In the Missouri Court of Appeals Western District FRANK JINDRA, ) ) Appellant, ) WD81689 ) v. ) OPINION FILED: July 30, 2019 ) STATE OF MISSOURI, ) ) Respondent. )
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Howard County, Missouri The Honorable Scott A. Hayes, Judge
Before Division One: Victor C. Howard, Presiding Judge, Lisa White Hardwick, Judge and Gary D. Witt, Judge
Frank Jindra ("Jindra") brings this appeal from Howard County Circuit Court
challenging the motion court's denial of his Rule 29.151 motion alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel following an evidentiary hearing. Jindra argues that the motion court
erred in denying his Rule 29.15 motion because his trial counsel ("Trial Counsel") was
ineffective in failing to call a witness that he believes would have corroborated his defense.
Jindra further argues that the motion court erred in denying his Rule 29.15 motion because
Trial Counsel was ineffective in failing to thoroughly investigate a note in the discovery
1 All rule references are to Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2018), unless otherwise indicated. handwritten by Officer Alexandria Leiva ("Officer Leiva") which provided more clarity as
to the target of his threatening statements. We affirm.
Statement of Facts
On February 23, 2015, Jindra filed in Boone County Circuit Court adult abuse
petitions pursuant to Section 455.007 et. seq., requesting ex parte orders of protection
against two of his tenants. He filed the petitions in person and deputy court clerk Latoya
Gatewood ("Gatewood") received the filings. Judge Leslie Schneider ("Judge Schneider")
denied the requests for ex parte relief in the petitions the following day but set the matters
for hearing on the request for full orders of protection. Jindra called the courthouse to
check the status of his petitions and Gatewood informed him that they had been denied but
that a hearing had been set. Jindra expressed concern about his relationship with his tenants
and Gatewood advised him to contact law enforcement. Jindra asked Gatewood which
judge had denied his petitions and she told him that it had been Judge Schneider. Jindra,
appeared very frustrated and angry and told Gatewood that, "[Judge Schneider] would be
on the NBC 17 news," and that he was "going to get his gun." Gatewood, believing the
statements to be threats toward Judge Schneider, then ended the conversation and called
Judge Schneider who told her to contact the court Marshals.
The Boone County Sheriff's Department and court marshals were contacted. Judge
Schneider did a casenet search to see what she could learn about Jindra and determined
that an attorney in her husband's law firm had previously represented him in a prior order
of protection case. She contacted her husband, Tom Schneider ("Mr. Schneider") regarding
Jindra's statements to Gatewood and he advised her to take the threat seriously. Jindra had
2 previously been represented by Curt Branson ("Branson") of Jones, Schneider, & Stevens
law firm where Mr. Schneider was a senior partner.
Beginning early the same day, Jindra called the Jones, Schneider, & Stevens law
firm multiple times requesting to speak with Branson. After his conversation with
Gatewood, he called the firm requesting to speak with Mr. Schneider. The receptionist,
Dena McMasters ("McMasters") told Jindra that Mr. Schneider was not available and he
continued to hang up and call back repeatedly. McMasters asked Jindra why he needed to
speak with Mr. Schneider and Jindra responded that it was because he was married to Judge
Schneider. During the course of the many phone calls, Jindra became increasingly angry,
upset, loud and belligerent. Jindra told McMasters that the firm had, "a really nice private
parking lot, and that … maybe [they] would like to have happen to [them] what had
happened to him in his parking lot in [their] nice parking lot" and then hung up. When
McMasters relayed the statement Jindra made about the parking lot to Branson, he advised
her that based on other knowledge he had of Jindra that the statement should be considered
a threat. Approximately 20-30 minutes after Judge Schneider informed Mr. Schneider
about the threats, Jindra's phone call was put through to Mr. Schneider. As soon as Mr.
Schneider learned that it was Jindra on the phone, he informed Jindra "I can't talk to you"
and hung up.
Law enforcement officers were dispatched to Jindra's residence. When they
knocked, Jindra opened the door while holding a rifle. The officers drew their weapons
and Jindra was ordered to drop his rifle. Instead he passed the rifle back and forth between
3 his hands before finally surrendering it to an officer. He was read his Miranda2 rights and
agreed to speak with the officers. He told the officers that he had called the courthouse
and spoken with a woman who informed him Judge Schneider had denied his petitions. He
admitted to making the statements to Gatewood and he admitted to calling Mr. Schneider,
"to get him to talk to his wife and see reason." Jindra acknowledged he told the court clerk
that he owned a rifle and that Judge Schneider would end up on the news. He also said that
he did not make threats what he made were promises. He stated that he promised he "would
shoot them in the legs and not kill them." He did not clarify who he was referring to when
he said he would shoot someone in the legs.
Jindra was charged with two counts of the Class C Felony of tampering with a
Judicial Officer; Count I regarding the statements he made to Gatewood towards Judge
Schneider and Count II for his statements to McMasters while attempting to contact Mr.
Schneider. The jury found Jindra guilty and he was sentenced to one year for Count I and
six months in county jail for Count II, with the sentences to run consecutively. The Court
suspended execution of the sentence on Count II and placed Jindra on a five-year term of
probation.
Jindra's convictions were affirmed on direct appeal to this Court. State v. Jindra,
504 S.W.3d 187, 192 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016). In his amended Rule 29.15 motion Jindra
argues, in pertinent part, that Trial Counsel erred in failing to thoroughly investigate and
call Branson as a witness and Trial Counsel failed to thoroughly investigate and determine
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4 the author of a handwritten note that was included in discovery. The note stated, "said had
rifle, said wasn't going to kill tenants, but shoot in legs."
The motion court held an evidentiary hearing on February 26, 2018 ("Motion
Hearing"). Branson testified at the Motion Hearing that he was called the day after "the
incident" and during that phone call, Jindra told Branson that if "[Branson] didn't protect
him and the court didn't protect him, he'd get a gun and protect himself."3 Branson testified
that it was likely the tenants that Jindra was afraid of and wanted protection from but
Branson couldn't say for sure. Trial Counsel also testified at the hearing. Trial Counsel
testified that the decision not to call Branson as a witness was trial strategy because it may
have had a "more negative impact than a positive impact." Trial Counsel also testified that
he did not know who wrote the handwritten note in the file but he did ask opposing counsel
at trial and counsel said she did not know. Trial Counsel testified that he believed he also
asked Gatewood if she was the author of the note but could not recall for sure. He also
testified that he was not sure if he asked Officer Leiva if she was the author and that while
he believed the note would have been useful, he also thought that the other deputies he
called at trial put the testimony of Officer Leiva in a negative light and her credibility was
diminished.
Officer Leiva was also questioned at the Motion Hearing regarding a handwritten
note contained in the discovery. The note stated, "said had rifle, said wasn't going to kill
tenants, but shoot in legs." Officer Leiva testified at the Motion Hearing that she was the
3 It is unclear from the transcript which "incident" this was referring to. Branson testified that he had previously represented Jindra on a prior petition for an order of protection that was denied following an evidentiary hearing.
5 author of the handwritten note and it was in her handwriting. Officer Leiva could not recall
who she was speaking to at the time or who provided her with the information and it could
have been the court marshal, Judge Schneider, or the court clerk. At the hearing, Officer
Leiva testified that when she spoke to Jindra on the day of the incident he "promised to
shoot them in the legs, and not kill them," but that she did not know who he was referring
to when he stated "them." Jindra argues that Trial Counsel could have used the note to
argue that the threats he made were directed at the tenants and not Judge Schneider.
The motion court entered its judgment on March 21, 2018, denying Jindra's
amended Rule 29.15 Motion. The motion court found that it was trial strategy to not call
Jindra's former attorney and this did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.
The motion court further found that even if Trial Counsel was ineffective in failing to call
Jindra's former attorney, Jindra had not been prejudiced because, considering the totality
and strength of the other evidence of guilt, there is no reasonable probability that, absent
the alleged error, the fact finder would have had reasonable doubt as to guilt.
Trial Counsel was aware of the handwritten note but was under the impression it
was the words of the Clerk or Judge and it contained hearsay contents that would not have
been admissible at trial. The motion court found that Trial Counsel's strategy to focus on
a particular defense and not the note did not fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Further, even if Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue the
author of the note, Jindra had not established prejudice because there is no reasonable
probability that, absent the alleged error, the fact finder would have a reasonable doubt as
to guilt.
6 This appeal followed.
Standard of Review
In reviewing a motion court's denial of a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel
the motion court's ruling is presumed correct. Zink v. State, 278 S.W.3d 170, 175 (Mo.
banc 2009). The court is limited to "a determination of whether the findings of fact and
conclusions of law are clearly erroneous." Patterson v. State, 110 S.W.3d 896, 900 (Mo.
App. W.D. 2003). The judgment is clearly erroneous when, "the court is left with the
definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made." Middleton v. State, 80 S.W.3d
799, 804 (Mo. banc 2002). The facts are interpreted, "in the light most favorable to the
verdict[,]" and the movant must show that the motion court clearly erred by a
preponderance of the evidence. State v. Tokar, 918 S.W.2d 753, 761 (Mo. banc 1996); see
Harrison v. State, 531 S.W.3d 611, 616 (Mo. App. W.D. 2017).
To be entitled to post-conviction relief for ineffective assistance of counsel, the
movant must satisfy the two-pronged Strickland test. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984) First, to prove counsel was ineffective, the movant must show that counsel
failed to perform to the degree of skill, care, and diligence that a reasonably competent
attorney would under similar circumstances. Id. 687. This requires that the movant show
that counsel's representation "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at
688. Next the movant must also show that they were prejudiced by this failure. Id. at 687.
Prejudice occurs when "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Johnson v.
State, 406 S.W.3d 892, 899 (Mo. banc 2013). "If either the performance prong or the
7 prejudice prong is not met, then [the court] need not consider the other, and the movant's
claim must fail." Butler v. State, 557 S.W.3d 427, 434 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018) (internal
quotation omitted). "A movant must overcome the strong presumption that counsel's
conduct was reasonable and effective." Johnson, 406 S.W.3d at 899. "To overcome this
presumption, a movant must identify 'specific acts or omissions of counsel that, in light of
all the circumstances, fell outside the wide range of professional competent assistance.'"
Id. (quoting Zink v. State, 278 S.W.3d 170, 176 (Mo. banc 2009)). "Trial strategy decisions
may be a basis for ineffective counsel only if that decision was unreasonable." Id.
Analysis
Jindra raises two points on appeal. In Point One, Jindra argues that the motion court
erred in denying his amended Rule 29.15 motion because it violated his right to effective
assistance of counsel since Trial Counsel failed to investigate and call Branson as a witness.
In Point Two, Jindra argues that the motion court erred in denying his amended Rule 29.15
motion because it violated his right to effective assistance of counsel since Trial Counsel
failed to thoroughly investigate and introduce into evidence Officer Leiva's handwritten
note.
Point One
In his first point on appeal, Jindra argues that Trial Counsel was ineffective for
failing to thoroughly investigate and call Branson as a witness. Jindra contends that Trial
Counsel was ineffective because had he called Branson as a witness, his testimony would
have added credibility to his defense. Jindra argues that Trial Counsel did not thoroughly
investigate because he did not contact Branson to determine if his concerns regarding
8 calling him at trial were well founded. Jindra argues that even if Trial Counsel is credited
with a reasonable investigation into Branson, his decision not to call him was unreasonable
because anything Branson would have testified to was already in evidence so Jindra could
not have been put in a more negative light.
"The selection of witnesses and evidence are matters of trial strategy, virtually
unchallengeable in an ineffective assistance claim." Vaca v. State, 314 S.W.3d 331, 335
(Mo. banc 2010) (quoting Anderson v. State, 196 S.W.3d 28, 37 (Mo. banc 2006));
Williams v. State, 168 S.W.3d 433, 443 (Mo. banc 2005). "Reasonable choices of trial
strategy, no matter how ill-fated they appear in hindsight, cannot serve as a basis for a
claim of ineffective assistance." Vaca, 314 SW.3d at 335 (quoting State v. Johnston, 957
S.W.2d 734, 755 (Mo. banc 1997)). A witness may not be called if counsel believes their
testimony will be more damaging than it is helpful. Davis v. State, 761 S.W.2d 636, 637-
38 (Mo. App. E.D. 1988). The burden is on the movant to show that ""(1) counsel knew
or should have known of the existence of the witness, (2) the witness could be located
through a reasonable investigation, (3) the witness would testify, and (4) the testimony of
the witness would have produced a viable defense." Hays v. State, 360 S.W.3d 304, 309
(Mo. App. W.D. 2012).
At the Motion Hearing, Trial Counsel testified that the decision not to call Branson
as a witness was part of his trial strategy. Counsel was aware of Branson and the
conversation Jindra had with him regarding shooting his tenants in the leg. Jindra and Trial
Counsel discussed the decision whether to call Branson as a witness. From the information
provided, Trial Counsel reasonably determined that there was no reason to investigate
9 further by contacting Branson because he determined Branson's testimony would, in Trial
Counsel's opinion, have only put Jindra in a negative light as a violent person. Further, it
was only when McMasters discussed with Branson the comments Jindra made on the phone
regarding the law firm's parking lot, that he informed her this should be considered a
significant threat. Why Branson found this to be a threat was never presented to the jury
because of attorney/client privilege between Jindra and Branson. Had Trial Counsel placed
him on the stand in trial, the reasons for his concerns regarding this language may have
been placed before the jury. Trial Counsel had no obligation to call Branson as a witness
once he deemed that doing so would not help his client's case. Jindra's statements to
Branson implied a willingness to use violence and specifically gun violence against
someone.
At the Motion Hearing, Branson's testimony was extremely limited.4 He testified
that he recalled giving a statement to the police at the time of the underlying events but had
little recollection of the specific facts. He testified that he had represented Jindra in a prior
order of protection matter and that the request for relief had been denied following an
evidentiary hearing. While Branson had no recollection of the exact conversation, he
agreed that the police report reflected that he told the officer that Jindra informed him at
some point after the hearing that if the courts were not going to protect him that he would
get a gun and protect himself. He testified that he didn't know for sure, but Jindra may
have been referring to the tenants when he said he would get a gun to protect himself. Even
4 Jindra signed a waiver of attorney client privilege to allow Branson to testify about their conversation.
10 had Branson been called at trial he would not be testifying about the charged conduct but
solely about a conversation that occurred on a different day, prior to the events in question.
This testimony did not corroborate Jindra's testimony regarding the charged conduct. It
was a reasonable trial strategy to assume that Branson's testimony would not have provided
a viable defense and consequently the decision not to call him as a witness was reasonable.
Jindra has failed to show that Trial Counsel was ineffective because Trial Counsel
conducted an investigation and made the decision not to call Branson as part of a reasonable
trial strategy.5
As Jindra has failed to satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test, we find no need
to address the possibility of prejudice. Point One is denied.
Point Two
In his second point on appeal, Jindra contends that the motion court erred in denying
his amended Rule 29.15 Motion because it violated his right to effective assistance of
counsel since Trial Counsel failed to thoroughly investigate and introduce into evidence at
trial a handwritten note made by Officer Leiva and located in the discovery. The note
stated, "said had rifle, said wasn't going to kill tenants, but shoot in legs." Jindra contends
that the note would have corroborated his defense that his statements were directed towards
his tenants and not Judge Schneider or Mr. Schneider. Further, Jindra argues that it would
have been valuable to his defense for Officer Leiva to testify that she had written the note
the day of the incident.
5 Jindra further fails to establish that he was prejudiced by the failure to call Branson as a witness, however we do not need to reach the second Strickland prong due to Jindra's failure to meet the first prong. Butler v. State, 557 S.W.3d 427, 434 (Mo. App. W.D. 2018).
11 We find that we need not address whether Trial Counsel's failure to introduce the
note into evidence fell below the standard of reasonably competent counsel because Jindra
failed to meet his burden to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by such a failure. Jindra
has the burden of proving that the probative value of the note was so high that counsel's
failure to thoroughly investigate and introduce the note at trial prejudiced him. Prejudice
exists where there "is a reasonable probability that but for his counsel's ineffectiveness, the
result would have been different." Rios v. State, 368 S.W.3d 301, 305 (Mo. App. W.D.
2012). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome." Id. A conceivable effect on the outcome is not enough to show prejudice. Id.
Trial Counsel testified at the Motion Hearing that the note would have been valuable
but that during trial, he was unaware who had written the note but believed it had been
Gatewood. At the time of trial, neither Trial Counsel nor the prosecutor were aware of the
origin of the note. However, Trial Counsel had already lead with the defense that Jindra
made statements to Branson regarding shooting his tenants in the leg to defend himself but
denied having any similar conversation with Gatewood. Branson's testimony that Jindra
claimed he would shoot his tenants in the leg was already in evidence. The note merely
confirmed Branson's testimony, which was not in dispute or even part of the charged
conduct.
Trial Counsel admits that the note would have been valuable at trial but that is not
sufficient to show that the outcome would have been different had he chosen to pursue the
note further. Not only was the note's origin unknown at the time of trial but its contents
still contained a threat made by Jindra to shoot his tenants. Regardless of whether Jindra
12 intended to shoot his tenants or Judge Schneider, his statements are still indicative of a
violent intention to shoot someone. Further, at trial, Gatewood would still have testified
regarding Jindra's statements to her over the phone. Evidence regarding Jindra's repeated
attempts to call Mr. Schneider would still have been presented, as well as Jindra's
statements to the receptionist about the parking lot. At trial, Officer Leiva still testified
that Jindra had made threats to shoot, "them in the legs." If the note had been further
investigated and admitted into evidence, it in no way negates the evidence from other
witnesses regarding Jindra's threats and actions on the day in question. Jindra failed to
show that this note alone undermines our confidence in the judgment given the weight of
the other evidence presented against him.
Point Two is denied.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the judgment is affirmed
__________________________________ Gary D. Witt, Judge
All concur