114 T.C. No. 5
UNITED STATES TAX COURT
FRANK ARMSTRONG, III, TRANSFEREE, ET AL.,1 Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Docket Nos. 7267-98, 7269-98, Filed February 28, 2000. 7270-98, 7274-98.
D transferred a substantial portion of his assets to Ps within 3 years of his death. After paying the Federal gift taxes associated with these gifts, D was nearly insolvent. Following D's death, R determined a deficiency in Federal estate tax due from D's estate attributable to the estate's failure to include in the gross estate the gift taxes that D paid on the aforementioned gifts. See sec. 2035(c), I.R.C. R subsequently issued notices of transferee liability to Ps who filed timely petitions for redetermination with the Court. Ps filed motions for partial summary judgment alleging that they are not liable as transferees as a matter of law.
1 Cases of the following petitioners are consolidated herewith: William Armstrong, Transferee, docket No. 7269-98; Gretchen A. Redmond, Transferee, docket No. 7270-98; JoAnne Armstrong-Jones, f.k.a. JoAnne A. Strader, Transferee, docket No. 7274-98. - 2 -
Held: Ps are transferees of property the value of which is treated as if included in D's gross estate pursuant to sec. 2035(d)(3)(C), I.R.C., and are, to the extent of the value of such property at the time of D's death, personally liable for unpaid estate taxes pursuant to sec. 6324(a)(2), I.R.C. Held, further, Ps' motions for partial summary judgment will be denied.
Charles S. McCandlish and Aubrey J. Owen, for petitioners.
Cheryl M.D. Rees, for respondent.
OPINION
DAWSON, Judge: These cases were assigned to Chief Special
Trial Judge Peter J. Panuthos, pursuant to the provisions of
section 7443A(b)(5) and Rules 180, 181, and 183.2 The Court
agrees with and adopts the opinion of the Special Trial Judge,
which is set forth below.
OPINION OF THE SPECIAL TRIAL JUDGE
PANUTHOS, Chief Special Trial Judge: These cases are before
the Court on petitioners' Motions for Partial Summary Judgment.
Petitioners contend that they are entitled to summary judgment
that they are not liable as transferees. As discussed in detail
below, we will deny petitioners' motions.
2 Section references are to the Internal Revenue Code, as amended. Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. - 3 -
Background
The material facts in these cases are not in dispute.
During 1991 and 1992, Frank Armstrong, Jr. (decedent),
transferred a substantial amount of stock in National Fruit
Product Co., Inc., to his children and grandchildren, including
Frank Armstrong III, JoAnne Armstrong-Jones, Gretchen A. Redmond,
and William Armstrong (hereinafter petitioners). Decedent was
nearly insolvent after paying $4,680,283 in Federal gift taxes
attributable to the stock transfers. Decedent died on July 29,
1993--within 3 years of the aforementioned transfers.
Respondent subsequently issued a notice of deficiency to the
Estate of Frank Armstrong (the Armstrong estate) determining a
deficiency in estate tax of $2,350,071. The deficiency is
attributable to respondent's determination that the estate failed
to include in the gross estate the gift taxes that decedent had
paid on the above-described transfers as required under the so-
called gross-up rule prescribed in section 2035(c).3 The estate
3 Sec. 2035(c) provides in pertinent part:
(c) Inclusion of Gift Tax on Certain Gifts Made During 3 Years Before Decedent's Death.--The amount of the gross estate (determined without regard to this subsection) shall be increased by the amount of any tax paid under chapter 12 by the decedent or his estate on any gift made by the decedent or his spouse after December 31, 1976, and during the 3-year period ending on the date of the decedent's death.
(continued...) - 4 -
filed a timely petition for redetermination (assigned docket No.
1118-98).
Respondent issued separate notices of transferee liability
to petitioners stating that, as transferees, petitioners each are
liable for $1,968,213 (the value of the stock that decedent
transferred to each petitioner) in respect of the estate tax
deficiency of $2,350,071 due from the estate. Petitioners filed
timely petitions for redetermination contesting the notices of
transferee liability.
Petitioners move for partial summary judgment asserting that
they are not liable as transferees as a matter of law.4
Respondent maintains that petitioners are subject to transferee
liability for the Armstrong estate tax deficiency pursuant to
section 6324(a)(2).
Discussion
Summary judgment is intended to expedite litigation and
avoid unnecessary and expensive trials. See Florida Peach Corp.
3 (...continued) The gift tax is imposed on the value of the property transferred to the donee and does not include the money used to pay the tax. In contrast, the estate tax base includes the money ultimately used to pay the estate tax. For gifts made within 3 years of death, the sec. 2035(c) gross-up rule is designed to eliminate this disparity between the gift tax and the estate tax. 4 In the event that their motions are denied, petitioners intend to contest the amount of the estate tax deficiency due from the estate and the amount of their personal liability. - 5 -
v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 678, 681 (1988). Summary judgment may
be granted with respect to all or any part of the legal issues in
controversy "if the pleadings, answers to interrogatories,
depositions, admissions, and any other acceptable materials,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that a decision may be
rendered as a matter of law." Rule 121(b); Sundstrand Corp. v.
Commissioner, 98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), affd. 17 F.3d 965 (7th
Cir. 1994); Zaentz v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 753, 754 (1988);
Naftel v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 527, 529 (1985).
Section 6901 sets forth the procedures that are applicable
prior to the assessment and collection of an income, estate, or
gift tax liability from a transferee. Section 6901(a)(1)(A)(ii)
provides:
SEC. 6901. TRANSFERRED ASSETS.
(a) Method of Collection.--The amounts of the following liabilities shall, except as hereinafter in this section provided, be assessed, paid, and collected in the same manner and subject to the same provisions and limitations as in the case of the taxes with respect to which the liabilities were incurred:
(1) Income, estate, and gift taxes.--
(A) Transferees.--The liability, at law or in equity, of a transferee of property--
* * * * * * * - 6 -
(ii) of a decedent in the case of a tax imposed by chapter 11 (relating to estate taxes) * * *.
When proceeding pursuant to section 6901(a), respondent generally
may not assess or attempt to collect an estate tax deficiency
from a transferee without first following the normal deficiency
procedures set forth in sections 6211 to 6216. See, e.g., Estate
of Frost v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-94.
Section 6901(h) defines the term "transferee" as follows:
SEC. 6901(h) Definition of Transferee.--As used in this section, the term “transferee” includes donee, heir, legatee, devisee, and distributee, and with respect to estate taxes, also includes any person who, under section 6324(a)(2), is personally liable for any part of such tax. [Emphasis added.]
Although section 6901(a) sets forth the procedures to be
followed in transferee liability cases, the existence and extent
of a transferee's substantive liability is established under
section 6324(a)(2). See Schuster v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d 311,
315 (9th Cir. 1962), affg. 32 T.C. 998 (1959), and revg. First
Western Bank & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 1017 (1959)
(interpreting section 827(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1939--a predecessor of section 6324(a)). Section 6324(a)
provides in pertinent part: - 7 -
(a) Liens for Estate Tax.--Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c)--
(1) Upon Gross Estate.--Unless the estate tax imposed by chapter 11 is sooner paid in full, or becomes unenforceable by reason of lapse of time, it shall be a lien upon the gross estate of the decedent for 10 years from the date of death, except that such part of the gross estate as is used for the payment of charges against the estate and expenses of its administration, allowed by any court having jurisdiction thereof, shall be divested of such lien.
(2) Liability of Transferees and Others.--If the estate tax imposed under chapter 11 is not paid when due, then the * * * transferee * * * who receives, or has on the date of the decedent's death, property included in the gross estate under sections 2034 to 2042, inclusive, to the extent of the value, at the time of the decedent's death, of such property, shall be personally liable for such tax. Any part of such property transferred by (or transferred by a transferee of) such * * * transferee * * * to a purchaser or holder of a security interest shall be divested of the lien provided in paragraph (1) and a like lien shall then attach to all the property of such * * * transferee * * *, except any part transferred to a purchaser or a holder of a security interest. [Emphasis added.]
In sum, in the event that a decedent's estate taxes are not paid
when due, section 6324(a)(1) imposes a 10-year lien on the gross
estate, and section 6324(a)(2) imposes personal liability upon
transferees of property included in the decedent's gross estate
under sections 2034 to 2042 and provides for the imposition of a - 8 -
lien on the transferee's separate property in the event the
transferee should transfer any part of such property received
from the decedent.
Section 6324(a)(2) provides that a transferee's liability
for unpaid estate taxes is limited to the value of the property
that is included in the decedent's gross estate under sections
2034 to 2042 and transferred to the transferee as measured at the
time of the decedent's death. However, a transferee's liability
is not conditioned on either the exhaustion of remedies for
collection against the estate or the estate's insolvency. See
Schuster v. Commissioner, 312 F.2d at 315; Equitable Life
Assurance Society v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 264, 269 (1952);
Estate of Callahan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1981-357.
Relying on the portion of section 6901(a) which states that
the Commissioner may only assess and collect an estate tax
deficiency from a transferee "in the same manner and subject to
the same provisions and limitations as in the case of the taxes
with respect to which the liabilities were incurred", petitioners
first contend that they are not liable for the Armstrong estate
tax deficiency inasmuch as the stock that decedent transferred to
them was not the source of the deficiency. Petitioners reason
that if there is no estate tax directly related to decedent's - 9 -
stock transfers, respondent is barred from attempting to collect
such taxes from them.
Petitioners' reliance on section 6901(a) as the basis for
defining the scope of their liability as transferees is
misplaced. As previously discussed, section 6901(h) defines a
transferee in pertinent part as "any person who, under section
6324(a)(2), is personally liable for any part of such tax."
Section 6324(a) in turn establishes the existence and extent of a
transferee's substantive liability. See Schuster v.
Commissioner, supra. In contrast, section 6901(a) merely
prescribes the procedures that respondent must follow in
assessing and collecting taxes from transferees under that
section. See id. Thus, although section 6901(a) provides that
respondent must follow the normal deficiency procedures before
assessing and collecting estate taxes from a transferee, the
provision does not define or otherwise restrict a transferee's
substantive liability as petitioners contend.
Petitioners argue in the alternative that they are not
liable as transferees under section 6324(a)(2) on the ground that
they did not receive property that is includable in the gross
estate pursuant to sections 2034 through 2042. Petitioners
emphasize that the estate tax deficiency is attributable solely - 10 -
to the estate's failure to include in the gross estate pursuant
to section 2035(c) the amount of the gift tax that decedent paid
with respect to the stock transfers.
Respondent counters that petitioners are personally liable
for the estate tax deficiency pursuant to section 6324(a)(2)
inasmuch as section 2035(d)(3)(C) provides that the value of the
stock that petitioners received from decedent is treated as if it
were included in the gross estate for purposes of section
6324(a)(2).
Section 2035 provides in pertinent part:
SEC. 2035(a) Inclusion of Gifts Made by Decedent.- -Except as provided in subsection (b), the value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer, by trust or otherwise, during the 3-year period ending on the date of the decedent's death.
* * * * * * *
(d) Decedents Dying After 1981.--
(1) In general.--Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, subsection (a) shall not apply to the estate of a decedent dying after December 31, 1981.
(3) 3-Year Rule Retained for Certain Purposes.--Paragraph (1) shall not apply for purposes of– - 11 -
(A) section 303(b) (relating to distributions in redemption of stock to pay death taxes),
(B) section 2032A (relating to special valuation of certain farm, etc., real property), and
(C) subchapter C of chapter 64 (relating to lien for taxes).
Section 2035(d)(3)(C) provides that the value of any gift made
within 3 years of death is included in the gross estate for
purposes of subchapter C of chapter 64. Section 6324(a)(2) falls
under subchapter C of chapter 64.
Petitioners assert that respondent's interpretation of
section 2035(d)(3)(C) is flawed in that respondent has ignored
the parenthetical language "(relating to lien for taxes)." In
petitioners' view, the parenthetical language limits the
application of section 2035(d)(3)(C) by providing that gifts made
within 3 years of death are treated as if they are included in
the gross estate only for purposes of a lien provision contained
in subchapter C of chapter 64--such as section 6324(a)(1).5
Petitioners argue that the first sentence of section 6324(a)(2)
is a personal liability provision, as opposed to a lien
5 Sec. 6324(a)(1), quoted supra at p. 6, provides that property included in the gross estate shall be subject to a 10-year lien for unpaid estate taxes. - 12 -
provision, and therefore the value of decedent's gifts is not
included in the gross estate for purposes of determining whether
petitioners are personally liable as transferees.
Petitioners further contend that the legislative history of
section 2035(d)(3)(C) supports their position. Section 2035(d)
was enacted by section 424 of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
1981, Pub. L. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172, 317. Petitioners rely on H.
Rept. 97-201, at 187 (1981), 1981-2 C.B. 352, 390, which explains
the addition of section 2035(d)(3)(C) as follows: "[A]ll
transfers within 3 years of death (other than gifts eligible for
the annual gift tax exclusion) will be included [in the gross
estate] * * * for purposes of determining property subject to the
estate tax liens (under subchapter C of Chapter 64)".
Based upon our review of the plain language of section
2035(d)(3)(C), and the background of section 6324(a)(2), we agree
with respondent that petitioners are liable as transferees in
these cases. The legislative history cited by petitioners does
not persuade us otherwise.
Initially, we reject petitioners' contention that the
parenthetical language "(relating to lien for taxes)" contained
in section 2035(d)(3)(C) limits the application of the provision
to what petitioners consider to be traditional lien provisions. - 13 -
Significantly, each of the subparagraphs in section 2035(d)(3)
contains parenthetical language. In each case, the parenthetical
language is simply an abbreviation of the title of the section or
subchapter referred to therein. For example, section
2035(d)(3)(A) provides that gifts made within 3 years of death
shall be included in the gross estate for purposes of "section
303(b)(relating to distributions in redemption of stock to pay
death taxes)". Like the parenthetical language, the title of
section 303 is "Distributions In Redemption Of Stock To Pay Death
Taxes." Similarly, the parenthetical language in section
2035(d)(3)(C), "(relating to lien for taxes)", is simply a
reference to the title for subchapter C of chapter 64--"Lien for
Taxes". Thus, we reject petitioners' argument that the
parenthetical language limits the applicability of section
2035(d)(3)(C) to any specific provisions within subchapter C of
chapter 64.
Moreover, section 6324(a)(2) is properly characterized as a
lien provision. Section 827(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1939, a predecessor to section 6324(a)(2), imposed personal
liability on a transferee of property included in a decedent's
gross estate and provided for the imposition of a lien on: (1)
The decedent's property in the hands of the transferee; and (2) a - 14 -
lien on the transferee's separate property in the event the
transferee should transfer any part of such property received
from the decedent. Although Congress later determined that it
was redundant to impose a lien on a decedent's property in the
hands of a transferee under section 827(b) given the imposition
of an identical lien on a decedent's property prescribed in
section 827(a) (the predecessor to section 6324(a)(1)), the
second sentence of section 6324(a)(2) continues to provide for a
lien on a transferee's separate property. Despite the difference
in the remedies provided under the first and second sentences of
section 6324(a)(2), we see no basis for concluding that Congress
intended to distinguish between the two in the application of
section 2035(d)(3)(C).
The legislative history underlying section 2035(d)(3)(C)
does not persuade us to hold otherwise. Although H. Rept. 97-
201, supra, suggests that the House may have viewed section
2035(d)(3)(C) primarily as a means to impose a lien upon property
in aid of the collection of unpaid estate taxes, the related
conference report explains the addition of section 2035(d)(3)(C)
as follows: "[A]ll gifts made within 3 years of death are
included [in the gross estate] for purposes of * * * estate tax
liens (subchapter C of chapter 64)." H. Conf. Rept. 97-215, at - 15 -
255, 1981-2 C.B. 481, 511. As we see it, the explanation of
section 2035(d)(3)(C) in the conference report supports our
holding that section 2035(d)(3)(C) is applicable in these cases.
Indeed, the plain language of section 2035(d)(3)(C), by referring
as it does to subchapter C of chapter 64, and not to section
6324(a)(1) to the exclusion of section 6324(a)(2), belies
petitioners' interpretation.
Petitioners' final contention is that there is an
insufficient "nexus" between the stock that they received from
decedent and the estate taxes that respondent seeks to collect
from them. Consistent with their argument under section 6901(a),
petitioners assert that there is no meaningful connection between
the estate tax liability--which is attributable to the
application of the section 2035(c) "gross-up" rule--and the stock
transfers that petitioners received from decedent.
The short answer to petitioners' contention is that Congress
did not restrict transferee liability to those instances where
there is an immediate link between an estate tax liability and
property transferred to a transferee. As previously discussed,
section 6324(a)(2) imposes personal liability for unpaid estate
taxes upon a transferee in the event that the transferee has
received property from a decedent that is includable in the gross - 16 -
estate pursuant to sections 2034 to 2042. Section 2035(d)(3)(C)
closes the circle by providing that gifts made by a decedent
within 3 years of his death are treated as if they are included
in the gross estate for purposes of subchapter C of chapter 64,
which includes section 6324(a)(2). Because petitioners received
property the value of which is included in decedent's gross
estate pursuant to section 2035(d)(3)(C), the only
congressionally mandated link or connection between petitioners
and the disputed estate tax liability has been satisfied. This
promotes sound Federal tax policy by enhancing the Commissioner's
ability to collect unpaid estate taxes where a taxpayer has
rendered himself insolvent by giving away the vast majority of
his assets within 3 years of death.
In sum, we hold that section 2035(d)(3)(C) provides that the
value of the stock that decedent transferred to petitioners is
included in the gross estate for purposes of subchapter C of
chapter 64, including section 6324(a)(2). Consequently,
petitioners are liable as transferees for the estate tax
deficiency due from the Armstrong estate. Consistent with the
foregoing, we will deny petitioners’ motions for partial summary
judgment.
To reflect the foregoing,
Orders denying petitioners'
motions for partial summary judgment
will be issued.