Fred Meyer Stores, Inc. v. Deboard (In re Deboard)

422 P.3d 322, 291 Or. App. 742
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
DecidedMay 16, 2018
DocketA159640
StatusPublished

This text of 422 P.3d 322 (Fred Meyer Stores, Inc. v. Deboard (In re Deboard)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fred Meyer Stores, Inc. v. Deboard (In re Deboard), 422 P.3d 322, 291 Or. App. 742 (Or. Ct. App. 2018).

Opinion

ARMSTRONG, P. J.

*743Although this workers' compensation case does not involve angels dancing on pin heads, it does involve dancing around medical terms and an emphasis on hyper-technicality that has unnecessarily delayed the resolution of what should have been a straight-forward new/omitted medical condition claim. And, unfortunately, in light of a change in the law since the board's order, we must once again extend this litigation by remanding the case for reconsideration.

The largely undisputed facts were described in our recent opinion involving an earlier claim by this same claimant, DeBoard v. Fred Meyer , 285 Or. App. 732, 397 P.3d 37, rev. den. , 361 Or. 885, 403 P.3d 770 (2017), and we summarize them here only as necessary for an understanding of the issues on review.

Claimant, who has worked for employer as a baker for 12 years, has a history of back injuries. In November 2012, claimant experienced acute pain in her mid-back while moving trays of bread and sought medical treatment. Employer accepted a claim for a disabling thoracic strain.

While the claim was still open, claimant had an MRI that a radiologist read to show a mild central T6-7 disc "protrusion" with mild spinal cord compression, a moderate right paracentral T7-8 disc "protrusion" with moderate spinal cord compression, and a slight right paracentral T8-9 disc "protrusion" with no spinal cord compression. Claimant filed a new/omitted medical condition claim, asking employer to accept a T6 disc protrusion, a T7-8 disc protrusion, and a T8-9 disc protrusion.

Employer denied the claim, and claimant requested a hearing. The medical evidence is *324undisputed that claimant suffers from a degenerative condition in three thoracic disc levels of her back. But medical experts offered differing views on the cause of claimant's degenerative disc condition, which they varyingly described as thoracic spondylosis, disc "protrusions" or disc "bulges." Dr. Arbeene, an orthopedic surgeon who examined claimant at employer's request, shared his view that, although doctors use the terms interchangeably, "protrusions" and "bulges" are technically different conditions, and that claimant's MRI was consistent with *744"bulges" rather than "protrusions." Arbeene also expressed the view that, although claimant's work might have contributed to her symptoms, the major contributing cause of the disc bulges was a degenerative process in claimant's back that was not work related. In July 2013, Arbeene concurred in a statement by employer's attorney that "[t]he disc protrusions and spondylosis have developed gradually over time and are not related to a specific identifiable event or injury." Arbeene later stated that, if he asked five doctors what they meant by "disc bulge" or "disc protrusion," he might get five different answers. He acknowledged that "bulge" and "protrusion" both describe abnormal disc pathology and "more often than not" are used interchangeably.

Dr. Bolstad, claimant's treating physician, used the terms "bulge" and "protrusion" interchangeably and stated that claimant's disc "protrusions" were caused by her work activities. Bolstad attributed claimant's need for treatment of the thoracic disc condition to her work injury.

Dr. Russo, a pain specialist, also was of the view that claimant had "disc bulges/protrusions" at three levels. He opined that her symptoms were in excess of what would be expected from "solely a pre-existing degenerative process," and believed that claimant's symptoms were caused by her work injury.

Based on Arbeene's opinion, employer amended its denial to reject claimant's new/omitted medical condition claim on both injury and occupational disease theories, explaining that "there is insufficient evidence these conditions are related to your [November 2012] injury."

The ALJ found Arbeene's opinion persuasive and upheld employer's denial. The ALJ was convinced by Arbeene's opinion that "protrusions" and "bulges" are distinct conditions and that claimant suffers from "bulges." The ALJ reasoned that, because claimant had sought acceptance of thoracic disc "protrusions," and those conditions were nonexistent, claimant had not established the existence of the new or omitted condition for which benefits were sought. Thus, claimant's request for acceptance of "protrusions" rather *745than "bulges" meant, in the ALJ's view, that claimant was seeking compensation for a condition that did not exist and, therefore, the claim was not compensable. See De Los-Santos v. Si Pac Enterprises, Inc. , 278 Or. App. 254, 257, 373 P.3d 1274, rev. den. , 360 Or. 422, 383 P.3d 857 (2016) (claimant bears the burden of proving the existence of a claimed new or omitted condition). That was the first unanticipated diversion on a claim in which neither party had questioned the existence of the condition for which claimant sought compensation, and the only issue was the condition's relationship to claimant's employment. In light of the ALJ's determination that claimant had not established the existence of the condition for which compensation was sought, the ALJ did not reach the question whether claimant's thoracic condition was caused by her employment.

Claimant attempted to persuade the board that the medical evidence showed that claimant suffered from a disc condition in her thoracic spine that was caused in material part by her employment and that the terminology used to describe the condition-"protrusion" or "bulge"-was inconsequential. But the board preferred the ALJ's approach and adopted it, with supplementation to address the compensability of the "claimed conditions":

"Even assuming that claimant established the existence of the claimed conditions * * * we would still conclude that the otherwise compensable injury was not the major contributing cause of the disability and need for treatment of the combined thoracic disc conditions. In reaching this conclusion, we are persuaded by the well-reasoned opinion of Dr. Arbeene that the *325preexisting condition was the major contributing cause of the disability and need for treatment of the combined conditions.

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Related

Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society v. Bonham
32 P.3d 899 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 2001)
Brown v. SAIF Corp.
391 P.3d 773 (Oregon Supreme Court, 2017)
Brown v. SAIF Corp.
325 P.3d 834 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 2014)
De Los-Santos v. Si Pac Enterprises, Inc.
373 P.3d 1274 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 2016)
DeBoard v. Meyer
397 P.3d 37 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 2017)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
422 P.3d 322, 291 Or. App. 742, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fred-meyer-stores-inc-v-deboard-in-re-deboard-orctapp-2018.