Franco Fuentes-Arriaga v. Pamela Bondi

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: November 21, 2025
• Docket: 15-73484
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 21 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FRANCO DARIO FUENTES-ARRIAGA, No. 15-73484

Petitioner, Agency No. A206-717-393

v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted November 19, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: WARDLAW, BERZON, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.

Franco Dario Fuentes-Arriaga, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions

for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing

an appeal of an order of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Petitioner’s

applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), and we

deny the petition. “Where, as here, the BIA agrees with the IJ decision and also

adds its own reasoning, we review the decision of the BIA and those parts of the

IJ’s decision upon which it relies.” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025,

1027–28 (9th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). “We review factual findings for

substantial evidence and legal questions de novo.” Guerra v. Barr, 974 F.3d 909,

911 (9th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). “To prevail under the substantial evidence

standard, the petitioner ‘must show that the evidence not only supports, but

compels the conclusion that these findings and decisions are erroneous.’”

Plancarte Sauceda v. Garland, 23 F.4th 824, 831 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Davila

v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2020).

1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of Petitioner’s asylum

claim. To qualify for asylum, Petitioner must demonstrate that he “is unable or

unwilling” to return to Guatemala “because of persecution or a well-founded fear

of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular

social group, or political opinion.” Lapadat v. Bondi, 145 F.4th 942, 951 (9th Cir.

2025) (quoting Melkonian v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2003)); see

also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (defining “refugee”). “Asylum is not available to

victims of indiscriminate violence, unless they are singled out on account of a

protected ground.” Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 2010).

2 Before the IJ, Petitioner indicated that his asylum claim was based on his

membership in a particular social group (“PSG”) but did not identify any PSG to

which he belonged. While Petitioner’s mother testified that she was repeatedly

robbed in Guatemala, and Petitioner therefore argues that “he suffered persecution

in Guatemala . . . on account of his social circumstances,” persecution based solely

on “financial motivation” does not establish the requisite nexus to a protected

characteristic. Rodriguez-Zuniga v. Garland, 69 F.4th 1012, 1025 (9th Cir. 2023).

Before the BIA, Petitioner also failed to articulate any PSG. And, Petitioner again

failed to identify in his petition for review any cognizable PSG, or any other

protected ground, as the basis for his asylum claim. Accordingly, substantial

evidence supports the BIA’s denial of Petitioner’s asylum claim.

2. Petitioner’s claim for withholding of removal also fails because Petitioner

has failed to demonstrate that he is a member of a PSG, or that any other protected

grounds are the basis of his fear of persecution. “To prevail on a claim for

withholding of removal, an applicant ‘must show, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that he will face persecution on account of a protected ground if

removed.’” Aleman-Belloso v. Bondi, 128 F.4th 1031, 1039 (9th Cir. 2024)

(quoting Iraheta-Martinez v. Garland, 12 F.4th 942, 955 (9th Cir. 2021)).

3. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of Petitioner’s CAT

claim. To qualify for deferral of removal under CAT, an applicant must prove

3 “that it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the

proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2). “The record must show

that it is more likely than not that the petitioner will face a particularized and non-

speculative risk of torture.” Park v. Garland, 72 F.4th 965, 980 (9th Cir. 2023)

(alterations in original) (citation omitted). While Petitioner presented evidence of

crime and gang activity in Guatemala, such “[g]eneralized evidence of violence

and crime is insufficient to establish a likelihood of torture.” Id. (citation omitted).

Moreover, Petitioner’s three siblings have continued to live in Guatemala in the

same house that Petitioner left, and there is no evidence that Petitioner’s siblings

have been harmed since Petitioner left the country. Petitioner does not explain

why he faces a greater risk of torture than his siblings, or why anyone in

Guatemala would target him, in particular, for torture.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.1

1 Petitioner’s Motion to Stay Removal is denied as moot. See Dkt. No. 1. The temporary stay will dissolve when the mandate issues. See Dkt No. 6. The government’s motion to present oral argument by video is also denied as moot. See Dkt. No. 49.