IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2022-CA-00501-COA
FRANK HEGMAN AND HEGMAN FARMS INC. APPELLANTS
v.
CLAY ADCOCK, WILL PHILLIPS, ALFRED F. APPELLEES EATON AND ANN W. BALLARD
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/22/2022 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JANNIE M. LEWIS-BLACKMON COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: YAZOO COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS: GEORGE PHILIP SCHRADER IV ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES: WILEY JOHNSON BARBOUR JR. NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - PROPERTY DAMAGE DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART - 01/09/2024 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., McDONALD AND EMFINGER, JJ.
CARLTON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Frank Hegman and Hegman Farms Inc. (collectively, Hegman), an upper riparian
landowner, filed a complaint against lower riparian landowners Alfred F. Eaton and Ann
Ballard, their tenant Clay Adcock, and contractor Will Phillips (collectively, Appellees).
Hegman claimed that the Appellees’ land-forming operations impeded the natural flow of
water off of Hegman’s property, and he sought injunctive relief and damages.
¶2. Adcock filed a counterclaim against Hegman alleging tortious interference with
business relations. After a bifurcated hearing, the Yazoo County County Court denied
Hegman’s claim for injunctive relief and compensatory damages and found Hegman liable
to Adcock for tortious interference with business relations. The county court awarded Adcock compensatory and punitive damages. The county court also found Hegman in
contempt of court.
¶3. Hegman appealed from county court to circuit court. After hearing oral arguments,
the Yazoo County Circuit Court affirmed in part the county court’s judgment, reversing only
the county court’s finding of contempt.
¶4. Hegman now appeals. After our review, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment
affirming the county court’s denial of Hegman’s claim for injunctive relief and compensatory
damages and the county court’s denial of Hegman’s motion for specific findings of fact and
conclusions of law pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 52. However, we find
that Adcock failed to prove his counterclaim of tortious interference with business relations
by a preponderance of the evidence. We accordingly reverse the circuit court’s judgment
affirming the county court’s award of compensatory and punitive damages and render
judgment denying Adcock’s counterclaim.
FACTS
¶5. Hegman Farms, Eaton and Ballard, and Frank own three separate but adjoining tracts
of real property in Yazoo County, Mississippi. Eaton and Ballard’s property (the
Eaton-Ballard Tract) is located in the middle of the properties owned by Frank (the Hegman
Tract) and Hegman Farms (the Hegman Farms Tract), with the Hegman Farms Tract located
to the west of the Eaton-Ballard Tract and the Hegman Tract located to the east.
¶6. At the time of the action, Frank was a co-owner of a family business that farms both
2 the Hegman Tract and Hegman Farms Tract. Hegman Farms leased the Hegman Tract from
Frank for the purposes of planting and harvesting annual agricultural crops. Clay Adcock
began leasing the Eaton-Ballard Tract in 2014 for his farming operations.
¶7. Hegman alleges that prior to September 17, 2015, the Hegman Tract was located at
a higher elevation than the Eaton-Ballard Tract, and the Eaton-Ballard Tract was at a higher
elevation than the Hegman Farms Tract. According to Hegman, the slope of these properties
caused rainwater and surface water to flow in a westerly and northwesterly direction from
the Hegman Tract, over the Eaton-Ballard Tract, then onto the Hegman Farms Tract, and
ultimately into specifically constructed drainage pipes and ditches that allowed the water to
reach a drainage ditch west of the Hegman Farms Tract.
¶8. In 2015, Adcock hired Phillips to perform land-forming work (also referred to in the
record as “dirt work”) on the Eaton-Ballard Tract.1 This work involved building up the
ground elevation on the east side of the Eaton-Ballard Tract along the common boundary line
with the Hegman Tract.
¶9. In February 2016, Hegman filed a complaint against the Appellees seeking
compensatory damages and injunctive relief to prevent and correct damage allegedly caused
by excessive drainage on the Hegman Tract. Hegman alleged that the land-forming work
performed on the Eaton-Ballard Tract substantially altered and increased the elevation of that
1 The record reflects that “land-forming” is the process of using equipment to add, move, or remove dirt or soil from one place to another to alter the ground elevation and slope of a piece of property.
3 tract, which then prevented surface water from flowing off of the Hegman Tract. Hegman
claimed that because the surface water was obstructed from flowing off of the Hegman Tract,
the water began to pool and accumulate, which prevented Hegman from planting and
harvesting the annual crops on the affected land. Hegman further asserted that the Appellees
intentionally or negligently breached their duty to Hegman not to alter the elevation of the
lower lands to a level that would impede the flow of surface water, and, according to
Hegman, this breach of duty proximately caused Hegman to suffer damages.
¶10. In the complaint, Hegman specifically requested that the county court grant a
temporary restraining order and permanent injunction requiring the Appellees to cease and
desist from raising the elevation of the Eaton-Ballard Tract and disrupting the flow of surface
water drainage from the Hegman Tract over and through the Eaton-Ballard Tract to the west.
Hegman also requested that the court either order the Appellees to return the Eaton-Ballard
Tract to its original state of elevation and grade or to otherwise “design, create, install or
otherwise construct a drainage system” on the Eaton-Ballard Tract to allow surface water to
drain off the Hegman Tract as it had prior to September 17, 2015. Hegman also sought
compensatory damages.
¶11. Adcock filed his answer to Hegman’s complaint and asserted a counterclaim against
Hegman for tortious interference with business relations. Adcock alleged that before filing
the lawsuit, Frank reviewed and discussed with Phillips the plan specifications for the land-
forming project and dirt work on the Eaton-Ballard Tract. According to Adcock, Hegman
4 ultimately approved the work. Adcock stated that he relied on this approval in proceeding
with the project. Adcock asserted that in the spring of 2016, he intended to grow crops on
the Eaton/Ballard Tract and sell those products following harvest, but Hegman’s lawsuit
precluded him from performing this work. Adcock stated that Hegman’s lawsuit also
precluded him from performing additional land-forming work on the Eaton-Ballard Tract,
which would have made the land more suitable for farming. Adcock maintained that he
suffered damages as a result of Hegman’s interference.
¶12. On November 18, 2016, the county court held a hearing on Hegman’s motion for a
temporary restraining order and permanent injunction. The parties submitted evidence, and
the court heard testimony from Hegman, Adcock, Phillips, and Adcock’s expert, Bill
Sheppard, a licensed professional civil engineer whom the county court accepted as an expert
on land grading, irrigation, drainage, and water management.
¶13. On December 16, 2016, the county court entered an order denying Hegman’s motion
for a temporary restraining order and permanent injunction with prejudice after finding that
Hegman failed to prove that any negligence or intentional acts or omissions by the Appellees
proximately caused Hegman to suffer damages that would entitle him to injunctive relief.
The county court declined to consider Hegman’s claims for monetary damages or Adcock’s
counterclaim at the hearing, explaining that those claims would remain pending.
¶14. The county court also directed Adcock and Phillips to finish the land-forming work,
after which time the court would determine what damages, if any, were caused by the land-
5 forming work, as well any damages to which Adcock may be entitled based on his
counterclaim for tortious interference with business relations.
¶15. In April and May of 2017, Adcock filed motions for injunctive relief and for contempt
against Hegman, alleging that Hegman intentionally interfered with Adcock’s land-forming
work on the Eaton-Ballard Tract.
¶16. On March 1, 2, and 7, 2018, the county court held a hearing on the remaining issues.
The county court heard testimony from Hegman’s experts: Kimble Slaton, a licensed
professional land surveyor, and Bobby Carpenter, a licensed civil engineer. The county court
also heard additional testimony from Hegman, Adcock, Phillips, and Adcock’s expert Bill
Sheppard.
¶17. After reviewing the testimony and evidence presented, the county court entered an
order on September 30, 2019, finding that Adcock met his burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence all the elements of his claim of tortious interference with
business relations.2 The county court awarded Adcock $94,176.12 in compensatory
damages: $58,917.36 in 2016 on soybeans, $13,073.87 in 2017 on soybeans, and $20,003.93
in 2017 on cotton, as well as $2,180.96 in reduced gin rebates caused by Adcock’s reduced
cotton production in 2017. The county court also found that Adcock was entitled to punitive
damages based on Hegman’s “willfulness, malice[,] and intent to cause damages to Adcock’s
2 The briefs refer to this as the September 27, 2019 order. Although the order was signed on September 27, 2019, the county court’s docket reflects that the order was entered on September 30, 2019.
6 lawful business” and accordingly awarded Adcock $1,000 in punitive damages. As to
Adcock’s motions for contempt, the county court found Hegman in contempt of court and
fined him $1,000.
¶18. Hegman filed a timely motion for reconsideration, relief from judgment, a new trial,
and for specific findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Mississippi Rules of Civil
Procedure 52, 59, and 60. Hegman also filed a supplemental motion for relief from the
judgment, alleging that Sheppard’s billing entries show he manipulated and altered his maps
and findings based on advice from Adcock’s counsel. Hegman specifically asserted that
Adcock’s counsel advised Sheppard to take out the verbiage on the maps referencing
“adversely affected areas.” Adcock responded and explained that his counsel advised
Sheppard to change the wording due to concern that Hegman would attempt to portray such
verbiage as an admission of fault by Adcock and Phillips. Adcock argued that Sheppard
testified he labeled those areas as affected “[b]ecause [h]e couldn’t tell exactly what was
going on right in there,” but he “knew something was happening . . . on the line.” Adcock
argued that Sheppard never testified that the words “affected area” were intended to denote
areas of Hegman’s land that were damaged or otherwise adversely impacted.
¶19. On February 29, 2020, Judge Mills Barbee recused himself from the case, and the
Mississippi Supreme Court appointed Judge Barry Ford to preside over the case. On August
21, 2020, the county court entered a final judgment denying Hegman’s motions and adopting
the findings and rulings from the September 30, 2019 final order.
7 ¶20. Hegman appealed to the Yazoo County Circuit Court. After reviewing the record and
hearing oral arguments from counsel, the circuit court entered an order affirming the county
court’s rulings in part and reversing in part. The circuit court found insufficient evidence to
support the finding of contempt, so the circuit court reversed and rendered the county court’s
finding of contempt against Hegman.
¶21. This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶22. This appeal primarily concerns the rulings the county court made. The circuit court
had the role of an intermediate appellate court in this case; as a result, we will review the
county court’s rulings “without any deference to the analysis of the circuit court.”3 Robinson
v. Singh, 303 So. 3d 65, 71 (¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020).
DISCUSSION
I. Adcock’s Counterclaim for Tortious Interference with Business Relations
¶23. Hegman argues that the county court applied an erroneous legal standard and
committed manifest error by finding Hegman liable to Adcock for tortious interference with
business relations. When reviewing cases like the one before us where “the county court sits
as the fact-finder,” we recognize that “the circuit court and this Court, as appellate courts,
are bound by the judgment of the county court if supported by substantial evidence and not
3 See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-51-79 (Rev. 2019) (requiring appeals from county court to circuit court to be “considered solely upon the record as made in the county court”).
8 manifestly wrong.” Biloxi Dock & Ice LLC v. Back Bay Fuel & Ice LLC, 340 So. 3d 378,
382 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he judgment of a
circuit or county court in a non-jury trial is entitled to the same deference on appeal as a
chancery court decree.” Id. “Questions of law are reviewed de novo.” Id. We further
recognize that “trial judge, sitting as the trier of fact, is the sole judge of the credibility of the
witness[es].” Edwards v. State, 355 So. 3d 784, 788 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023).
¶24. Hegman submits that Par Industries Inc. v. Target Container Co., 708 So. 2d 44, 48
(¶10) (Miss. 1998), and Scruggs, Millette, Bozeman & Dent P.A. v. Merkel & Cocke P.A.,
910 So. 2d 1093, 1098 (¶23) (Miss. 2005), provide the proper elements for establishing a
claim for tortious interference with business relations. In Par Industries, the Mississippi
Supreme Court distinguished the claim of tortious interference with a contract from the claim
of tortious interference with business relations. Par Industries, 708 So. 2d at 48 (¶10). The
supreme court explained that tortious interference with a contract occurs when a person
unlawfully and intentionally interferes with and causes damage to another’s business, and
tortious interference with business relations “occurs when a person unlawfully diverts
prospective customers away from one’s business.” Id. at 48 (¶¶8-10). Hegman asserts that
pursuant to this definition, the county court erred in finding him liable for tortious
interference with Adcock’s business relations. Hegman argues that Adcock failed to prove
that Hegman intentionally, willfully, and unlawfully diverted any customers away from
Adcock’s business for the calculated purpose of causing damage to Adcock’s business.
9 ¶25. However, in Par Industries, the supreme court clarified that although it originally
“intended there be different elements for elements for interference with business relations
and interference with contract,” the court later established that “the same four elements for
interference with a business relationship . . . apply to the separate tort of interference with
contract.” Id. at 48 (¶10) (citing MBF Corp. v. Century Business Commc’ns Inc., 663 So. 2d
595, 598 (Miss. 1995)). Therefore, we find the county court correctly applied the four
elements necessary to prove a claim for tortious interference with business relations as set
forth in MBF Corp.:
(1) The acts [of the defendant] were intentional and willful; (2) The acts were calculated to cause damage to the plaintiffs in their lawful business; (3) The acts were done with the unlawful purpose of causing damage and loss, without right or justifiable cause on the part of the defendant (which constitutes malice); (4) Actual damage and loss resulted.
663 So. 2d at 598; see also Biglane v. Under The Hill Corp., 949 So. 2d 9, 18 (¶29) (Miss.
2007). The plaintiff must prove all four elements by a preponderance of the evidence. MBF
Corp., 663 So. 2d at 598-99.
¶26. As to the first element of the claim, Adcock alleges that Hegman’s filing of the
complaint on February 5, 2016, precluded Adcock from conducting his spring 2016 business
farming operations on the Eaton-Ballard Tract and from performing additional land-forming
work that would make the land more suitable for farming. Hegman maintains that he did not
file the complaint for the purpose of intentionally and willfully interfering with Adcock’s
business; rather, he filed the complaint for the sole purpose of seeking judicial relief to
10 restore adequate drainage to Hegman’s property and to recover damages caused by Adcock’s
land-forming project. Hegman argues that Phillips’s testimony at the hearing reflects that
Phillips had to stop the land-forming project due to the rain and weather conditions, not
because of the lawsuit.
¶27. Our review of the hearing transcript confirms that Phillips testified before the county
court that he had to temporarily stop the land-forming work on the Eaton-Ballard Tract due
to weather conditions. However, Phillips’s testimony also reflects that he intended to resume
and complete the land-forming project once the weather improved. When asked why he did
not resume the work once the weather conditions improved, Phillips answered that he
received a restraining order from Hegman prohibiting him from performing any more work
on the project.4 Phillips then clarified that the only reason he had not completed the land-
forming work by the time of the November 18, 2016 hearing was because of Hegman’s
lawsuit.
¶28. Adcock also testified and confirmed that he intended to complete the land-forming
work once the weather conditions improved, but he was unable to do so because of
Hegman’s lawsuit. Adcock admitted that he never received a court order expressly
prohibiting him from completing the land-forming work, but he testified that his attorney
instructed him to stop the land-forming work while the lawsuit was pending. Adcock stated
4 The record does not contain any restraining order against Phillips; instead, it appears that Phillips is referring to Hegman’s complaint and motion seeking a temporary restraining order.
11 that before Phillips paused the work due to the weather conditions, the land-forming work
was ninety percent complete.
¶29. After reviewing the evidence and testimony, the county court ultimately found that
Hegman’s actions “were intentional and willful, were calculated to cause damage to Clay
Adcock’s lawful farming business, and were done with the unlawful purpose of causing
damage and loss, without right or justifiable cause.” The county court listed instances of
Hegman’s conduct in support of its finding that Hegman’s filing of the lawsuit was
malicious, including Hegman’s trespassing and interfering with the work being done on the
Eaton-Ballard Tract, as well as Hegman’s performing work on his land years prior to the
commencement of the land-forming work to address problems and drainage issues that
Hegman later blamed on the land-forming work.
¶30. The county court further explained that it based its opinion and findings on the
evidence presented and “upon witness credibility and the plausibility of the many differing
of bits of testimony of the witnesses.” The testimony shows that prior to filing the complaint,
Hegman and Phillips had a conversation regarding the land-forming project on the Eaton-
Ballard Tract. Phillips testified that he and Hegman ran into each other at a gas station
approximately a month before Hegman filed his complaint. According to Phillips, Hegman
asked about the work Phillips was performing on the Eaton-Ballard Tract, and Phillips
informed Hegman about the land-forming work. Phillips explained to Hegman that the
project would also benefit Hegman’s land. Phillips testified that Hegman acknowledged his
12 approval of the work, and Hegman told Phillips that all he wanted was for someone to tell
him what was going on. At the hearing, Hegman acknowledged that he ran into Phillips at
a gas station, but he disputed Phillips’s recollection of their conversation, as well as the time
frame for when it occurred. Hegman also testified when he filed his complaint in February
2016, he believed that Adcock and Phillips had completed the land-forming project.
¶31. The county court ultimately found that Phillips was more credible than Hegman,
noting that “Phillips had no motivation to misrepresent the occurrence and substance” of the
disputed discussion with Hegman about the land-forming work because “[Phillips] had not
asserted any claims against Hegman based upon said discussion.” However, the county court
determined that “[t]he opposite is true with regard to Hegman, as said purported discussion
is a basis for the counterclaim filed against him by Clay Adcock.” The county court also
found that Hegman’s testimony that he thought the land-forming project was complete at the
time he filed his complaint was not credible. The county court explained that Hegman’s
complaint showed that he expressly requested that the county court order Adcock “to
immediately cease and desist” from engaging in any further land-forming activities on the
Eaton-Ballard Tract, which made it “clear that Hegman knew the subject land-forming work
was not complete when he filed suit.” The county court judge concluded, based on
Hegman’s contradictory statements, that Hegman’s testimony regarding his knowledge about
the status of the land-forming project “was untruthful.”
¶32. Upon review, we find that the record does not support the county court’s finding that
13 Hegman’s act of filing the lawsuit was “intentional and willful, . . . [was] calculated to cause
damage to [Clay Adcock’s lawful farming business], and . . . [was] done with the unlawful
purpose of causing damage and loss, without right or justifiable cause.” MBF Corp., 663 So.
2d at 598. As stated, the third element necessary to prove a claim of tortious interference
with business relations is that “[t]he acts were done with the unlawful purpose of causing
damage and loss, without right or justifiable cause on the part of the defendant (which
constitutes malice).” Id. Adcock, as the counterclaimant, was required to prove all four
elements by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
¶33. Instead, our review of the record shows that Hegman provided sufficient evidence
showing that he had a justifiable right to file his lawsuit and that his filing of the lawsuit was
not malicious or even frivolous. At the hearing, Hegman produced two qualified
experts—Slaton and Carpenter—who testified and provided evidence in support of
Hegman’s claim that the land-forming work affected the flow of surface water off of the
Hegman Tract and caused damage to Hegman’s land. Slaton testified that he personally
observed standing water on the Hegman Tract, and he also identified areas on the aerial
photo mosaic maps admitted into evidence that depicted standing water on the Hegman Tract
near the common boundary line with the Eaton-Ballard Tract. Carpenter testified that he also
observed flooded field conditions on the west side of the Hegman Tract. After reviewing
maps and photographs and performing his own inspection of the properties, Carpenter
testified regarding his conclusion that the land-forming project on the Eaton-Ballard Tract
14 obstructed and prevented adequate surface water drainage from the west side of the Hegman
Tract. Although the county court found Adcock’s expert witness more credible than
Hegman’s experts, the record reflects no objection to Slaton or Carpenter’s qualifications or
to the county court’s acceptance of them as experts in their respective fields of expertise.
The record further shows that although Hegman’s lawsuit was ultimately unsuccessful, the
county court denied Adcock’s motion for a directed verdict at the close of Hegman’s case-in-
chief after finding that Hegman had provided sufficient evidence in support of his case to
continue with the hearing.
¶34. Both parties also agree that upon Hegman’s filing of the lawsuit, the county court
never entered any order commanding Adcock and Phillips to cease the land-forming
operations or preventing them from completing the project. The record contains no action
by Adcock seeking a ruling on Hegman’s request for a temporary restraining order or
injunction prior to the November 2016 hearing, which was held over nine months after
Hegman filed the lawsuit. Adcock also failed to cite any cases in support of his argument
that the filing of a lawsuit constitutes an act sufficient to satisfy the third element of tortious
interference with business relations.
¶35. After our review, we find that Hegman possessed a justifiable, factual basis for filing
his lawsuit. Although Hegman’s lawsuit was ultimately unsuccessful, the record reflects that
it was not frivolous or malicious. The supreme court has held that “[t]he general rule in this
state is that there is no tortious interference when one has a justifiable interest and reason for
15 acting.” Hopewell Enters. Inc. v. Trustmark Nat. Bank, 680 So. 2d 812, 819 (Miss. 1996);
see also Progressive Casualty Insurance v. All Care Inc., 914 So. 2d 214, 219 (¶7) (Miss.
Ct. App. 2005) (“[T]ortious interference requires intermeddling without sufficient reason.”
(internal quotation mark omitted)). Because Hegman possessed a justifiable basis and right
to file his lawsuit, we find no substantial evidence supports the county court’s ruling that
Adcock proved the third element required for tortious interference with business relations
by a preponderance of the evidence.5 We therefore reverse the circuit court’s judgment
affirming the county court’s judgment finding Hegman liable to Adcock for tortious
interference with business relations and awarding compensatory and punitive damages. We
render judgment denying the counterclaim.
II. Hegman’s Claim for Injunctive Relief and Damages
¶36. Hegman also argues that the county court erred in denying his claim for damages and
injunctive relief.6 Hegman claims that the overwhelming weight of the evidence at trial
established that the Appellees’ land-forming project on the Eaton-Ballard Tract adversely and
unlawfully affected the drainage of the Hegman Tract. Hegman asserts that the county court
5 Because a claimant must prove all four elements in order to prevail upon a claim of tortious interference with business relations, we decline to address Hegman’s argument regarding the fourth and remaining element—damages. See Progressive Cas. Ins., 914 So. 2d at 221 (¶13). 6 At oral argument, Hegman’s counsel appeared to waive this issue. However, because Hegman’s claim for injunctive relief and damages was ruled on in the judgment before us on appeal, and because Hegman fully briefed this issue, we will proceed to address it.
16 should have required the Appellees to construct a ditch on the east side of the Eaton-Ballard
Tract’s boundary line to allow surface water to drain off the Hegman Tract and into the
existing drainage ditch running along the north end of the Eaton-Ballard Tract or, in the
alternative, pay for the costs of digging a ditch on the west side of the Hegman Tract’s
boundary line.
¶37. Hegman further argues that the county court should have awarded him damages for
two rental values of the affected area, as well as all costs and legal expenses, including
attorney’s fees and fees for expert witnesses necessary to substantiate his claim.
¶38. “In determining whether a verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence,
we must accept as true the evidence presented as supportive of the verdict.” Erves v.
Hosemann, 335 So. 3d 603, 612 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022). “We will disturb a verdict only
when convinced that the lower court has abused its discretion or if the final result will result
in an unconscionable injustice.” Id. “[O]nce a verdict has been returned in a civil case, ‘we
are not at liberty to direct that a judgment be entered contrary to that verdict short of a
conclusion on our part that, given the evidence as a whole, taken in the light most favorable
to the verdict, no reasonable, hypothetical [finder of fact] could have’ made the same
finding.” Id. (quoting Starcher v. Byrne, 687 So. 2d 737, 739 (Miss. 1997)).
¶39. Hegman’s complaint alleged that the Appellees’ land-forming work on the Eaton-
Ballard Tract obstructed the natural drainage of surface water from the Hegman Tract and
caused damage to the land and farming operations. We recognize that “[i]n diverting waters
17 from his lands, any landowner must use reasonable care to prevent unnecessary injury to
adjoining landowners.” Hall v. Wood, 443 So. 2d 834, 839 (Miss. 1983) (citing Holman v.
Richardson, 115 Miss. 169, 179, 76 So. 136, 137 (1917)). The supreme court has held that
“[i]f a lower riparian landowner obstructs the flow of a stream or water course, thereby
causing his upper riparian neighbor’s lands to flood, the latter may secure judicial relief.”
Ga. Pac. Corp. v. Armstrong, 451 So. 2d 201, 205 (Miss. 1984). “In such cases, the burden
is upon the plaintiff to show that the acts of the lower riparian landowner were a substantial
contributing cause of the damages he suffered.” Id. “Redress may take the form of an award
of damages, temporary or permanent, or both, and an injunction, mandatory or prohibitory,
or both, as may be appropriate.” Id. The trial court “may provide for such other redress as
may be equitable and proper under the facts and circumstances of the particular case.” Id.
¶40. The main issues before the county court were which direction the surface water on the
Hegman Tract naturally drained off of the property, and whether the land-forming work on
the Eaton/Ballard Tract affected or impaired the drainage. At the hearing, Hegman asserted
that the water always drained to the west (toward the Eaton-Ballard Tract) and that the land-
forming work blocked the flow of the water. However, the Appellees asserted that the
surface water drained off of the Hegman Tract to the east (away from the Eaton/Ballard
Tract). At the hearing, the parties presented expert witnesses in support of their respective
positions regarding surface water drainage.
¶41. The county court heard from Hegman’s expert witnesses: Kimble Slaton, an expert
18 in the field of topographical surveying, and Bobby Carpenter, an expert in the field of civil
engineering. Slaton testified that in January 2018, he used a drone to perform an aerial
survey of the area at issue for the purposes of “stitching together” the photographs to extract
features and topographic information. Slaton used the aerial survey to prepare a map for an
engineer to use to conduct a watershed study, which studies the flow of water across a piece
of property and the impact that it may have on other properties. Slaton testified that he also
prepared a map of the areas at issue based on historical data he obtained from the Mississippi
Automated Resource Information System, which is a graphic information system
compilation. Slaton explained that he was also able to find data taken by LiDAR, an aerial
survey performed by lasers mounted on an airplane, to create a map showing the features of
the areas at issue in 2009. Slaton testified that the map from 2018 shows changes in
elevation on the Eaton-Ballard Tract that did not exist in 2009.
¶42. During cross-examination, Slaton admitted that he did not perform any on-the-ground
surveys or take photographs from ground level to determine elevation levels on the
properties. Slaton admitted that elevation levels measured from the ground are more reliable
than elevation levels taken from the air. Slaton also admitted that if a discrepancy existed
between elevation levels taken from an aerial survey and an on-the-ground survey, he would
defer to the ground-level survey because they are more reliable. Slaton further stated that
standing water could affect the accuracy of aerial elevation levels.
¶43. Carpenter testified that Hegman asked him to conduct a watershed study on the
19 properties at issue. Carpenter explained that this entailed using available information, such
as historical maps of the property and site visits, including data created by Slaton, to create
a topographical map showing ground contours and the flow of water drainage. In February
2018, Carpenter prepared a report of his findings, and the report was admitted into evidence.
Based on his findings, Carpenter opined that the higher elevation of the Eaton-Ballard Tract
blocked water from draining off of the Hegman Tract. Carpenter determined that prior to the
land-forming work on the Eaton-Ballard Tract, the surface water flowed west off of the
Hegman Tract, across the Eaton-Ballard Tract, and continued flowing west until it eventually
entered a drainage ditch on the Hegman Farms Tract. Carpenter testified that the higher
elevation on the Eaton-Ballard Tract caused by the land-forming work prevented the surface
water from flowing west, and as a result, the surface water began “ponding” on the Hegman
Tract.
¶44. Carpenter testified that Hegman also expressed concern about access to and future
maintenance of a drainage ditch across the Eaton-Ballard Tract, and as a result of Hegman’s
concerns, Carpenter recommended the installation of a ditch along the eastern property line
of the Eaton-Ballard Tract, with the ditch running south to north. Carpenter also
recommended that a larger drainage pipe be installed in a ditch running under Adcock’s field
road to allow adequate flow through the existing ditch that runs along the north end of the
Hegman Tract. During cross-examination, Carpenter admitted that his recommendations
addressed potential future concerns about issues that had not yet occurred and may never
20 occur.
¶45. The county court also heard testimony from Adcock’s expert witness, Bill Sheppard,
who was accepted as an engineering expert on matters related to land grading, irrigation,
drainage, and water management. Sheppard testified that he had reviewed Adcock and
Phillips’s land-forming plans, and he opined that when the project was complete, neither the
Hegman Tract nor the Hegman Farms Tract would be injured by the blockage and pooling
of water. Sheppard also opined that the land-forming work, once completed, would benefit
Hegman’s property and improve surface water drainage.
¶46. Sheppard testified that as part of his work on this case, he prepared maps compiled
from LiDAR data that showed the historic drainage patterns of the Hegman Tract. Sheppard
explained that these maps, which were admitted into evidence, indicated that historically,
some portion of the Eaton-Ballard Tract has drained to the east onto the Hegman Tract, and
some portion of the Eaton-Ballard Tract has also drained to the west onto the Hegman Farms
¶47. Sheppard also testified that he performed a site visit to the Eaton-Ballard Tract in
February 2018 and took on-the-ground measurements of the tract using his survey-grade GPS
system. Sheppard explained that he also took on-the-ground measurements to verify his
LiDAR data. Sheppard testified that data from a survey performed on the ground is
“absolutely” more reliable than LiDAR data. Sheppard explained that his initial survey was
based off LiDAR data, but he testified that after performing an on-the-ground survey of the
21 areas at issue, he discovered details that were not provided in the LiDAR data and that
caused him to change his opinions regarding drainage patterns on the Eaton-Ballard Tract;
namely, that the western half of the Hegman Tract has historically drained and continues to
drain to the east, away from the Eaton-Ballard Tract.7
¶48. After hearing testimony from the expert witnesses and reviewing the evidence
presented, the county court found that the experts presented conflicting opinions as to the
direction surface water naturally drained off of the Hegman Tract and whether the land-
forming work affected the surface water drainage from the Hegman Tract. The county court
ultimately determined that Sheppard’s opinions regarding the historic and current drainage
patterns of the tracts at issue were more reliable, explaining that Sheppard based his opinion
“upon on ground survey data[,] which even [Hegman’s] expert Kimble Slaton admits is the
most reliable data available.” The county court further found that Hegman “offered no
credible proof indicating that said data is flawed in any way.” In reviewing the record, we
7 As stated above, after the county court entered its judgment, Hegman filed a supplemental motion for relief from the judgment pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), alleging that Sheppard’s billing entries show that he manipulated and altered his maps and findings to remove the verbiage “adversely affected areas.” At the hearing on Hegman’s motion, Adcock’s counsel explained that he advised Sheppard to change the wording due to concern that Hegman would attempt to portray such verbiage as an admission of fault by Adcock and Phillips. Adcock’s counsel also argued that Hegman never claimed that Sheppard changed the substance of his maps; rather, Hegman only argued that Sheppard removed the word “adversely.” The county court found no merit to Hegman’s claim and denied relief. On appeal, Hegman does not advance an argument regarding the county court’s denial of his Rule 60(b) motion; accordingly, we will not discuss the merits of that particular issue. See Jackson v. State, 962 So. 2d 649, 678 (¶105) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007).
22 “recognize[] that the trial judge, sitting in a bench trial as the trier of fact, has the sole
authority for determining the credibility of the witnesses.” City of Jackson v. Lipsey, 834 So.
2d 687, 691 (¶14) (Miss. 2003).
¶49. Regarding the alleged drainage issues on the Hegman Tract, Hegman testified at trial
that in 2010 he installed culvert #4 to help with drainage issues. Hegman testified that he
performed regular maintenance on culvert #4 to unclog any blockages and to keep the water
flowing. Testimony reflects that during the litigation, Adcock hired Tim Pepper to perform
an inspection on culvert #4 and assess any drainage issues. Hegman testified that he was
aware that Adcock requested the inspection and that the inspection was performed on August
25, 2017. Hegman denied performing any work on culvert #4 in preparation for the
inspection.
¶50. However, Adcock submitted photographs and videos into evidence depicting the
condition of the properties at issue between June 21, 2016, and February 28, 2018. The
photos and videos showed the western half of the Hegman Tract experienced severe and
repeated drainage problems caused by standing water originating at the location of culvert
#4. Despite Hegman’s testimony that he regularly maintained and unclogged culvert #4,
these photographs and videos show that culvert #4 was continuously obstructed from
approximately January 30, 2017, through August 17, 2017. Adcock testified regarding two
photographs of culvert #4: one taken on August 17, 2017, and one taken on August 24, 2017,
one day before Pepper inspected the culvert. Adcock observed that in the picture from
23 August 17, the opening of the culvert was covered, and in the picture from August 24, the
culvert had been cleaned out. The county court found that videos and photographs admitted
into evidence “wholly undermine” Hegman’s testimony that he regularly checks for any
maintenance issues on the Hegman Tract and that he immediately resolves any issues that he
observes, particularly any issues with culvert #4. Additionally, Sheppard testified that when
he performed his site visit, he observed a “really deep” and “good” ditch on the Hegman
Tract that had filled with silt and had not been cleaned out. Sheppard opined that lack of
maintenance of this ditch would be a “major cause” of the water pooling on the Hegman
¶51. As stated, Hegman had the burden of showing that the Appellees’ acts “were a
substantial contributing cause of the damages he suffered.” Ga. Pac. Corp., 451 So. 2d at
205. After reviewing the testimony and evidence, the county court ultimately found that
Hegman failed to prove that any negligence or intentional acts or omissions by the Appellees
proximately caused Hegman to suffer damages that would entitle him to injunctive relief or
damages. After reviewing the evidence as a whole and in the light most favorable to the
verdict, we cannot say that the verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence
or that no reasonable, hypothetical finder of fact could have made the same finding. Erves,
335 So. 3d at 612 (¶18).
III. Specific Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
¶52. Hegman next claims that the county court erred in failing to make specific findings
24 of facts and conclusions of law as requested in his amended motion for reconsideration, relief
from judgment, a new trial, and for specific findings of fact and conclusions of law.
¶53. Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) provides:
In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury the court may, and shall upon the request of any party to the suit or when required by these rules, find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon and judgment shall be entered accordingly.
Additionally, Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 52(b) provides:
Upon motion of a party filed not later than ten days after entry of judgment or entry of findings and conclusions, or upon its own initiative during the same period, the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may accompany a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised regardless of whether the party raising the question has made in court an objection to such findings or has filed a motion to amend them or a motion for judgment or a motion for a new trial.
¶54. We recognize that “Rule 52(a) addresses the lower court’s duty to make specific
findings of fact[,] . . . [and] Rule 52(b) provides the procedure that a party or the court, upon
its own motion, must follow to amend a judgment or make additional findings.” Anderson
v. Anderson, 8 So. 3d 264, 268 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009). The Advisory Committee Notes
to Rule 52 provide that the “principal purpose” of Rule 52(a) “is to provide the appellate
court with a record regarding what the trial court did—the facts it found and the law it
applied, in part so that the appellate court can refrain from deciding issues of fact and issues
that were not decided by the trial court.” M.R.C.P. 52 advisory committee notes.
¶55. In his motion, Hegman requested that the county court provide specific findings of
25 fact and conclusions of law as to the following issues:
a. Whether the completed land[-]forming activities on the Eaton-Ballard tract actually prevented rainwater and other run-off from draining off the Hegman tract[;] b. The nature and date of each and every specific intentional, willful and/or unlawful act Hegman committed that unlawfully diverted prospective customers away from Adcock’s business; c. The nature and date of each and every specific intentional, willful and/or unlawful act Hegman committed that caused actual damage to Adcock’s business; d. The nature and date of each and every specific intentional, willful and/or unlawful act Hegman committed that unlawfully prevented Adcock from completing the land[-]forming project on the Eaton-Ballard Tract; e. How each specific intentional, willful and/or unlawful act prevented Adcock from completing the land[-]forming project on the Eaton-Ballard tract; f. The specific facts on which the Court relied for measuring Adcock’s damages using estimated crop yield loss rather than depreciation of rental value of lands idled due to Hegman’s intentional, willful and/or unlawful acts; g. The specific legal authority on which the Court relied for measuring Adcock’s damages using estimated crop yield loss rather than depreciation of rental value of lands idled due to Hegman’s intentional, willful and/or unlawful acts.
¶56. Our review of the county court’s September 30, 2019 judgment reflects that it contains
substantial findings of fact and conclusions of law and clearly sets forth the county court’s
explanations for its rulings on Hegman’s claims and Adcock’s counterclaim. We accordingly
find that the county court’s judgment “clearly convey[s] the basis of his decision and [is]
sufficient for this Court to review that decision.” Stowe v. Edwards, 331 So. 3d 24, 32 (¶31)
(Miss. Ct. App. 2021). Additionally, Rule 52(b) states that a request for a trial court to
“amend its findings or make additional findings” is discretionary. M.R.C.P. 52(b). We
therefore find no abuse of discretion by the county court in denying Hegman’s request to
make additional findings. See Roley v. Roley, 329 So. 3d 473, 499-500 (¶¶77-78) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2021).
26 IV. In-Person Site Inspection by the County Court
¶57. Finally, Hegman argues that the county court abused its discretion by refusing to make
an in-person, on-site inspection of the lands involved in this action. Hegman asserts that
during the litigation, he requested that the county court make an in-person, on-site inspection
of the property, and the county court refused. Hegman submits that if the county court judge
had personally inspected the property at issue, he would have observed that the land-forming
work on the Eaton-Ballard Tract does in fact prevent water from draining off of the Hegman
Tract and that Hegman was justified in filing the complaint.
¶58. In his appellate brief, Hegman fails to cite any legal authority in support of his
assertion. “Our caselaw clearly provides that the failure to cite supporting legal authority
precludes consideration of an issue on appeal.” Hardin v. Hardin, 335 So. 3d 1088, 1094
(¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022); see also M.R.A.P. 28(a)(7). Accordingly, Hegman has waived
consideration of this issue on appeal.
CONCLUSION
¶59. After our review, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment affirming the county court’s
denial of Hegman’s claim for injunctive relief and damages, as well as the county court’s
denial of Hegman’s Rule 52 motion. However, we reverse the circuit court’s judgment
affirming the county court’s judgment finding Hegman liable to Adcock for tortious
interference with business relations and render judgment denying Adcock’s counterclaim.
Because we reverse the judgment for tortious interference with business relations, we also
27 reverse the award of $94,176.12 in compensatory damages and $1,000 in punitive damages.
¶60. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART.
BARNES, C.J., GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY AND SMITH, JJ., CONCUR. WILSON, P.J., AND EMFINGER, J., CONCUR IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.