Franklin v. Barksdale

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Virginia
DecidedJune 4, 2025
Docket7:25-cv-00323
StatusUnknown

This text of Franklin v. Barksdale (Franklin v. Barksdale) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Franklin v. Barksdale, (W.D. Va. 2025).

Opinion

CLERE’S OFFICE U.S. DIST. Ce AT HARRISONBURG, VA FILED IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT June 04, 2025 FOR THE ve oe OINISION VIRGINIA LAURA A. AUSTIN, CLE N N BY: S/J.Vasquez DEPUTY CLERE SAUNDERS MILES FRANKLIN, ) ) Plaintiff, ) Case No. 7:25-cv-00323 ) v. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION ) SGT. BARKSDALE, ¢é a/, ) By: | Hon. Thomas T. Cullen ) United States District Judge Defendants. )

Plaintiff Saunders Miles Franklin, proceeding pro se, filed this civil-rights action under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 against various employees of the Lynchburg Adult Detention Center in Lynchburg, Virginia, related to an alleged assault by Defendant Set. Barksdale against Plaintiff. (See generally Compl. [ECF No. 1].) Plaintiff did not pay the filing fee before filing his complaint and is instead seeking leave to proceed with this action 7m forma pauperis. (See id.; Prisoner Trust Account Report [ECF No. 2].) Under the “three-strikes” provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (““PLRA”), a prisoner may not bring a civil action without prepayment of fees, even upon meeting the 7 forma pauperis requirements, “if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brough an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Upon the court’s review, Plaintiff has had more than three cases dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim while incarcerated, including:

(i) Franklin v. Green, Case No. 7:98-cv-00275 (W.D. Va.) (dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)); (ii) Franklin v. Ayers, Case No. 7:03-cv-00036 (W.D. Va.) (dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)); (iii) Franklin v. Jones, et al., Case No. 7:23-cv-00481 (W.D. Va.) (dismissed for failure to state a claim); and (iv) Franklin v. Agnor, et al., Case No. 7:24-cv-00204 (W.D. Va.) (dismissed for failure to state a claim). Because Plaintiff has three “strikes” under § 1915(g), he is only eligible to proceed without prepaying the filing fee if he demonstrates that he “is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). This exception to the three-strikes rule “allows a very narrow class of prisoner claims to bypass the ‘three strikes’ rule.” Meyers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 801 F. App’x 90, 95 (4th Cir. 2020). Importantly, “the requisite imminent danger of serious physical injury must exist at the time the complaint or the risk that the conduct complained of [must] threaten[] continuing or future injury . . . .” Chase v. O’Malley, 466 F. App’x 185, 186 (4th Cir. 2012). When a prisoner has three or more strikes and does not show imminent danger, he or she must pay the full filing fee before proceeding with his or her claims. See Green v. Young, 454 F.3d 405, 407–08 (4th Cir. 2006).

Here, Plaintiff’s filings do not show that he is in imminent danger of serious physical harm because his allegations concern only past danger. “[S]omeone whose danger has passed cannot reasonably be described as someone who ‘is’ in ‘imminent’ danger.” Hall v. United States, 44 F.4th 218, 224 (4th Cir. 2022). Although “past danger or past threats of danger may be considered in evaluating whether the danger is imminent at the time of filing . . ., past allegations of danger or threats of harm on their own are insufficient to satisfy the exception.” Id. (citing Chase, 466 F. App’x at 186) (emphasis in original). Absent specific factual allegations showing that a threat to a plaintiff’s health or safety persists in the present, a prisoner cannot rely on the exception to the three-strikes rule. See Smith v. Stirling, No. 9:20-2359-TMC-MHC,

2020 WL 8713675, at *3 (D.S.C. Sept. 10, 2020) (citing Johnson v. Warner, 200 F. App’x 270, 272 (4th Cir. 2006)). Plaintiff’s complaint lacks the necessary factual allegations to show that any threat of harm persists in the present. (See Compl. 3–4.) His allegations concern a single past incident and the past behavior of Defendants during that incident. (See id.) He offers no indication that he perceives any present threat to his safety or wellbeing at the hands of the Defendants. For

this reason, Plaintiff is not eligible for the exception to § 1915(g)’s three-strikes provision and cannot proceed with this action without first paying the full filing fee. The court will therefore deny Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis and will order that he pay the full filing fee within 30 days to proceed with his claims in this action. The Clerk is directed to send copies of this Memorandum Opinion and the accompanying order to Plaintiff.

ENTERED this 4th day of June, 2025. /s/ Thomas T. Cullen HON. THOMAS T. CULLEN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Related

Warren Chase v. Martin O'Malley
466 F. App'x 185 (Fourth Circuit, 2012)
Johnson v. Warner
200 F. App'x 270 (Fourth Circuit, 2006)
Marc Hall v. United States
44 F.4th 218 (Fourth Circuit, 2022)

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Bluebook (online)
Franklin v. Barksdale, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/franklin-v-barksdale-vawd-2025.