Francisco Villegas v. New Jersey State Parole Board

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: January 13, 2026
• Docket: A-1686-23
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1686-23

FRANCISCO VILLEGAS, a/k/a PAQUITO,

Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD,

Respondent. ________________________

Submitted April 28, 2025 – Decided January 13, 2026

Before Judges Gummer, Berdote Byrne, and Jacobs.

On appeal from the New Jersey State Parole Board.

Francisco Villegas, self-represented appellant.

Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Hilary Cohen, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

ADAM E. JACOBS, J.A.D. Francisco Villegas appeals a final decision of the New Jersey State Parole

Board ("Board") upholding denial of parole and imposing a sixty-month future

parole eligibility term ("FET"). For reasons that follow, we dismiss the appeal

as moot.

In 1995, following a jury trial, Villegas was sentenced to life

imprisonment for first-degree murder and a five-year consecutive term for third-

degree unlawful possession of a handgun. He appealed his sentence as illegal,

and we affirmed. State v. Villegas, No. A-3503-17T4 (App. Div. Nov. 19, 2019)

(slip op. at 4). Our Supreme Court denied defendant's petition for certification.

State v. Villegas, 241 N.J. 507 (2020).

In October 2022, a two-member Board panel denied parole to Villegas

based on: (1) the facts and circumstances of the offense, first-degree murder;

(2) Villegas's prior offense record; (3) the nature of his increasingly serious

criminal record; (4) his commitment to incarceration for multiple offenses; (5)

failure to deter Villegas's criminal behavior through community supervision

(probation); (6) institutional disciplinary infractions, with the last occurring on

January 28, 2016; and (7) insufficient problem resolution, specifically citing

Villegas's lack of insight into his criminal behavior and minimization of his

A-1686-23 2 conduct, as demonstrated by the panel interview and documentation in the case

file.

Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21(d), the two-member Board panel

referred the case to a three-member panel to establish a FET beyond the thirty-

six-month presumptive term. In March 2023, a three-member Board panel

established a sixty-month FET. The three-member panel stated its decision was

based on "the aggregate of all pertinent factors" in accordance with N.J.A.C.

10A:71-3.21(a).

On November 22, 2023, a full Board panel affirmed the parole denial and

sixty-month FET. Villegas timely appealed the Board's final agency decision.

Villegas submitted a brief in June 2024, and the Board submitted a brief

in response in September 2024. Both parties waived oral argument. In his brief,

Villegas contended the imposition of a sixty-month FET did not meet statutory

requirements. He further argued the Board had applied N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11

in an unconstitutional manner by construing his continued declaration of

innocence as a factor against release, the parole denial was not supported by

substantial evidence in the record or a reasonable weighing of the relevant

factors in the Administrative Code, particularly with respect to his "minor

disciplinary infractions," and the Board had failed to consider his "advanced age

A-1686-23 3 as a major factor in favor of granting parole." In favor of affirmance, the Board

argued its decision was supported by sufficient credible evidence and was in

accord with the applicable legal principles and the Administrative Code.

While the appeal was pending, we learned the Board scheduled and held

a second hearing in October 2025 and recommended release in a report issued

in November 2025. Consistent with that information, we learned and have

confirmed that Villegas was released on parole on December 29, 2025. Because

neither side supplemented the record, we do not have before us the precise date

of the October hearing or a copy of the Board's decision from November.

Further, in reviewing the parties' arguments, we took note that the

Supreme Court had granted a petition for certification in Cowan v. New Jersey

State Parole Board, 259 N.J. 485 (2025), and subsequently heard argument in

that case on September 25, 2025. The Court has yet to rule. However, a central

issue in Cowan is whether the Board's imposition of a 200-month FET⸺173

months beyond the standard FET⸺was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.

But because Villegas argued the Board erred by exceeding the thirty-six month

standard term and he was released twenty-five months after his hearing on

November 23, 2023, or eleven months shy of thirty-six months, this basis for

appeal is factually moot.

A-1686-23 4 Also, while this appeal was pending, the Court decided Krug v. New

Jersey State Parole Board, 261 N.J. 477 (2025). In Krug, the Court held that

constitutional ex post facto prohibitions forbid only punishment beyond what

was contemplated at the time the crime was committed. Because the law at the

time of Krug's 1973 offenses permitted the Board to consider the same "all

existing" information it could consider under the 1997 amendment, retroactive

application of the 1997 amendment to Krug created no risk of additional

punishment. Our decision to dismiss is without prejudice to any argument based

on Krug Villegas may raise in the event he is reincarcerated and again before

the Parole Board.

"[A]n issue is 'moot' when the decision sought in a matter, when rendered,

can have no practical effect on the existing controversy." Comando v. Nugiel,

436 N.J. Super. 203, 219 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting Greenfield v. N.J. Dep't of

Corr., 382 N.J. Super. 254, 257-58 (App. Div. 2006)) "Mootness is a threshold

justiciability determination rooted in the notion that judicial power is to be

exercised only when a party is immediately threatened with harm." Stop & Shop

Supermarket Co., LLC v. Cnty. of Bergen, 450 N.J. Super. 286, 291 (App. Div.

2017) (quoting Betancourt v. Trinitas Hosp., 415 N.J. Super. 301, 311 (App.

Div. 2010)).

A-1686-23 5 "[F]or reasons of judicial economy and restraint, courts will not decide

cases in which the issue is hypothetical, [or] a judgment cannot grant effective

relief[.]" Ibid. (alterations in original) (quoting Cinque v. N.J Dep't. of Corrs.,

261 N.J. Super. 242, 243 (App. Div. 1993)). We may "entertain a case that has

become moot when the issue is of significant public importance and is likely to

recur." State v. Cassidy, 235 N.J. 482, 491 (2018) (quoting State v. Gartland,

149 N.J. 456, 464 (1997)). We do not discern either circumstance present here

and dismiss the appeal as moot.

Dismissed.

A-1686-23 6