Franklin County Memorial Hospital v. Sabrina Fairman

• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Decided: April 20, 2023
• Docket: 2021-IA-01283-SCT
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI

NO. 2021-IA-01283-SCT

FRANKLIN COUNTY MEMORIAL HOSPITAL

v.

SABRINA FAIRMAN

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/01/2021 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. DEBRA W. BLACKWELL TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: S. MARK WANN KELLY HOLLINGSWORTH STRINGER LANE B. REED KRISTIAN ALICIA McCRAY COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: FRANKLIN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: KELLY HOLLINGSWORTH STRINGER S. MARK WANN LANE B. REED ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: KRISTIAN ALICIA McCRAY NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED AND REMANDED - 04/20/2023 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:

BEFORE KING, P.J., CHAMBERLIN AND ISHEE, JJ.

ISHEE, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:

¶1. At issue in this interlocutory appeal is whether the statute of limitations has run on

Sabrina Fairman’s malpractice claims against Franklin County Memorial Hospital. Fairman

alleged she was injured as a result of negligent treatment in the Hospital’s emergency room.

She served a timely notice of claim on the Hospital’s CEO that correctly identified the

Hospital as the responsible party. But when she filed suit, Fairman named as defendants

“The Foundation for a Healthy Franklin County d/b/a Franklin County Memorial Hospital” as well as several John Does. According to the Hospital, it “is not, and never has been, the

d/b/a of the Foundation.”

¶2. Fairman filed an amended complaint naming the Hospital correctly and then

voluntarily dismissed the Foundation as a party by agreed order. She then served the

amended complaint on the Hospital’s CEO within 120 days of the timely filing of the original

complaint. The Hospital moved to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds, but the circuit

court denied the motion. This Court granted the Hospital’s request for an interlocutory

appeal of that decision.

¶3. This case has been presented as hinging on the doctrine of misnomer—whether

Fairman’s original complaint named the Hospital as the defendant under the wrong name.

The Hospital contends that, otherwise, Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 21 required

Fairman to secure leave of the court before amending her complaint.

¶4. Ultimately, we conclude that this is not a case of misnomer, but the trial court was

nonetheless correct to refuse to dismiss the case. Rule 21 should not be read to require a

court order when an amended complaint could otherwise be filed as a matter of course and

the amendment merely corrects a misidentification of the defendant by substituting a new

defendant for an old one.

¶5. Under Rule 15, Fairman’s amended complaint related back to the time of the filing

of the first complaint for statute of limitations purposes, and the original complaint was

timely. We therefore affirm the trial court’s order denying the Hospital’s motion to dismiss,

and we remand the case for further proceedings.

2 STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶6. “The application of a statute of limitations raises a question of law, which is reviewed

de novo.” Wolfe v. Delta Discount Drugs, Inc., 291 So. 3d 339, 341 (Miss. 2020).

DISCUSSION

¶7. The Hospital presents three “questions,” but it divides its argument into just two

issues. We agree that the first two questions present one issue, so we will address them

together; but the third question should be addressed first.

1. Whether a Rule 54 judgment entered as to the named defendant signed by the Court prior to the filing of an Amended Complaint precludes relation back for purposes of the statute of limitations.

¶8. Fairman filed her amended complaint the same day the trial court entered the agreed

order dismissing the Foundation as a defendant. According to the docket, the amended

complaint was filed first. In this issue, the Hospital contends that the suit became a nullity

when the agreed order was signed by the trial judge, which was a few days before the

amended complaint was filed. The Hospital further contends that even though the original

complaint named numerous John Does as defendants, it did so frivolously and stated no

claims against any other identified party. Therefore, the Hospital argues, there was no

existing cause in which Fairman could file her amended complaint.

¶9. We find this argument without merit. The amended complaint is docketed first, and

the order dismissing the Foundation recites that the amended complaint had already been

filed. The date that the trial judge signed the agreed order does not matter; it is the entry of

the order that makes it effective, especially if it is to be viewed as a final judgment in the

3 case. Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 58 states in relevant part that “[a] judgment shall

be effective only when entered [by the clerk] as provided in M.R.C.P. 79(a).” The agreed

order was not entered until after the amended complaint was filed, and thus it could not have

constituted a final judgment. As we shall explain, the amended complaint was properly filed

without leave of the court; thus, this issue is without merit.

2. Whether Rule 21 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure requires an order of the Court as a prerequisite to the filing of an Amended Complaint when the Amended Complaint adds a new legal entity as a party defendant.

3. Whether the trial court erred when it held Franklin County Memorial Hospital was not a new defendant added by the Amended Complaint.

¶10. In the remaining issues, the Hospital contends that the amended complaint added a

new party and that Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 21 required leave of the trial court

before the amended complaint could be filed. The Hospital reasons that since the only named

defendant—the Foundation—was dismissed and since the amended complaint was filed

without leave, the whole case should have been dismissed.

¶11. The trial court denied the Hospital’s motion to dismiss, reasoning that the amended

complaint was filed to correct a misnomer, which this court has described as “allow[ing]

parties to correct party-name errors if doing so would not result in prejudice.” Scaggs v.

GPCH-GP, Inc., 23 So. 3d 1080, 1083 (Miss. 2010). Were it a misnomer, the amended

complaint would have just changed the name of a party, no new party would have been

added, and no Rule 21 order would have been required.

4 ¶12. On appeal, the Hospital argues that the trial court was wrong because a misnomer

occurs when a plaintiff sues the “right party by the wrong name.” Id. at 1085 (quoting

Roberts v. Michaels, 219 F.3d 775, 777-78 (8th Cir. 2000)). “A ‘misidentification,’ on the

other hand, occurs when two separate legal entities exist, and a plaintiff mistakenly sues an

entity with a name similar to that of the correct entity.” 67A C.J.S. Parties § 176, Westlaw

(database updated Mar. 2023). “Because a misidentification directs the documents regarding

the action [to] the wrong entity, the correct defendant is generally not put on notice of the

action, and consequences of misidentification are harsh.” Id.

¶13. The Hospital is correct that today’s case falls into the misidentification category. The

Foundation is a separate legal entity from the Hospital, even though the two have been

represented by the same law firm, share a business relationship, have similar names and

geographic locations, and so forth. The original complaint—though alleging misconduct of

the Hospital, unambiguously names the Foundation, not the Hospital, as the defendant.

¶14. But the Hospital is wrong about the misnomer issue being dispositive. Rule 21 states

in relevant part that “[p]arties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of

any party or of its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just.”

According to the Hospital, an order of the trial court was required before Fairman could

amend her complaint to add it as a defendant. The Hospital relies on Veal v. J.P. Morgan

Trust Co., 955 So. 2d 843 (Miss. 2007), in which this Court held that a new party could not

be added by consent of the existing defendants under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure

15(a). This Court noted that the existing defendants should not be allowed to consent to the

5 amendment on behalf of the new defendant. Id. at 844-45. It also rejected the plaintiff’s

argument that the amended complaint was simply substituting the new defendant for a

fictitious party named in the original complaint. Id. at 845-47. Notably, Veal also quoted

a decision from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals which held that “[a]lthough Rule 15(a)

generally permits the plaintiff to amend his complaint once as a matter of course before a

response pleading is served . . . the plaintiff’s requested amendment required leave from the

court because it sought to assert claims against additional defendants.” Veal, 955 So. 2d at

847 (alterations in original) (quoting Moore v. Indiana, 999 F.2d 1125, 1128 (7th Cir.

1993)).

¶15. We do not find that passage from Veal applicable to today’s case. The amended

complaint in Veal was purportedly filed with permission of the defendants, not as a matter

of course before a responsive pleading as in today’s case. Veal, 955 So. 2d at 844-45. As

the trial court in Veal observed, the old defendants were not the “adverse party” to the

amended complaint adding new defendants. See Id. at 845. Rule 15(a)—not Rule

21—required leave of the Court to file an amended complaint, and the trial judge never

entered an order approving of the addition of the new party. Veal, 955 So. 2d at 844-45.

¶16. At any rate, Rule 21 does not require leave of the Court to file an amended complaint;

it requires an “order of the Court” to “drop[] or add[]” a party. The Rule 21 order may be

done “on motion of any party or of [the court’s] own initiative at any stage of the action and

on such terms as are just.” We see no reason why the amended complaint could not be filed

first (if otherwise allowed by the Rules) and the Court order approving the addition of a new

6 party later. This is the position taken by Wright & Miller with regard to the parallel federal

rules—“if plaintiff files an amended complaint without first obtaining leave to add an

additional party, the defect may be corrected and does not justify dismissal of the action.” 7

Charles Allen Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1688 (3d ed.),

Westlaw (database updated Apr. 2023).

¶17. The agreed order of dismissal in today’s case recited that “an amended complaint has

been filed to correct [an] error in naming [the defendant].” The trial judge further denied the

Hospital’s motion to dismiss, approving of Fairman’s amended complaint. These orders

satisfy any requirement of court approval Rule 21 might impose.

¶18. Moreover, as noted above, the original complaint misidentified the intended defendant

by identifying the Hospital as a d/b/a/ of the Foundation. The amended complaint simply

corrected this misidentification, placing the Hospital into the exact position of the Foundation

in the original complaint and removing the Foundation as a defendant entirely. “Several

[federal] courts have held that [federal] Rule 21 contemplates the retention of one or more

parties in the action and is not a method for substituting the sole plaintiff or defendant in the

case with another party.” 7 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure § 1686 (3d ed.), Westlaw (database updated Apr. 2023). Indeed, Veal said as

much when it acknowledged that leave of the court would not have been required had the

new defendant been substituted for an existing fictitious defendant under Rule 9(h). Veal,

955 So. 2d at 845. Thus, since the amended complaint was otherwise permitted by the rules,

Rule 21 did not require an order of the court to substitute the Hospital for the Foundation.

7 ¶19. The only remaining question is whether the statute of limitations has run. Both parties

agree that the original complaint was filed within the statute of limitations, which expired

before the amended complaint was filed. Thus, the question is whether the amended

complaint relates back to the time of the filing of the original complaint.

¶20. It is apparent to us that it did. Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) provides, in

relevant part:

(c) Relation Back of Amendments.

(1) Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading.

(2) An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period provided by Rule 4(h) for service of the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment:

(a) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining the party’s defense on the merits, and

(b) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party.

Fairman’s claims in the amended complaint arose from the same transaction or

occurrence—she simply changed the name of the defendant. And there can be no question

that the Hospital received timely notice of the claim and “knew or should have known that,

but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been

brought against” the Hospital. M.R.C.P. 15(c)(1)(b). The Hospital’s CEO received written

8 notice of the claim prior to the initiation of the action that identified the Hospital as the

responsible party, which was sufficient notice for the amended complaint to relate back. See

Scaggs v. GPCH-GP, Inc., 23 So. 3d 1080, 1083 (Miss. 2010) (citing Mieger v. Pearl River

Cnty., 986 So. 2d 1025 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008)). Moreover, the Hospital’s CEO was served

with the amended complaint within the 120 days allowed for service of the original complaint

by Rule 4(h). See M.R.C.P. 15(c)(2). No prejudice has been alleged. Thus, we find that

Fairman’s amended complaint relates back to the time of filing the original complaint and

that the statute of limitations has not run.

CONCLUSION

¶21. Rule 21 does not require leave of the court to file an amended complaint if the

amendment merely substitutes the correct defendant for a misidentified one. The amended

complaint here was otherwise permitted by the rules. And it was served within the 120 days

allowed for service of the original complaint, so it related back and the statute of limitations

has not run. The trial court’s order denying the Hospital’s motion to dismiss is affirmed, and

the case is remanded for further proceedings.

¶22. AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.

RANDOLPH, C.J., KITCHENS AND KING, P.JJ., COLEMAN, MAXWELL, BEAM, CHAMBERLIN AND GRIFFIS, JJ., CONCUR.