Franklin v. United States

135 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 25 Ct. Int'l Trade 198, 25 C.I.T. 198, 25 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 198, 2001 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 43
CourtUnited States Court of International Trade
DecidedMarch 28, 2001
DocketSlip Op. 01-32; 99-05-00283
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 135 F. Supp. 2d 1336 (Franklin v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of International Trade primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Franklin v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 25 Ct. Int'l Trade 198, 25 C.I.T. 198, 25 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 198, 2001 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 43 (cit 2001).

Opinion

OPINION

POGUE, Judge.

Plaintiff, Arthur L. Franklin d/b/a/ Health Technologies Network (“Arthur Franklin”), challenges a decision of the United States Customs Service (“Customs”) denying Arthur Franklin’s protests filed in accordance with section 514 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1514 (1994). At issue is the proper tariff classification under 19 U.S.C. § 1202, Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”), of Arthur Franklin’s imports of coral sand packets marketed under the names “Ericssons Alka-Mine Coral Calcium” and “Alka-Line Coral Calcium,” and identified as, respectively, “GRANULES OF NATURAL CORAL, Additive for Healthy Water,” see Def.’s Ex. D, and “NATURAL MINERAL FOOD SUPPLEMENT, Additive for Healthy Water,” see Def.’s Ex. J.

Arthur Franklin claims that the subject merchandise is classifiable under subheading 8421.21.00, HTSUS, covering “Filtering or purifying machinery and apparatus for liquids: For filtering or purifying water.” Goods classifiable under subheading 8421.21.00 were subject to duty rates of 3.1% (1995), 2.3% (1996) and 1.6% (1997), ad valorem, for the years in which the subject merchandise was entered at the port of Norfolk, Virginia. Alternatively, Arthur Franklin claims classification under subheading 0508.00.00, HTSUS, as “Coral and similar materials, unworked or simply prepared but not otherwise worked.... ” Goods classifiable under 0508.00.00 were *1338 allowed to be entered duty free from 1995 to 1997. 1

Customs classified the merchandise under a residual or “basket” provision, subheading 2106.90.99, HTSUS, covering “Food preparations not elsewhere specified or included: Other.... ” Goods classifiable under subheading 2106.90.99 were subject to duty rates of 9.4% (1995), 8.8% (1996) and 8.2% (1997), ad valorem. Arthur Franklin protested Customs’ classification and, in response, Customs issued Headquarters Ruling 962059 (Oct. 21, 1998). Arthur Franklin asks the Court to overturn Customs’ Ruling and classify its merchandise under subheading 8421.21.00, or, in the alternative, subheading 0508.00.00.

Standard of Review

Jurisdiction is predicated on 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a); therefore, Customs’ classification is subject to de novo review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2640. Following the Federal Circuit’s holding in Mead Corp. v. United States, 185 F.3d 1304, 1306-07 (Fed.Cir.1999), cert. granted, 530 U.S. 1202, 120 S.Ct. 2193, 147 L.Ed.2d 231 (2000), the Court does not afford the deference articulated in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), to Customs’ standard classification rulings. Moreover, although there is a statutory presumption of correctness that attaches to Customs’ classification decisions, see 28 U.S.C. § 2639(a)(1), that presumption is not relevant where the Court is presented with a question of law in a proper motion for summary judgment, see Universal Elecs., v. United States, 112 F.3d 488, 492 (Fed.Cir.1997).

This action is before the Court on summary judgment motions made by Arthur Franklin and Defendant, the United States, pursuant to USCIT Rule 56. Summary judgment is appropriate when the “pleadings depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” USCIT R. 56(c). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that [the trier of fact] could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

The court resolves any doubt over material factual issues in favor of the nonmov-ing party, and draws all reasonable inferences in its favor. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Mingus Constructors, Inc. v. United States, 812 F.2d 1387, 1390-91 (Fed.Cir.1987). Nevertheless, “[w]hen a motion for summary judgment is made and supported ... an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleading, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” USCIT R. 56(e).

Here, the parties agree that the imported merchandise is coral sand, to which a small amount of L-ascorbic acid has been added, and which has been packaged in one gram fiber bags. See PL’s Stmt. Undisputed Material Facts and Addition to Def.’s Stmt. Undisputed Material Facts at (“Pl.’s Stmt.”) ¶¶ 2-4; Def.’s Stmt. Undisputed Material Facts (“Def.’s Stmt.”) at ¶¶2-4; Def.’s Resp. Pl.’s Stmt. (“Def.’s *1339 Resp. Stmt”) at ¶4. Moreover, the parties agree that the effect of the merchandise is to increase the hardness and alkalinity of water, as well as to reduce bacteria and chlorine present in water. 2 See Pl.’s Stmt, at ¶¶ 7-11; Def.’s Stmt, at ¶¶ 7-11; Def.’s Resp. Stmt, at ¶¶ 7-11. Although the parties disagree as to the “principal use” of the merchandise, see Pl.’s Mem. at 12, Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. (“Def.’s Mem.”) at 5, Pl.’s Reply Mem. Supp. Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. (“PL’s Reply”) at 5, Arthur Franklin has failed to set forth specific facts showing that this is a genuine issue for trial. See discussion infra Part I. Summary judgment is therefore appropriate.

The Court’s analysis of a Customs classification issue proceeds in two steps: “first, [it] construe[s] the relevant classification headings; and second, [it] determinéis] under which of the properly construed tariff terms the merchandise at issue falls.” Bausch & Lomb, 148 F.3d at 1365 (citing Universal Electronics, 112 F.3d at 491). While the first step is a question of law and the second step is a question of fact, see Orlando Food Corp. v. United States, 140 F.3d 1437, 1439 (Fed.Cir.1998), whether the imported merchandise is properly classified is ultimately a question of law.

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Bluebook (online)
135 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 25 Ct. Int'l Trade 198, 25 C.I.T. 198, 25 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 198, 2001 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 43, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/franklin-v-united-states-cit-2001.