Franklin National Bank v. Ives

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Franklin National Bank v. Ives

27 A.D.2d 744, 277 N.Y.S.2d 504, 1967 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4815

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedFebruary 20, 1967

StatusPublished

This text of 27 A.D.2d 744 (Franklin National Bank v. Ives) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Franklin National Bank v. Ives, 27 A.D.2d 744, 277 N.Y.S.2d 504, 1967 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4815 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1967).

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Opinion

Resettled judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, dated March 23, 1965, reversed, with $10 costs and disbursements, and plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment denied. In our opinion, there are triable fact issues, barring summary judgment, as to (a) whether there was a secret preference given to plaintiff’s assignor and (b) whether the preference, secret or not, was obtained by duress. If there was such secret preference, it would be void and inoperative (Solinger v. Earle, 82 N. Y. 393; White v. Kuntz, 107 N. Y. 518; Hanover Nat. Bank v. Blake, 142 N. Y. 404). If the preference was not secret, but was obtained by duress, it would be voidable (Port Chester Elec. Constr. Corp. v. Hastings Terraces, 284 App. Div. 966; see, also, J. M. Deutsch, Inc. v. Robert Paper Co., 13 A D 2d 768); and the further question would then arise as to whether defendants had ratified it by their subsequent conduct. Brennan, Acting P. J.) Rabin, Hopkins, Benjamin and Munder, JJ., concur.

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Resettled judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, dated March 23, 1965, reversed, with $10 costs and disbursements, and plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment denied. In our opinion, there are triable fact issues, barring summary judgment, as to (a) whether there was a secret preference given to plaintiff’s assignor and (b) whether the preference, secret or not, was obtained by duress. If there was such secret preference, it would be void and inoperative (Solinger v. Earle, 82 N. Y. 393; White v. Kuntz, 107 N. Y. 518; Hanover Nat. Bank v. Blake, 142 N. Y. 404). If the preference was not secret, but was obtained by duress, it would be voidable (Port Chester Elec. Constr. Corp. v. Hastings Terraces, 284 App. Div. 966; see, also, J. M. Deutsch, Inc. v. Robert Paper Co., 13 A D 2d 768); and the further question would then arise as to whether defendants had ratified it by their subsequent conduct. Brennan, Acting P. J.) Rabin, Hopkins, Benjamin and Munder, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

27 A.D.2d 744, 277 N.Y.S.2d 504, 1967 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4815, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/franklin-national-bank-v-ives-nyappdiv-1967.

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