Francis v. Commissioner

1988 T.C. Memo. 30, 54 T.C.M. 1607, 1988 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 30
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedJanuary 27, 1988
DocketDocket No. 42658-85.
StatusUnpublished

This text of 1988 T.C. Memo. 30 (Francis v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Francis v. Commissioner, 1988 T.C. Memo. 30, 54 T.C.M. 1607, 1988 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 30 (tax 1988).

Opinion

HAROLD LEE AND BIRTHA MAE FRANCIS, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Francis v. Commissioner
Docket No. 42658-85.
United States Tax Court
T.C. Memo 1988-30; 1988 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 30; 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 1607; T.C.M. (RIA) 88030;
January 27, 1988.
Harold Lee Francis, for the petitioners.
Rebecca A. Dance, for the respondent.

KORNER

MEMORANDUM OPINION

KORNER, Judge: By separate statutory notices of deficiency dated September 5, 1985, respondent determined deficiencies of income tax and additions to tax against petitioners as follows:

ADDITION TO TAX
YEARPETITIONER(S)DEFICIENCYSECTION 6653(b) 1
1982Harold L. Francis$ 31,477.50$ 15,738.75
plus 50% of
interest due
on $ 31,477.50
1983Harold L. Francis$ 24,000.40$ 12,000.20
Birtha M. Francisplus 50% of
interest due
on $ 24,000.40

*31 By timely petition filed herein, the petitioners placed all of the above amounts in dispute. At the time of filing their petition herein, petitioners were residents of Mulberry, Arkansas.

In his answer filed herein, respondent, after denying the allegations of fact in the petition, made detailed affirmative allegations of fact in support of his determinations of unreported income by petitioners in each of the two years at issue, as well as affirmative allegations of fact supporting respondent's determination of additions to tax for fraud under section 6653(b). Upon petitioners' failure to file a reply to the affirmative allegations of respondent's answer, as required by Rule 37, respondent filed a motion with this Court, praying for an order that the undenied allegations of the answer be deemed admitted, pursuant to Rule 37(c). On April 14, 1986, the Court notified petitioner of the filing of respondent's motion, and allowed petitioner until May 5, 1986 to file an appropriate reply to the affirmative allegations of respondent's answer. No response having been received from petitioners, the Court, by orders dated May 16 and June 18, 1986, extended the time within which petitioner*32 could file a reply to respondent's answer to July 17, 1986, further ordering service by regular mail as well as by the regular service of certified or registered mail. Upon petitioner's continued failure to respond, the court, by order dated July 28, 1986, ordered that "the affirmative allegations of fact set forth in paragraph 6, and the subparagraphs thereof, of respondent's answer are deemed to be admitted for the purposes of this case."

By notice dated June 29, 1987, this case was set for trial at a trial session of the Court at Little rock, Arkansas, beginning on November 30, 1987. On September 25, 1987, respondent filed a motion herein for judgment on the pleadings in his favor, on the grounds that the facts deemed admitted by the Court's order of July 28, 1986, left no further material facts in dispute and presented no further justiciable issue to the Court with respect either to the deficiencies determined nor the additions to tax under section 6653(b). By order dated September 30, 1987, respondent's motion was calendared for hearing at the previously scheduled trial session of the Court at Little Rock, Arkansas, on November 30 1987. The matter was called from the calendar*33 on that date, both parties were heard thereon, and the Court took respondent's motion under advisement. The case is before us in this posture.

In an ordinary case, where there are no issues on which respondent has the burden of proof and must affirmatively plead, a petition which raises no justiciable issues is properly subject to a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 120. See . Where, as here, however, respondent has the burden of proof on the fraud issue, section 7454; Rule 142(b), and the necessary facts are supplied by an order of the Court under Rule 37(c), such facts are established by matters outside the pleadings. In these circumstances, a motion for judgment on the pleadings is not appropriate, and we shall consider respondent's motion herein as a motion for summary judgment under rule 121. See ; compare ; .

The relevant and material facts which are deemed to be established in this record, under Rule 37(c), and*34 as to which there are no established contrary facts, are as follows:

During the years 1982 and 1983, petitioner Harold Lee Francis 2 was self-employed as an independent truck driver.

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1988 T.C. Memo. 30, 54 T.C.M. 1607, 1988 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 30, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/francis-v-commissioner-tax-1988.