Frazelle v. Maola Milk Co.

CourtNorth Carolina Industrial Commission
DecidedNovember 15, 2002
DocketI.C. NOS. 801638, 824147
StatusPublished

This text of Frazelle v. Maola Milk Co. (Frazelle v. Maola Milk Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering North Carolina Industrial Commission primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Frazelle v. Maola Milk Co., (N.C. Super. Ct. 2002).

Opinions

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The Full Commission has reviewed the Deputy Commissioner's Opinion and Award based on the record of the proceedings before the Deputy Commissioner. The appealing party has not shown good grounds to reconsider the evidence, receive further evidence, rehear the parties or their representatives, and having reviewed the competent evidence of record, the Full Commission affirms the Opinion and Award with minor modifications.

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The Full Commission finds as fact and concludes as matters of law the following which were entered into by the parties through the Pre-trial Agreement and at the deputy commissioner hearing as

STIPULATIONS
1. The parties are subject to and bound by the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act.

2. An employee-employer relationship existed between the named employee and the named employer.

3. Valley Forge Insurance Company is the correctly named carrier on the risk.

4. The Plaintiff-employee's average weekly wage is $337.65.

5. The parties stipulated at the hearing to a packet of exhibits, including numerous medical records, to be submitted as evidence. That packet was later received along with the contentions from Plaintiff's counsel.

6. The parties further stipulated that the Plaintiff was involved in an accident at work on or about March 6, 1998. There is no stipulation that Plaintiff sustained injury as a result of that accident.

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Based upon the competent evidence of record, the Full Commission makes the following additional

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On the date of the deputy commissioner hearing, plaintiff was 31 years of age. He quit school in the ninth grade and has not completed a GED or any further studies. Plaintiff began working for the Defendant in 1996.

2. On November 17, 1997, plaintiff suffered an admittedly compensable injury by accident arising out of and in the course and scope of his employment with defendant-employer when a barrel struck him, injuring his lower back.

3. On that same date, plaintiff went to the emergency room at Craven Regional Medical Center, where he had an orthopaedic examination and x-rays were taken of both the thoracic and lumbar spine. The x-rays were negative and Plaintiff was assessed with a contusion to his back and told to return if needed.

4. Later on that same day, November 17, 1997, plaintiff reported to New Bern Family Practice and complained of low back pain. Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Joseph Overby, a general practitioner, and diagnosed with a back contusion. Plaintiff was released to return to work effective November 18 at light duty with a ten pound lifting restriction. Plaintiff did return to work at light duty the next day.

5. On November 19, 1997, Plaintiff returned to New Bern Family Practice with ongoing complaints of low back pain. On this visit he was seen by Dr. J Phillip Mahaney, a general practitioner. He ordered x-rays of Plaintiff's lower back which were interpreted by Dr. Thomas W. Stohrer as normal. There was no evidence of fracture, misalignment, or soft tissue abnormality.

6. It appears that plaintiff was not satisfied with the foregoing medical assessments, and presented himself to Dr. Terry Kay, an orthopaedic specialist with East Carolina Orthopedics, on December 8, 1997. Upon reviewing x-rays and conducting a physical examination of plaintiff, Dr. Kay found no bone injuries and no evidence of nerve root irritability. Dr. Kay assessed plaintiff with acute lumbar strain and initiated conservative treatment through physical therapy and pain medication. Dr. Kay also wrote paintiff out of work for two weeks with a release to return to light duty with a ten pound lifting restriction at the end of that period.

7. On December 19, 1997, plaintiff returned to Dr. Kay with continued complaints of pain. Dr. Kay continued plaintiff's physical therapy at that time and wrote him out of work for an additional week.

8. On January 5, 1998, plaintiff returned to see Dr. Kay, and an MRI of plaintiff's lumbar spine was ordered. The MRI was done on January 7, 1998, Craven Regional Medical Center. This imaging study was interpreted by radiologist Dr. Garret Young and determined to be normal.

9. Plaintiff's claim for his November 17, 1997, injury was accepted pursuant to a Form 60 dated January 8, 1998. Plaintiff received temporary total disability benefits from November 17, 1997, through March 6, 1998, at a compensation rate of $220.42 per week based on a stipulated average weekly wage of $330.62.

10. On January 14, 1998, plaintiff returned to see Dr. Kay to discuss the findings of the MRI. At that time Dr. Kay advised plaintiff that the MRI was normal and that his condition should improve with physical therapy. Dr. Kay then placed plaintiff into a three-week physical therapy regimen with instructions to return to work upon completion of the program.

11. On February 5, 1998, plaintiff returned to see Dr. Kay. At this time, Dr. Kay referred plaintiff to Dr. Christopher Delaney, physiatrist, for a second opinion. Dr. Kay released plaintiff to return to sedentary duty at work with a 5 pound lifting restriction.

12. On February 9, 1998, plaintiff returned to Dr. Kay and stated that he was unable to perform sedentary work as released. Dr. Kay again wrote plaintiff out of work for one week and instructed him to return to light duty at the end of that time.

13. On February 26, 1998, paintiff presented to Dr. Christopher Delaney for a second opinion. Upon examination, Dr. Delaney found no objective evidence of any significant musculoskeletal or neurologic injury. Dr. Delaney also found at this time that plaintiff's examination was markedly inconsistent, suggesting profound symptom magnification.

14. On March 5, 1998, plaintiff was seen by Dr. Kay to discuss the findings of the second opinion. At this time, Dr. Kay released paintiff to return to work at full duty effective March 6, 1998.

15. Plaintiff returned to work with the employer on March 6, 1998. He testified that within an hour or two of starting work, he suffered another injury by accident when he fell while pushing a cart loaded with ice cream.

16. On March 9, 1998, Plaintiff returned to see Dr. Delaney with complaints of back pain from his alleged injury of March 6, 1998. At that time, Dr. Delaney determined that plaintiff either had a severe psychiatric problem or was malingering. Dr. Delaney released plaintiff to return to work without restriction.

17. Dr. Delaney was the only physician to have examined plaintiff both before and after his second alleged injury. Dr. Delaney was in the best position to compare plaintiff's condition to his previous injuries and formulate an opinion as to whether the March 6, 1998, accident caused any new or additional injury to plaintiff.

18. Dr. Delaney has performed numerous tests on plaintiff, including the Waddell's criteria, to rule out symptom magnification or malingering. The Waddell's criteria are designed to show inconsistent responses which may indicate underlying psycho-social causes for a patient's complaints. All of plaintiff's Waddell's signs were positive. Dr. Delaney testified that he performed an axial compression test, an en bloc rotation test, and a distracted straight leg raise test. All of these tests were positive for symptom magnification or malingering.

19. Dr. Delaney has found no evidence that plaintiff has any musculoskeletal or neurologic disorder.

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Bluebook (online)
Frazelle v. Maola Milk Co., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/frazelle-v-maola-milk-co-ncworkcompcom-2002.