Frazell v. United States

269 F. Supp. 885, 27 Oil & Gas Rep. 335, 20 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5146, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10881
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Louisiana
DecidedJune 22, 1967
DocketCiv. A. No. 8031
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 269 F. Supp. 885 (Frazell v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Frazell v. United States, 269 F. Supp. 885, 27 Oil & Gas Rep. 335, 20 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5146, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10881 (W.D. La. 1967).

Opinion

OPINION ON MERITS AFTER REMAND

BEN C. DAWKINS, Jr., Chief Judge.

On remand from the Court of Appeals, we are to make only two factual determinations in this case. The facts concerning the transactions at issue are largely undisputed and are discussed at length in our original opinion on the merits.1 For the purposes of our de[886]*886terminations on remand, however, we deem it necessary briefly to summarize those facts.

In early 1949, the Abilene, Texas area was experiencing a colossal boom in oil and gas production. William D. Frazell, a geologist, was actively practicing his profession in that area — compiling geologic data, gathering and completing geologic maps and securing leases for his employers. After two years of both intensive and extensive experience in the area, Frazell entered into a contract2 with the N. H. Wheless Oil Company and W. C. Woolf under which he was to recommend their procuring certain properties which he deemed capable of potential oil and gas production. As his remuneration, Frazell was to receive “a monthly salary or drawing account” plus expenses and specified interests in the acquired property. It was agreed, however, that Frazell’s interests in the property were not to be realized until Wheless and Woolf recovered all of their expenses, including those amounts advanced to Frazell during the existence of the joint venture.

To say that the arrangement proved successful is an understatement. Of thirty-six wells drilled during the venture, twenty-nine were producers. When it became evident that Wheless and Woolf would soon recover their expenses, the parties decided to incorporate and transfer the previously acquired properties to the corporation in return for the issuance of debentures to Wheless and Woolf and stock to Wheless, Woolf and Frazell. As his interest, Frazell received thirteen per cent of the issued stock, having a fair market value of $91,000.00. Believing that he received this stock in a tax-free exchange under section 351(a), Internal Revenue Code of 1954,3 he included no part of the stock’s value in his 1955 income tax return. The Commissioner ruled that the entire $91,000.00 should have been included as income and assessed a deficiency. Frazell and his spouse paid under protest $64,169.80 as additional federal incomé taxes with interest and then sought recovery.

In our original opinion, we concluded that under Louisiana law the agreement between Wheless, Woolf and Frazell constituted a joint venture rather than an employment contract. Since Frazell had an interest in the properties subject to the joint venture agreement, it was our conclusion that an exchange of stock for that interest was a tax-free exchange of “property” for stock within the meaning of section 351(a).4 The Court of Appeals, however, ruled that categorization of the agreement as a joint venture under Louisiana law did not bring the exchange within section 351(a). Thus the Court held that Frazell’s interest in the corporation was primarily in return for his services as a geologist and taxable as income. Finding that Frazell had allegedly contributed to the joint venture certain valuable maps and geologic data, which would constitute “property” within section 351(a), the case was remanded for resolution of these two factual determinations:

“(1) Did Frazell contribute the maps in question to the oil venture or did he keep them as his own personal property? (2) If he contributed them to the venture, what was their value at the time they were contributed?”5

Since the Government concedes that the maps were contributed to the joint ven[887]*887ture by Frazell, the only issue remaining for our determination is the value of the maps at the time of contribution. In attempting to prove the value of the maps, Frazell offers the use of two distinctively different valuation methods.

By the first method, Frazell contends that the maps’ true value can be ascertained only by valuing each of the forty-one saleable geologic ideas or prospects on the maps. By the use of statistical averages and the remuneration customarily received by an independent geologist in the sale of a prospect, Frazell values the maps, after discount, at $367,-000.00. Using basically the same method, Dr. Frank B. Conselman, an eminent geologist who has practiced in the Abilene area since 1947, values the maps at $328,-000.00. However, since we conclude that this type of valuation is improper because of its highly speculative nature, we must reject those figures.

The reasons we view this method as speculative are virtually self-evident. Here we are to determine the value of the maps at the time of contribution, and the prospects upon which Frazell and Dr. Conselman based their valuations actually consist of forty-one red circles drawn on the maps after remand of this case. Although we do not doubt Frazell’s veracity regarding his interest in these properties in 1951, we simply cannot judicially ascertain the value of the maps in light of ultimate production from within certain areas which were not delineated at the time of the contribution of those maps.

The alternative method of valuation, which neither Frazell nor Dr. Conselman considers to reflect the true value of the maps, consists of tabulating the cost of reconstruction of the maps. The basis for this type of valuation is that since Frazell contributed the maps to the joint venture, their value to the venture is reflected by what it would have cost to construct the maps. Without doubt, evaluating in this manner reduces the element of speculation and results in a more conservative estimate of value. However, while Frazell contends that the cost of construction in 1951 would have been $61,375.00, the Government’s expert witnesses assess the cost at various points between $975.00 and $2,050.00. In view of this wide disparity, examination of the bases upon which the witnesses grounded their opinions is necessary.

According to Frazell, it would require in excess of 491 days for a geologist in the Abilene area to duplicate the maps in 1951, considering the availability of information and the sources of that information during the boom period. Dr. Conselman, Frazell’s expert witness, was unable to definitely fix a specific number of days, but he was of the opinion that Frazell’s estimation was within reasonable limits. As to Frazell using $125.00 per day as basic remuneration due a geologist in the Abilene area during the years 1949-1951, Dr. Conselman testified that such a rate was normal and justified. The Government does not contend otherwise.

Both active, experienced geologists, the Government’s expert witnesses were Howard E. Rothrock and Philip Bohart. Except for a period between 1922 and 1926, Mr. Rothrock did not actively practice his profession in the Abilene area until 1952, admittedly after the area had reached its peak in oil production. In testifying that he could reproduce the maps at issue for $1,-506.00, Mr. Rothrock said that electric logs, drillers’ logs and elevations could be purchased at nominal prices. With this information, and surface and aerial maps also acquired at nominal prices, he would employ landmen to put the lease information on the maps and draftsmen to complete the drafting at $2.00 per hour. When asked on cross-examination what experience he had in the Abilene area during the oil boom, Mr. Rothrock replied:

“In every boom period labor is scarce, of course.

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269 F. Supp. 885, 27 Oil & Gas Rep. 335, 20 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5146, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10881, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/frazell-v-united-states-lawd-1967.