Frankie Haigood v. the State of Texas

Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-25-00029-CR

FRANKIE HAIGOOD, APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

On Appeal from the 320th District Court Potter County, Texas Trial Court No. 082639-D-CR, Honorable Steven Denny, Presiding

November 6, 2025 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and DOSS, JJ.

Appellant, Frankie Haigood, appeals the trial court’s judgment memorializing his

conviction for engaging in deadly conduct. Through his sole issue, he maintains that the

trial court’s judgment should be reformed to reflect two days of credit toward his ten-year

sentence rather than just one reflected in the judgment. We affirm the judgment as

executed by the trial court. Discussion

Article 42.03 provides that the trial court shall give the defendant credit on the

defendant’s sentence for the time the defendant spent “in jail for the case” from the time

of his arrest and confinement until his sentencing. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42.03,

§ 2; Ex parte Jasper, 538 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). Allegedly, appellant

was 1) taken into custody in the late hours of the night on June 10, 2022; 2) initially

transported to a hospital to be medically cleared; 3) eventually booked into the Potter

County jail in the wee hours of June 11, 2025; and 4) bonded out of jail on the day of

booking. Those purported circumstances reveal, according to appellant, entitlement to

two days’ jail credit against his ensuing ten-year sentence. We reject the contention for

several reasons.

First, the argument is inadequately briefed. Aside from quoting the aforementioned

statute, he provides no substantive discussion explaining its application to the

circumstances at hand. For instance, and assuming the appellate record contains

evidence supporting his factual claims, nowhere does he attempt to illustrate (or cite

authority showing) how the several hours involved here can morph into “two days.” Does

the mere happenstance of being arrested at 11:59 p.m. and released three minutes later

at 12:02 a.m. equal two days simply because the arrest occurred on one calendar day

and the release on the next? Is that how one must calculate jail time credit? Or, to

paraphrase Cousin Vinny, “perhaps the laws of physics cease to exist [in the Potter

County jail]” thereby making time pass at a quicker pace? Appellant seemingly wants us

to answer one or more of these basic questions in his favor without his assistance through

substantive argument and citation to authority. But, the burden was his to supply just that

2 in his appellate brief. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 896–

97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Because he did not, he waived his complaint. See Schwartz

v. State, 07-23-00274-CR, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 5898, at *15 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug.

15, 2024, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

Second, the only document supposedly establishing when appellant was confined

in jail is an unauthenticated copy of an email appended to his appellant’s brief. Said email

was not part of the appellate record filed with us. And, this is fatal since we may not

consider matters outside the appellate record. See TEX. R. APP. P. 34.1; Davy v. State,

525 S.W.3d 745, 750 n.6 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2017, pet. ref’d); Viscaino v. State, 513

S.W.3d 802, 814 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.). Nor does any evidence within the

same appellate record demonstrate when appellant was released from jail on bond.

Without that, pivotal components to calculating jail time credit are missing.

We overrule appellant’s sole issue and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Brian Quinn Chief Justice

Do not publish.