Franco v. Barnhart
This text of 107 F. App'x 21 (Franco v. Barnhart) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM
Marisa Franco challenges the district court’s affirmation of the Social Security Administration Appeals Council’s (“the Council's”) denial of her social security disability benefits from the period of December 20, 1994, to January 31, 1997. We conclude that Franco was disabled for part of that period and therefore affirm in part and reverse in part. Because the facts are familiar to the parties, we do not recite them here except as necessary.
The Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ’s”) and Council’s denial of disability benefits from January 5, 1996, to January [23]*2331, 1997, was based on legal error and was not supported by substantial evidence in the record.1 The ALJ and Council failed to substantiate their implicit rejection of Dr. Bjorn Eek’s opinion that Franco was “totally disabled” and should remain off work from January 26, 1996, to April 8, 1996. Because Dr. Eek was one of Franco’s treating physicians, the ALJ and Council owed his opinion special deference.2 The ALJ’s and the Council’s failure to set forth specific, legitimate reasons for rejecting Dr. Eek’s opinion was legal error.3
Franco’s primary treating physician, Dr. Walter Strauser, opined that Franco should remain off work from August 16, 1996,4 to beyond the current disability onset date of February 1, 1997. The Council did not offer specific, legitimate reasons for disregarding Dr. Strauser’s opinion.5 To the extent that the Council implicitly adopted the ALJ’s specific reasons for rejecting Dr. Strauser’s opinion, those reasons are not clear and convincing.6 Furthermore, the ALJ and Council ignored the statement of Dr. Vert Mooney on January 8, 1996,7 that Franco was “extremely disabled.”
Because the record does not lend support to Franco’s contention that she was disabled prior to January 5, 1996, we affirm the Council’s determination for the time period of December 20,1994, to January 4, 1996. However, taking into account Dr. Mooney’s opinion that Franco was extremely disabled and Dr. Eek’s and Dr. Strauser’s opinions that Franco should remain off work, substantial evidence in the record establishes that Franco was disabled from January 5,1996, to January 31, 1997.8 We therefore reverse and remand to the district court to remand to the Council for an award of benefits for that period of time.
[24]*24AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART. COSTS TO APPELLANT.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
107 F. App'x 21, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/franco-v-barnhart-ca9-2004.