Francisco Martinez Ramirez, an individual; Consuelo Medrano Sanchez, an individual v. Robert Dale, an individual; NSH Logistics Inc. a foreign corporation; Nikolozi Shaverdashvili, an individual; Does II through X; and Roe Corporations II through X

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 FRANCISCO MARTINEZ RAMIREZ, an individual; CONSUELO MEDRANO CASE NO. 2:25-cv-01188-MDC-JAD 4 SANCHEZ, an individual, ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND 5 Plaintiffs, RECOMMENDATION TO DENY v. DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS 6 ROBERT DALE, an individual; NSH (ECF NO. 7) 7 LOGISTICS INC. a foreign corporation; NIKOLOZI SHAVERDASHVILI, an individual; 8 DOES II through X; and ROE CORPORATIONS II through X, 9 Defendants. 10 On 11/12/25, the magistrate judge entered this report and recommendation [ECF No. 14]: 11 12 This matter was assigned to me per the Court’s First amended General Order 2023-11. See ECF 13 No. 3. However, not all defendants have appeared and consented to the assignment. Therefore, District 14 Judge Jennifer A. Dorsey was assigned, and she referred to me the Motion to Dismiss (“Motion”) (ECF 15 No. 7) by defendant Nikolozi Shaverdashvili (“Shaverdashvili”) per 28 USC § 636. For the reasons 16 below, I RECOMMEND the Motion be DENIED. 17 DISCUSSION 18 I. BACKGROUND This is a personal injury action arising from an alleged vehicle accident. On or about February 19 20 20, 2023, plaintiffs’ car was struck by another car driven by defendant Robert Dale (“Dale”) while Dale 21 was exiting a shopping center. See Second Amended Complaint at ¶11, ECF No. 1-4. As a result of the 22 collision, plaintiffs’ car crossed over several lane of traffic and struck a parked freightliner truck owned 23 by defendant NSH Logistics, Inc. (“NSH”). Id. Plaintiffs further allege that defendant Shaverdashvili 24 was an employee of NSH who parked the freightliner at the relevant location, which was a no parking 25 zone. Id. Defendant Shaverdashvili moves to dismiss plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 1- 1 4)on the singular ground that parking in a no parking section was not the proximate cause of plaintiffs’ 2 injuries. See ECF No. 7. 3 4 II. LEGAL STANDARD 5 Dismissal is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) where a pleader fails to state a claim 6 upon which relief can be granted. Id.; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A pleader 7 fails to state a claim when it does not give fair notice of a legally cognizable claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. 8 at 555. Fair notice under FRCP 8 requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation 9 of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must 10 contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 11 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Dismissal is 12 appropriate if “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his 13 claims which would entitle him to relief.” Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing 14 Buckey v. Los Angeles, 957 F.2d 652, 654 (9th Cir.1992)). “All allegations of material fact are taken as 15 true and construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Everest & Jennings v. American 16 17 Motorists Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 226, 228 (9th Cir.1994); see Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 27 n. 2 18 (1977). 19 III. ANALYSIS 20 Plaintiffs’ negligence clam is governed by Nevada law. See Giue v. United States, No. 2:05-CV- 21 0475-LDG-GWF, 2007 WL 9724915, at *1 (D. Nev. Sept. 21, 2007). The elements of a negligence 22 claim under Nevada law are: (1) defendant's duty toward a plaintiff, (2) defendant's breach of that duty, 23 (3)that the breach was the actual and proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, and (4) that the plaintiff 24 25 was damaged. Id. (citing Joynt v. California Hotel & Casino, 108 Nev. 539, 542, 835 P.2d 799, 801 1 (1992)). 2 Defendant Shaverdashvili’s argues that parking the freightliner in the no parking zone cannot be 3 4 proximate cause of plaintiffs’ injuries as a matter of law. ECF No. 7. According to defendant, “[i]t has 5 been held that parking in a no-parking zone cannot be the proximate cause of an injury when the injury 6 is caused by the independent act of a third person.” ECF No. 7 at 5:5-7 (citing Gann v. Oltesvig, 491 7 F.Supp.2d 771 (N.D. Ill. 2007)). Defendant’s argument and reliance on Gann is not persuasive. 8 Gann is not persuasive authority because it was reached under Illinois law, not Nevada law, 9 which governs plaintiffs’ negligence claim here. Defendant did not cite any Nevada authorities adopting 10 or espousing the holding in Gann and I was unable to locate any such authority. Gann is also 11 procedurally different because it determined on post-trial motions, based on factual considerations, and 12 not in the context of a motion to dismiss. More importantly, the Nevada Supreme Court has determined 13 that in Nevada, “negligence and proximate cause are factual matters whose determination is essentially 14 within the province of the jury.” Karlsen v. Jack, 80 Nev. 201, 206, 391 P.2d 319, 321 (1964): Joynt v. 15 California Hotel & Casino, 108 Nev. 539, 542, 835 P.2d 799, 801 (1992)(under Nevada law, “questions 16 17 of negligence and proximate cause are generally questions of fact…”). Thus, in Karlsen¸ the Nevada 18 Supreme Court found the issue of whether parking on the shoulder of highway was a proximate cause of 19 plaintiff’s accident was an factual matter for the jury. Id., 80 Nev. at 206, 391 P.2d at 322. 20 // 21 // 22 // 23 // 24 // 25 IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5 For the foregoing reasons, 3 IT RECOMMEND that the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 7) by defendant Shaverdashvili be 4 || DENIED. ° DATED: November 12, 2025. ° IT IS SO RECOMMENDED. 7 JL Hon Maximiliang D. @uvillier II] 9 Upitted Stateé/Magistrate Judge UV 11 12 ORDER 13 The deadline for any party to object to this recommendation was 11/26/2025, and no party filed 14 || anything or asked to extend the deadline to do so. “[N]o review is required of a magistrate judge’s 15 || report and recommendation unless objections are filed.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 16 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Having reviewed the report and recommendation, I find good cause to adopt it, 17 |jandI do. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 18 || Recommendation [ECF No. 14] is ADOPTED in its entirety, and the motion to dismiss [ECF No. 7] 19 ||is DENIED. 20 U.S. District JudgeJennifer\A,/Dorsey 21 Dated: December 1, 2025 22 23 24 25