Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-24-00313-CR
Frank James HUGHES, The Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas, Appellee
From the 437th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2022CR7935 Honorable Joel Perez, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Irene Rios, Justice
Sitting: Irene Rios, Justice Lori Massey Brissette, Justice Adrian A. Spears II, Justice
Delivered and Filed: March 11, 2026
AFFIRMED
Appellant Frank James Hughes argues his right to a speedy trial was violated. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On October 14, 2021, Hughes was arrested for injury to a child causing serious bodily
injury. He was initially indicted under trial cause number 2021-CR-11675 and remained in custody
because he was unable to pay his bond. Subsequently, the State dismissed the indictment in trial
cause number 2021-CR-11675 but had already reindicted Hughes on August 16, 2022, under trial 04-24-00313-CR
cause number 2022-CR-7935 on two counts of injury to a child causing serious bodily injury.
Despite the trial court reducing Hughes’s bond before trial, Hughes remained incarcerated.
After numerous trial resets and several continuances requested by both parties, Hughes’s
trial began February 6, 2024. 1 The day before trial, the trial court heard several motions, including
a motion to set aside the indictment for violating Hughes’s right to a speedy trial that the trial court
denied. Following the presentation of the evidence to the bench, the trial court took the case under
advisement; and, on April 15, 2024, found Hughes guilty of committing two counts of injury to a
child causing serious bodily injury. On July 15, 2024, the trial court sentenced Hughes to serve
two life sentences. Hughes appeals claiming his right to a speedy trial was violated, and thus his
convictions should be reversed and the charges dismissed with prejudice.
APPLICABLE LAW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Both the United States Constitution and Texas Constitution guarantee an accused the right
to a speedy trial. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 10; see also State v. Lopez,
631 S.W.3d 107, 113 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (describing Texas Constitution as containing “the
same guarantee” as U.S. Constitution); Shaw v. State, 117 S.W.3d 883, 888 (Tex. Crim. App.
2003) (stating that courts apply the same legal standard to state and federal constitutional speedy-
trial challenges). The right to a speedy trial attaches once a person is either arrested or charged.
See Cantu v. State, 253 S.W.3d 273, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
Courts evaluate a speedy-trial claim under a four-factor test that considers the length of the
delay, the reasons for the delay, the extent to which the accused asserted the right to a speedy trial,
and any prejudice suffered by the accused due to the delay. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514,
530 (1972); Lopez, 631 S.W.3d at 113. If the defendant can make a threshold showing that the
1 After the parties conducted voir dire on February 6, 2024, Hughes waived his right to a jury, and testimony began February 7, 2024.
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interval between accusation and trial is “presumptively prejudicial,” then a court must consider
each of the remaining Barker factors and weigh them. Balderas v. State, 517 S.W.3d 756, 767
(Tex. Crim. App. 2016). There is no set time element that triggers the Barker analysis, but the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that a delay of eight months to a year or longer is
sufficient to cross the threshold requiring a court to conduct a complete speedy-trial analysis.
Lopez, 631 S.W.3d at 114. The accused bears the burden of showing that the length of delay is
unreasonable enough to require a complete speedy-trial analysis. Gonzales v. State, 435 S.W.3d
801, 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
When the length of delay is sufficiently unreasonable to require a complete speedy-trial
analysis, a court must assess the strength of each of the four factors and balance their relative
weights considering the prosecution’s and defendant’s conduct. Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 281. No
single factor is necessary or sufficient on its own to support a finding that the accused’s right to a
speedy trial has been violated. Id. Because the four factors must be considered together, courts
must engage “‘in a difficult and sensitive balancing process’ in each individual case.” Id. (quoting
Barker, 407 U.S. at 533).
“‘Dismissal of the charging instrument with prejudice is mandated only upon a finding that
an accused’s Sixth Amendment speedy-trial right was actually violated.’” State v. Gabaldon, 727
S.W.3d 1, 16–17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025) (quoting Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 281) (emphasis added by
Gabaldon court). “This is indeed a serious consequence because it means that a defendant who
may be guilty of a serious crime will go free, without having been tried.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 522.
Each case must be analyzed “with common sense and sensitivity to ensure that charges are
dismissed only when the evidence shows that a defendant’s actual and asserted interest in a speedy
trial has been infringed.” Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 281.
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We apply a bifurcated standard of review to a trial court’s ruling on a speedy-trial claim.
Id. at 282. We review the factual components for an abuse of discretion and the legal components
de novo. Id. Review of the individual Barker factors necessarily involves factual determinations
and legal conclusions, but the balancing test overall is “a purely legal question.” Id. As to the trial
court’s determination of factual issues, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the
trial court’s ruling. Id.
ANALYSIS
A. Length of Delay
The first Barker factor is the length of delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. The length of delay
that provokes an inquiry into the other factors “is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar
circumstances of the case.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 530–31. “The delay that can be tolerated for an
ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex . . . charge.” Id. at 531.
The length of delay between an accused’s arrest or indictment and when he demands a
speedy trial or is tried determines whether the time frame is presumptively unreasonable. See
Zamorano v. State, 84 S.W.3d 643, 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). As stated above, delay
“approaching one year” is presumptively unreasonable so as “to trigger the Barker enquiry.”
Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 768 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Under the original indictment, Hughes was arrested on October 14, 2021, and appointed
counsel within days. While Hughes retained paid counsel on October 21, 2021, his retained counsel
filed a motion to withdraw; and, on April 4, 2022, the trial court granted retained counsel’s request
to withdraw and reappointed Hughes’s prior appointed counsel to represent him. Based on our
review of the record, it appears the case was then reset in April 2022, June 2022, and September
2022. Hughes was reindicted on August 16, 2022.
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At the October 3, 2022 trial setting, Hughes moved for a sixty-day continuance stating he
had received a sizable amount of discovery and needed time to review it. Noting Hughes had
received the discovery more than a month prior to the hearing, the trial court granted Hughes’s
continuance in part, resetting the case for the end of October 2022. Hughes’s counsel then filed
multiple motions on October 5, 2022, including a motion to set aside the indictment based on
speedy-trial concerns. No hearings appear to have been requested for the motions at that time. The
docket sheet, which is sparsely documented, reflects that the trial court then reset the case again
on October 31, 2022, noting the defense needed time to review more discovery. On November 10,
2022, Hughes filed a pro se motion to dismiss his case based in part on failure to have a speedy
trial. At the December 2022 trial setting, the trial was reset for January 27, 2023.
On January 27, 2023, the defense announced ready, but the State requested a continuance
to coordinate its expert witnesses for trial. Hughes complained contending the State routinely
requested resets and that the trial court had already warned the State to be ready for trial, an
allegation the State refuted proclaiming discovery was the reason for most of the resets. For
example, the defense requested another video copy of a witness’s interrogation because it had poor
audio quality, and the State provided a new video. The trial granted the continuance but stated the
parties needed to quickly choose a trial date. However, the record reflects the case was reset again
in February 2023 and May 2023, and several times thereafter.
Before the August 2023 trial setting, Hughes filed multiple pro se motions and petitions
for writ of habeas corpus requesting his right to a speedy trial be granted, he be released from
custody because of the delay in going to trial, or for the case to be dismissed because of the delay.
Hughes also forwarded correspondence to the trial court requesting he be released because of the
State’s delay and claimed a right to appeal his denial of a speedy trial, although no hearings had
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been requested and the trial court had not ruled on any of his pro se motions. Additionally, in the
same month the case was set to go to trial, Hughes’s counsel filed another motion for continuance
to allow him to seek another expert after discovering a conflict with the current expert. The trial
court granted the continuance and reset the case to November 3, 2023.
Prior to the November 2023 setting, Hughes continued to file pro se requests addressing
his right to a speedy trial. However, Hughes’s counsel filed an additional motion to continue the
November 3, 2023 trial setting, this time to allow counsel to receive the recently hired expert’s
feedback on his review of the complainant’s medical records. The trial court granted the motion
and reset the case for January 12, 2024. On the day of trial in January and over Hughes’s objection,
the trial court granted the State’s motion for continuance after the State claimed its expert could
not be available to testify until early February.
The trial court reset the case to February 2, 2024, for a pretrial hearing, at which the State
and Hughes both announced they were ready. On February 5, 2024, the trial court heard Hughes’s
pretrial motions, including his motion to set aside the indictment alleging his right to a speedy trial
was violated. The trial court denied Hughes’s speedy-trial motion, and trial began February 6,
2024. Following voir dire, Hughes waived his right to a jury trial, and the trial court proceeded
with a bench trial on February 7, 2024, taking the case under advisement at the conclusion of the
evidence before rendering its verdict. On April 15, 2024, the trial court found Hughes guilty of
committing two counts of injury to a child causing serious bodily injury; and on July 15, 2024, the
trial court sentenced Hughes to two life sentences.
The State concedes on appeal, and we agree, that the delay from arrest to trial was more
than enough to trigger a complete Barker analysis. See Lopez, 631 S.W.3d at 114 (holding that a
delay of eight months or more is presumptively prejudicial and triggers a speedy-trial analysis).
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B. Reasons for Delay
“While the State has the burden of justifying the length of the delay, the defendant has the
burden of proving the assertion of the right and showing prejudice.” Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 280
(citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 531; Ex parte McKenzie, 491 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973)).
When evaluating the reasons for the delay, “a court must accord different weights to different
reasons, and it must ask “‘whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for
the delay.’” Hopper v. State, 520 S.W.3d 915, 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (quoting Vermont v.
Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 90 (2009)); see also Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 649 (providing that the reasons
for the delay determine how heavily this factor weighs). Deliberate delays aimed at hampering the
defense weigh heavily against the government, while negligence or overcrowded courts also weigh
against the government, just less heavily. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531; State v. Munoz, 991 S.W.2d
822 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). On the other hand, valid reasons for the delay, including
accommodating witnesses, should not be weighed against the government at all. See Barker, 407
U.S. at 531.
Delays attributable to the defense weigh against the defendant. Hopper, 520 S.W.3d at 924.
“In the absence of an assigned reason for the delay, a court may presume neither a deliberate
attempt on the part of the State to prejudice the defense nor a valid reason for the delay.” Balderas,
517 S.W.3d at 768 (quoting Dragoo v. State, 96 S.W.3d 308, 314 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)).
Here, from the record on appeal, it is difficult to determine the reasons for several of the
trial resets. The clerk’s record fails to document all the trial resets, including whether they were
agreed upon. However, during the hearing on Hughes’s motion to set aside the indictment
conducted the day before trial, when the trial court inquired into the reason for the delay, the State
acknowledged the record was not very clear but explained that in addition to both parties
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requesting continuances, many of the resets concerned discovery and witness issues and were
agreed upon. See Richardson v. State, 631 S.W.3d 269, 274 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2020, pet. ref’d) (explaining that “agreed resets are inconsistent with the assertion of a speedy trial
right”).
Furthermore, Hughes’s counsel filed the first speedy-trial motion on October 5, 2022.
Hughes filed several pro se speedy-trial motions afterwards. However, the record does not indicate
that Hughes brought any of his motions to the trial court’s attention to obtain a ruling until the day
before the February 2024 trial setting. Thus, the delay from the date Hughes filed his first speedy-
trial motion until February 5, 2024, is substantially attributable to Hughes. See Crocker v. State,
441 S.W.3d 306, 311 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d) (quoting Guevara v. State,
985 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d) (providing that a speedy-
trial motion must be “‘presented’” to the trial court and the movant “‘must make the trial judge
aware of the motion by calling the judge’s attention to it in open court and requesting a ruling
thereon’”) (emphasis added by Crocker Court).
Moreover, just days before filing his first speedy-trial motion, Hughes sought and obtained
a sixty-day continuance. And although in January of 2023 Hughes objected to the State’s request
for additional time, Hughes then filed two additional motions for continuance in August 2023 and
November 2023. Not until January 2024, did Hughes unequivocally object to the State’s request
for more time. However, the State’s request for time specifically concerned the availability of its
physician expert. Consequently, the extended delay is significantly attributable to Hughes. See
Hopper, 520 S.W.3d at 924; see also Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 768 (“Delay caused by either the
defendant or his counsel weighs against the defendant.”).
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While the State requested additional time in January 2023 and then in January 2024, the
State’s delays were based on the coordination of witnesses, including its testifying experts. On
February 5, 2024, the day before trial, the trial court held a hearing on Hughes’s first speedy-trial
motion filed in October 2022. During the hearing, the State acknowledged that it could not
specifically explain every delay between Hughes’s arrest and trial but reasoned much of the delay
was because of voluminous discovery, which we note included hundreds of pages of medical
records, a high level of difficulty concerning the case, and problems coordinating the physician
experts. Hence, the State’s requests for continuances were either neutral or valid and do not weigh
heavily or at all against the State. See Munoz, 991 S.W.2d at 822.
Therefore, the State is responsible for some of the delay; however, the State’s requested
continuances are attributable to the coordination of witnesses, including its physician expert.
Delays for this reason are justified. See id. Also, nothing in the record suggests that the majority
of the resets were not agreed upon, so either Hughes agreed to the delays or the reasons for the
delays are considered neutral. See Richardson, 631 S.W.3d at 275; see also Balderas, 517 S.W.3d
at 768. Hughes, on the other hand, filed four motions requesting the case be continued and failed
to present any of his speedy-trial motions to the trial court prior to the day before trial. Therefore,
we conclude that the reason-for-delay factor weighs against finding a violation of the speedy-trial
right. See Hopper, 520 S.W.3d at 925; Guevara, 985 S.W.2d at 592.
C. Assertion of the Right
“The third Barker factor—the defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial—is
entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant has been deprived of
that right.” Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 771. The accused bears the burden of proving he asserted the
right. Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 282–83. “A defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial;” he does
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however have a responsibility to assert his right to a speedy trial. Barker; 407 U.S. at 527; see
Zamorano, 84 S.W.3d at 651; see also Henson v. State, 407 S.W.3d 764, 768–69 (Tex. Crim. App.
2013) (holding speedy-trial right is subject to ordinary error-preservation rules). An accused’s
failure to timely assert his right to a speedy trial strongly indicates that he did not desire one.
Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 771. An accused who desires a speedy trial is more likely to assert this
right the longer the trial is delayed. Id. Hence, prolonged inaction by the accused weighs more
heavily against finding that the speedy-trial guarantee has been violated. Id.
Here, Hughes’s counsel invoked Hughes’s speedy-trial right on October 5, 2022—a year
after Hughes was arrested but days after requesting a continuance on September 30, 2022—by
filing a motion to dismiss the indictment because of the delay. Starting in November 2022 and
while he was represented by counsel, Hughes began filing his various pro se motions to dismiss,
motions for a speedy trial, petitions for writ of habeas corpus, and other correspondence with the
trial court regarding his continued incarceration and denial of his right to a speedy trial. However,
a defendant has no right to hybrid representation. Robinson v. State, 240 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007); see also Jenkins v. State, 592 S.W.3d 894, 902 n.47 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018)
(citing to Robinson when reaffirming a defendant’s lack of right to hybrid representation in a case
regarding a pro se motion to quash an indictment). Therefore, a trial court is free to disregard any
pro se motion presented by a defendant who is represented by counsel, who does not adopt or urge
the pro se motion. Robinson, 240 S.W.3d at 922; see also Tracy v. State, 597 S.W.3d 502, 509
(Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (rejecting appellant’s argument that death penalty cases require hybrid
representation and holding that trial court did not err in disregarding pro se motions presented by
appellant).
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Based on our review of the record, none of Hughes’s motions were set for hearing prior to
his motion to set aside the indictment that the trial court considered the day before trial.
Additionally, while some of Hughes’s pro se motions for speedy trial requested a trial, Hughes’s
counsel’s motion and several of Hughes’s pro se filings sought dismissal of his case for alleged
speedy-trial violations rather than a speedy trial. It is well-established that “[f]iling for dismissal
instead of a speedy trial will generally weaken a speedy-trial claim because it shows a desire to
have no trial instead of a speedy one.” Gabaldon, 727 S.W.3d at 18 (quoting Cantu, 253 S.W.3d
at 283).
Moreover, as explained above, the record is devoid of Hughes’s objecting to the multiple
resets in this case. And despite Hughes’s objection to the State’s request for more time at the
January 27, 2023 trial setting, several months later Hughes filed two motions for continuance
himself—in August 2023 and November 2023. Thus, the record shows that Hughes acquiesced to
the very delay he now challenges, by repeatedly requesting or consenting to resets while filing
speedy-trial motions, failing to bring them to the trial court’s attention, and failing to object to the
State’s requests for continuance. See Hopper, 520 S.W.3d at 929.
D. Prejudice Assessment
We assess prejudice in light of the defendant’s interests that the speedy trial right is
designed to protect: “(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and
concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.” Barker,
407 U.S. at 532. The last interest is the most serious because a defendant’s inability to prepare an
adequate defense skews the fairness of the entire system. Id. While a defendant shoulders the
burden to make some showing of prejudice, “a showing of actual prejudice is not required.”
Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 772; cf. Gabaldon, 727 S.W.3d at 19 (“[I]n in the absence of excessive
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bad-faith or excessive negligent delay by the government, a defendant usually has to show specific
prejudice to his defense.”) (internal quotation and citations omitted). “Excessive delay
presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or
identify.” Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 772.
However, “delay is a two-edged sword[.]” Gabaldon, 727 S.W.3d at 19 (citation omitted).
In addition to the impacts the delay can cause the defendant, the passage of time can also negatively
impact or altogether prevent the State’s ability to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. See id.
(citation omitted). Thus, a presumption of prejudice may be “extenuated . . . by the defendant’s
acquiescence in the delay.” Id. (internal quotation and citations omitted).
Hughes urged that he suffered from oppressive pretrial incarceration because he had been
in custody since his arrest in October 2021. Hughes claimed that because he was incarcerated and
could not pay his bond, he was not able to assist his defense in gathering evidence. At no time,
however, has Hughes alluded to what type of evidence he would have discovered, what it may
have shown, and how it negatively impacted his ability to defend himself. Additionally, Hughes’s
counsel provided no explanation of how Hughes’s pretrial incarceration prejudiced his defense of
Hughes. Counsel’s representations and defendant’s unsupported assertions are generally not
competent evidence; and, even assuming they were, they are conclusory in nature.
To add, Hughes’s assertions fail to demonstrate anxiety or concern beyond that which
would be expected for someone charged with a serious crime. See id. at 19 (citing Shaw, 117
S.W.3d at 890); see also State v. Beck, 695 S.W.3d 729, 748 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2024, no pet.); State v. Moreno, 651 S.W.3d 399, 415 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, no
pet.). Moreover, on this record, any presumptive prejudice due to the passage of time is arguably
extenuated by Hughes’s acquiescence in the delay resulting from agreed resets and his requests for
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continuances. See Hopper, 520 S.W.3d at 929; see also Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 773 (concluding
that any prejudice to defendant was extenuated by his role in requesting the delay). As mentioned
above, Hughes filed his first motion to set aside the indictment because of speedy-trial violations
in October 2022, but he did not present the motion to the trial court and obtain a ruling until the
day before trial on February 5, 2024.
While we acknowledge that Hughes suffered some prejudice from his pretrial
incarceration, such prejudice standing alone is not enough to support his claim that his speedy trial
rights were violated. See Munoz, 991 S.W.2d at 829 (seventeen-month pretrial incarceration was
“minimal” prejudice); State v. Conatser, 645 S.W.3d 925, 931 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2022, no pet.)
(two years on bond awaiting trial without more is no showing of “significant prejudice” making
this factor “weigh heavily” against defendant); Meyer v. State, 27 S.W.3d 644, 650–51 (Tex.
App.—Waco 2000, pet. ref’d), abrogated on other grounds by Robinson, 240 S.W.3d at 922
(twenty-three-month pretrial incarceration and resultant anxiety alone is “minimal” showing of
prejudice). Beyond the prejudice to be expected from the passage of time before Hughes was tried,
Hughes did not make any particularized showing of how the delay potentially prejudiced his
defense. See Gabaldon, 727 S.W.3d at 21–22; Balderas, 517 S.W.3d at 772.
E. Balancing of Factors
Based on the record before us, Hughes contradicted his own demands for a speedy trial,
quietly acquiescing to the delay. The record also establishes that most of the delay could not be
attributed to the State as its delays were justified or were considered neutral to both parties. We
conclude that the weight of the four factors, balanced together, goes against finding a violation of
Hughes’s right to a speedy trial. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 5034.
Accordingly, we overrule Hughes’s sole appellate issue.
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CONCLUSION
Because we overrule Hughes’s speedy-trial issue, we affirm the trial court’s final
judgments of conviction.
Irene Rios, Justice
DO NOT PUBLISH
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