Francienna Grant v. Marshall Williams

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: May 23, 2023
• Docket: 22-3108
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 22-3108 __________

FRANCIENNA GRANT, Appellant

v.

MARSHALL L. WILLIAMS; SUPERIOR COURT OF CAMDEN NEW JERSEY; SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION; SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY ____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil Action No. 1-19-cv-16952) District Judge: Honorable Noel L. Hillman ____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) May 1, 2023 Before: JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: May 23, 2023) ___________

OPINION * ___________

PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. Francienna Grant appeals the District Court’s orders dismissing her complaint and

denying her motion for reconsideration. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the

District Court’s judgment.

In 2008, Grant filed a counseled employment discrimination complaint in the

United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. The District Court dismissed

the complaint as a sanction for failing to comply with discovery orders, and we affirmed

the District Court’s judgment. See C.A. No. 09-4403. Grant then filed a claim of legal

malpractice against her attorney, Marshall Williams, in the Superior Court of New Jersey,

Law Division, Camden County. That court determined after a bench trial that Williams’s

representation had fallen below the acceptable standards of care but that Grant had not

shown that she would have recovered any damages as her underlying case had no value.

The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s determination. See Grant v. Williams,

No. A-1411-15T1, 2018 WL 1936827, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 25, 2018).

In 2019, Grant filed a complaint in the District Court alleging that Williams had

sexually harassed her and refused to provide legal services, resulting in the dismissal of

her first District Court case. She stated that she had won a malpractice case in state court

against Williams but that the state court judge refused to award her damages. She

requested that the District Court reverse the state courts’ findings, award her damages,

and order the defendants to attend sensitivity training. In an amended complaint, she

named Williams, the Superior Court Law Division, the Superior Court Appellate

Division, and the Supreme Court of New Jersey as defendants. 2 In January 2021, the District Court dismissed her claims against the State Court

Appellees based on Eleventh Amendment immunity and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 1

It also denied her motion for a default judgment against them. As for her claims against

Williams, it ordered her to show cause why those claims should not be dismissed for lack

of prosecution for failure to serve him or for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Grant

then filed a motion for reconsideration with respect to the District Court’s dismissal of

her claims against the State Court Appellees.

In August 2021, the District Court denied her motion for reconsideration and

dismissed her claims against Williams for lack of prosecution. It also noted that allowing

Grant additional time to serve Williams would be futile because she failed to establish

that the District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over her claims against Williams.

Grant then filed a timely motion for reconsideration, arguing that she had newly

discovered evidence, i.e., a decision by the Office of Attorney Ethics of the Supreme

Court of New Jersey to suspend Williams for two years. She also appeared to argue that

she had served Williams: “return service and regular mail was not returned. Which

constitutes service.” ECF #23 at 3. In June 2022, the District Court denied the motion

for reconsideration. Grant filed a notice of appeal and challenges the January 2021 and

June 2022 orders. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

1 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives a District Court of jurisdiction to review, directly or indirectly, a state court adjudication. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). 3 Claims against Williams

The District Court determined that Grant had failed to serve Williams and had not

provided good cause for this failure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (providing that “[i]f a

defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court . . . must

dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made

within a specified time. But if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court

must extend the time for service for an appropriate period”). We review a District

Court’s dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) for an abuse of discretion. See Ayres

v. Jacobs & Crumplar, P.A., 99 F.3d 565, 568 (3d Cir. 1996).

In response to the order to show cause, Grant stated that in November 2019, after

attempting service on Williams at his office with a professional process server, she

“personally served Williams with a second Summons. No return of mailed documents to

date.” ECF #18 at 3. 2 We agree with the District Court that Grant did not establish that

she properly served Williams. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e) (describing methods to serve an

individual, including following state law where the District Court is located or where

service is made); N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-4 (describing manner of proper service under New

Jersey law); Pa. R. Civ. P. No. 402 (describing manner of proper service under

Pennsylvania law); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2) (allowing an adult who is not a party

2 It appears that by using the word “personally,” Grant meant that she herself mailed the summons to Williams and not that she handed the summons to him in person. Either method would not constitute proper service.

4 to serve a complaint). And, after failing to properly serve Williams for over a year and a

half, Grant did not show good cause such that the District Court was required to further

extend the original 90-day deadline for service. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Nor did the

District Court abuse its discretion in declining to grant her request for substitute service

as she had not indicated that she had attempted to serve Williams at his place of abode as

allowed by statute. See N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-4(b)(1) (allowing substitute service if service

cannot be made pursuant to Rule 4:4-4(a)(1) despite diligent effort and inquiry); see also

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2) (allowing service by leaving a copy of the summons at the

defendant’s dwelling or usual place of abode with resident of suitable age); N.J. Ct. R.

4:4-4(a)(1) (same ); Pa. R. Civ. P. No. 402 (allowing service at defendant’s residence by

handing a copy to an adult family member).

Grant also challenges the District Court’s denial of her motion for reconsideration

based on the new evidence of the Ethics Board’s opinion. However, this evidence does

not undermine the District Court’s determination that Williams was not properly served

with the complaint.

As we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Grant’s claims against Williams

for lack of prosecution, we need not reach the issue of whether the District Court had

subject matter jurisdiction over her claims against Williams.

Claims against the State Court Appellees

Grant challenges the District Court’s refusal to grant her a default judgment

against the State Court Appellees. We review the District Court’s denial of her request 5 for a default judgment for an abuse of discretion. See Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210

F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2000). Grant has not shown any prejudice from the denial of the

default, and the Appellees had a litigable, and, in fact, meritorious defense. See id.

(discussing factors to consider in reviewing refusal to enter default judgment). The

District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying her request for a default judgment

against the State Court Appellees.

To the extent that Grant requested that the District Court reverse a state court’s

judgment, the District Court lacked jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

See Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir.

2010) (describing the requirements for applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine).

To the extent that the complaint was not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,

we agree with the District Court that the State Court Appellees were entitled to Eleventh

Amendment immunity. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,

100–02 (1984) (explaining that Eleventh Amendment immunity protects a state and its

agencies from suit unless Congress has specifically abrogated the state’s immunity or the

state has waived its immunity). Grant argues that Appellees were not entitled to

immunity, but the cases she cites do not support her argument. See Pierson v. Ray, 386

U.S. 547, 553 (1967) (holding that judicial defendant was immune from suit); Bradley v.

Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 357 (1871) (holding that judge was not liable for damages to

attorney whose name was struck from the roll of attorneys for threatening judge).

6 Grant argues that New Jersey waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity and

consented to being sued when it enacted a law that extended the state statute of limitation

for claims of sexual abuse. However, there is nothing in that statute that supports this

argument. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2a(a)(1).

Grant also criticizes the time the District Court took to adjudicate her case and

asserts generally that the District Judge was biased against her. However, any delay in

the adjudication of this case is not a ground to vacate the judgment. See In re Fine Paper

Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982) (noting that the manner in which a

court disposes of cases on its docket is generally within its discretion). And her claim of

bias is not supported by the record. Cf. Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc.,

224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000) (“We have repeatedly stated that a party’s displeasure

with legal rulings does not form an adequate basis for recusal . . . .”).

For the above reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.