Frazier v. United States

• Court: United States Court of Federal Claims
• Decided: December 16, 2024
• Docket: 24-861
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

In the United States Court of Federal Claims No. 24-861C (Filed: December 16, 2024) NOT FOR PUBLICATION ************************************* NICHOLAS L. FRAZIER, * * Plaintiff, * * v. * * THE UNITED STATES, * * Defendant. * * ************************************* OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff Nicholas L. Frazier, proceeding pro se, raises claims arising from a 2019 car accident. See Compl. (ECF 1). He has moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, see Application (ECF 7), which is GRANTED. The government has moved to dismiss under RCFC 12(b)(1). Mot. to Dismiss (ECF 8). Plaintiff has not responded. The motion to dismiss is GRANTED. This Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction — its authority to pass judgment on the cases before it — is limited to specific types of claims, most commonly non-tort claims for money damages under the Tucker Act. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1); see also Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“The Court of Federal Claims is a court of limited jurisdiction.”). Perhaps confusingly for pro se litigants, it is not a forum for “federal claims” generally. Claims that are outside the Court’s jurisdiction must be dismissed. RCFC 12(h)(3). “In determining jurisdiction, a court must accept as true all undisputed facts asserted in the plaintiff’s complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d 1159, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 797 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). “Although a pro se plaintiff’s complaint is held to a less stringent standard than those prepared by counsel, pro se litigants are not excused from meeting jurisdictional requirements.” Spengler v. United States, 688 F. App’x 917, 920 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citations omitted) (citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980), and Kelley v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987)); see also Howard-Pinson v. United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 551, 553 (2006) (explaining that pro se litigants are “entitled to a liberal construction of [their] pleadings”) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972)). Plaintiff’s claims appear to be directed at officers and employees of the State of Georgia, and perhaps private parties. This Court has no jurisdiction over claims against defendants other than the United States, United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 588 (1941), which means that this Court cannot hear claims against “states, state officials, and state agencies.” Lawton v. United States, 621 F. App’x 671, 672 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 588). Plaintiff’s claims against private parties are outside this Court’s jurisdiction for the same reason. Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 588. Plaintiff may intend to challenge the decisions of Georgia state courts, but this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear collateral attacks on, or appeals from, the decisions of other courts. Vereda, Ltda. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d 378, 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Jones v. United States, 440 F. App’x 916, 918 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Robinson v. United States, 135 Fed. Cl. 556, 558 (2017).

CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss (ECF 8) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (ECF 7) is GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED. s/ Stephen S. Schwartz STEPHEN S. SCHWARTZ Judge

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