Frank Garcia v. Lydia Gomez

Court of Appeals of Texas

Frank Garcia v. Lydia Gomez

Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided November 26, 2008·No. 07-06-00403-CV·Published

Opinion

NO. 07-06-0403-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL E

NOVEMBER 26, 2008

______________________________

FRANK GARCIA, APPELLANT

v.

LYDIA GOMEZ, APPELLEE

_________________________________

FROM THE 72^ND DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY;

NO. 2003-523,605; HON. RUBEN REYES, PRESIDING

_______________________________

Before QUINN, C.J., CAMPBELL, J., and BOYD, S.J.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Appellant Frank Garcia appeals from the trial courtâs judgment finding appellee Lydia Gomez to be the owner of a tract of land and ordering Garcia to vacate the land. We affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Gomez and Barnabe Trevino were divorced in 1990. As part of their divorce, Gomez conveyed her interest in a tract of land in Lubbock County to Trevino. Later, by a 2001 deed, Trevino conveyed that property to Gomez in forgiveness of back child support he owed her.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Garcia, an associate of Trevino, has resided on the property since 2001. In September 2003, Gomez filed suit against Garcia alleging conversion, interference and trespass claims. Garcia filed a general denial. Thereafter, Gomez amended her petition to include a request for a declaratory judgment that she be adjudicated the true owner of the real property in question. Trevino was not made a party to the suit.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The case was tried to the bench. Gomez, Garcia and Trevino testified. Testimony showed that Garcia had provided funds by which Trevino had redeemed the property in 1997 after tax authorities had sold it for back taxes, and had since provided funds for improvements and for the payment of taxes on the property. The trial courtâs judgment declared Gomez to be the owner of the land and ordered Garcia to vacate the property. This appeal followed.

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Issue

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Garciaâs appellate issue reads: âAfter being tried by consent, the Trial Court erred in not considering Promissory Estoppel as a defense to the Statute [of] Frauds claim by [Gomez].â We interpret the issue as challenging the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial courtâs failure to find in favor of Garcia on a promissory estoppel theory. AnalysisGarcia contends Trevino had promised to convey two acres from the tract to him in consideration of his provision of funds for redemption of the property and for payment of taxes. Garciaâs only pleading was his general denial. Gomez contends Garciaâs failure to plead his affirmative defense of promissory estoppel bars the defense. Garcia responds it was tried by consent. For purposes of this opinion, we assume, without deciding, that Garcia is correct that his promissory estoppel defense was tried by consent.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In a bench trial, it is the role of the trial court to resolve inconsistencies in the evidence. Ponce v. Sandoval, 68 S.W.3d 799, 806 (Tex. App.âAmarillo 2001, no pet.). The trial court, as fact finder, is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Sterquell v. Scott, 140 S.W.3d 453, 461 (Tex. App.âAmarillo 2004, no pet.). The finder of fact may accept or reject any part or all of a witnessâs testimony. Vickery v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline, 5 S.W.3d 241, 255 n.5 (Tex.App.âHouston [14^th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied). It may believe one witness and disbelieve others. Id.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Here, no findings of fact or conclusions of law were made. The record contains no request for findings or conclusions. Tex. R. Civ. P. 296. On appeal, this court therefore must presume the trial court made all fact findings necessary to support its judgment. Zac Smith & Co., Inc. v. Otis Elevator Co., 734 S.W.2d 662, 667 (Tex. 1987). Because the record contains a reporterâs record of the trial, however, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the implied findings of fact may be challenged. BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002); Roberson v. Robinson, 768 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Tex. 1989).

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â It was Garciaâs burden at trial to prove all the essential elements of his promissory estoppel defense. See Boy Scouts of America v. Responsive Terminal Sys., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 738, 743 (Tex.App.âDallas 1990, writ denied) (holding burden of proving promissory estoppel is on party asserting the doctrine). Garcia cites âMooreâ Burger, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 492 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. 1972), in which the Supreme Court held courts will enforce an oral promise to sign an instrument complying with the Statute of Frauds if: (1) the promisor should have expected the promise would lead the promisee to some definite and substantial injury; (2) such injury occurred; and (3) the court must enforce the promise to avoid injustice. Id. at 934; see Nagle v. Nagle, 633 S.W.2d 796, 800 (Tex. 1982) (applying âMooreâ Burger).

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Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â An appellant attacking the legal sufficiency of evidence supporting an adverse finding on an issue on which he had the burden of proof must show on appeal that the evidence establishes, as a matter of law, all vital facts in support of the issue. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam). Because Garcia had the burden of proof on his promissory estoppel defense, his challenge to the evidence must fail if the trial courtâs finding is supported by more than a scintilla of evidence. See id. Further, even if no evidence appears to support the finding, we must examine the entire record to determine whether the contrary proposition is established as a matter of law. Id. A proposition is established as a matter of law when a reasonable fact finder could draw only one conclusion from the evidence presented. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 814-16 (Tex. 2005). Garciaâs appellate challenge may be sustained only if the contrary proposition is conclusively established. Dow Chem. Co.,

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NO. 07-06-0403-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL E

NOVEMBER 26, 2008

______________________________

FRANK GARCIA, APPELLANT

v.

LYDIA GOMEZ, APPELLEE

_________________________________

FROM THE 72^ND DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY;

NO. 2003-523,605; HON. RUBEN REYES, PRESIDING

_______________________________

Before QUINN, C.J., CAMPBELL, J., and BOYD, S.J.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Appellant Frank Garcia appeals from the trial courtâs judgment finding appellee Lydia Gomez to be the owner of a tract of land and ordering Garcia to vacate the land. We affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Gomez and Barnabe Trevino were divorced in 1990. As part of their divorce, Gomez conveyed her interest in a tract of land in Lubbock County to Trevino. Later, by a 2001 deed, Trevino conveyed that property to Gomez in forgiveness of back child support he owed her.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Garcia, an associate of Trevino, has resided on the property since 2001. In September 2003, Gomez filed suit against Garcia alleging conversion, interference and trespass claims. Garcia filed a general denial. Thereafter, Gomez amended her petition to include a request for a declaratory judgment that she be adjudicated the true owner of the real property in question. Trevino was not made a party to the suit.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The case was tried to the bench. Gomez, Garcia and Trevino testified. Testimony showed that Garcia had provided funds by which Trevino had redeemed the property in 1997 after tax authorities had sold it for back taxes, and had since provided funds for improvements and for the payment of taxes on the property. The trial courtâs judgment declared Gomez to be the owner of the land and ordered Garcia to vacate the property. This appeal followed.

Â

Issue

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Garciaâs appellate issue reads: âAfter being tried by consent, the Trial Court erred in not considering Promissory Estoppel as a defense to the Statute [of] Frauds claim by [Gomez].â We interpret the issue as challenging the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial courtâs failure to find in favor of Garcia on a promissory estoppel theory. AnalysisGarcia contends Trevino had promised to convey two acres from the tract to him in consideration of his provision of funds for redemption of the property and for payment of taxes. Garciaâs only pleading was his general denial. Gomez contends Garciaâs failure to plead his affirmative defense of promissory estoppel bars the defense. Garcia responds it was tried by consent. For purposes of this opinion, we assume, without deciding, that Garcia is correct that his promissory estoppel defense was tried by consent.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In a bench trial, it is the role of the trial court to resolve inconsistencies in the evidence. Ponce v. Sandoval, 68 S.W.3d 799, 806 (Tex. App.âAmarillo 2001, no pet.). The trial court, as fact finder, is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Sterquell v. Scott, 140 S.W.3d 453, 461 (Tex. App.âAmarillo 2004, no pet.). The finder of fact may accept or reject any part or all of a witnessâs testimony. Vickery v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline, 5 S.W.3d 241, 255 n.5 (Tex.App.âHouston [14^th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied). It may believe one witness and disbelieve others. Id.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Here, no findings of fact or conclusions of law were made. The record contains no request for findings or conclusions. Tex. R. Civ. P. 296. On appeal, this court therefore must presume the trial court made all fact findings necessary to support its judgment. Zac Smith & Co., Inc. v. Otis Elevator Co., 734 S.W.2d 662, 667 (Tex. 1987). Because the record contains a reporterâs record of the trial, however, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the implied findings of fact may be challenged. BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002); Roberson v. Robinson, 768 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Tex. 1989).

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â It was Garciaâs burden at trial to prove all the essential elements of his promissory estoppel defense. See Boy Scouts of America v. Responsive Terminal Sys., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 738, 743 (Tex.App.âDallas 1990, writ denied) (holding burden of proving promissory estoppel is on party asserting the doctrine). Garcia cites âMooreâ Burger, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 492 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. 1972), in which the Supreme Court held courts will enforce an oral promise to sign an instrument complying with the Statute of Frauds if: (1) the promisor should have expected the promise would lead the promisee to some definite and substantial injury; (2) such injury occurred; and (3) the court must enforce the promise to avoid injustice. Id. at 934; see Nagle v. Nagle, 633 S.W.2d 796, 800 (Tex. 1982) (applying âMooreâ Burger).

Â

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â An appellant attacking the legal sufficiency of evidence supporting an adverse finding on an issue on which he had the burden of proof must show on appeal that the evidence establishes, as a matter of law, all vital facts in support of the issue. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam). Because Garcia had the burden of proof on his promissory estoppel defense, his challenge to the evidence must fail if the trial courtâs finding is supported by more than a scintilla of evidence. See id. Further, even if no evidence appears to support the finding, we must examine the entire record to determine whether the contrary proposition is established as a matter of law. Id. A proposition is established as a matter of law when a reasonable fact finder could draw only one conclusion from the evidence presented. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 814-16 (Tex. 2005). Garciaâs appellate challenge may be sustained only if the contrary proposition is conclusively established. Dow Chem. Co., 46 S.W.3d at 241, citing Croucher v. Croucher, 660 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex. 1983); Raw Hide Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Maxus Exploration Co., 766 S.W.2d 264, 276 (Tex.App.âAmarillo 1988, writ denied).

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Even assuming, arguendo, that no evidence supported the trial courtâs implied finding, after examining the entire record, we could not conclude that Garcia established his promissory estoppel defense as a matter of law. We need look no further than the evidence supporting his contention Trevino made a promise to convey him two acres from the property deeded to Gomez. In support of that vital fact, Garcia points to the following testimony:

Â

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Q.Â Â Â Â Â Â Â (By Mr. Garcia)Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The roof on the house and the improvements that I have done to the place there, the road, who provided the funds for that?

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â A.Â Â Â Â Â Â Â (By Mr. Trevino)Â Â Â Â Â Â You did.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Q.Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Besides the 10,500 [dollars] I helped as muchâMr. Trevino, after you go into the pen, what happened to the two acres?

You deeded the land to Ms. Gomez and can you tell the Court here with the intention of the two acres coming back to Frank Garcia?

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â A.Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Well, I thought she was going to do the right thing and give you the two acres, but, I mean, she donât want to now. And I told her a bunch of times that, âJust do what is right, and you could have lost the whole thing, you know, and could have ended up with nothing, butâ--

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Q.Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Do you recall a statement from Ms. Gomez that she was not interested in the land no more?

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â A.Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Yeah.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Q.Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â That she was willing to give up the land? Particularly this summerâor the past summer, not this summer, but the summer before, she had aâshe was in a bind . . . . And how much money did she take away from me, or borrowed, or got it for the taxes, with the understanding that the land was going to be conveyed toâthe two acres?

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â A.Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â I donât remember. About three hundred, one time, and maybe seven hundred, another time.

Â

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Garcia also refers to Gomezâs testimony, in which she agreed that, when Trevino conveyed the land to her, he told her âabout the two acres that were supposed to be deeded to [Garcia].â Elsewhere, Gomez agreed with her counsel that Garcia âalleges to have loaned money to [Trevino] in order for [Trevino] to redeem the property from the individual who bought it,â and âalleges that [Trevino] promised to deed Frank Garcia two of the eight subject acres to this lawsuit in exchange for Mr. Garcia giving him money to redeem that property[.]â During his testimony, Garcia also testified to the fact that Gomez was âsupposed to deed me the two acres.â We note also that Trevino acknowledged during his testimony that he understood the need for âsomething in writingâ to convey the two acres to Garcia.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Based on this testimony, reasonable minds could differ on the question whether Trevino promised to execute a deed to Garcia for two acres from the tract. While it seems clear that Garcia expected to receive the two acres, and believed Trevino or Gomez was âsupposedâ to convey them, the evidence of a promise by Trevino to do so is less than conclusive. See Nagle, 633 S.W.2d at 800. Garcia has not shown that his promissory estoppel defense to Gomezâs claims was established as a matter of law. Accordingly, we overrule his appellate point and affirm the trial courtâs judgment.

Â

James T. Campbell

Justice

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NO. 07-10-00436-CV

Â

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

Â

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

Â

AT AMARILLO

Â

PANEL A

Â

JULY 27, 2011

Â

IN THE INTEREST OF K.L.J., K.N.J. AND B.H.B., CHILDREN

Â

FROM THE 237TH DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY;

Â

NO. 2000-509,448; HONORABLE KEVIN HART, JUDGE

Â

Before CAMPBELL and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.

Â

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Appellant, H.P.B.,[1] appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child, B.H.B.Â We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Background

The trial courtÂs order terminating H.P.B.Âs parental rights was entered on September 29, 2010.Â The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination would be in the best interest of H.P.B.Âs child, B.H.B., because H.P.B. knowingly placed or allowed B.H.B. to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered the childÂs physical or emotional well-being, engaged in conduct or placed the child with persons that engaged in conduct which endangered the childÂs physical or emotional well-being, and failed to comply with a court order.Â See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. Â§ 161.001(1)(D), (E), (O) (West Supp. 2010).[2]Â H.P.B.Âs appointed trial counsel timely filed a Motion for New Trial and Notice of Appeal with the trial court.[3]Â H.P.B. filed an application for appointment of counsel on appeal and affidavit of indigence on October 18.Â According to the clerkÂs record, the trial court held a hearing on H.P.B.Âs motion and application on October 19.Â As a result of this hearing, the trial court denied H.P.B.Âs new trial motion, denied his claim for indigence, and deemed his appeal not frivolous.Â See Â§ 263.405(d).Â

Subsequent to the trial courtÂs October 19 Order, H.P.B. filed a pro se Motion for New Trial and Notice of Appeal on October 29, in which he raised additional issues he intends to appeal.Â However, this pro se motion and notice was untimely filed.Â See Â§ 263.405(b).Â As such, these additional issues may not be considered by this Court.Â See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 341 (Tex. 2009) (citing section 263.405(i) as barring an appellate court from considering any issue not presented to the trial court in a timely filed statement of points).Â

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â On December 6, the trial court entered an order discharging H.P.B.Âs trial counsel from further representation of H.P.B.[4]Â On December 16, this Court sent H.P.B. notice that the reporterÂs record had not yet been requested and directed H.P.B. to request this record by December 28, or the Court may set a deadline for H.P.B.Âs brief in the absence of a reporterÂs record.Â See Tex. R. App. P. 37.3(c)(1).Â After receiving no response to our correspondence, on January 7, 2011, we informed H.P.B. that his brief was due by February 7.Â H.P.B. filed three different documents by this February 7 deadline.Â None of these documents come close to complying with the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1; however, this Court construed these documents to collectively constitute H.P.B.Âs appellate brief.Â The Department filed its brief in response on March 24.Â H.P.B. filed a document entitled a ÂFinal Summary BriefÂ on May 3, that this Court construed to be a reply brief.Â See Tex. R. App. P. 38.3.

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In H.P.B.Âs four filings with this Court, he does not present any issues with the trial courtÂs judgment.Â See Tex. R. App. P. 38.3(f).Â After reading each of H.P.B.Âs filings with this Court, he appears to challenge the trial courtÂs finding that H.P.B. failed to comply with a court order, but he does not challenge either of the other bases for termination of his parental rights or the finding that termination would be in the best interest of B.H.B.Â

Termination of H.P.B.Âs Parental Rights

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Liberally construing H.P.B.Âs appellate briefs, he appears to challenge the trial courtÂs finding that he failed to comply with a court order.Â However, the Order of Termination challenged by H.P.B. also includes findings that H.P.B. knowingly placed or allowed B.H.B. to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered the childÂs physical or emotional well-being, and engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons that engaged in conduct which endangered the childÂs physical or emotional well-being.Â See Â§ 161.001(1)(D), (E).Â Further, H.P.B. does not challenge the trial courtÂs finding that termination of H.P.B.Âs parental rights is in the best interest of B.H.B.Â See Â§ 161.001(2).

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â A parent's rights to "the companionship, care, custody, and management" of his or her children are constitutional interests "far more precious than any property right."Â Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982).Â In a termination case, the State seeks to end parental rights permanently--to divest the parent and child of all legal rights, privileges, duties, and powers normally existing between them, except for the child's right to inherit.Â Â§ 161.206(b) (West 2008).Â While parental rights are of constitutional magnitude, they are not absolute.Â In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex. 2002).Â Just as it is imperative for courts to recognize the constitutional underpinnings of the parent-child relationship, it is also essential that emotional and physical interests of the child not be sacrificed merely to preserve that right.Â Id.

In proceedings to terminate the parent-child relationship brought under section 161.001, the Department must establish one or more of the acts or omissions enumerated under subsection (1) of the statute, and must also prove that termination is in the best interest of the child.Â Â§ 161.001; Texas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533, (Tex. 1987).Â While the evidence must establish a violation of subsection (1) and that termination is in the best interest of the child, only one finding alleged under subsection (1) is necessary to support a judgment of termination.Â In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003); In re R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 744 (Tex.App.ÂFort Worth 2004, pet. denied).Â

An appeal of a termination order is limited to the issues presented in the timely filed statement of points.Â See Â§ 263.405(i); see also Pool v. Texas Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 227 S.W.3d 212, 215 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.).Â To satisfy the requirements of section 263.405(i), a statement of points must be "sufficiently specific" to allow the trial court to correct any erroneous findings on the challenged grounds.Â In re J.J.C., 302 S.W.3d 436, 444 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied).Â If the statement of points on appeal does not specifically challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the statutory grounds for termination, those issues are not preserved for appellate review.Â Id.

In the present case, H.P.B.Âs timely filed statement of points indicate his intent to appeal the DepartmentÂs alleged denial of psychological assistance as well as the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence Âto support the judgment of the Court.ÂÂ Nothing in this statement of points specifically challenges the trial courtÂs findings that H.P.B. violated section 161.001(1)(D) and (E) nor that termination would be in the best interest of B.H.B.Â As such, those issues are not preserved for appellate review.[5]Â Id.

Conclusion

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial courtÂs Order of Termination.

Â

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Mackey K. Hancock

Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Justice

Â

[1] In accordance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.8(b)(2), appellant and his child will be identified by their initials to protect the minor childÂs identity.Â See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2).

Â

[2] Further reference to provisions of the Texas Family Code will be by reference to Âsection ___Â or ÂÂ§ ___.Â

Â

[3] Under Texas Family Code section 263.405(b), an appeal of a final order terminating a parentÂs rights to a child in a suit brought by the Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services (hereafter ÂDepartmentÂ) must include a statement of points on which the party intends to appeal.Â See Â§ 263.405(b)(2) (West 2008).Â The statement of points must be filed within 15 days after the date the final order is signed by the trial court.Â See Â§ 263.405(b).Â The required statement may be combined with a motion for new trial.Â Â§ 263.405(b-1).Â In this case, H.P.B.Âs Motion for New Trial indicates his intent to appeal the DepartmentÂs alleged denial of psychological assistance to H.P.B as well as the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the termination.Â We construe these issues to have been a timely filed statement of points.Â See In re T.J.H., No. 13-06-00407-CV, 2009 Tex.App. LEXIS 6688, at *15-*16 (Tex.App.ÂCorpus Christi Aug. 26, 2009, pet. denied) (mem. op.).Â

Â

[4] H.P.B. requested this Court appoint him appellate counsel, and supported that request with an affidavit of inability to pay costs.Â However, this request was submitted after the trial court held a hearing on H.P.B.Âs claim of indigence and denied his claim.Â H.P.B. was entitled to appeal the trial courtÂs denial of his claim of indigence in accordance with Texas Family Code section 263.405(g).Â See Â§ 263.405(g).Â However, nothing in H.P.B.Âs request for appointment of counsel challenged the trial courtÂs indigency determination.Â Further, because no records from the October 19, 2010 hearing on H.P.B.Âs motion for new trial are part of the appellate record, we are unable to review this ruling of the trial court.

[5] No reporterÂs record was filed in this cause due to H.P.B.Âs failure to request same, and, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to cure was given H.P.B. by this Court, this Court chose to consider and decide those points that do not require a reporterÂs record.Â See Tex. R. App. P. 37.3(c)(1).Â Thus, even were we to assume that H.P.B.Âs statement of points challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial courtÂs termination was sufficiently specific to preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, in the absence of a reporterÂs record, this Court must assume the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the judgment.Â See Hebisen v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 217 S.W.3d 527, 536 (Tex.App.ÂHouston [14^th Dist.] 2006, no pet.).

Frank Garcia v. Lydia Gomez, (Tex. Ct. App. 2008).

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