Francisco Martinez Ramirez, an individual; Consuelo Medrano Sanchez, an individual v. Robert Dale, an individual; NSH Logistics Inc. a foreign corporation; Nikolozi Shaverdashvili, an individual; Does II through X; and Roe Corporations II through X

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: November 12, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-01188
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 3 FRANCISCO MARTINEZ RAMIREZ, an individual; CONSUELO MEDRANO CASE NO. 2:25-cv-01188-MDC-JAD 4 SANCHEZ, an individual, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO 5 Plaintiffs, DENY DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO v. DISMISS (ECF NO. 7) 6 ROBERT DALE, an individual; NSH 7 LOGISTICS INC. a foreign corporation; NIKOLOZI SHAVERDASHVILI, an individual; 8 DOES II through X; and ROE CORPORATIONS II through X, 9 Defendants. 10 This matter was assigned to me per the Court’s First amended General Order 2023-11. See ECF 11 No. 3. However, not all defendants have appeared and consented to the assignment. Therefore, District 12 Judge Jennifer A. Dorsey was assigned, and she referred to me the Motion to Dismiss (“Motion”) (ECF 13 No. 7) by defendant Nikolozi Shaverdashvili (“Shaverdashvili”) per 28 USC § 636. For the reasons 14 below, I RECOMMEND the Motion be DENIED. 15 DISCUSSION 16 I. BACKGROUND 17 This is a personal injury action arising from an alleged vehicle accident. On or about February 18 20, 2023, plaintiffs’ car was struck by another car driven by defendant Robert Dale (“Dale”) while Dale 19 was exiting a shopping center. See Second Amended Complaint at ¶11, ECF No. 1-4. As a result of the 20 collision, plaintiffs’ car crossed over several lane of traffic and struck a parked freightliner truck owned 21 by defendant NSH Logistics, Inc. (“NSH”). Id. Plaintiffs further allege that defendant Shaverdashvili 22 was an employee of NSH who parked the freightliner at the relevant location, which was a no parking 23 zone. Id. 24 25 Defendant Shaverdashvili moves to dismiss plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 1- 1 4) on the singular ground that parking in a no parking section was not the proximate cause of plaintiffs’ 2 injuries. See ECF No. 7. 3 4 II. LEGAL STANDARD 5 Dismissal is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) where a pleader fails to state a claim 6 upon which relief can be granted. Id.; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A pleader 7 fails to state a claim when it does not give fair notice of a legally cognizable claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. 8 at 555. Fair notice under FRCP 8 requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation 9 of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must 10 contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 11 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Dismissal is 12 appropriate if “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his 13 claims which would entitle him to relief.” Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing 14 Buckey v. Los Angeles, 957 F.2d 652, 654 (9th Cir.1992)). “All allegations of material fact are taken as 15 true and construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Everest & Jennings v. American 16 17 Motorists Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 226, 228 (9th Cir.1994); see Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 27 n. 2 18 (1977). 19 III. ANALYSIS 20 Plaintiffs’ negligence clam is governed by Nevada law. See Giue v. United States, No. 2:05-CV- 21 0475-LDG-GWF, 2007 WL 9724915, at *1 (D. Nev. Sept. 21, 2007). The elements of a negligence 22 claim under Nevada law are: (1) defendant's duty toward a plaintiff, (2) defendant's breach of that duty, 23 (3) that the breach was the actual and proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, and (4) that the plaintiff 24 25 was damaged. Id. (citing Joynt v. California Hotel & Casino, 108 Nev. 539, 542, 835 P.2d 799, 801 1 (1992)). 2 Defendant Shaverdashvili’s argues that parking the freightliner in the no parking zone cannot be 3 4 proximate cause of plaintiffs’ injuries as a matter of law. ECF No. 7. According to defendant, “[i]t has 5 been held that parking in a no-parking zone cannot be the proximate cause of an injury when the injury 6 is caused by the independent act of a third person.” ECF No. 7 at 5:5-7 (citing Gann v. Oltesvig, 491 7 F.Supp.2d 771 (N.D. Ill. 2007)). Defendant’s argument and reliance on Gann is not persuasive. 8 Gann is not persuasive authority because it was reached under Illinois law, not Nevada law, 9 which governs plaintiffs’ negligence claim here. Defendant did not cite any Nevada authorities adopting 10 or espousing the holding in Gann and I was unable to locate any such authority. Gann is also 11 procedurally different because it determined on post-trial motions, based on factual considerations, and 12 not in the context of a motion to dismiss. More importantly, the Nevada Supreme Court has determined 13 that in Nevada, “negligence and proximate cause are factual matters whose determination is essentially 14 within the province of the jury.” Karlsen v. Jack, 80 Nev. 201, 206, 391 P.2d 319, 321 (1964): Joynt v. 15 California Hotel & Casino, 108 Nev. 539, 542, 835 P.2d 799, 801 (1992)(under Nevada law, “questions 16 17 of negligence and proximate cause are generally questions of fact…”). Thus, in Karlsen¸ the Nevada 18 Supreme Court found the issue of whether parking on the shoulder of highway was a proximate cause of 19 plaintiff’s accident was an factual matter for the jury. Id., 80 Nev. at 206, 391 P.2d at 322. 20 // 21 // 22 // 23 // 24 // 25 IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5 For the foregoing reasons, 3 IT RECOMMEND that the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 7) by defendant Shaverdashvili be 4 || DENIED. ° DATED: November 12, 2025. ° IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

Hon Maximiliang D. ouvillier II 9 United Stateg/Magistrate Judge U7 11 12 NOTICE 13 Pursuant to Local Rules IB 3-1 and IB 3-2, a party may object to orders and reports and 14 || recommendations issued by the magistrate judge. Objections must be in writing and filed with the Clerk 15 || of the Court within fourteen days. LR IB 3-1, 3-2. The Supreme Court has held that the courts of appeal 16 || may determine that an appeal has been waived due to the failure to file objections within the specified 17 || time. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 142 (1985). 18 This circuit has also held that (1) failure to file objections within the specified time and (2) 19 || failure to properly address and brief the objectionable issues waives the right to appeal the District 20 || Court's order and/or appeal factual issues from the order of the District Court. Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 21 |] 1153, 1157 (Oth Cir. 1991); Britt v. Simi Valley United Sch. Dist., 708 F.2d 452, 454 (9th Cir. 1983). 22 || Pursuant to LR JA 3-1, the plaintiff must immediately file written notification with the court of any 23 || change of address. The notification must include proof of service upon each opposing party’s attomey, 24 || or upon the opposing party if the party is unrepresented by counsel. Failure to comply with this rule may 25 || result in dismissal of the action.

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