Franzen v. Juhl

32 S.W.2d 627, 182 Ark. 663, 1930 Ark. LEXIS 551
CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas
DecidedNovember 10, 1930
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 32 S.W.2d 627 (Franzen v. Juhl) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Franzen v. Juhl, 32 S.W.2d 627, 182 Ark. 663, 1930 Ark. LEXIS 551 (Ark. 1930).

Opinion

Mehaffy, J.

Suit was begun by appellant in the Arkansas Chancery Court, Northern District, against appellees to foreclose a mortgage on the northwest quarter of section 21, township 3 south, range 5 west, in Arkansas County. On March 2, 1925, there was a decree for $13,-988.24 and for the foreclosure of the mortgage and sale of above-described land. On April 24, 1929, the appellee, Fred H. L. Juhl, was adjudged a bankrupt, and the above-described property was included in his schedule. The appellant, A. W. Franzen, filed an intervention in the district court of the United States. The court granted the prayer of appellant and ordered the trustee in bankruptcy to deliver possession of above-described property to the commissioner named in the decree of the Arkansas County Chancery Court for the purpose of selling same under the terms of said decree. On July 24, 1929, the commissioner sold said land to appellant for $6,000, after having advertised the same as provided in the decree. At the next term of court, appellees filed the following exceptions to the report of sale and the confirmation.

“Comes the above-named defendants and for their exceptions to the sale, the report of sale and the confirmation of sale in the above-styled cause of action state:

“That on the 2d day of March, 1925, a decree was rendered in the above-styled cause by the terms of which judgment was given against said defendants in the sum of thirteen thousand, nine hundred eighty-eight and 24/100 dollars ($13,988.24). That thereafter, and before any sale was had under said decree, the plaintiff promised and agreed to dismiss said foreclosure proceedings under which said decree was rendered and vacate said decree in the event of the payment of a certain part of the indebtedness evidenced by said decree. That the defendants arranged to pay and did pay to the plaintiff the amount of money necessary to comply with this arrangement, and upon the payment of the same were assured by the plaintiff and his representatives that said decree would be vacated and have believed since said time that said decree was vacated. That since the time of the making of payment upon said decree as referred to the defendants have made other large payments upon said indebtedness.
“That without notice to the defendants the plaintiff had the lands described in the mortgage foreclosed in said decree advertised for sale and sold during the month of July, 1929. That this sale was made by Duce Pike as commissioner. That no credit is shown upon the decree originally entered nor is any order made vacating the same. That the sale of said lands as made in this proceeding was in complete violation of the agreement made by the plaintiff with the defendants whereby a payment of several thousand dollars was obtained by the plaintiff from the defendants. That said payment and subsequent payments were never indorsed upon said decree, and that when said sale was made by the commissioner the same was advertised to be sold for the full amount of the decree without crediting said payments.
“That such advertisement and such sale, if otherwise valid, should be set aside because of the grave injustice done to these defendants by the misrepresentation of the correct indebtedness owing upon said lands.
“Wherefore, defendants pray that the sale referred to be set aside and the decree referred to be vacated;
“As alternative relief defendants pray that the said sale be set aside and the credits to which these defendants are properly entitled be made upon said decree prior to any advertisement or resale of same;
“That the costs of the sale heretofore erroneously held be chargeable against the plaintiff and not chargeable as costs of this action; for all other relief proper in law and equity. ’ ’

Thereupon the appellant filed motion to strike the exceptions as follows:

“Comes now the plaintiff and moves the court to strike the exceptions to the report of sale filed by the defendant, Fred Juhl, and for cause says:

“That, after the decree of foreclosure herein and before the sale by the commissioner, the defendant, Fred Juhl, was adjudged a bankrupt by the United States District Court, for the Western Division of the Eastern District of Arkansas, and has never been discharged.
“That E. H. Noble was elected or appointed as trustee in said bankruptcy proceedings, and duly qualified as such and was such trustee at the time said Juhl filed said exceptions.
‘ ‘ That he intervened in said bankruptcy matter and set up his decree of foreclosure and prayed said court for an order permitting said sale, which prayer said court granted.
“Plaintiff says that said Juhl had no right or interest in said land, and, if so, same passed to said trustee.
“Wherefore, plaintiff prays that said exceptions be stricken from the files and said report be confirmed and for all other relief.”

On the same day the appellees filed the following response:

“That he was adjudged a bankrupt on the .................. day of................................................, 1929, and further states that he has never been discharged from said bankruptcy.
“That the lands involved in the foreclosure proceedings of which this motion is part of the pleadings, is land upon which this defendant is now living and has lived for several years. That said land is impressed with the right of homestead in this defendant, and that as such he is entitled to and has an interest which did not pass to the trustee appointed in said bankruptcy proceedings'.
“Wherefore, this defendant prays that the motion to which this response is offered be overruled.”

The court overruled appellant’s motion to strike exceptions and the appellees filed the following amendment to exceptions:

“On or about March 26, 1925, the following letter was received by F. H. L. Juhl:
‘“Mr. F. H. L. Juhl,
“ ‘Stuttgart, Arkansas.
‘ ‘ ‘ Bear Sir: In connection with the foreclosure suit against you instituted by A. W. Franzen at the last term of court; this is to advise you that when the $3,000 is applied to your credit out of the loan of $6,500 being made to your father, Hy. Juhl, together with the payment of note for $404 on which judgment was taken and all taxes due for the year 1925, payable on or before April 10, 19'25, and all costs such as abstracter’s bill and examination of title, the recording charges and $500. paid to Power Mfg. Co., then the suit above mentioned will be dismissed without prejudice. I am,
“ ‘Yours very truly,
“ ‘A. W. Franzen,
“ ‘By C. Gr. Rodgers.’

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Bluebook (online)
32 S.W.2d 627, 182 Ark. 663, 1930 Ark. LEXIS 551, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/franzen-v-juhl-ark-1930.