Frank Junior Johnson v. United States

Ninth Circuit

Frank Junior Johnson v. United States

424 F.2d 537, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 10440

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

DecidedMarch 5, 1970

Docket24471_1

StatusPublished

Cited by8 cases

This text of 424 F.2d 537 (Frank Junior Johnson v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Frank Junior Johnson v. United States, 424 F.2d 537, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 10440 (9th Cir. 1970).

Pincite

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

A jury convicted Frank Junior Johnson of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (entering a federal credit union with intent to commit larceny). He testified in his own behalf, and the only substantial question is whether the prosecutor injected prejudicial error on cross-examination.

Johnson, who had not been convicted of a felony, was asked if he had been convicted of a felony, and he answered, “yes.” He had been convicted of obstructing a police officer. Under A.R.S. § 13-541, the offense could be treated by the sentencing judge either as a felony or as a misdemeanor. Johnson’s sentence made the conviction one for a misdemeanor.

This circuit has said that misdemeanor convictions may not be shown in impeachment. Carlton v. United States, 198 F.2d 795, 800 (9th Cir. 1952). But even in circuits that permit evidence of certain misdemeanor convictions for impeachment, proof of a conviction for obstructing an officer would not have been admissible. The offense does not necessarily reflect upon the honesty of the offender. See 2 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 416, at 188-190 (1969), for collected cases.

In a close case a relatively innocuous blunder may tip the balance against a defendant. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 67, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942). In a case where the proof of guilt is strong, however, the same mistake would not necessarily justify reversal. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a). Corley v. United States, 124 U.S.App.D.C. 351, 365 F.2d 884 (1966).

*538 In the case before us the proof of guilt was strong. The prosecutor’s mistake was promptly cured. The judge instructed the jury to “[l]ay the whole matter of any previous offense of any nature out of your consideration and determine this case solely on the evidence with regard to this offense and nothing else.” See United States v. Altavilla, 419 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1969); Beasley v. United States, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 406, 218 F.2d 366, cert. denied 349 U.S. 907, 75 S.Ct. 584, 99 L.Ed. 1243 (1955).

Affirmed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

PER CURIAM.

A jury convicted Frank Junior Johnson of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (entering a federal credit union with intent to commit larceny). He testified in his own behalf, and the only substantial question is whether the prosecutor injected prejudicial error on cross-examination.

Johnson, who had not been convicted of a felony, was asked if he had been convicted of a felony, and he answered, “yes.” He had been convicted of obstructing a police officer. Under A.R.S. § 13-541, the offense could be treated by the sentencing judge either as a felony or as a misdemeanor. Johnson’s sentence made the conviction one for a misdemeanor.

This circuit has said that misdemeanor convictions may not be shown in impeachment. Carlton v. United States, 198 F.2d 795, 800 (9th Cir. 1952). But even in circuits that permit evidence of certain misdemeanor convictions for impeachment, proof of a conviction for obstructing an officer would not have been admissible. The offense does not necessarily reflect upon the honesty of the offender. See 2 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 416, at 188-190 (1969), for collected cases.

In a close case a relatively innocuous blunder may tip the balance against a defendant. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 67, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942). In a case where the proof of guilt is strong, however, the same mistake would not necessarily justify reversal. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a). Corley v. United States, 124 U.S.App.D.C. 351, 365 F.2d 884 (1966).

*538 In the case before us the proof of guilt was strong. The prosecutor’s mistake was promptly cured. The judge instructed the jury to “[l]ay the whole matter of any previous offense of any nature out of your consideration and determine this case solely on the evidence with regard to this offense and nothing else.” See United States v. Altavilla, 419 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1969); Beasley v. United States, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 406, 218 F.2d 366, cert. denied 349 U.S. 907, 75 S.Ct. 584, 99 L.Ed. 1243 (1955).

Affirmed.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

424 F.2d 537, 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 10440, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/frank-junior-johnson-v-united-states-ca9-1970.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack