25CA0782 Franklin v State of Colorado 05-21-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0782 City and County of Denver District Court No. 24CV620 Honorable Sarah B. Wallace, Judge
Sara Franklin,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
State of Colorado and Douglas County District Court,
Defendants-Appellees.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division II Opinion by JUDGE BROWN Harris and Tow, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced May 21, 2026
Sara Franklin, Pro Se
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Dmitry B. Vilner, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees ¶1 Plaintiff, Sara Franklin, appeals the district court’s order
granting the motion to dismiss filed by defendants, the State of
Colorado and the Douglas County District Court (collectively, the
State defendants). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In April 2012, Franklin petitioned to dissolve her marriage to
her now ex-husband in Douglas County District Court Case No.
12DR455. Almost two months later, Franklin’s ex-husband filed for
a civil protection order against her, requesting protection for himself
and their two children. After an ex parte hearing, the Douglas
County District Court (the dissolution court) issued a temporary
civil protection order and set the matter for a permanent protection
order hearing. A few days later, the ex-husband filed a motion to
restrict Franklin’s parenting time. Two days before the permanent
protection order hearing, Franklin also filed for a civil protection
order against her ex-husband.
¶3 On June 6, the dissolution court held a combined hearing on
the parties’ competing motions for civil protection orders and the
ex-husband’s motion to restrict Franklin’s parenting time. The
dissolution court denied Franklin’s motion for a civil protection
1 order, made her ex-husband’s temporary civil protection order
permanent (the PPO), and restricted her parenting time.
¶4 In April 2014, the dissolution court entered written permanent
orders dissolving the parties’ marriage. As relevant, the dissolution
court ordered that Franklin’s ex-husband would have “sole custody
and full decision-making responsibility” for the children but that
Franklin was entitled to supervised visitation. The court also
granted the ex-husband discretion to allow telephone or electronic
communication between the children and Franklin.
¶5 In August 2024, Franklin filed a complaint in Denver District
Court (the district court) asserting eight claims:
(1) Title 13, article 14, of the Colorado Revised Statutes,
providing the statutory framework for civil protection
orders, is “unconstitutional in its “‘indefinite’ lifespan
allowance” under United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680
(2024), which, according to Franklin, held “that States’
laws do not violate the federal U.S. Second Amendment
so long as disarmament is temporary.”
(2) Title 13, article 14, is unconstitutional “because it
exclusively severed the Parent-Child Relationship BOTH
2 in actuality and/or constructively on the lowest
evidentiary standard — Preponderance of the Evidence”
in violation of Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982),
which, according to Franklin, held “that States’ law
violate[] the federal U.S. Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process protections when State actions are not at least
supported by the Clear and Convincing evidentiary
standard prior to completely and irrevocably severing
biological parental rights.”
(3) Section 24-34-805(2)(d)(I), C.R.S. 2025, requiring
compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act in
title 14 cases, is unconstitutional because “it exclusively
sever[ed] the Parent-Child Relationship BOTH in actuality
and/or constructively on the lowest evidentiary
standard — Preponderance of the Evidence” in violation
of Santosky.
(4) Section 13-14-108, C.R.S. 2025, regarding modification
and termination of permanent civil protection orders,
“violates substantive Due Process protections in that it
3 in actuality and/or constructively via indefinitely allowing
Filings only every [two] years” and “requiring [Franklin] to
perform a fingerprint-based criminal history record check
prior to any Court consideration . . . in direct
contravention to the foundational legal principle of
innocent until proven guilty.”
(5) Title 13, article 14, violates “the federal U.S. Fourteenth
Amendment procedural Due Process Clause protections
because [Franklin] has a cognizable liberty interest in her
Biological Parent-Child Relationship existence AND the
[State defendants] deprived [Franklin of] her liberty
interest . . . without an appropriate level of process or
procedural safeguards.”
(6) Title 13, article 14, violates “the federal U.S. Fourteenth
Amendment substantive Due Process Clause protections”
because Franklin “has a fundamental right to raise and be
in relation with her biological children in a Biological
Parent-Child Relationship AND the [State defendants]
deprived [Franklin of] her fundamental right . . .
4 arbitrarily, capriciously, and without a rational basis so
egregiously that is sincerely shocks the conscious.”
(7) Title 13, article 14, is unconstitutional, “resulting in
involuntarily unconstitutional termination of the
Parent-Child Relationship resulting in Loss of Consortium
between [Franklin] and her beloved marital, minor
children,” when (i) the State defendants “were Negligent
in terminating the Parent-Child Relationship completely”;
(ii) Franklin “sustained injuries resulting from” the State
defendants’ negligence; (iii) Franklin “had a strong
Parent-Child Relationship up to and when the [State
defendants] illegally and unconstitutionally terminated”
that relationship through the entry of the PPO; and
(iv) Franklin, “[a]s a direct result . . . , has lost all rights
of consortium with [the children], manifested currently in
absolute parental alienation through continued abuse
and [the] unjustified, indefinite” PPO.
(8) Title 13, article 14, is unconstitutional, “resulting in
Parent-Child Relationship resulting in Negligent Infliction
5 of Emotional Distress,” when (i) the State defendants
“were Negligent in terminating the Parent-Child
Relationship”; (ii) the State defendants’ negligence
“created an unreasonable risk of physical harm to
[Franklin]” while she was suffering from pre-existing
medical conditions and post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD); (iii) the State defendants’ negligence “caused
[Franklin] to be put in fear for her own safety and such
fear is shown by physical consequences and long
continued causal emotional PTSD recurrences”; and
(iv) that “fear has caused injuries, damages, and losses.”1
¶6 Franklin asked the district court to (1) declare title 13, article
14, unconstitutional, with “enforcement cessation” and “[r]ecord
1 Franklin’s seventh and eighth claims, and possibly her sixth
claim, appear to be tort claims. In their motion to dismiss, the State defendants characterized these claims as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. Section 1983 “authorizes a private right of action against a person ‘who, under color of any statute . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.’” Woodall v. Godfrey, 2024 COA 42, ¶ 13 (quoting § 1983). Franklin did not contest this characterization of her claims, and the district court adopted it. Because Franklin does not challenge this characterization on appeal, we also treat these claims as § 1983 claims.
6 expungement”; and (2) remove the “yolk” of the PPO to allow
Franklin “expeditious, unencumbered reintegration back into” her
children’s lives. Franklin also requested compensatory damages,
general damages, punitive or exemplary damages, nominal
damages, incidental damages, and consequential damages.
¶7 As factual support for her claims, Franklin detailed the
procedural history of Douglas County District Court Case No.
12DR455 and referenced the PPO and the permanent orders
entered by the dissolution court. Franklin also attached the
permanent orders to her complaint.
¶8 The State defendants moved to dismiss Franklin’s complaint
under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1), asserting that the district court did not
have subject matter jurisdiction to entertain a collateral attack on
the PPO or permanent orders entered by the dissolution court and
that the dissolution court retained exclusive jurisdiction. The State
defendants also moved to dismiss under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) for failure
to state a claim because Franklin (1) filed her claims outside the
applicable two-year statutes of limitation and (2) was not entitled to
§ 1983 damages against the State or the dissolution court.
7 ¶9 The district court granted the motion to dismiss. The district
court first noted that “Franklin’s claims revolve[d] around the PPO
issued by [the dissolution court] in 2012.” It then determined that,
to the extent Franklin’s complaint sought to collaterally attack the
PPO, the district court lacked jurisdiction because (1) the
dissolution court issued the PPO and retained jurisdiction over the
matter, and (2) the district court lacked authority to review orders
from a court of coordinate jurisdiction. The district court also
concluded that Franklin’s constitutional claims were as-applied
challenges2 subject to a two-year statute of limitations, which began
to run when the PPO was entered in 2012. Finally, the district
court concluded that Franklin was not entitled to damages under
§ 1983 because the State and the dissolution court, as an arm of
2 A facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute asserts that
“no conceivable set of circumstances exists under which it may be applied in a permissible manner.” Danielson v. Dennis, 139 P.3d 688, 691 (Colo. 2006). In contrast, “an as-applied challenge tests the application of [a] restriction to the facts of a plaintiff’s concrete case.” Harmon v. City of Norman, 61 F.4th 779, 789 (10th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). Because Franklin asserts that the applicable statutes are unconstitutional only as enforced against her, we agree with the district court that they are, at best, as- applied constitutional challenges. Franklin does not contend otherwise on appeal.
8 the State, were shielded from liability for monetary damages by the
Eleventh Amendment. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491
U.S. 58, 66-67 (1989) (holding that states are not considered
“persons” under § 1983 and that § 1983 was not intended to
override states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity). Franklin appeals.
II. Standard of Review
¶ 10 We review a trial court’s order dismissing a complaint for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) as a mixed
question of fact and law, reviewing the court’s factual findings for
clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. See Ferguson v.
Spalding Rehab., LLC, 2019 COA 93, ¶ 7. When, as here, “all
relevant evidence is presented to the trial court, and the underlying
facts are undisputed, the trial court may decide the jurisdictional
issue as a matter of law, in which case appellate review is de novo.”
Medina v. State, 35 P.3d 443, 452 (Colo. 2001).
¶ 11 We also review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a C.R.C.P.
12(b)(5) motion to dismiss. Hess v. Hobart, 2020 COA 139M2, ¶ 11.
A motion to dismiss under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted tests the formal sufficiency
of the complaint. Lavarato v. Branney, 210 P.3d 485, 488 (Colo.
9 App. 2009). To survive such a motion, “a plaintiff must state a
claim for relief that is plausible (not speculative) on its face.” Hess,
¶ 11. In reviewing an order granting a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion, we
apply the same standards as a trial court, accepting the complaint’s
factual allegations as true and viewing them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Patterson v. James, 2018 COA 173, ¶ 16.
But we need not accept as true legal conclusions that are couched
as factual allegations or conclusory assertions that are unsupported
by factual allegations. Warne v. Hall, 2016 CO 50, ¶ 9. We
consider only facts that are alleged in the pleadings and documents
that are attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference. Prospect
Dev. Co. v. Holland & Knight, LLP, 2018 COA 107, ¶ 11.
¶ 12 Although a statute of limitations defense generally should not
be raised in a motion to dismiss, a court may dismiss a plaintiff’s
claims on statute of limitations grounds when the “bare allegations”
of the complaint reveal the untimeliness of the claims. Meyerstein
v. City of Aspen, 282 P.3d 456, 470-71 (Colo. App. 2011).
¶ 13 Because Franklin filed this appeal without the assistance of
counsel, we construe her briefs broadly to ensure that she is not
denied review of important issues because of her inability to
10 articulate her argument like a lawyer. See Jones v. Williams, 2019
CO 61, ¶ 5. Still, it is not our role to rewrite her briefs or to act as
her advocate. See Johnson v. McGrath, 2024 COA 5, ¶ 10.
III. Analysis
¶ 14 Franklin contends that the district court erred by granting the
State defendants’ motion to dismiss because (1) it considered
information outside of the complaint; (2) it had subject matter
jurisdiction to consider her constitutional challenges to statutes;
(3) the statute of limitations did not bar her claims; and (4) she was
entitled to damages under § 1983. We affirm the district court’s
dismissal of Franklin’s claims.
A. Procedural Challenge
¶ 15 Franklin contends that the district court erroneously relied on
information outside the complaint to grant the State defendants’
motion to dismiss. We reject this contention for two reasons.
¶ 16 First, to the extent Franklin contends that the district court
erred by looking beyond the complaint to address the State
defendant’s C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) argument, she is mistaken. A court is
allowed to consider evidence outside the pleadings to resolve a
11 jurisdictional challenge. City of Aspen v. Kinder Morgan, Inc., 143
P.3d 1076, 1078 (Colo. App. 2006).
¶ 17 Second, to the extent Franklin contends that the district court
erred by considering information outside the complaint to dismiss
her claims on statute of limitations grounds, she does not identify
what information the district court erroneously considered.
Although the district court clearly relied on the PPO, Franklin
referenced it and the dissolution court’s permanent orders in her
complaint. So the district court was allowed to consider those
orders in resolving the State defendants’ C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5)
argument. See Yadon v. Lowry, 126 P.3d 332, 335-36 (Colo. App.
2005) (documents attached to or referenced in the complaint are
not “matters outside the pleading” for purposes of C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5)).
¶ 18 Without knowing what other information Franklin believes the
district court improperly considered, we cannot address this
contention further. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court
did not err by considering the PPO or the permanent orders when
resolving the State defendants’ motion to dismiss. See Prospect
Dev. Co., ¶ 11; Medina, 35 P.3d at 452.
12 B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
¶ 19 Franklin contends that the district court erred by concluding
it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over her claims. Specifically,
Franklin contends that she did not ask the district court to review
or set aside the PPO but instead brought standalone constitutional
challenges to statutes over which the district court had “original
jurisdiction.” We are not persuaded.3
¶ 20 Franklin argues that she raised purely constitutional
challenges to statutes that were not tied to the PPO, but she clearly
sought to invalidate the PPO through those constitutional claims.
For example, claim one asserted that title 13, article 14, which
provides the statutory framework for civil protection orders, see
§§ 13-14-100.2 to -111, C.R.S. 2025, was unconstitutional because
“its” indefinite deprivation of her Second Amendment rights ran
afoul of Rahimi. Claim two asserted that title 13, article 14, was
unconstitutional because “it” severed Franklin’s parent-child
relationship under a relaxed evidentiary standard. And claim five
3 As we best understand the complaint, Franklin seeks relief from
only the PPO. To the extent she also seeks relief from the permanent orders, our rationale for affirming the dismissal of her claims would be the same.
13 asserted that title 13, article 14, was unconstitutional because “it”
deprived Franklin of her fundamental right to parent without
adequate due process safeguards. But title 13, article 14, did not,
by itself, commit any of the alleged constitutional transgressions.
Instead, it was the entry of the PPO under the challenged statutes
that allegedly violated Franklin’s constitutional rights. Indeed,
Franklin asked the district court to declare title 13, article 14,
unconstitutional to prevent enforcement of the PPO against her.4
¶ 21 For this reason, we agree with the district court that
Franklin’s constitutional claims were an attempt to collaterally
attack the dissolution court’s orders. See Brennan v. Grover, 404
P.2d 544, 546 (Colo. 1965) (“A collateral attack on a judgment has
been defined as an ‘attempt to avoid, defeat, or evade it, or deny its
force and effect, in some incidental proceeding not provided by law
. . . .’” (citation omitted)). And because “all district courts are equal
in the judicial hierarchy,” the jurisdiction of one district court “does
not extend to a review of the decisions and judgment of” another
4 Franklin’s other constitutional claims are framed similarly and
suffer from the same defects.
14 district court. State ex rel. Dep’t of Corr. v. Pena, 911 P.2d 48, 57
(Colo. 1996).
¶ 22 Regardless of whether the PPO violated Franklin’s
constitutional rights, the district court did not have jurisdiction to
invalidate it because it was entered by the dissolution court, which
is another district court. See id. (Even “an erroneous judgment . . .
is not subject to collateral attack by another court of coordinate
jurisdiction.”). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did
not err by dismissing Franklin’s constitutional claims for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. See Medina, 35 P.3d at 452.
¶ 23 But even if we misunderstand Franklin’s claims and the
district court had subject matter jurisdiction over them, we
nonetheless conclude they are barred by the statute of limitations,
as we discuss next.
C. Statute of Limitations
¶ 24 Franklin contends that the district court erred by concluding
that her claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations.
We disagree.
¶ 25 Franklin does not dispute that a two-year statute of
limitations governs both her constitutional claims and her § 1983
15 claims. See § 13–80–102(1)(a), (g), C.R.S. 2025 (requiring that tort
actions, outside of an exception not relevant here, and “[a]ll actions
upon liability created by a federal statute where no period of
limitation is provided in said federal statute” “must be commenced
within two years after the cause of action accrues”); Indus.
Constructors Corp. v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 15 F.3d 963, 968
(10th Cir. 1994) (an action brought pursuant to § 1983 is subject to
the statute of limitations of the general personal injury statute in
the state where the action arose). Nor does Franklin dispute that
an action accrues, for purposes of the statute of limitations, when a
plaintiff has “knowledge of the facts essential to the cause of
action,” whether or not the plaintiff has “knowledge of the legal
theory supporting the cause of action.” Murry v. GuideOne Specialty
Mut. Ins. Co., 194 P.3d 489, 492 (Colo. App. 2008); see
§ 13-80-108(8), C.R.S. 2025 (“A cause of action for losses or
damages . . . shall be deemed to accrue when the injury, loss,
damage, or conduct giving rise to the cause of action is discovered
or should have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable
diligence.”); Onyx Props. LLC v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 868 F. Supp.
2d 1171, 1174 (D. Colo. 2012) (the accrual date for a § 1983 claim
16 is when the plaintiff “knew or should have known that their
constitutional rights were violated”).
¶ 26 In her complaint, Franklin alleges that her ex-husband
“deceitfully, maliciously, and vengefully obtain[ed]” the PPO in June
2012. Thus, based on the bare allegations of the complaint, any
claim that the PPO was unconstitutional (or that the cited statutes
were unconstitutional as applied to her when the PPO was entered)
and any claim for damages under § 1983 resulting from entry of the
PPO must have been brought no later than 2014. See Meyerstein,
282 P.3d at 470-71; Murry, 194 P.3d at 492. Franklin filed her
complaint in August 2024. As a result, Franklin’s claims are barred
by the statute of limitations. See § 13-80-102(1)(a), (g).
¶ 27 We are not persuaded otherwise by Franklin’s argument that
she could not have known about her constitutional claims earlier.
Franklin asserts that her claims did not manifest as “factual
realties” until Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, was announced in 2024. Even
if that were true, Rahimi only arguably impacts claim one, in which
Franklin asserts that entry of the PPO violated her Second
Amendment rights as discussed in that case. But Franklin knew of
the essential facts underlying her claims in 2012. That Rahimi may
17 have given her a new legal theory to pursue does not change when
her claim accrued. See Murry, 194 P.3d at 492.
¶ 28 Franklin also cites Santosky, 455 U.S. 745, to argue that she
could not have known of her claims earlier. But that case was
announced in 1982, and Franklin does not explain why it requires a
different accrual date given its age. See Murry, 194 P.3d at 492;
Barnett v. Elite Props. of Am., Inc., 252 P.3d 14, 19 (Colo. App. 2010)
(“We will not consider a bald legal proposition presented without
argument or development.”).
¶ 29 We are also not persuaded by Franklin’s argument that the
continuing violation doctrine changes the accrual date on her
claims. The continuing violation doctrine is a federal common law
doctrine that can alter the accrual date for tort claims (including
§ 1983 claims). See Herrera v. City of Espanola, 32 F.4th 980,
993-94 (10th Cir. 2022). It applies when there are continual
unlawful acts or a series of separate acts that collectively constitute
one unlawful act, “such that if any acts occurred within the statute
of limitations, the entire course of conduct can be pursued in the
action.” Id. at 993. The doctrine does not apply when there is “a
18 discrete unlawful act” followed by “continual ill effects from the
original violation.” Id. at 993 (citations omitted).
¶ 30 Franklin asserts that she continues to suffer each year the
PPO remains in place, so the statute of limitations accrues anew
each year. Franklin argues her case is like Ben v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp., 374 F. Supp. 1199, 1202 (D. Colo. 1974), in
which the plaintiff’s civil rights were violated each time her
insurance policy renewed annually. But unlike the insurance
policy in Ben, the PPO entered once; it does not enter anew each
year. Consequently, Franklin alleged one “discrete unlawful act”
that occurred when the PPO was entered in 2012. Herrera, 32
F.4th at 993 (citation omitted). Even if the “ill effects” continue,
Franklin’s claim does not accrue again each year the PPO remains
in place. Id. (citation omitted).
¶ 31 To the extent Franklin argues that her claims accrued in
October 2024 when the dissolution court modified the PPO, we
decline to consider the argument. Franklin filed her complaint
before the court modified the PPO, so the claims asserted in the
complaint could not have related to the 2024 modification. And
19 Franklin did not ask the district court to allow her to amend the
complaint to include any claims based on the 2024 modification.5
¶ 32 To the extent Franklin raises an argument based on the
supremacy clause, she did not preserve that argument by raising it
with the district court, so we decline to address it. See Am. Fam.
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Allen, 102 P.3d 333, 340 n.10 (Colo. 2004)
(“Arguments not raised before the trial court may not be raised for
the first time on appeal.”).
5 Based on our review of the record, the only modifications the
dissolution court made to the PPO were to allow Franklin to write letters to her minor child and to allow phone or text communication if initiated by the child. The modifications do not appear to relate to any of Franklin’s constitutional complaints.
20 ¶ 33 For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did not
err by dismissing Franklin’s claims.6 See Hess, ¶ 11; Meyerstein,
282 P.3d at 470-71.
IV. Disposition
¶ 34 The district court’s judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE HARRIS and JUDGE TOW concur.
6 The district court dismissed Franklin’s § 1983 claims on the basis
that Franklin may not recover damages from the State or the district court, as an arm of the State, under § 1983. But in their motion to dismiss, the State defendants argued that all of Franklin’s claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations, and they reassert that argument on appeal. Because we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the § 1983 claims on the alternative basis that the claims are barred by the statute of limitations, see Laleh v. Johnson, 2017 CO 93, ¶ 24 (an appellate court can affirm a trial court’s order on any ground supported by the record, whether relied upon or even considered by the trial court), we do not reach Franklin’s contention that district court erred by concluding that the State defendants were immune from § 1983 damages.