Case: 17-12282 Date Filed: 02/02/2018 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 17-12282 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cv-20984-JLK
FRANK I. SINGLETON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
THE PUBLIC HEALTH TRUST OF MIAMI-DADE COUNTY,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ________________________
(February 2, 2018)
Before TJOFLAT, NEWSOM and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 17-12282 Date Filed: 02/02/2018 Page: 2 of 7
Dr. Frank Singleton appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment
in favor of his former employer, the Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade County
(PHT), on his claims for disability discrimination and retaliation under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112 and 12203. Singleton
argues there were genuine issues of material fact on his discrimination and
retaliation claims, which we discuss in turn. After review, 1 we affirm.
I. DISCUSSION
A. Discrimination
Singleton first argues the district court erred by concluding he failed to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112 (“No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the
basis of disability . . . .”); Cleveland v. Home Shopping Network, Inc., 369 F.3d
1189, 1193 (11th Cir. 2004) (“To establish a prima facie case of ADA
discrimination, [the plaintiff] had to show (1) a disability, (2) that she was
otherwise qualified to perform the job, and (3) that she was discriminated against
based upon the disability.”). Specifically, he contends there are factual issues as to
both whether he was a “qualified individual” under the meaning of the ADA and
whether he was discriminated against because of his disability. 1 We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, viewing all evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 2 Case: 17-12282 Date Filed: 02/02/2018 Page: 3 of 7
As the district court correctly determined, meeting minimum productivity
requirements—which were measured by the number of patients treated each day—
was an essential function of Singleton’s job as an attending physician. This was
true both at the Jackson Memorial Hospital Hematology/Oncology Clinic (Jackson
Memorial) and the Jefferson Reaves Senior Health Center (Jefferson Reaves). The
undisputed facts further establish that, despite receiving reasonable
accommodations, Singleton was unable to meet his productivity requirements at
Jackson Memorial. In addition, there was no evidence from which a jury could
infer he would have been able, provided similar accommodations, to meet the more
demanding productivity requirements at Jefferson Reaves. Thus, with respect to
the attending-physician positions at both Jackson Memorial and Jefferson Reaves,
Singleton was not a qualified individual within the meaning of the ADA. See
Holly v. Clairson Indus., L.L.C., 492 F.3d 1247, 1256 (11th Cir. 2007) (defining
“qualified individual” as “someone with a disability who, ‘with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment
position that such individual holds or desires’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8))).
He was, however, qualified for his position at the Department of Quality and
Patient Safety (which did not involve a significant level of patient treatment). But
that position was terminated as part of a reduction in force affecting more than 500
employees. There was no evidence sufficient for a rational jury to determine he
3 Case: 17-12282 Date Filed: 02/02/2018 Page: 4 of 7
was included in the force reduction because of his disability. See Standard v.
A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1331 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that a prima
facie case requires “production of sufficient evidence from which a rational fact
finder could conclude [the] employer intended to discriminate . . . in making the
discharge decision”). Thus, Singleton failed to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination.
B. Retaliation
Singleton next argues the district court erred by concluding there was no
causal connection between his protected conduct and an adverse employment
action. Specifically, he argues he experienced multiple adverse actions following
his transfer to Jefferson Reaves that occurred soon after he requested
accommodations and filed his first EEOC charge. This temporal proximity,
according to Singleton, was sufficient to establish the causation element of his
prima facie case.
To make a prima facie showing of causation, Singleton was required to
show: (1) “the decision-maker[s] [were] aware of the protected conduct”; and
(2) “the protected activity and the adverse action were not wholly unrelated.”
Gupta v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 590 (11th Cir. 2000) (alteration in
original) (quoting Farley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 197 F.3d 1322, 1336 (11th
Cir. 1999)), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by Crawford v. Carroll,
4 Case: 17-12282 Date Filed: 02/02/2018 Page: 5 of 7
529 F.3d 961, 973–74 (11th Cir. 2008). We have held that, where a decision-
maker becomes aware of protected conduct, a close temporal proximity between
the decision-maker’s acquisition of that knowledge and an adverse employment
action will generally be enough to create a factual issue on the causation element.
Farley, 197 F.3d at 1337. But where, as here, there is no other evidence tending to
show causation, the temporal proximity must be “very close.” Thomas v. Cooper
Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Clark Cnty. Sch.
Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001)) (concluding a gap of three to four
months is not close enough). But see Farley, 197 F.3d at 1337 (holding a gap of
approximately seven weeks is sufficiently close).
Singleton contends causation may be inferred from the actions taken after
his May 2010 request for accommodations at Jefferson Reaves and his June 2010
EEOC charge. Specifically, he suggests the following actions were retaliatory:
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Case: 17-12282 Date Filed: 02/02/2018 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 17-12282 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cv-20984-JLK
FRANK I. SINGLETON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
THE PUBLIC HEALTH TRUST OF MIAMI-DADE COUNTY,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ________________________
(February 2, 2018)
Before TJOFLAT, NEWSOM and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 17-12282 Date Filed: 02/02/2018 Page: 2 of 7
Dr. Frank Singleton appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment
in favor of his former employer, the Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade County
(PHT), on his claims for disability discrimination and retaliation under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112 and 12203. Singleton
argues there were genuine issues of material fact on his discrimination and
retaliation claims, which we discuss in turn. After review, 1 we affirm.
I. DISCUSSION
A. Discrimination
Singleton first argues the district court erred by concluding he failed to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112 (“No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the
basis of disability . . . .”); Cleveland v. Home Shopping Network, Inc., 369 F.3d
1189, 1193 (11th Cir. 2004) (“To establish a prima facie case of ADA
discrimination, [the plaintiff] had to show (1) a disability, (2) that she was
otherwise qualified to perform the job, and (3) that she was discriminated against
based upon the disability.”). Specifically, he contends there are factual issues as to
both whether he was a “qualified individual” under the meaning of the ADA and
whether he was discriminated against because of his disability. 1 We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, viewing all evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 2 Case: 17-12282 Date Filed: 02/02/2018 Page: 3 of 7
As the district court correctly determined, meeting minimum productivity
requirements—which were measured by the number of patients treated each day—
was an essential function of Singleton’s job as an attending physician. This was
true both at the Jackson Memorial Hospital Hematology/Oncology Clinic (Jackson
Memorial) and the Jefferson Reaves Senior Health Center (Jefferson Reaves). The
undisputed facts further establish that, despite receiving reasonable
accommodations, Singleton was unable to meet his productivity requirements at
Jackson Memorial. In addition, there was no evidence from which a jury could
infer he would have been able, provided similar accommodations, to meet the more
demanding productivity requirements at Jefferson Reaves. Thus, with respect to
the attending-physician positions at both Jackson Memorial and Jefferson Reaves,
Singleton was not a qualified individual within the meaning of the ADA. See
Holly v. Clairson Indus., L.L.C., 492 F.3d 1247, 1256 (11th Cir. 2007) (defining
“qualified individual” as “someone with a disability who, ‘with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment
position that such individual holds or desires’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8))).
He was, however, qualified for his position at the Department of Quality and
Patient Safety (which did not involve a significant level of patient treatment). But
that position was terminated as part of a reduction in force affecting more than 500
employees. There was no evidence sufficient for a rational jury to determine he
3 Case: 17-12282 Date Filed: 02/02/2018 Page: 4 of 7
was included in the force reduction because of his disability. See Standard v.
A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1331 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that a prima
facie case requires “production of sufficient evidence from which a rational fact
finder could conclude [the] employer intended to discriminate . . . in making the
discharge decision”). Thus, Singleton failed to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination.
B. Retaliation
Singleton next argues the district court erred by concluding there was no
causal connection between his protected conduct and an adverse employment
action. Specifically, he argues he experienced multiple adverse actions following
his transfer to Jefferson Reaves that occurred soon after he requested
accommodations and filed his first EEOC charge. This temporal proximity,
according to Singleton, was sufficient to establish the causation element of his
prima facie case.
To make a prima facie showing of causation, Singleton was required to
show: (1) “the decision-maker[s] [were] aware of the protected conduct”; and
(2) “the protected activity and the adverse action were not wholly unrelated.”
Gupta v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 590 (11th Cir. 2000) (alteration in
original) (quoting Farley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 197 F.3d 1322, 1336 (11th
Cir. 1999)), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by Crawford v. Carroll,
4 Case: 17-12282 Date Filed: 02/02/2018 Page: 5 of 7
529 F.3d 961, 973–74 (11th Cir. 2008). We have held that, where a decision-
maker becomes aware of protected conduct, a close temporal proximity between
the decision-maker’s acquisition of that knowledge and an adverse employment
action will generally be enough to create a factual issue on the causation element.
Farley, 197 F.3d at 1337. But where, as here, there is no other evidence tending to
show causation, the temporal proximity must be “very close.” Thomas v. Cooper
Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Clark Cnty. Sch.
Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001)) (concluding a gap of three to four
months is not close enough). But see Farley, 197 F.3d at 1337 (holding a gap of
approximately seven weeks is sufficiently close).
Singleton contends causation may be inferred from the actions taken after
his May 2010 request for accommodations at Jefferson Reaves and his June 2010
EEOC charge. Specifically, he suggests the following actions were retaliatory:
(1) the increase in his workload from 16 to 20 patients per day; (2) the May 2010
disciplinary-action report (DAR) citing his inability to meet productivity
requirements; (3) Dr. Karen Esposito’s July 2010 recommendation that he be
terminated based on the DAR; (4) his placement on paid administrative leave in
August 2010; (5) his transfer to a position in the Department of Quality and Patient
Safety in October 2010; and (6) his May 2011 termination. With the exception of
the May 2010 DAR, Singleton fails to establish that both the decision-maker
5 Case: 17-12282 Date Filed: 02/02/2018 Page: 6 of 7
responsible for each alleged adverse action had knowledge of his protected activity
and the decision-maker’s knowledge was acquired in close temporal proximity to
the adverse action. See Gupta, 212 F.3d at 590.
The May 2010 DAR, however, was issued by Singleton’s immediate
supervisor—Dr. Michael Sheehan—who does not dispute receiving the
accommodations request shortly before issuing the DAR. With respect to that
action (and only that action), the evidence was sufficient to satisfy the general rule
of temporal proximity. But the rule of temporal proximity is not absolute.
See, e.g., Fleming v. Boeing Co., 120 F.3d 242, 248 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that
a prima facie case of retaliation was not established with respect to a decision to
deny permanent employment, despite the decision’s temporal proximity with
protected conduct, where the record established the plaintiff was not qualified for
the position); Whatley v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit, 632 F.2d 1325, 1329 (5th
Cir. 1980) (“The evidence reveals . . . the dismissal was a culmination of problems
growing out of appellant’s manner of handling his job . . . .”).2
Here, not only is there no evidence tending to support Singleton’s claim that
the DAR was motivated by his accommodations request, the evidence
overwhelmingly indicates the DAR resulted from Singleton’s inability to keep up
2 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981. 6 Case: 17-12282 Date Filed: 02/02/2018 Page: 7 of 7
with the daily demands of his job. Given Singleton’s record at PHT, which
documents both his failure to meet productivity requirements and PHT’s efforts to
assist him in that regard (before his May 2010 accommodations request), no
rational jury could infer retaliatory intent from the mere fact Singleton received
another citation for failing to be minimally productive—even if the citation
followed shortly after an accommodations request. Under the unique
circumstances of this case, an exception to the general rule of temporal proximity
is warranted. Singleton did not establish a prima facie case of retaliation.
II. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of PHT.
AFFIRMED.