Franquet v. Martuscello

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided July 1, 2025·No. 7:25-cv-03585·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JULIUS C. FRANQUET, JR., Plaintiff, 7:25-CV-3585 (KMK) -against- ORDER OF SERVICE DANIEL F. MARTUSCELLO III, et al., Defendants. KENNETH M. KARAS, United States District Judge: Plaintiff Julius C. Franquet, Jr., who is currently incarcerated in the Fishkill Correctional Facility (“Fishkill”), a New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”) prison, brings this action pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking damages and declaratory relief.1 He sues: (1) Daniel F. Martuscello III, the DOCCS Commissioner; (2) Carol 0F A. Moores, the DOCCS Chief Medical Officer and Deputy Commissioner in charge of prisoner medical treatment; (3) Michael A. Daye, the Fishkill Superintendent; (4) Latasha Jackson-Smith, the Fishkill Deputy Superintendent in charge of medical services; (5) Dr. Zamilus, a Fishkill physician; (6) Katie Ngbodi, a Fishkill nurse; (7) “RN #636,” an unidentified Fishkill nurse; and (8) “John Doe RN #1,” another unidentified Fishkill nurse. By order dated June 4, 2025, the court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.2 The Court directs service on the identified 1F defendants, directs the Attorney General of the State of New York to provide Plaintiff and the

1 Plaintiff originally filed this action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York. By decision and order dated April 24, 2025, that court transferred this action to this court. (ECF 7.) 2 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee, even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Court with the identities and the service addresses of the unidentified defendants, and denies Plaintiff’s motion for the appointment of counsel (ECF 3) without prejudice to Plaintiff’s filing an application for the Court to request pro bono counsel at a later date. I. DISCUSSION A. Service on Identified Defendants Because Plaintiff has been granted permission to proceed IFP, he is entitled to rely on assistance from the Court and the United States Marshals Service (“USMS”) to effect service.3 2F Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d. 119, 123 n.6 (2d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process . . . in [IFP] cases.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (the court must order the USMS to serve if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed IFP). To allow Plaintiff to effect service on the identified defendants (Martuscello, Moores, Daye, Jackson-Smith, Zamilus, and Ngbodi) through the USMS, the Clerk of Court is instructed to fill out a USMS Process Receipt and Return form (“USM-285 form”) for each of those defendants. The Clerk of Court is further instructed to issue a summons for each of those defendants and deliver to the USMS all the paperwork necessary for the USMS to effect service of a summons and the complaint on each of those defendants.

If a summons and the complaint are not served on each of those defendants within 90 days after the date that the summonses for those defendants are issued, Plaintiff should request an extension of time for service. See Meilleur v. Strong, 682 F.3d 56, 63 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that it is the plaintiff’s responsibility to request an extension of time for service).

3 Although Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally requires that a summons be served within 90 days of the date the complaint is filed, Plaintiff is proceeding IFP and could not have effected service until the Court reviewed the complaint and ordered that any summonses be issued. The Court therefore extends the time to serve the identified defendants until 90 days after the date that any summonses for those defendants issue. Plaintiff must notify the Court in writing if his address changes, and the Court may dismiss this action if he fails to do so. B. Unidentified Defendants Under Valentin v. Dinkins, a pro se litigant is entitled to assistance from the Court in ascertaining an unidentified defendant’s identity and that defendant’s service address. 121 F.3d

72, 76 (2d Cir. 1997). In his Complaint, Plaintiff supplies sufficient information to permit DOCCS to ascertain the identities and service addresses of the unidentified defendants; they include: (1) “RN #636”–a Fishkill nurse who medically screened Plaintiff upon Plaintiff’s arrival at Fishkill on May 18, 2024; and (2) “John Doe RN #1” – a Fishkill nurse who examined and/or medically treated Plaintiff on or about May 20, 2024, in the Fishkill Regional Medical Unit (RMU). (See Compl. ¶¶ 10, 11.) The Attorney General of the State of New York, who is the agent of and attorney for DOCCS, must provide this information to Plaintiff and the Court within 60 days of the date of this order. Within 30 days of receiving this information, Plaintiff must file an Amended Complaint naming the newly identified individuals as defendants and providing their service addresses. The

Amended Complaint will replace, not supplement, Plaintiff’s original complaint. Amended Complaint form that Plaintiff should complete is attached to this order. Once Plaintiff has filed an Amended Complaint, the Court will screen it and, if necessary, issue an order directing service on the newly identified defendants. C. Motion for the Appointment of Counsel Plaintiff also requested the appointment of pro bono counsel. (See Dkt. No. 3.) Although there is not a constitutional right to counsel in civil cases, the Court has the authority to appoint counsel for indigent parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Yet, “[b]road discretion lies with the district judge in deciding whether to appoint counsel pursuant to this provision.” Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 60 (2d Cir. 1986). When analyzing whether appointment of counsel is appropriate, the Court should undertake a two-step inquiry. See Ferrelli v. River Manor Health Care Ctr., 323 F.3d 196, 203–04 (2d Cir. 2003). First, the Court “‘should . . . determine whether the indigent’s position seems likely to be of substance.’” Id. at 203 (quoting Hodge, 802 F.2d at 61); see also Johnston v. Maha, 606 F.3d 39, 41 (2d Cir. 2010) (“This Court

considers motions for appointment of counsel by asking first whether the claimant has met a threshold showing of some likelihood of merit.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In other words, the claim must not be so “highly dubious” that the plaintiff appears to have no chance of success. Hodge, 802 F.2d at 60 (internal quotation marks omitted). In making this determination, the Court construes pleadings drafted by pro se litigants liberally and interprets them “to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” See Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (emphasis omitted); Sommersett v.

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