Frank James Finley v. Thomas F. Staton, Chairman

Fifth Circuit

Frank James Finley v. Thomas F. Staton, Chairman

542 F.2d 250, 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 6304

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

DecidedNovember 10, 1976

Docket76-2631

StatusPublished

Cited by13 cases

This text of 542 F.2d 250 (Frank James Finley v. Thomas F. Staton, Chairman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Frank James Finley v. Thomas F. Staton, Chairman, 542 F.2d 250, 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 6304 (5th Cir. 1976).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM:

Finley, an Alabama state prisoner, brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, against the Alabama Board of Corrections and its Chairman. He alleged a denial of both equal protection and due process of law in the Board’s failure to admit him into the Alabama work release program. The district court held that Finley’s pro se complaint was frivolous, and dismissed the action without requiring the defendants to answer. Because “[i]t cannot be said that, without doubt, there exists no set of facts which would entitle the plaintiff to the relief he demands”, we vacate the order of dismissal and remand the cause for an evidentiary hearing. Williams v. McCall, 5 Cir. 1976, 531 F.2d 1247, 1248.

Finley alleged that he meets all substantive and procedural requirements qualifying him for Alabama’s work release program. He raises an equal protection objection to the state’s administrative requirement 1 that sex offenders obtain special certification by the Board in order to be eligible for work release. We agree with the district court that there is no merit to Finley’s claim that this requirement amounted to unconstitutional discrimination against sex offenders. Madison v. Sielaff, N.D.Ill. 1975, 393 F.Supp. 788; Wagner v. Holmes, E.D.Ky.1973, 361 F.Supp. 895.

*251 Finley makes an alternative argument that the Board of Corrections arbitrarily failed to follow its own regulations in its treatment of his application. The district court held that the complaint did not state a claim for relief regardless of the extensive factual substantiation presented by plaintiff because a prisoner has no constitutional right to work release status. While this may be so, the complaint clearly contains substantial allegations of denial of procedural due process, and seeks to compel the state corrections officials simply to duly administer the “procedural amenities believed to have been arbitrarily withheld”. Williams, supra, 531 F.2d at 1248.

In view of the broad standard of liberality of construction required of a district court “[i]n deciding whether a prisoner’s pro se complaint, states a cause of action . it was error to dismiss the complaint without affording the plaintiff an opportunity to prove his allegations.” Id.

VACATED AND REMANDED.

1

. Administrative Regulation 410, adopted pursuant to Ala. Code, tit. 45, § 188(3) (1973).

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PER CURIAM:

Finley, an Alabama state prisoner, brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, against the Alabama Board of Corrections and its Chairman. He alleged a denial of both equal protection and due process of law in the Board’s failure to admit him into the Alabama work release program. The district court held that Finley’s pro se complaint was frivolous, and dismissed the action without requiring the defendants to answer. Because “[i]t cannot be said that, without doubt, there exists no set of facts which would entitle the plaintiff to the relief he demands”, we vacate the order of dismissal and remand the cause for an evidentiary hearing. Williams v. McCall, 5 Cir. 1976, 531 F.2d 1247, 1248.

Finley alleged that he meets all substantive and procedural requirements qualifying him for Alabama’s work release program. He raises an equal protection objection to the state’s administrative requirement 1 that sex offenders obtain special certification by the Board in order to be eligible for work release. We agree with the district court that there is no merit to Finley’s claim that this requirement amounted to unconstitutional discrimination against sex offenders. Madison v. Sielaff, N.D.Ill. 1975, 393 F.Supp. 788; Wagner v. Holmes, E.D.Ky.1973, 361 F.Supp. 895.

*251 Finley makes an alternative argument that the Board of Corrections arbitrarily failed to follow its own regulations in its treatment of his application. The district court held that the complaint did not state a claim for relief regardless of the extensive factual substantiation presented by plaintiff because a prisoner has no constitutional right to work release status. While this may be so, the complaint clearly contains substantial allegations of denial of procedural due process, and seeks to compel the state corrections officials simply to duly administer the “procedural amenities believed to have been arbitrarily withheld”. Williams, supra, 531 F.2d at 1248.

In view of the broad standard of liberality of construction required of a district court “[i]n deciding whether a prisoner’s pro se complaint, states a cause of action . it was error to dismiss the complaint without affording the plaintiff an opportunity to prove his allegations.” Id.

VACATED AND REMANDED.

1

. Administrative Regulation 410, adopted pursuant to Ala. Code, tit. 45, § 188(3) (1973).

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