Auburn. Walker is the president of an

insulation installation company. In the spring of 2015, the Taylors contracted

with Walker’s company to install foam insulation in their home. The Taylors

allege that the job was done unsatisfactorily and that the method Walker’s

company used to install the insulation damaged the home’s roof and siding. The

Taylors subsequently initiated a small claims action in the District Court against

Walker seeking damages of $4,256 plus costs. A hearing on the Taylors’

statement of claim was scheduled for July 5, 2016.

[¶3] On the day of the hearing, Walker failed to appear, and the court

(Ende, J.) entered a default judgment in favor of the Taylors. Later that same

day, Walker submitted to the court a letter in which he alleged that he had

appeared at the wrong courthouse, and when he realized his mistake, he made

efforts to get to the hearing in a timely fashion. In his letter, Walker alleged that

he finally arrived at the correct location approximately two-and-a-half-hours

after the hearing was scheduled to begin. The District Court accepted the letter 3

as a motion to set aside the default judgment1 and in a handwritten order,

without conducting a hearing, the court (Oram, J.)2 denied that motion. The

court’s order states in pertinent part, “After considering the filings, [Walker’s]

motion to set aside default is denied.”

[¶4] Walker subsequently appealed to the Superior Court. See M.R.S.C.P.

11(a). The Superior Court vacated the District Court’s order denying Walker’s

motion to set aside the default judgment. It made factual findings, entered an

order setting aside the default, and remanded the matter to the District Court

for a hearing on the Taylors’ underlying claims. In its judgment, without

hearing from Walker and the Taylors, the Superior Court made various factual

findings and credibility determinations, found that the circumstances

described in Walker’s motion to set aside the default judgment constituted

excusable neglect, and therefore concluded that the District Court abused its

discretion in denying his motion. M.R.S.C.P. 9; M.R. Civ. P. 60(b). The Taylors

then filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Superior Court denied. See

M.R. Civ. P. 59(e). They now appeal from the order setting aside the default.

1 M.R.S.C.P. 9, the rule governing motions to set aside small claims judgments, incorporates the

provisions of M.R. Civ. P. 60.

2 It is not clear from the record why the District Court judge who presided over the small claims

trial list was not the judge who acted on Walker’s motion to set aside the default. 4

II. DISCUSSION

A. Process for Appealing Small Claims Judgments

[¶5] The Superior Court has limited and specific authority when a small

claims matter is appealed. See 4 M.R.S. § 105(3)(B)(2) (2016); 14 M.R.S.

§ 7484-A(1) (2016); M.R.S.C.P. 11(d). If a defendant appeals and seeks a trial

of the facts, the defendant must include a jury trial request and pay the required

fee for a jury trial in the Superior Court. See M.R.S.C.P. 11(d)(2); Revised Court

Fees Schedule and Document Management Procedures, Me. Admin. Order

JB-05-26 (as amended by A. 7-16), § I(A)(3) (effective July 29, 2016). However,

a plaintiff, having chosen the small claims forum, may appeal only on questions

of law and cannot appeal and request another trial of the facts. See M.R.S.C.P.

11(d)(1).

[¶6] A party may appeal a small claims order to the Superior Court to

raise issues of law or, as is the case here, to challenge an exercise of discretion

not related to the court’s factual findings on the substance of a motion. See

M.R.S.C.P. 11(d)(1)-(2). Thus, although the Superior Court may not decide facts

in a small claim appeal when acting in a purely appellate capacity, the court may

review challenges to the District Court’s application of the law or, in rare

circumstances, the Superior Court may review the District Court’s exercise of 5

discretion in a making a determination that is not related to the trial of facts on

the merits of the claim. See id.

B. Final Judgment Rule

[¶7] Here, Walker appealed from the District Court’s exercise of

discretion in denying his motion to set aside the default. Thus, the Superior

Court’s authority was purely on questions of law. Nonetheless, it made

independent factual findings, vacated the District Court’s order, and remanded

the matter for a trial on the substance of the complaint.

[¶8] The matter is not yet final because there is further action to be taken

in the District Court. Griswold v. Town of Denmark, 2007 ME 93, ¶ 17, 927 A.2d

410. Therefore, the appeal to us is interlocutory and is not ripe for appellate

review unless an exception to the final judgment rule applies. See Doggett v.

Town of Gouldsboro, 2002 ME 175, ¶ 8, 812 A.2d 256 (“We have regularly held

that appeals from court orders remanding a matter to another court . . . for

further action are interlocutory appeals . . . .”); Aubry v. Town of Mt. Desert,

2010 ME 111, ¶ 5, 10 A.3d 662; Fiber Materials, Inc. v. Subilia, 2009 ME 71,

¶¶ 12-13, 974 A.2d 918. “A party urging that we reach the merits of an

otherwise interlocutory appeal has the burden of demonstrating to us that one 6

of th[e] exceptions to the final judgment rule justifies our reaching the merits

of the appeal.” Sanborn v. Sanborn, 2005 ME 95, ¶ 6, 877 A.2d 1075.

[¶9] Because the Superior Court’s authority did not extend to deciding

the facts related to the motion to set aside default, and because of the unique

and expedited nature of a small claims matter, see 14 M.R.S. § 7481; M.R.S.C.P. 1,

we conclude that the judicial economy exception applies. Accordingly, rather

than simply dismissing the matter without comment, we address the authority

of the Superior Court and the process on remand.

C. Superior Court Authority and Remand

[¶10] As noted above, the Superior Court vacated the District Court’s

order denying Walker’s motion to set aside the default judgment and entered

judgment in Walker’s favor on that motion. In doing so, the Superior Court

made certain factual findings that exceeded its authority and vacated an

exercise of the District Court’s discretion based on the facts that it found

independently, without the authority for fact finding or a record upon which to

review the facts. The District Court was authorized to deny the motion without

a hearing upon concluding that the facts alleged in Walker’s motion, even if

proved, did not constitute excusable neglect for the purposes of M.R.

Civ. P. 60(b). See Laurel Bank & Tr. Co. v. Burns, 398 A.2d 41, 45 (Me. 1979) 7

(stating that a party seeking relief from judgment bears the burden of

presenting competent evidence demonstrating his entitlement to relief

pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)). Acting as the appellate tribunal here, the

Superior Court was not at liberty to independently make the factual findings

that formed the basis of its decision to grant Walker’s motion. Cf. Suzman v.

Comm’r, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 2005 ME 80, ¶ 24, 876 A.2d 29

(“Neither this Court nor the Superior Court, acting in an appellate capacity, is

free to make factual findings independent of those made by [an] agency . . . .”);

see also Sheepscot Land Corp. v. Gregory, 383 A.2d 16, 24 (Me. 1978) (“Whether

the default entry or default judgment resulted from factual circumstances

justifying relief is a question of fact and must be proven by evidence . . . .”).

[¶11] Thus, assuming that, as an appellate court, the Superior Court

identified an important factual allegation in the record before it that would

necessitate fact-finding, it should have exercised its appellate authority to

remand the matter to the District Court for an evidentiary hearing on the

motion to set aside the default.

[¶12] We therefore remand to the Superior Court with instructions to

determine whether the allegations set forth in Walker’s motion to set aside the

default necessitated an evidentiary hearing on the motion. If the Superior Court 8

determines that the District Court abused its discretion in deciding the motion

without a hearing, it will remand the matter to the District Court for a hearing

on Walker’s motion. If the Superior Court determines that the District Court

did not abuse its discretion in adjudicating the motion to set aside the default

without a hearing, the Superior Court must affirm the District Court’s denial of

the motion to set aside the default and affirm the judgment in favor of the

Taylors.

The entry is:

Order of the Superior Court vacated. The matter is remanded to the Superior Court with instructions to determine whether to remand the case to the District Court for an evidentiary hearing on the motion to set aside the default or to affirm the District Court’s judgment.

ALEXANDER, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part.

[¶13] I concur with the Court that we should reach the merits of this

interlocutory appeal, and I concur with the Court that the Superior Court’s

judgment on appeal from the District Court must be vacated. However, because

the record of information available to the District Court demonstrates that the

District Court acted within its discretion, I respectfully dissent from the Court’s 9

remanding for any further review of facts by the Superior Court or by the

District Court. Because error in the District Court’s order has not been

demonstrated on this appeal, the District Court’s judgment should be affirmed.

[¶14] Review of the record discloses the following facts, available to the

District Court when it reached its decision, that support the District Court’s

action after receiving Mark Walker’s letter. Fred and Eleanor Taylor initiated

the small claims action in the Lewiston District Court seeking damages of

$4,256 plus costs. A hearing on the Taylors’ statement of claim was scheduled

for July 5, 2016, at 8:30 a.m.

[¶15] On June 13, 2016, three weeks before the hearing date, a notice of

the hearing was sent to Walker at his Windham address. The notice specifically

stated that the hearing would be held at the Lewiston District Court, with the

court’s address prominently displayed in the middle of the page, set-off from

the rest of the text. The notice stated that the hearing was set for 8:30 a.m. and

warned Walker that failure to appear may result in a default judgment against

him. On July 5, Walker failed to appear, and the court (Ende, J.) entered a default

judgment in favor of the Taylors.

[¶16] Later on July 5, Walker submitted a letter to the Lewiston District

Court. In the letter, Walker alleged that he had (i) appeared at the Portland 10

District Court; (ii) called the Lewiston District Court at 9:08 a.m. “and was told

I could yet come to Lewiston”; (iii) found he had mislaid his car keys;

(iv) discovered that his car keys had been left at entry screening; (v) called the

“clerk” again, left Portland after 10:00 a.m., and arrived at Lewiston District

Court around 11:00 a.m. The letter provided no justification for Walker going

to Portland rather than Lewiston, as the notice had specifically directed him to

do, nor did the letter provide any justification for the apparent late arrival at

Portland.

[¶17] By letter to the District Court dated July 15, 2016, the Taylors

opposed reopening the hearing. The District Court treated Walker’s July 5

letter as a motion to set aside the default judgment.3 In an order dated July 26,

the court (Oram, J.) denied the motion. The court’s order states, in pertinent

part, “After considering the filings, [Walker’s] motion to set aside default is

denied.” In evaluating the motion, the court could have reasonably concluded,

based on its review of the letter and the court file, that even if the claims in

Walker’s letter were true, he was not entitled to relief.

3 M.R.S.C.P. 9, the rule governing motions to set aside small claims judgments, incorporates the

provisions of M.R. Civ. P. 60. 11

[¶18] There are many defaults and failures to appear in properly noticed

small claims proceedings and other minor civil actions. Acting without hearing

on post-judgment letters or motions seeking to excuse defaults in such minor

civil matters is frequent practice.4 Were the practice otherwise, final resolution

of such matters could be unduly delayed, and parties who did appear to

prosecute or defend such matters could be unduly burdened because of a

nonappearing party’s dilatory behavior or carelessness.

[¶19] As the Court’s opinion correctly notes: “The District Court was

authorized to deny the motion without a hearing upon concluding that the facts

alleged in Walker’s motion, even if proved, did not constitute excusable neglect

for the purposes of M.R. Civ. P. 60(b).” Court’s Opinion ¶ 10.

[¶20] In his July 5 letter to the District Court, Walker did not explain why

he went to Portland when the notice he received, in explicit terms, directed him

to the Lewiston District Court; and he did not explain why he arrived at the

Portland District Court clerk’s office after 9:00 a.m., when the noticed hearing

time was 8:30 a.m. The District Court was authorized to deny the motion

4 See M.R. Civ. P. 7(b)(7) (“Except as otherwise provided by law or these rules, after the opposition

is filed the court may in its discretion rule on the motion without hearing.”); M.R. Civ. P. 7(b)(5) (“The court may in its discretion deny a motion for reconsideration without hearing and before opposition is filed.”). 12

without a hearing upon concluding that the limited facts alleged in Walker’s

July 5 letter, even if they could have been proved at a hearing, did not constitute

excusable neglect for the purposes of M.R. Civ. P. 60(b). Too much was left

unexplained in Walker’s letter. See Laurel Bank & Tr. Co. v. Burns, 398 A.2d 41,

45 (Me. 1979) (stating that a party seeking relief from judgment bears the

burden of presenting competent evidence demonstrating his entitlement to

relief pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 60(b)).

[¶21] The trial court’s action, whether taken with or without a hearing,

is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. On appeal from the District Court to the

Superior Court, Walker, the party seeking to change the decision on appeal, had

the burden of persuasion to demonstrate error or, in this case, abuse of

discretion. See Beal v. Town of Stockton Springs, 2017 ME 6, ¶ 13, 153 A.3d 768;

Rossignol v. Me. Pub. Employees Ret. Sys., 2016 ME 115, ¶ 6, 144 A.3d 1175.

Walker had the burden to demonstrate that the District Court abused its

discretion in (i) not holding a hearing and (ii) denying Walker’s request to

reconsider and reopen the hearing.

[¶22] An abuse of discretion may be demonstrated when the record

indicates that a court, in discretionary decision-making: “(1) considers a factor

prohibited by law; (2) declines to consider a legally proper factor under a 13

mistaken belief that the factor cannot be considered; (3) acts or declines to act

based on a mistaken view of the law; or (4) expressly or implicitly finds facts

not supported by the record according to the clear error standard of review.”

Smith v. Rideout, 2010 ME 69, ¶ 13, 1 A.3d 441; Pettinelli v. Yost, 2007 ME 121,

¶ 11, 930 A.2d 1074.

[¶23] The limited record that Walker presented to the District Court

lacked explanation of critical facts relating to his disregard of the explicit notice

Walker received directing him when and where to appear. That record does

not demonstrate that the District Court abused its discretion in denying,

without hearing, Walker’s motion to strike the default conveyed by his letter of

July 5, 2016. Because no abuse of discretion has been demonstrated, the

District Court’s decision must be affirmed.

Adam R. Lee, Esq., Trafton, Matzen, Belleau & Frenette, LLP, Auburn, for appellants Fred and Eleanor Taylor

Mark W. Walker, appellee pro se

Androscoggin County Superior Court docket number AP-2016-11 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY