Frazier v. Bisignano

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: August 18, 2025
• Docket: 24-4621
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 18 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LUCIEN FRAZIER, No. 24-4621 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:23-cv-05819-MLP v. MEMORANDUM* FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Michelle L. Peterson, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted August 12, 2025 Seattle, Washington

Before: HAWKINS, McKEOWN, and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges.

Lucien Frazier appeals the district court’s decision affirming the

Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his application for disability insurance

benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s decision affirming the

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. agency’s denial of benefits, Miskey v. Kijakazi, 33 F.4th 565, 570 (9th Cir. 2022),

and must affirm if the agency’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and

free of legal error, Shaibi v. Berryhill, 883 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2017).

Frazier first contends that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) erred by

discounting the opinions of two physician assistants—Angela Minor and Omar

Gonzalez—regarding Frazier’s standing and walking limitations. Contrary to

Frazier’s contentions, the ALJ properly reviewed the opinions of P.A. Minor and

P.A. Gonzalez for “supportability” and “consistency.” See Woods v. Kijakazi, 32

F.4th 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2022). Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s

determination that their opinions were inconsistent with (1) their own notes and other

treatment records, which indicated that Frazier had a normal gait, did not require the

use of an assistive device, moved with ease, and did not present in acute distress; (2)

the opinions of three other physicians who, based on their reviews of Frazier’s full

medical records, determined that Frazier was less limited than P.A. Minor and P.A.

Gonzalez opined; and (3) Frazier’s reported daily activities. See id. at 792–93.

Because the ALJ’s determination is a rational interpretation of the evidence, we must

uphold it. See Terry v. Saul, 998 F.3d 1010, 1013 (9th Cir. 2021).

Frazier next contends that the ALJ impermissibly discounted his testimony

that he could stand for only ten to fifteen minutes at a time. The ALJ’s proffered

reasons for discounting Frazier’s testimony—inconsistency with medical evidence

2 24-4621 and Frazier’s reported daily activities—are specific, clear, and convincing. See

Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 498 (9th Cir. 2022) (inconsistency with medical

evidence); Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1040 (9th Cir. 2007)

(inconsistency with daily activities). Because substantial evidence also supports the

ALJ’s stated reasons for discounting Frazier’s testimony, there was no error. See

Smartt, 53 F.4th at 499–500.

Finally, Frazier contends that the ALJ failed to discharge his duty of

reconciling the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”) with the Dictionary of

Occupational Titles (“DOT”). The ALJ limited Frazier to occasional overhead, right

reaching. The VE testified that Frazier was capable of performing work as an

electronics worker, small products assembler II, or marker. Because the DOT

defines those jobs as requiring either “frequent” or “constant” reaching, Frazier

contends that the VE’s testimony was inconsistent with the DOT, and the ALJ was

required to resolve that inconsistency on the record.

Under the regulations in effect at the time of the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ was

required to “reconcile [any] inconsistency” if there was “an apparent conflict

between the vocational expert’s testimony and the DOT—for example, expert

testimony that a claimant can perform an occupation involving DOT requirements

that appear more than the claimant can handle.” Lamear v. Berryhill, 865 F.3d 1201,

1206, 1206 n.5 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Zavalin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 842, 846 (9th

3 24-4621 Cir. 2015)) (citing SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at *2). Although the DOT

indicates that the identified jobs require “frequent” or “constant” reaching, “not

every job that involves reaching requires the ability to reach overhead.” Gutierrez

v. Colvin, 844 F.3d 804, 808 (9th Cir. 2016). The ALJ acknowledged that his

hypothetical asked for more specific information about the amount of overhead, right

reaching required by each job than provided for in the DOT descriptions. The ALJ

then asked the VE whether his testimony was (1) consistent with the DOT, and (2)

on what his testimony was based to the extent it varied from the DOT descriptions.

The VE confirmed that his testimony was consistent with the DOT and that he relied

on his many years of professional experience to provide the additional details

requested by the ALJ. Given the absence of an “apparent or obvious conflict”

between the VE’s testimony and the DOT, the ALJ sufficiently inquired into the

consistency of the VE’s testimony with the DOT and permissibly relied on the VE’s

testimony. See id. at 808–09.

AFFIRMED.

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