Frank v. Frank, No. Fa97 034 77 19 S (Jan. 30, 2002) Ct Page 1237

2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 1236
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedJanuary 30, 2002
DocketNo. FA97 034 77 19 S
StatusUnpublished

This text of 2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 1236 (Frank v. Frank, No. Fa97 034 77 19 S (Jan. 30, 2002) Ct Page 1237) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Frank v. Frank, No. Fa97 034 77 19 S (Jan. 30, 2002) Ct Page 1237, 2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 1236 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON MOTION FOR MODIFICATION (DOCKET ENTRY 150) AND MOTION FOR CONTEMPT (DOCKET ENTRY NO. 148)
The current matter before the court is Rocco J. Frank's Motion to Modify Visitation dated September 14, 2001.1 Mr. Frank seeks unsupervised visits with his two children, Andrew, born February 6, 1994 and Rachel; born September 17, 1996.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Custody and parental visitation have been contested issues from the moment the plaintiff father filed his original petition for marriage dissolution. In January, 1998, the parents agreed to refer the issue of visitation to the Bridgeport Superior Court Family Relations Office (hereinafter family relations) for mediation.2

The parties were divorced pursuant to a judgment of dissolution issued on August 21, 1998. By understanding of the parties, that judgment granted the defendant sole custody of the two minor children. The agreement also provided that "After six months the issue of visitation will be revisited by the court and a determination will be made concerning further visitation."

Beginning in December 1998 and on a regular basis since that date, the Plaintiff has petitioned this court in his effort to secure unsupervised visitation.3 In March of 1999, the trial court ordered that family relations complete a full custody and visitation evaluation.4 At the same time, the parties agreed that the plaintiff would have a psychological evaluation conducted by Harry Adamakos. The parties further arranged to have a telephone placed in Andrew's bedroom in order to facilitate the child's private communication with his father.

On October 19, 2000, in response to one of the plaintiff's many motions for visitation, the court ordered the parties to participate in mediation. While mediation was pending, they both. accepted the following court ordered supervised visitation schedule: Thursday 4:30 p.m. to 6:30 CT Page 1238 p.m., Friday 6:00 p.m. to 7:30 p.m. and Sunday 1:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m., all at a neutral center. Both parties agreed that the plaintiff's fianceé could participate in some of those visits.

Further litigation and mediation soon followed. See family relations report dated January 18, 2001. By order of the trial court, family relations completed a custody and visitation evaluation. That report, dated July 3, 2001, recommended the initiation of unsupervised visits. To facilitate this change in status, the reporter further recommended that the plaintiff participate in parenting classes as well as post-dissolution counseling that would address the question of communication and co-parenting.

II FACTS OF THE CASE

The parties were heard on two days of trial on the defendant's motion to modify visitation and his motion for contempt.5 During the hearing, both testified concerning the plaintiff's character and his conduct during supervised visits. A family relations officer familiar with the children and parents testified, and her written report was submitted as a court exhibit. Additionally, supervisors at visitation centers used by the plaintiff testified before the court. The children's guardian ad litem participated in the proceedings. The court had the opportunity to evaluate the evidence and to observe the demeanor of the parties.

The litigation history of this case indicates the acrimony between these parties. Mutual distrust, coupled with a total lack of communication, has led to substantial litigation. The plaintiff does not seek to have custody of his children. At the present time, he simply requests unsupervised visitation with the children so that he can develop a meaningful parent-child relationship. Although the defendant agrees that such a relationship is desirable, she insists that it is not warranted at the present time. Her primary concern appears to be the mental stability of the plaintiff. An auxiliary fear is her belief that the plaintiff will not properly monitor the children's activities.

Visitation, not custody, has always been at issue in this case. As noted in the initial family relations report, there is no question that the defendant is a "devoted, capable mother. Her world revolves around the children's needs and she takes great joy in parenting." The children have thrived in her care. Unfortunately, the defendant is overprotective.

On the other hand, the plaintiff is also a generally acceptable parent. As observed in that same 1998 report, "there is no indication that CT Page 1239 it would not be safe for Andrew and Rachel to spend longer periods of time in their father's care." More recently, he is in a new relationship. He relates well to his fiancée, Terry Finch, and Ms. Finch's own two children, aged seven and sixteen. Both of these children interact well with the plaintiff. His home environment is calm, well-kept and spacious enough for his growing children.

Court orders made it clear that supervised visitation might not continue indefinitely. Initially, family relations envisioned expanded visits, first with the oldest child that would include weekend overnights on a biweekly basis. Unfortunately, the parties' adversarial relationship precluded any potential for an amicable resolution of this issue.

The defendant has some concerns about the plaintiff's mental stability. In August, 1998, in support of a motion to modify child support and alimony payments, the plaintiff himself had raised that very issue. Then the plaintiff claimed "Since the date of the Court's order, Plaintiff has become afflicted with a psychiatric condition which precludes his ability to engage in a meaningful employment if any kind. Plaintiff is under a medical doctor's order to refrain from any work activity." See Motion to Modify Alimony and Child Support dated August, 1998.6

The defendant also had some hesitation due to her belief that the plaintiff did not supervise the children at all times during visits several years ago. She has relied on the fact that the plaintiff did at one time leave the children alone in the vicinity of a swimming pool. He also allowed Rachel to play in the snow without proper winter attire. However, there is no evidence that the conduct would be repeated. There is no indication that inattention remains a threat.

Even in the area of supervised visitation, the parties have had some major difficulties. The Sterling Center, site of the initial "neutral" visitation, had to be changed when the defendant acted inappropriately. Her unacceptable conduct significantly postponed the defendant's visits with his children.7 Later visits occurred at the Children's Center in Fairfield, Connecticut.

Supervisors at the two visitation centers used by these parties both testified that the plaintiff was a loving, appropriate caretaker. Part of the plaintiff's evidence included twenty-six hours of randomly selected tape recordings from the Children's Center. The children approached their father willingly, without fear or hesitation. Their mutual affection was evident.

During the sessions at both centers, the plaintiff presented himself as CT Page 1240 a caring, concerned parent. During the taped sessions, the plaintiff played with the children, read to them and talked with them. He responded to their concerns in a generally acceptable manner.

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Bluebook (online)
2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 1236, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/frank-v-frank-no-fa97-034-77-19-s-jan-30-2002-ct-page-1237-connsuperct-2002.