Franchise Realty Corp. v. Indiana State Board of Tax Commissioners

682 N.E.2d 832, 1997 Ind. Tax LEXIS 14, 1997 WL 398832
CourtIndiana Tax Court
DecidedJune 27, 1997
Docket49T10-9607-TA-00081
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 682 N.E.2d 832 (Franchise Realty Corp. v. Indiana State Board of Tax Commissioners) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Franchise Realty Corp. v. Indiana State Board of Tax Commissioners, 682 N.E.2d 832, 1997 Ind. Tax LEXIS 14, 1997 WL 398832 (Ind. Super. Ct. 1997).

Opinion

FISHER, Judge.

Franchise Realty Corp. (Franchise) appeals the State Board of Tax Commissioners’ (State Board) final determination of the effective age of its real property. Franchise filed a Form 133 Petition for Correction of Errors, contending that a determination of the effective age of a remodeled building involves an objective mathematical computation, thereby making Form 133 the correct method for appealing the Board’s decision. In contrast, the State Board claims that a decision regarding effective age is subjective, and therefore not reviewable on a 133 Petition. The issue before this Court is whether a taxpayer may use a Form 133 Petition to challenge the State Board’s determination of effective age. This Court agrees with the State Board, and holds that using a Form 133 Petition to challenge the determination of effective age is improper.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Franchise owns a remodeled McDonald’s restaurant in Connersville, Indiana that was assessed for the March 1, 1990, 1991 and *833 1992 assessments as having an effective age of 1981. The effective age is used to determine the depreciation of a building by using the physical depreciation schedule provided by the State Board. Ind. Admin. Code tit. 50, r. 2.1-4-8 (1988). Franchise contested the county assessor’s determination of effective age and its subsequent finding of depreciation by filing a Form 133 Petition with the State Board on October 10, 1993. It argued that an incorrect mathematical formula was used by the county assessor in arriving at his value of effective age. Franchise asserted that use of the incorrect formula resulted in a “mathematical error” correctable on a Form 133.

Franchise argues that the effective age for its building should be arrived at by use of the following calculation: multiply 1975 (the actual age of the building) by 91 percent (the portion of the building that remained unchanged after the addition) and add that product to 1986 (the date of the addition) multiplied by 9 percent (the portion of the building that was added on to the original structure). Franchise claims that the value arrived at by means of this formula should then be used to find a depreciation value on the physical depreciation schedule.

The State Board contends that the effective age of a building is a subjective determination that cannot be calculated by a simple mathematical formula. It argues that effective age is determined by looking at the overall condition of the building. In this particular case, the assessor was not able to differentiate between what was added on to the buflding during the renovation and what remained from the original structure. For this reason, he determined effective age from the overall condition of the building, not from a straightforward calculation. The assessor judged how much “life” had been restored to the building by means of the addition that was put on.

The State Board denied Franchise’s Form 133 Petition and issued a final determination upholding the county assessor’s decision on effective age and depreciation value for the McDonald’s restaurant. The State Board justified its decision by stating that the effective age of a building is a subjective determination, and therefore not correctable by a Form 133. Franchise responded by filing an appeal with this Court on July 16, 1996.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Determinations made by the State Board are accorded great deference when the Board is acting within its scope of authority. Bender v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 676 N.E.2d 1113, 1114 (Ind.Tax Ct.1997). Therefore, a final determination of the State Board will be reversed only if it is unsupported by substantial evidence, constitutes an abuse of discretion, exceeds statutory authority, or is arbitrary or capricious. Id.

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

A taxpayer challenging a property assessment bears the responsibility of using the appropriate method. When that taxpayer pursues an improper method, the State Board’s determination will be upheld. Bender, 676 N.E.2d at 1114; See Williams Indus. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 648 N.E.2d 713, 718 (Ind.Tax Ct.1995). At the time of Franchise’s appeal, three methods of challenging an improper assessment were available to the taxpayer: (1) filing a Form 130/131 Petition for Review of Assessment within thirty days of a general reassessment to challenge both subjective and objective errors; (2) filing a Form 134 Petition for Reassessment by March 31st of years in which a general reassessment was not done to challenge both subjective and objective errors; 1 or (3) filing a Form 133 Petition for Correction of Errors at any time to challenge only objective errors. Bender, 676 N.E.2d at 1114; Williams, 648 N.E.2d at 716-17; Reams v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 620 N.E.2d 758, 759-60 (Ind.Tax Ct.1993).

In this particular case, the taxpayer filed a Form 133 Petition, which is governed by Indiana Code § 6-1.1-15-12. See Bender, 676 *834 N.E.2d at 1114. Specifically, Franchise asserted that its claim arose under subsection 12(a)(7), which deals with mathematical errors in computing assessments. Ind.Code Ann. § 6-1.1-15-12(a)(7) (West 1989) (amended 1993 & 1995). This Court has held that such mathematical errors are clearly objective and not subjective. Bender, 676 N.E.2d at 1116. In order to resolve matters more efficiently, objective mistakes are to be challenged on a Form 133 so that they can be handled separately from subjective errors because the assessor’s subjective judgment plays no role in the correction. Indiana Code § 6-1.1-15-12(a) provides an avenue for correcting objective mistakes in an assessment, not errors in subjective judgment. Id. at 1114; See, e.g., Hatcher v. State Bd. of Tax Comm’rs, 561 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ind.Tax Ct.1990). In creating the statute, the legislature chose to limit the types of correctable computation errors to those which were mathematical errors — errors which could be corrected pursuant to precise and exact standards. Id. at 855.

In Bender, a case similar to the one at bar, the taxpayer owned property commonly referred to as row-type dwelling. His property was assessed under the Residential Pricing Schedule with an adjustment for a row-type dwelling. The taxpayer appealed this assessment by filing a Form 133. He argued that the General Commercial Residential Pricing Schedule should have been used instead of the residential schedule, because the units- were leased and not owned by the occupants. Bender, 676 N.E.2d at 1113. The use of Form 133 was justified by the taxpayer on the grounds that this mistake was a “mathematical error”.

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Bluebook (online)
682 N.E.2d 832, 1997 Ind. Tax LEXIS 14, 1997 WL 398832, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/franchise-realty-corp-v-indiana-state-board-of-tax-commissioners-indtc-1997.