Franklin, P. v. Franklin, D.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

Franklin, P. v. Franklin, D.

DecidedMarch 4, 2016

Docket736 MDA 2015

StatusUnpublished

This text of Franklin, P. v. Franklin, D. (Franklin, P. v. Franklin, D.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Franklin, P. v. Franklin, D., (Pa. Ct. App. 2016).

Pincite

Opinion

J-S07017-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

PENNY L. FRANKLIN IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee

v.

DENNIS J. FRANKLIN

Appellant No. 736 MDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered March 31, 2015 In the Court of Common Pleas of Susquehanna County Civil Division at No(s): 2008-1154-CP

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OTT, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED MARCH 04, 2016

Dennis J. Franklin (Husband) brings this appeal from the order entered

on March 31, 2015, in the Court of Common Pleas of Susquehanna County,

and made final by the divorce decree entered July 23, 2015. The March 31,

2015 order disposed of Husband’s exceptions to the amended Master’s

Report and Recommendations, dated December 9, 2014, and directed the

Recommendations to be made an order of court. In this appeal, Husband

presents three issues: (1) “[D]id [the Master’s Report, issued on September

12, 2013,] become a final order which was binding on the court at the time

of its March 31, 2015 decision”, (2) “When the court directed the Master to

determine the amount of spousal maintenance, did the Master make that

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-S07017-16

determination based on appropriate standards,” and (3) “In establishing the

amount of maintenance, should the Master have utilized a division of the

royalty payments as his basis for awarding a payment in lieu of

maintenance?” Husband’s Brief at 4. Based upon the following, we affirm

on the basis of the trial court’s opinion.

As we write primarily for the parties who are well acquainted with the

factual and procedural history, we need not discuss the background of the

case here. We proceed directly to Wife’s argument that this Court should

quash Husband’s appeal. On August 17, 2015, Wife filed an application to

quash Husband’s appeal. This Court, on October 7, 2015, denied the

application without prejudice to raise the issue to the merits panel. In her

brief, Wife has renewed her request that we quash this appeal.

When deficiencies in a brief hinder this Court’s ability to conduct

meaningful appellate review, this Court may dismiss the appeal entirely or

find certain issues to be waived. Pa.R.A.P. 2101; Irwin Union Nat. Bank

and Trust Co. v. Famous, 4 A.3d 1099, 1103 (Pa. Super. 2010). Where

breaches of the rules of appellate procedure do not prevent meaningful

review, the merits of the appeal may be addressed. See Savoy v. Savoy,

641 A.2d 596, 598 (Pa. Super. 1994).

Wife claims that Husband’s counseled brief and reproduced record are

defective for failure to comply with the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate

Procedure. Wife notes, first, that the brief fails to include the statement of

scope and standard of review, a Rule 1925(b) averment, the trial court’s

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answers to the questions involved, Pa.R.A.P. 2116, and a copy of the trial

court’s opinion. See Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(3), 2111(d), 2116, and 2111(b),

respectively. Second, Wife states Husband’s statement of the case is

incomplete as Husband fails to provide references to the record, and

therefore fails to comply with Pa.R.C.P. 2117(c). Third, Wife states

Husband’s argument sections are not properly divided as required by

Pa.R.A.P. 2119, and that the argument does not set forth the place in the

record where the issue was raised or preserved, as required by Pa.R.A.P.

2119(e). Fourth, Wife faults Husband’s failure to cite to legal authority in

both his statement of jurisdiction and his argument, as mandated by

Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(1), 2114, and 2119(b). Finally, Wife complains not only

are the contents of the reproduced record not designated, but the

reproduced record is also wholly inadequate. Wife states Husband has

produced no transcripts and only four exhibits, and failed to provide a copy

of his own exceptions that led to the appeal, or the trial court’s opinion

regarding his exceptions. In this regard, Wife cites Pa.R.A.P. 2154.

Our review confirms Wife’s position that Husband’s brief is fraught with

violations of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. However, while

this Court is greatly displeased with the brief submitted by counsel, we will

not dismiss this appeal. See Long v. Ostroff, 854 A.2d 524, 527 (Pa.

Super. 2004) (merits of appeal considered despite party violating rules of

appellate procedure where violations did not impede review). Rather, we

have reviewed the record, the arguments presented by Husband, and the

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relevant statutes, rules and case law, and conclude Husband’s claims are

meritless.1

Contrary to Husband’s position, it is clear that the Court’s March 31,

2015 order is the final, appealable order in this case, 2 and we affirm on the

basis of the trial court’s March 31, 2015 opinion, filed in support of its order

denying Husband’s exceptions and making the amended Master’s report and

recommendations of December 9, 2014 an order of court.3

1 “Our standard of review when assessing the propriety of an order effectuating the equitable distribution of marital property is whether the trial court abused its discretion by a misapplication of the law or failure to follow proper legal procedure.” Balicki v. Balicki, 4 A.3d 654, 662–663 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Additionally, “[f]ollowing divorce, alimony provides a secondary remedy and is available only where economic justice and the reasonable needs of the parties cannot be achieved by way of an equitable distribution.” Id. at 659. 2 See Wilson v. Wilson, 828 A.2d 376, 378 (Pa. Super. 2003) (“It is well settled that a pre-divorce decree distributing marital property is an interlocutory order.”); Verdile v. Verdile, 536 A.2d 1364, 1366 (Pa. Super. 1988) (“[equitable] distribution order is reviewable once rendered final by entry of a divorce decree”). 3 In the event of future proceedings, the parties are directed to attach a copy of the trial court’s March 31, 2015 opinion, to this memorandum.

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Order affirmed. Application to quash appeal denied.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 3/4/2016

-5- Circulated 02/18/2016 12:17 PM (

PENNY FRANKLIN : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Plaintiff, :OFSUSQUEHANNACOUNTY, .. : COMMONWEALTH OF PENNS~Y,~ v. . .... ·: :, -~·~ i ••• .

: CNILACTION ... -...·~ :·:,:.~ ·--:-·: DENNIS FRANKLIN Defendant. : NO.: 2008 -1154 C.P. ~ :.~ i~~ .... -- ..-·.

ORDER ..... ~ ..... ::.-.:, .. NOW, this 31st day of March, 2015, for the reasons articulated in our acc~inpaiiying: ., ·t··

Opinion, we dispose of the Petition before the Court, generally regarded as exceptions to the

masters' report and recommendations, and order that the recommendations of the master attached

hereto are made an Order of the Court.

For the sakeof clarity, we note that thirty-five percent (35%) of the oil and gas royalties

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