ACCEPTED 06-14-00224-CR SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS TEXARKANA, TEXAS 5/8/2015 9:40:27 AM DEBBIE AUTREY CLERK
06-14-00224-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FILED IN FOR THE SIXTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS 6th COURT OF APPEALS AT TEXARKANA TEXARKANA, TEXAS 5/8/2015 9:40:27 AM DEBBIE AUTREY Clerk
FRANJESSICA WILLIAMS, Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 282nd Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas Cause No. F14-00534-S The Honorable Andy Chatham, Judge Presiding
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, THE STATE OF TEXAS
Counsel of Record:
Susan Hawk G. Brian Garrison Criminal District Attorney State Bar No. 24065276 Dallas County, Texas Assistant District Attorney Dallas County District Attorney's Office 133 N. Riverfront Blvd., LB 19 Dallas, TX 75207-4399 (214) 653-3600 (telephone) (214) 653-3643 (fax) Brian.Garrison@dallascounty.org
The State waives oral argument IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
Appellant Franjessica Williams
Appellant's Counsel at Trial Caroline Simone 101 S. Woodrow, Ste. 102 Denton, TX 75205
Jose Noriega 10300 N. Central Exwy. Dallas, TX 75231
Appellant's Counsel on Appeal Allan Fishburn 211 N. Record St., Ste. 450 Dallas, TX 75202
State's Counsel at Trial Eren Price Summer Elmazi Assistant District Attorneys Dallas County District Attorney's Office 133 N. Riverfront Blvd., LB 19 Dallas, TX 75207-4399
State's Counsel on Appeal G. Brian Garrison Assistant District Attorney Dallas County District Attorney's Office 133 N. Riverfront Blvd., LB 19 Dallas, TX 75207-4399
i TABLE OF CONTENTS
Identity of Parties and Counsel i Index of Authorities iii Statement of the Case 1 Issues Presented 2 Statement of Facts 2 Summary of the Argument 6 Argument 8 1. The State's response to Appellant's first point of error: The evidence was sufficient to prove that Appellant intentionally and knowingly caused the death of J.L. by failing to provide him with hydration 8 2. The State's response to Appellant's second point of error: The trial court did not err in charging the jury 12 3. The State's response to Appellant's third point of error: The trial court had jurisdiction over Appellant's case 13 Prayer 16 Certificate of Service 17 Certificate of Compliance 17
ii INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Allen v. State, 249 S.W.3d 680 (Tex. App. — Austin 2008, no pet.) 9
Atkinson v. State, 107 S.W.3d 856 (Tex. App — Dallas 2003, no pet.) 13
Baldwin v. State, Nos. 01-06-00861-62-CR, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 932 (Tex. App. — Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 7, 2008, pet. ref d) (not designated for publication) 10, 11
Bell v. State, 326 S.W.3d 716 (Tex. App. — Dallas 2010, pet. dism'd) 8
Bourque v. State, 156 S.W.3d 675 (Tex. App. — Dallas 2005, pet. ref d) 14, 15
Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.) 8
Brown v. State, 270 S.W.3d 564 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) 8
Chappel v. State, No. 05-10-00629-CR, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 4658 (Tex. App. — Dallas Jun. 20, 2011, no pet.) (not designated for publication) 13, 15
Dallas County Dist. Attorney v. Does, 969 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. App. — Dallas 1998, no pet.) 14
Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) 8
Ex parte Edone, 740 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) 14
Hill v. State, No. 05-09-00778-CR, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 1486 (Tex. App. — Dallas Mar. 3, 2010, no pet.) (not designated for publication) 13, 15
Hultin v. State, 351 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Crim. App. 1961) 14
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) 8, 9
Lee v. State, 21 S.W.3d 532 (Tex. App. — Tyler 2000, pet. refd) 9
Luquis v. State, 72 S.W.3d 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) 12
iii Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) 9
Pina v. State, No. 08-05-00103-CR, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 9986 (Tex. App. — El Paso Nov. 16, 2006, pet. ref d) (not designated for publication) 12
Stubler v. State, 218 S.W.3d 706 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) 9
Vasquez v. State, 272 S.W.3d 667 (Tex. App. — Eastland 2008, no pet.) 12
Ward v. State, No. 05-14-00270-CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 3317 (Tex. App. — Dallas Apr. 3, 2015, no pet. h.) (not designated for publication) 13
Statutes Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 20.09 (West 2005) 14
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 20.19 (West 2005) 14
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07 (West Supp. 2014) 12
Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 24.304 (West Supp. 2014) 14
Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 74.093 (West 2013) 14
Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.04 (West Supp. 2014) 10
iv TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:
The State of Texas respectfully submits the instant brief in response to
the brief of Franjessica Williams ("Appellant"), on behalf of Susan Hawk, the
Criminal District Attorney of Dallas County, Texas.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant was charged by indictment with the offense of injury to a
child — serious bodily injury.' Appellant entered a plea of not guilty to the
charge.2 The jury found Appellant guilty and sentenced her to incarceration
for a period of fifty years.' Appellant filed a motion for new trial, which was
denied by the trial court.4Appellant timely filed her notice of appeal.'
C.R. at 8. 2 III R.R. at 25.
C.R. at 21, 29, 37. 4C.R. at 24.
C.R. at 46. 1 ISSUES PRESENTED
1 Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove the culpable mental state beyond a reasonable doubt.
2. Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury on good conduct time.
3. Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to hear Appellant's case.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
J.L., Appellant's son, was two years old when he passed away.6 James
Penny testified that Appellant was one of his best friends.' Mr. Penny testified
that he was at Appellant's home on the date of J.L.'s death.' Mr. Penny testi-
fied that J.L. had no bruises on his body.9Mr. Penny testified that Appellant
had very high, unrealistic expectations of J.L; Appellant expected J.L. to feed
himself:11' A speech therapist testified that J.L. had a disability which hindered
his ability to communicate and understand; however, Appellant believed that
J.L. was simply arrogant and thick headed.' Mr. Penny testified that Appel-
6III R.R. at 34-35. 'III R.R. at 33. 'III R.R. at 49-50. 9III R.R. at 56; State's Ex. 4.
10III R.R. at 65.
" V R.R. at 69-70. 2 lant would "whoop" J.L. the way one would discipline an older child.' Mr.
Penny testified that he never encouraged Appellant to tie up J.L.'3
Doctor Mini Delashaw worked as an ER physician at Medical City on
the day that Appellant brought J.L. in." Dr. Delashaw testified that the cir-
cumstances of J.L.'s death raised a number of red flags. Dr. Delashaw testified
that J.L. was cold and rigid and that he "clearly had been dead for a long
time."' Dr. Delashaw testified that Appellant brought J.L. into the hospital
through a "random hospital door" far removed from the clearly-marked
emergency entrance.' Appellant stated that she had found J.L at the bottom
of the stairs "tangled up in bands or string" and that she had "put him in
time-out" the night before.'' Dr. Delashaw testified that there was bruising all
over J.L.'s body.m Dr. Delashaw testified that J.L. had ligature marks on his
wrists and ankles, as if he had been tied up.'9Dr. Delashaw testified that, if
12 III R.R. at 66-67. 13III R.R. at 67. 14 III R.R. at 80, 84. 15 III R.R. at 84-85, 92. 16 III R.R. at 86-87.
17 III R.R. at 88.
"III R.R. at 90. 19 III R.R. at 103-04.
3 she saw a child with the level of bruising she observed on J.L., she would have
taken him to him the emergency room.2°
Detective Briana Valentine investigated the death of J.L.2' Det. Valen-
tine testified that J.L. had bruises all over his body as well as ligature marks.22
Det. Valentine interviewed Appellant at the hospital.' Appellant stated that
she found J.L. in the morning and that he was tangled up in a ribbon.24 Ap-
pellant stated that, the night before, she had put him in time-out and that he
kept getting up.25Appellant stated that she fed herself that night but did not
feed J.L.26Det. Valentine testified that she did not believe that Appellant's
story accounted for what had happened to J.L.27Det. Valentine executed a
search warrant at Appellant's home.28Det. Valentine testified that Appellant's
home was extremely hot.29Det. Valentine testified that there were no ribbons
at the base of the stairs.3°
20 III R.R. at 97. 21 R.R. at 112. 22 III R.R. at 115-19.
23 III R.R. at 121.
24 III R.R. at 122.
25 III R.R. at 122.
26 III R.R. at 122.
27 III R.R. at 125-26.
28 III R.R. at 126-27.
29 III R.R. at 132-33.
3° III R.R. at 159.
4 Detective Corey Forman testified that he also investigated the death of
J.L.3' Det. Forman testified that J.L.'s body was heavily bruised and that he
had ligature marks around his extremities.32Appellant admitted to Det. For-
man that she was frustrated with J.L. and that she had spanked him several
times.33Appellant ultimately admitted she had tied up U.'
Doctor Reade Quinton performed the autopsy on J.L.35Dr. Quinton
testified that J.L. died as a result of dehydration and hyperthermia.36J.L.'s ribs
were unnaturally prominent.' J.L.'s lips were flaky, consistent with dehydra-
tion.' Dr. Quinton testified that dehydration can cause serious bodily injury
and even death and that J.L. would still be alive if he had had adequate hydra-
tion." Dr. Quinton further testified that J.L. had a large quantity of fresh
bruises on his body as well as ligature marks." Dr. Quinton testified that the
quantity of bruises indicated child abuse.'
31 1V R.R. at 13. 32IV R.R. at 19.
" IV R.R. at 22, 67. 34IV R.R. at 45.
" IV R.R. at 93-94. 36IV R.R. at 125, 129-30.
37IV R.R. at 98.
38IV R.R. at 101.
39IV R.R. at 130-34.
4° IV R.R. at 104, 107, 114, 118-21.
41IV R.R. at 115-16.
5 SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
With respect to Appellant's first point of error, the evidence was suffi-
cient to prove the culpable mental state. The jury heard testimony that J.L.
died of dehydration and hyperthermia and that he would still be alive if he had
been provided adequate hydration. The jury heard testimony that Appellant
did not feed J.L. on the night of his death and that she expected J.L. to feed
himself. Appellant admitted to hitting J.L. and tying him up. J.L.'s injuries
were consisted with child abuse.
With respect to Appellant's second point of error, the trial court did not
reversibly err in charging the jury. The trial court charged the jury in accord-
ance with the law. The charge specifically instructed the jury that, although
the defendant may earn good conduct time, it could not be predicted how it
might apply to the defendant; therefore, the jurors were not to consider how
good conduct time might affect the Appellant's sentence. Under these cir-
cumstances, this Court cannot conclude that Appellant suffered egregious
harm or that the good conduct time instruction violated her right to due pro-
cess.
6 With respect to Appellant's third point of error, the 282nd Judicial Dis-
trict Court had jurisdiction over Appellant's case. The case was filed in the
282nd; it was never transferred from the 291st Judicial District Court.
7 ARGUMENT
1. The State's response to Appellant's first point of error: The evidence was sufficient to prove that Appellant intentionally and knowingly caused the death of J.L. by failing to provide him with hydration In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, an
appellate court views all of the evidence in a light most favorable to the prose-
cution to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the es-
sential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' This standard,
which is the sole standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in Tex-
as criminal cases, gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact to re-
solve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable
inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.'
The trier of fact is the exclusive judge of the weight and credibility of
the evidence." As such, the reviewing court may not re-evaluate the weight
and credibility of the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the fact-
finder.45Rather, the reviewing court presumes that the factfinder resolved any
42Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). 43Id.; see Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.)
(concluding that the Jackson standard "is the only standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a crimi- nal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt"); Bell v. State, 326 S.W.3d 716, 720 (Tex. App. — Dallas 2010, pet. dism'd) (adopting Brooks). 44See Brown v. State, 270 S.W.3d 564, 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
45Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
8 conflicting evidence in favor of the prosecution and defers to that resolution.'
The reviewing court's role is that of a due process safeguard, ensuring only the
rationality of the fact finder's finding of the essential elements of the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt.47
The sufficiency of the evidence in both jury and bench trials is measured
by reference to the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically cor-
rect jury charge for the case." "Such a charge would be one that accurately
sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily in-
crease the State's burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State's theories
of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the de-
fendant was tried. "49
Injury to a child is a result-oriented offense requiring a mental state that
relates not to the charged conduct but to the result of the conduct.5° The
State must prove that the defendant caused the result with the requisite men-
tal state.5' The factfinder may infer intent from the accused's acts and words as
46Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. 47See Allen v. State, 249 S.W.3d 680, 688 (Tex. App. — Austin 2008, no pet.).
48Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
49 Id.
5° See Stuhler v. State, 218 S.W.3d 706, 718 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
51Lee v. State, 21 S.W.3d 532, 540 (Tex. App. — Tyler 2000, pet. ref d).
9 well as the surrounding circumstances.' A jury may reasonably infer that the
defendant intentionally inflicted the injury when the defendant fails to render
aid known to be needed." A reasonable inference also arises in the presence of
proof that the defendant tried to conceal the conditions that led to the vic-
tim's injuries.'
Here, the indictment alleged that Appellant intentionally and knowingly
caused the death of J.L. by failing to provide him with adequate hydration."
The evidence supporting Appellant's conviction was overwhelming.
Dr. Quintion testified that J.L. died of dehydration and hyper- thermia.56 J.L. showed visible signs of dehydration and malnourishment. J.L.'s lips were flaky and his ribs protruded unnaturally from his body.57 Mr. Penny testified that Appellant expected J.L. to feed himself and that her expectations of J.L were too high." Appellant admitted to law enforcement that she fed herself before going to bed but that she did not feed J.L.59
52See Baldwin v. State, Nos. 01-06-00861-62-CR, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 932, at *12 (Tex. App. — Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 7, 2008, pet. ref d) (not designated for publication). " Id. 54 Id. at *13-14.
" C.R. at 8; see Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.04(a) (West Supp. 2014). 56IV R.R. at 125, 129-30.
57IV R.R. at 98-101.
58 III R.R. at 65-66. 59III R.R. at 122.
10 Dr. Quinton testified that J.L. would still be alive if he had been provided with water.6° Law enforcement testified that it was a hot Texas day on the date of J.L.'s death and that Appellant's apartment was uncomfortably hot." Det. Valentine was unable to spend a significant amount of time in Appellant's apartment due to the heat.62 J.L.'s body was heavily bruised.63Mr. Penny testified that J.L. was not bruised on the day of his death.64Both Dr. Delashaw and Dr. Quinton testified that J.L.'s injuries were consistent with child abuse.65 J.L. had ligature marks on his extremities.66When asked, Appel- lant initially stated that she found J.L. tangled up in ribbons at the base of the stairs.' However, she ultimately admitted that she had spanked J.L. repeatedly and had tied him up.68Det. Valentine tes- tified that she found no ribbons, rope, or strings when she searched Appellant's home.69Appellant's initial story was an at- tempt to conceal the nature of J.L.'s death from medical profes- sionals and law enforcement.7° Dr. Delashaw testified that Appellant did not bring J.L into the emergency room, as a normal person would have done, and that J.L. had been dead for some time.71
60IV R.R. at 130-34. 61 R.R. at 132-33; IV R.R. at 39. 62III R.R. at 132-33; IV R.R. at 39.
63III R.R. at 90; State's Ex. 4.
64 IIIR.R. at 56.
65 IIIR.R. at 97; IV R.R. at 115-16.
66III R.R. at 103-04, 115-19.
67III R.R. at 88, 122.
68IV R.R. at 22, 45, 67.
69 IIIR.R. at 159.
7°See Baldwin, Nos. 01-06-00861-62-CR, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 932, at *13-14.
71 III R.R. at 84-87. 11 The foregoing evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to rationally conclude
that Appellant intentionally and knowingly caused the death of J.L. by failing
to provide him with adequate hydration.72Accordingly, this Court should
overrule Appellant's first point of error.
2. The State's response to Appellant's second point of error: The trial court did not err in charging the jury In her second point of error, Appellant argues that the trial court erred
by informing the jury about good conduct time because she was ineligible for
good conduct time.73She further argues that even though she failed to object,
the "egregious harm" standard does not apply because the error was in viola-
tion of the United States Constitution. In Luquis v. State, the court examined
these arguments and concluded there was no violation of a defendant's due
process rights by instructing the jury in accordance with statute.' Similarly, in
Atkinson v. State, this Court concluded that "[w]ithout evidence to the con-
trary, we may assume the jury was not confused or mislead by the charge and
did not consider the possibility of good conduct time when assessing [the de-
72See, e.g., Vasquez v. State, 272 S.W.3d 667, 670-72 (Tex. App. — Eastland 2008, no pet.); Pina v. State, No. 08-05-00103-CR, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 9986, at *28-31 (Tex. App. — El Paso Nov. 16, 2006, pet. ref d) (not designated for publication). 73Appellant's Br. at 32.
74Luquis v. State, 72 S.W.3d 355, 368 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); see Tex. Code Crim. Proc.
Ann. art. 37.07, § 4(a) (West Supp. 2014). 12 fendant's] punishment."' In Atkinson, as here, the jury charge specifically in-
structed the jury that, although the defendant may earn good conduct time, it
could not be predicted how it might apply to the defendant; therefore, the ju-
rors were not to consider how good conduct time might affect the defendant's
sentence.' Under these circumstances, this Court cannot conclude that Ap-
pellant suffered egregious harm or that the good conduct time instruction vio-
lated her right to due process.' Accordingly, this Court should overrule Ap-
pellant's second point of error.
3. The State's response to Appellant's third point of error: The trial court had jurisdiction over Appellant's case This Court should overrule Appellant's third point of error because the
282nd Judicial District Court did not lack jurisdiction to adjudicate Appel-
lant's case. This Court has already decided this issue.' A grand jury formed
and impaneled by a district judge inquires "into all offense liable to indict-
ment" and hears all the testimony available before voting on whether to indict
75Atkinson v. State, 107 S.W.3d 856, 859-60 (Tex. App — Dallas 2003, no pet.). 76See id.
77Ward v. State, No. 05-14-00270-CR, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 3317, at *13-15 (Tex.
App. — Dallas Apr. 3, 2015, no pet. h.) (not designated for publication). 78Chappel v. State, No. 05-10-00629-CR, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 4658, at *1-3 (Tex.
App. — Dallas Jun. 20, 2011, no pet.) (not designated for publication); Hill v. State, No. 05-09-00778-CR, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 1486, at *3 (Tex. App. — Dallas Mar. 3, 2010, no pet.) (not designated for publication). 13 an accused.' A grand jury is "often characterized as an arm of the court by
which it is appointed rather than an autonomous entity.”8° After the conclu-
sion of testimony, a grand jury votes "as to the presentment of an indict-
ment.' Following presentment, an indictment is filed in a court with compe-
tent jurisdiction.' In counties having two or more district courts, the judges
of the courts may adopt rules governing the filing, numbering, and assign-
ment of cases for trial and the distribution of the courts' work they consider
necessary and desirable to conduct the business of the courts." Thus, while a
specific district court may impanel a grand jury, this does not mean that all in-
dictments returned by that grand jury must or will be filed in the impaneling
district court.84
In the case sub judice, the record establishes that the Grand Jury, which
indicted Appellant, was impaneled by the 291st Judicial District Court.85 The
indictment, however, was filed in and, ultimately, adjudicated in the 282nd
79Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 20.09 (West 2005), 20.19 (West 2005); Ex parte Edone, 740 S.W.2d 446, 448 (Tex. Grim. App. 1987). 8° Dallas County Dist. Attorney v. Does, 969 S.W.2d 537, 542 (Tex. App. — Dallas 1998, no
pet.). 81Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 20.19.
82See Hultin v. State, 351 S.W.2d 248, 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 1961).
83 See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 24.003 (West Supp. 2014); see also § 74.093 (West 2013) (addressing adoption of local rules of administration to provide, in part, for assignment, docketing, transfer, and hearing of all cases). 84See Bourque v. State, 156 S.W.3d 675, 678 (Tex. App. — Dallas 2005, pet. refd).
85 C.R. at 8. 14 Judicial District Court.' Nothing in the record indicates that the instant case
was ever filed in or appeared on the docket of the 291st Judicial District
Court. As Appellant's case was never transferred into the 282nd Judicial Dis-
trict Court, Appellant's sixth point of error is moot. The 282nd Judicial Dis-
trict Court had jurisdiction over Appellant's case.' Accordingly, this Court
should overrule Appellant's sixth point of error.
86C.R. at 8, 21. 87See Bourque, 156 S.W.3d at 678; Chappel, No. 05-10-00629-CR, 2011 Tex. App. LEX-
IS 4658, at *1-3; Hill, No. 05-09-00778-CR, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 1486, at *3. 15 PRAYER
The State of Texas prays that this Court will overrule Appellant's three
points of error and affirm Appellant's conviction.
Respectfully submitted,
Susan Hawk B lattGarrison Criminal District Attorney State Bar No. 24065276 Dallas County, Texas Assistant District Attorney Dallas County District Attorney's Of- fice 133 N. Riverfront Blvd., LB 19 Dallas, TX 75207-4399 (214) 653-3600 (telephone) (214) 653-3643 (fax) Brian.Garrison@dallascounty.org
16 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing brief has been served
on Appellant's Counsel on Appeal, the Hon. Allan Fishburn, 211 N. Record
St., Ste. 450, Dallas, TX 75202 by electronic service on this the 8th day of
May, 2015.
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I hereby certify that this brief, inclusive of all its contents, is 3,829
words in length, according to Microsoft Office, which was used to prepare this
brief, and that this brief complies with the word-count limit and typeface con-
ventions required by the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.
4 / 3af-(Garrison .;