Frank Gaynor v. United States

D.C. Circuit

Frank Gaynor v. United States

247 F.2d 583, 101 U.S. App. D.C. 177, 1957 U.S. App. LEXIS 3726

CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit

DecidedJuly 11, 1957

Docket13641_1

StatusPublished

Cited by7 cases

This text of 247 F.2d 583 (Frank Gaynor v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Frank Gaynor v. United States, 247 F.2d 583, 101 U.S. App. D.C. 177, 1957 U.S. App. LEXIS 3726 (D.C. Cir. 1957).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Appellant and two others were indicted and put on trial for housebreaking, larceny and destruction of property in violation of D.C.Code (1951) §§ 22-1801, 22-2201, 22-2202, 22-403. The evidence against appellant was circumstantial and, though sufficient to go to a jury, inconclusive. Before the trial was concluded the court entered judgment of acquittal as to one of the co-defendants. The remaining defendant other than appellant, one Mitchell, was permitted in open court and in the presence of the jury to change his plea of not guilty to guilty. When doing this he was asked by the trial judge whether he admitted that he committed the offense. He replied, “of being with them, yes” — “them” including appellant. Counsel for appellant moved for a mistrial. It will be seen that Mitchell was in all substance permitted to testify against appellant without taking the stand. The incident was clearly prejudicial to appellant and the error in permitting it is obvious. We have accordingly entered judgment reversing and remanding. Cf. Payton v. United States, 96 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 222 F.2d 794.

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PER CURIAM.

Appellant and two others were indicted and put on trial for housebreaking, larceny and destruction of property in violation of D.C.Code (1951) §§ 22-1801, 22-2201, 22-2202, 22-403. The evidence against appellant was circumstantial and, though sufficient to go to a jury, inconclusive. Before the trial was concluded the court entered judgment of acquittal as to one of the co-defendants. The remaining defendant other than appellant, one Mitchell, was permitted in open court and in the presence of the jury to change his plea of not guilty to guilty. When doing this he was asked by the trial judge whether he admitted that he committed the offense. He replied, “of being with them, yes” — “them” including appellant. Counsel for appellant moved for a mistrial. It will be seen that Mitchell was in all substance permitted to testify against appellant without taking the stand. The incident was clearly prejudicial to appellant and the error in permitting it is obvious. We have accordingly entered judgment reversing and remanding. Cf. Payton v. United States, 96 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 222 F.2d 794.

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247 F.2d 583, 101 U.S. App. D.C. 177, 1957 U.S. App. LEXIS 3726, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/frank-gaynor-v-united-states-cadc-1957.

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