Frank v. United States

42 Cont. Cas. Fed. 77,216, 79 Ct. Cl. 516, 1934 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 271
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJune 4, 1934
DocketNo. F-26
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 42 Cont. Cas. Fed. 77,216 (Frank v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Frank v. United States, 42 Cont. Cas. Fed. 77,216, 79 Ct. Cl. 516, 1934 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 271 (cc 1934).

Opinion

Williams, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This suit was instituted by Jacob Frank, now deceased. The administrators of Frank’s estate have been substituted as parties plaintiff.

Frank, in response to public proposal of the Surplus Property Division of the War Department to sell certain surplus drugs and chemicals at prices and in the minimum quantities stated in the proposal f.o.b. points of storage, bid upon and was awarded, omitting items not in suit, argyrol or equivalent, 128,075 ounces, and protargol or equivalent, 854,880 ounces. The decedent, under the terms of the proposal, made a deposit of $22,562.27, ten percent of the. amount of his bid. The claim is for a balance of $20,784.28 of the deposit applicable, to the argyrol and protargol awarded the decedent on his bid, which were not withdrawn and paid for by him.

The bid was submitted in the name of the Frank Lang-ham Company, a partnership entered into between the decedent and Frank Langham for the purpose of buying and selling surplus Government property. After the acceptance of the bid the award was made in the name of the decedent at the request of Frank Langham Company. Prior to the submission of the bid the Frank Langham Company had entered into a verbal agreement with reputed agents of the Russian Soviet Government whereby they were to purchase from the company the argyrol and protargol involved in suit and advance the money necessary for payment of the purchase price to the United States. Officials of the War Department having to do with the sale of the drugs were [525]*525informed of this arrangement by the decedent and Langham but had no part in it. Subsequent to the sale and within the time in which decedent was required to pay for the drugs, decedent, through his representative Langham, called upon the Soviet agents to furnish the funds necessary for payment to the Government of the purchase price of the argyrol and protargol. They refused to furnish the money or proceed in the matter until decedent had procured an •export license for the drugs to Eussia, which was required under the proclamation of the President, effective from February 16, 1918. Up to that time the decedent did not know of the existence of the embargo against exportation of goods from the United States to Russia, except by license. He made diligent efforts to obtain a license for the exportation of the drugs and chemicals but was unable to do so. Whereupon he requested cancellation of his contract of purchase, which was refused, but an extension of 90 days was granted him in which to make payment. During this 90-day period Langham, acting for the decedent, made diligent but unsuccessful efforts to dispose of the argyrol and protargol on the domestic market. The decedent being unable to sell the drugs could not pay for them and after the expiration of the 90 days’ extension of time requested that the articles be resold for the decedent’s account. The defendant proceeded to resell the available argyrol and protargol not withdrawn and paid for by the decedent for his account, at a price greatly below the price at which they had been sold to the decedent. The defendant has filed a counterclaim in which judgment is asked against plaintiffs in the amount of $118,031.15, the alleged loss sustained by defendant on the resale of the goods after crediting decedent with all the deposit money paid upon their purchase.

Plaintiffs predicate their right to recover the balance of the deposit money retained by the United States on the ground that the contract was void because the defendant was unable to deliver the drugs for export to Russia. It is contended that the Government, being unable to deliver the drugs for export because of the embargo, was no more able to perform the contract than it would have been had [526]*526it not owned or possessed drugs is valid only if the defendant contracted to deliver the drugs for export to Russia with a guarantee of their exportability to that country. There is nothing in the terms of the sale, which consists of the defendant’s proposal to sell, the decedent’s bid in response thereto, and the defendant’s acceptance of the same, to justify this contention. There was no representation or guarantee on the part of the defendant in any way that the goods were exportable. The proposal was for the unconditional sale of the drugs at fixed prices shown in an attached list f.o.b. points of storage. The bid was for the unqualified purchase of the entire lot offered, at the prices stated, accompanied with a certified check for 10 percent of the amount of the bid. The acceptance of the bid and the award of the drugs to decedent were likewise unqualified. The embargo against the exportation of the goods to Russia did not affect the contract between the decedent and the defendant, but only the agreement between the decedent and the Soviet agents, to which the United States was not a party. The Government had title to the goods sold, was in possession of them, and was able and ready to make delivery in accordance with contract terms. In these circumstances the existence of an embargo against the exportation of the goods to Russia at the time the award was made is immaterial and in no way affected the validity of the contract, and this would also be true had the embargo been established subsequent to the sale. Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458. It is not necessary to consider what effect the existence of the embargo would have had on the validity of the contract if the Government had in fact sold the drugs for export to Russia, as the plaintiffs contend it did. The drugs were not so sold, and that question is not in the case, in which respect it is clearly distinguished from Bencoe Exporting & Importing Co. v. Erie City Iron Works et al., 280 Fed. 690, cited and relied on by plaintiffs. The contract was valid and the defendant acted well within its rights in refusing to cancel it, and in retaining the balance of the deposit money applicable to the drugs not withdrawn and paid for by the decedent pending an adjudication [527]*527of the rights and liabilities of the parties under the contract, the decedent being entitled to credit for the amount withheld.

the counterclaim;

The plaintiffs in the brief question the authority of Lang-ham to act for the decedent in requesting an extension of time of 90 days in which to dispose of the drugs in the domestic market after they had been awarded decedent and after the Soviet agents had refused to accept them and advance the purchase price, and also his authority to request the defendant to resell them after Langham’s and decedent’s efforts to sell them had proved fruitless. The facts do not support this contention. Decedent and Langham were partners in buying and selling surplus Government property. They had organized a company for the express purpose of carrying on that business, and the bid was submitted in the name of the company. Langham was the active member of the company and conducted all the negotiations leading up to the purchase of the goods. He visited the department and talked with defendant’s officers having to do with the sale. He conducted the negotiations with the Soviet agents and personally made the arrangements with them whereby they were to repurchase the argyrol and protargol and furnish the funds to pay the defendant for them. He conducted all the negotiations with officers of the Government looking to the procurement of an export license for the drugs. He made diligent efforts during the extended period for making payment to sell the drugs on the domestic market.

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Related

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162 Ct. Cl. 390 (Court of Claims, 1963)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
42 Cont. Cas. Fed. 77,216, 79 Ct. Cl. 516, 1934 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 271, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/frank-v-united-states-cc-1934.