Frank Servillo v. People of The State of California

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedMay 17, 2021
Docket2:21-cv-03905
StatusUnknown

This text of Frank Servillo v. People of The State of California (Frank Servillo v. People of The State of California) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Frank Servillo v. People of The State of California, (C.D. Cal. 2021).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 WESTERN DIVISION 11 12 FRANK SERVILLO, ) No. CV 21-3905-JGB (PLA) ) 13 Petitioner, ) ) ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE: DISMISSAL 14 v. ) OF HABEAS PETITION ) 15 PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) CALIFORNIA, ) 16 ) Respondent. ) 17 ) 18 I 19 BACKGROUND 20 Frank Servillo (“petitioner”) initiated this action on May 4, 2021, by filing a Petition for Writ 21 of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”). The Petition challenges his conviction and sentence in Los Angeles 22 County Superior Court case number BA421848-01, in which a jury convicted petitioner of robbery 23 and a firearm allegation (Cal. Penal Code §§ 212.5, 12022.53(b)) in November 2014. Petitioner 24 25 26 27 28 1 was sentenced in January 2015 to a term of fifteen years in state prison.1 (ECF No. 1 at 22). The 2 Petition sets forth two grounds for relief: (1) petitioner’s sentence enhancement is “outdated” 3 because a new sentencing policy, Special Directive 20-14, supersedes the “Legal Policies Manual” 4 used by the trial court when imposing the enhancement; and (2) petitioner is entitled to a reduced 5 sentence enhancement pursuant to California Assembly Bill 1509 (“AB 1509”). (ECF No. 1 at 3-4). 6 7 II 8 DISCUSSION 9 Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases requires the Court to conduct a 10 preliminary review of the Petition. Pursuant to Rule 4, the Court must summarily dismiss a petition 11 “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled 12 to relief in the district court.” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases; see also 13 Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1990). Having conducted a preliminary review of 14 the Petition, the Court issues this Order to Show Cause directed to petitioner because the face 15 of the Petition suggests that his grounds for relief are not cognizable on federal habeas review, 16 and that he failed to exhaust his state court remedies. 17 A. Failure to State Cognizable Claims 18 A petitioner may seek federal habeas relief from a state court conviction or sentence if he 19 is contending that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 20 States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219, 131 S. Ct. 859, 178 L. 21 Ed. 2d 732 (2011) (per curiam); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S. Ct. 475, 116 L. Ed. 22 2d 385 (1991). Matters relating solely to the interpretation and/or application of state law generally 23 are not cognizable on federal habeas review. See, e.g., Rhoades v. Henry, 611 F.3d 1133, 1142 24 (9th Cir. 2010) (“violations of state law are not cognizable on federal habeas review”); Christian 25 26 1 As petitioner is in custody pursuant to a state court judgment, the Court construes the Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 27 2 For ease of reference, the Court refers to the ECF-generated page numbers when citing 28 1 v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 469 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Absent a showing of fundamental unfairness, a state 2 court’s misapplication of its own sentencing laws does not justify federal habeas relief.”). 3 In his first ground for relief, petitioner cites “Special Directive 20-14,” which sets forth the 4 Los Angeles County District Attorney’s resentencing policy that took effect on December 8, 2020. 5 See https://da.lacounty.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/SPECIAL-DIRECTIVE-20-14.pdf (last visited May 6 17, 2021). This claim relates only to the application of a county policy; it does not even implicate 7 a state law. Accordingly, Ground One does not present a federal question, and is not cognizable 8 on federal habeas review. 9 Ground Two likewise fails to state a federal question. Petitioner bases his sentencing 10 challenge on AB 1509, a California Assembly Bill concerning sentence enhancements that has 11 not yet been approved by the California State Legislature. (See California Legislative Information 12 website at https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billStatusClient.xhtml?bill_id=202120220AB1509 13 (last visited on May 17, 2021)). In any event, even if AB 1509 is ultimately enacted, this claim 14 would still not be cognizable as it appears to pertain only to state sentencing law. 15 B. Failure to Exhaust 16 As a matter of comity, a federal court will not entertain a habeas corpus petition unless the 17 petitioner has exhausted the available state judicial remedies on every ground presented in the 18 petition. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518-22, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982). The 19 habeas statute explicitly provides that a habeas petition brought by a person in state custody “shall 20 not be granted unless it appears that -- (A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available 21 in the courts of the State; or (B)(I) there is an absence of available State corrective process; or (ii) 22 circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.” 28 23 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). Moreover, if the exhaustion requirement is to be waived, it must be waived 24 expressly by the state, through counsel. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3). 25 Exhaustion requires that a petitioner’s contentions be fairly presented to the state supreme 26 court. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845-47, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999); James 27 v. Giles, 221 F.3d 1074, 1077 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000). A claim has not been fairly presented unless 28 the prisoner has described in the state court proceedings both the operative facts and the federal 1 legal theory on which his claim is based. See Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66, 115 S.Ct. 2 887, 130 L.Ed.2d 865 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-78, 92 S.Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 3 438 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830 (9th Cir. 1996). 4 Petitioner has the burden of demonstrating that exhaustion was completed. See, e.g., 5 Brown v. Cuyler, 669 F.2d 155, 158 (3d Cir. 1982). Here, there is no indication that petitioner has 6 presented his claims to the California Supreme Court. Accordingly, it appears that dismissal of 7 the Petition for failure to exhaust is also appropriate. 8 9 III 10 ORDER 11 In light of the foregoing, petitioner is ordered to show cause why the Petition should not be 12 dismissed. No later than June 7, 2021, petitioner must submit to the Court a response making 13 clear his arguments, if any, as to why the Petition should not be dismissed as not cognizable and 14 for failure to exhaust.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Hicks v. Pleasure House, Inc.
404 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 1971)
Picard v. Connor
404 U.S. 270 (Supreme Court, 1971)
Rose v. Lundy
455 U.S. 509 (Supreme Court, 1982)
Hilton v. Braunskill
481 U.S. 770 (Supreme Court, 1987)
Estelle v. McGuire
502 U.S. 62 (Supreme Court, 1991)
O'Sullivan v. Boerckel
526 U.S. 838 (Supreme Court, 1999)
Rhoades v. Henry
611 F.3d 1133 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Leroy Brown v. Julius T. Cuyler, Supt., at S.C.I.G.
669 F.2d 155 (Third Circuit, 1982)
Duncan v. Henry
513 U.S. 364 (Supreme Court, 1995)
Swarthout v. Cooke
178 L. Ed. 2d 732 (Supreme Court, 2011)
In re Whitaker
513 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 1994)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Frank Servillo v. People of The State of California, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/frank-servillo-v-people-of-the-state-of-california-cacd-2021.