FRANCIS v. STATE
This text of 2020 OK CR 17 (FRANCIS v. STATE) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
FRANCIS v. STATE
2020 OK CR 17
Case Number: F-2019-255
Decided: 09/10/2020
SKYLER FRANCIS, Appellant v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Appellee.
Cite as: 2020 OK CR 17, __ __
SUMMARY OPINION
¶1 Appellant, Skyler Francis,1 was tried and convicted in a nonjury trial in Texas County District Court, Case No. CF-2018-101, of two counts of embezzlement in violation of 21 O.S.Supp.2016, § 1451.2 The Honorable Judge Jon K. Parsley, District Judge, presided at trial and sentenced Francis to two concurrent five-year suspended sentences. The court further ordered Francis pay $5,497.00 in restitution and various other costs and fees. By agreement of both parties, the trial court ordered the sentences stayed pending this appeal. Francis now appeals and raises the following proposition of error before this Court:
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO 22 OKL. ST. ANN. § 130, AS THE PROSECUTION IN OKLAHOMA WAS BARRED DUE TO THE APPELLANT'S CONVICTION IN KANSAS FOR THE SAME CRIME.
¶2 After thorough consideration of the entire record before us on appeal, including the original record, transcripts, exhibits and the parties' briefs, we find that no relief is required under the law and evidence. Appellant's judgment and sentence is AFFIRMED.
¶3 On October 31, 2018, Appellant filed a motion to dismiss the present case arguing the State's prosecution was in violation of his constitutional and statutory rights against double jeopardy. The State filed a responsive pleading opposing the motion to dismiss and a hearing on the matter was held on February 13, 2019. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied Appellant's motion. In his sole proposition of error on appeal, Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss. Citing 22 O.S.2011, § 130 and the Oklahoma and Federal Double Jeopardy Clauses, Appellant argues that his prosecution and conviction in Kansas foreclosed the possibility that Oklahoma could subsequently prosecute him.
¶4 This Court reviews the denial of a motion to dismiss for an abuse of discretion. Lozano v. State, 2013 OK CR 17, ¶ 4, 313 P.3d 272, 273 (finding the trial court "did not abuse its discretion in determining that Appellant's retrial was not barred by former jeopardy"). "An abuse of discretion has been defined as a clearly erroneous conclusion and judgment, one that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts presented." Vanderpool v. State, 2018 OK CR 39, ¶ 32, 434 P.3d 318, 325 (citing Neloms v. State, 2012 OK CR 7, ¶ 35, 274 P.3d 161, 170). Appellant fails to show the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to dismiss. As discussed below, the facts clearly show Appellant's Oklahoma prosecution was not for the same acts or offenses for which he was prosecuted in Kansas.
¶5 Viewing his criminal conduct in Kansas and Oklahoma as the "same act"--embezzlement from his employer in Kansas--Appellant asserts his Oklahoma prosecution in Texas County violated both 22 O.S.2011, § 130 and the state and federal protections against double jeopardy.3 Section 130 provides:
"When an act charged as a public offense is within the jurisdiction of another territory, county or state, as well as this state, a conviction or acquittal thereof in the former is a bar to a prosecution therefor in this state."
(emphasis added).4
¶6 Appellant argues Section 130 is "clear and unambiguous" and "does not allow for an interpretation [which] fabricate[s] exclusive jurisdiction" for a second prosecution for the "same act". Appellant's argument is flawed from the onset as the record shows his Kansas and Oklahoma convictions do not arise out of the "same act."
¶7 Section 130's protection against successive prosecutions for "an act" is analogous to Title 21, Section 11's prohibition against multiple punishments for a single criminal act.5 Like 21 O.S.2011, § 11, Section 130's protection is confined to "an act." Cf. Irwin v. State, 2018 OK CR 21, ¶ 5, 424 P.3d 675, 676 ("If two or more crimes truly arise out of one act, section 11 prohibits prosecution and punishment for more than one crime." (emphasis added)); Barnard v. State, 2012 OK CR 15, ¶ 27, 290 P.3d 759, 767 (same). "An act" therefore denotes a single criminal act. A Section 130 analysis is thus dependent on the particular facts presented. Cf. Sanders v. State, 2015 OK CR 11, ¶ 8, 358 P.3d 280, 284 (Section 11 analysis is "based on the particular facts presented").
¶8 The record in the present case shows Appellant committed multiple acts, resulting in multiple offenses, some of which occurred in Kansas and others that transpired in Oklahoma. Each act was chronologically separated in time.6 His actions in Kansas were thus separate and distinct from his criminal conduct in Oklahoma. Cf. Logsdon v. State, 2010 OK CR 7, ¶ 17, 231 P.3d 1156, 1165 ("Where there is a series of separate and distinct crimes, . . . Section 11 is not violated." (citing Davis v. State, 1999 OK CR 48, ¶ 12, 993 P.2d 124, 126)). Moreover, contrary to Appellant's assertion on appeal, the fact each act involved the same victim is of no consequence. Cf. Rousch v. State, 2017 OK CR 7, ¶ 3, 394 P.3d 1281, 1282 ("Two distinct acts of the same offense, carried out against the same victim, will not violate double jeopardy where the acts are interrupted and separate in time."). Appellant's Oklahoma prosecution was thus not prohibited by Section 130.
¶9 Nor was Appellant's prosecution in Oklahoma violative of the state or federal Double Jeopardy Clauses.7
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2020 OK CR 17, 474 P.3d 372, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/francis-v-state-oklacrimapp-2020.