Frances Spanos Shelton v. Vernon Leuschner, and as Durable Power of Attorney for Katherine Leuschner, Robert Lee Spanos, Christopher Blake Spanos, and Kathryn Nicole Lawrie

Opinion

ACCEPTED 15-25-00072-CV FIFTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 10/3/2025 10:25 AM No. 15-25-00072-CV CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE CLERK FILED IN IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 15th COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTEENTH DISTRICT AUSTIN, TEXAS 10/3/2025 10:25:47 AM AT AUSTIN CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE Clerk

FRANCES SPANOS SHELTON, Appellant, v. VERNON LEUSCHNER, ROBERT LEE SPANOS, CHRISTOPHER BLAKE SPANOS, KATHRYN NICOLE LAWRIE, AND KATHERINE LEUSCHNER, Appellees.

On Interlocutory Appeal from the 414th District Court of McLennan County, Texas, Cause No. 2024-3035-5

REPLY BRIEF

Kirk L. Pittard Craig D. Cherry State Bar No. 24010313 State Bar No. 24012419 kpittard@dpslawgroup.com ccherry@cjsjlaw.com Rick Thompson Ryan C. Johnson State Bar No. 00788537 State Bar No. 24048574 rthompson@dpslawgroup.com rjohnson@cjsjlaw.com DURHAM, PITTARD & SPALDING, LLP Scott H. James P.O. Box 224626 State Bar No. 24037848 Dallas, Texas 75222 sjames@cjsjlaw.com (214) 946-8000 CHERRY JOHNSON SIEGMUND JAMES, PLLC (214) 946-8433 (fax) 7901 Fish Pond Road, 2nd Floor Waco, Texas 76710 (254) 732-2242 (866) 627-3509 (fax)

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page(s)

Table of Authorities .............................................................................................. iv

Introduction ............................................................................................................. 1

I. The County Court at Law’s Orders Are Void and the District Court Abused Its Discretion by Enforcing Aspects of the Void Orders in the Order Appointing the Receiver ..................... 1

A. Fran May “Collaterally Attack” the County Court’s Orders ................................................................................................... 2

B. This Court Has Jurisdiction to Review the County Court’s Jurisdiction to Issue the Order Appointing Judge Stem to Serve as Trust Advisor ............................................. 3

C. The Order Appointing the Receiver Implicitly, Indirectly, or Silently Incorporates and Gives Effect to the County Court’s Void Rulings ................................................ 4

D. The County Court Did Not Have Jurisdiction to Issue the Orders Appointing Judge Stem to Serve as Trust Advisor................................................................................................. 8

1. The County Court Did Not Have Original Probate Jurisdiction Following the End of the Temporary Administration of Ms. Spanos’s Estate ...................................... 9

2. County Court at Law No. 1 Did Not Have Pendent or Ancillary Jurisdiction Over the Administration of the Trust Either ..................................................................... 11

ii TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT’D)

Page(s)

II. The County Court’s Orders Are Void, Not Voidable, Because the Court Had No Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over the Claims Related to the Trust ...................................................... 16

III. Fran Did Not Waive and Is Not Estopped from Arguing that the County Court at Law and District Court’s Orders Are Void ....................................................................................................... 20

IV. The Order Appointing Receiver Is Not Supported by Relevant Evidence ...................................................................................... 22

A. No Evidence Supports the Appointment of the Receiver Under Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 64.001(a)(6) ........................................................................... 22

B. There Was No Evidence Supporting the Appointment of a Receiver Under Texas Property Code § 114.008(a)(5) ......................................................................... 23

C. There Was No Evidence Supporting the Appointment of a Receiver Under the General Rules of Equity ............................................................................................. 26

V. The District Court’s Order Appointing Receiver Is Overly Broad and Violates Fran’s Rights ............................................................. 28

Certificate of Compliance .................................................................................... 31

Certificate of Service ............................................................................................. 32

iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page(s)

Barton v. Buchanan, Nos. 03–02–00596–CV, 03–02–00632–CV, 2003 WL 21939725 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 14, 2003, no pet.) ............ 14-15

Benefield v. State, 266 S.W.3d 25 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) ..............................................27

Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. 2005) ........................................ 17, 18

Castaneda v. Chapa, No. 13-22-00537-CV, 2024 WL 2197216 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg May 16, 2024, pet. denied) ...... 13-14

Elephant Ins. Co., LLC v. Kenyon, 644 S.W.3d 137 (Tex. 2022) ............................3

Estate of Hoskins, 501 S.W.3d 295 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2016, no pet.) .................................5, 6

Fieldtech Avionics & Instruments, Inc. v. Component Control.Com, Inc., 262 S.W.3d 813 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.) ................................26

For the Protection of S.M., 658 S.W.3d 876 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, no pet.) ........................................................... 20, 21

Gilbreath v. Horan, 682 S.W.3d 454, 552 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet. denied) ......................................27

Goodman v. Summit at West Rim, Ltd., 952 S.W.2d 930 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, no pet.) ...................................................................15

In re D.L.S., No. 05-08-00173-CV, 2009 WL 1875579 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 1, 2009, orig. proceeding) ................................ 17, 19

In re Estate of Hallmark, 629 S.W.3d 433 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2020, no pet.) ................................................................13

iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT'D)

Cases (cont'd) Page(s)

In re Estate of Martinez, No. 01-18-00217-CV, 2019 WL 1442100 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 2, 2019, no pet.).................................22

In the Interest of R.V., Jr., 977 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, no pet.) ...........................................................20

Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150 (Tex. 2004) ....................26

Lawton v. Lawton, No. 01–12–00932–CV, 2014 WL 3408699 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 10, 2014, no pet.) ........................ 14, 15

Matter of Estate of Rushing, 644 S.W.3d 383 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2022, pet. denied) ..............................................................11

Molinet v. Kimbrell, 356 S.W.3d 407 (Tex. 2011) .................................................15

Parsons v. Parsons, 648 S.W.3d 354 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2021, pet. denied) .............................................. 17, 18

Peters v. Blockbuster, Inc., 65 S.W.3d 295 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2001, no pet.) ...............................................................3

Pickens v. Pickens, 62 S.W.3d 212 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, pet. denied) ......22

Schuchmann v. Schuchmann, 193 S.W.3d 598 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied) ....................................................13

Solomon, Lambert, Roth & Assocs., Inc. v. Kidd, 904 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ) .............................................19

Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1993) .............20

Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860 (Tex. 2010) ........................... 16, 17

v TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT'D)

Cases (cont'd) Page(s)

Walker v. Money, 120 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. 1938) .....................................................23

Womble v. Atkins, 331 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. 1960) ....................................................11

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1367......................................................................................................15

Acts 2025, 89th Leg., ch. 73 (S.B. 2034), § 1, eff. May 19, 2025. .......................23

Acts 2025, 89th Leg., ch. 956 (S.B. 17), § 2, eff. Sept. 1, 2025............................23

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(1).........................................................3

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 64.001(a) .................................................... 22, 23

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 64.001(a)(3).......................................................23

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 64.001(a)(6).......................................... 22, 23, 26

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 64.001(a)(7).......................................................23

TEX. ESTATES CODE § 32.001(a) ........................................................................ 9, 10

TEX. ESTATES CODE § 32.001(b) .............................................................................11

TEX. ESTATES CODE § 32.001(d) .............................................................................12

TEX. ESTATES CODE § 31.002(a) .............................................................................10

TEX. ESTATES CODE § 31.002(a)(1).........................................................................10

vi TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (CONT'D)

Statutes (cont'd) Page(s)

TEX. ESTATES CODE § 31.002(b) .............................................................................10

TEX. ESTATES CODE § 31.002(b)(3) ........................................................................10

TEX. ESTATES CODE § 452.051(a) ...........................................................................12

TEX. GOV’T CODE § 25.0003(d) ................................................................................9

TEX. PROP. CODE § 114.008 ............................................................................. 23, 24

TEX. PROP. CODE § 114.008(a) ...............................................................................24

TEX. PROP. CODE § 114.008(a)(5)...........................................................................23

Rules

TEX. R. APP. P. 38.2(a)(1)(B) ....................................................................................1

TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(g) ..............................................................................................1

TEX. R. APP. P. 38.2(a)(2) .........................................................................................1

Other Authorities

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024) ............................................................5

vii INTRODUCTION

Appellees’ statement of facts is replete with allegations of wrongdoing

by Fran that are not supported by any record citations and violate Texas Rule

of Appellate Procedure 38.2. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(g), 38.2(a)(1)(B). Fran

objects to these allegations and does her best to contradict the many factual

inaccuracies in Appellees’ Brief below.

Next, rather than respond to Fran’s arguments in the order presented,

Appellees have disregarded Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.2(a)(2)

and reordered their responsive arguments in their preferred order. See Resp.

Br. at 18 n.70. Appellant will reply to the arguments in the order originally

presented to this Court.1

I. THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW’S ORDERS ARE VOID AND THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ENFORCING ASPECTS OF THE VOID ORDERS IN THE ORDER APPOINTING THE RECEIVER.

In her brief, Fran explained that the district court’s Order Appointing

Receiver is itself void because it incorporates aspects of the County Court at

1 On September 26, 2025, the Texas Supreme Court issued its order denying Appellant’s motion to transfer and consolidate this appeal with the mandamus pending in the Waco Court of Appeals. As a result, and given this Court’s letter to the Texas Supreme Court stating its belief that the Court may have jurisdiction to grant mandamus relief in a case transferred to this Court via docket equalization, Appellant intends to file a petition for writ of mandamus like the one currently pending in the Waco Court of Appeals in this Court as quickly as possible.

1 Law No. 1’s orders appointing Judge Stem as receiver, which are void for

want of jurisdiction. See App’t Br. at 13-26. Thus, the Order Appointing

Receiver constitutes an abuse of discretion requiring reversal. See App’t Br.

at 12. Appellees respond by misstating the rules for jurisdictional review.

A. Fran May “Collaterally Attack” the County Court’s Orders.

Appellees maintain that Fran’s collateral attacks on the county court’s

orders are beyond the Court’s jurisdiction in this appeal. See Resp. Br. at xix,

12, 14, 16, 19, 32, 34. Appellees are wrong.2

The county court’s orders that were related to the Trust and were

issued following the end of the temporary administration of Ms. Spanos’s

estate are void for want of subject matter jurisdiction. See App’t Br. at 12-25.

However, this argument is not, as Appellees claim, a stand-alone challenge

to the county court at law’s orders. Rather, the Court’s determination that

the county court’s orders are void is simply a necessary step to resolve

2 Appellees state that they do not challenge this Court’s jurisdiction to grant mandamus relief, see Resp. Br. at xix; however, they repeatedly argue that Fran presents arguments that go beyond the Court’s limited jurisdiction to review the order on interlocutory appeal. Appellees effectively argue that Fran cannot attack, and the Court cannot review, the validity of the void orders issued by the county court at law via interlocutory appeal. This is effectively a jurisdictional challenge to the Court’s ability to review issues that could require the Court to grant mandamus relief. This is one example of the types of arguments that Fran had hoped to avoid by filing her motion to consolidate the appeal and mandamus into a single case.

2 whether the Order Appointing Receiver enforces void orders. See App’t Br.

at 12-26. Fran still appeals the Order Appointing Receiver.

B. This Court Has Jurisdiction to Review the County Court’s Jurisdiction to Issue the Orders Appointing Judge Stem to Serve as Trust Advisor.

Appellees blithely argue that this Court “need not analyze whether the

County Court at Law had jurisdiction to issue any orders, especially agreed

orders, more than three years ago, that Appellant failed to timely appeal.”

Resp. Br. at 32. Appellees are again wrong.

This interlocutory appeal vests the Court with jurisdiction to address

the order appointing the receiver as well as “those issues subsumed within

it.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 51.014(a)(1); Peters v. Blockbuster, Inc., 65

S.W.3d 295, 302 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2001, no pet.); see Elephant Ins. Co.,

LLC v. Kenyon, 644 S.W.3d 137, 147 (Tex. 2022) (“[P]ermissive appeals are

resolved according to the same principles as any other appeal, including

addressing all fairly included subsidiary issues and ancillary issues

pertinent to resolving the controlling legal issue.”). This Court cannot

determine whether the Order Appointing Receiver improperly gives effect

to the county court’s void rulings without determining whether the county

court’s orders are, in fact, void. Thus, the issues related to the county court’s

3 jurisdiction to issue the order appointing Judge Stem to serve as trust advisor

are fairly included within this interlocutory appeal of the Order Appointing

Receiver, and this Court has jurisdiction to review those issues.

C. The Order Appointing the Receiver Implicitly, Indirectly, or Silently Incorporates and Gives Effect to the County Court’s Void Rulings.

Appellees state as “fact” that the Order Appointing Receiver does not

“mirror” or “refer to any prior orders, nor does it enforce any of Judge Stem’s

prior acts taken as Trust Advisor.” See Resp. Br. at 14, 16-17, 29. Appellees

are correct; however, their hyper-technical fixation on the literal text of the

order ignores the effect of the orders and the fact that the text of the Order

Appointing Receiver enforces the existence, and assumes the validity, of the

county court’s prior void rulings, thereby rendering the Order Appointing

Receiver itself void.

The following aspects of the Order Appointing Receiver give effect to

the county court’s void orders: (1) the district court noted his reliance on the

hearing testimony of the “Trust Advisor, Judge Robert Stem,” whose

appointment as trust advisor was improperly extended by the void order of

the county court at law long after the close of Ms. Spanos’s estate, CR 1292;

and (2) the district court’s order expressly accepts that Judge Stem is the

4 proper Trust Advisor, CR 1292, 1295-96. Though the Order Appointing

Receiver does not state that it is adopting, enforcing, or incorporating aspects

of the county court’s void orders, it clearly, albeit silently, adopts the county

court’s extension of Judge Stem’s appointment as trust advisor. This aspect

of the district court’s order is particularly troubling given the district court’s

evident deference to Judge Stem at the motions hearing.3

Nevertheless, Appellees argue that the district court’s order is distinct

from the county court’s previous rulings and that this case is akin to the facts

of Estate of Hoskins. Resp. Br. at 31-32. In Hoskins, the Thirteenth Court of

Appeals reviewed whether a probate court’s order appointing a receiver was

a simple confirmation of an arbitrator’s previous appointment of a receiver

or was a distinct, stand-alone order appointing a receiver. See 501 S.W.3d

295, 302 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2016, no pet.). In considering

whether the party defending the appointment of the receiver filed a timely

notice of appeal, the court of appeals ruled that the district court did not

3 Appellees are quite bothered by Fran’s argument that the Order Appointing Receiver “silently incorporates” aspects of the county court’s void orders, going so far as to label it “specious.” See Resp. Br. at 16, 29. But the silent, indirect, or implicit incorporation of the terms from one document, contract, or statute into another is a common legal principle. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY Imply (12th ed. 2024); id. Implied (12th ed. 2024).

5 confirm the arbitrator’s appointment of the receiver, but rather made an

independent determination to appoint the same receiver:

Rather than ratifying or approving any of the responsibilities which the arbitrator had previously granted to Rogers, the probate court’s order assigned Rogers with a new and distinct set of responsibilities. . . . Rather than confirming the receiver and his previously ordered duties, the probate court’s order signifies a new and separate appointment.

Id. at 303-04.

The differences between this case and Hoskins are stark, indeed. First,

Fran has not argued that the district court’s order was a confirmation of the

county court’s appointment of Judge Stem as trust advisor. The district

court’s order appointing a receiver and the county court’s orders appointing

the trust advisor are two separate rulings. The district court’s order simply

recognizes the existence and validity of the county court’s void orders and

gives credence to, and gives effect to, the county court’s earlier void orders

appointing the trust advisor.

Second, although the district court had jurisdiction to confirm the

appointment of Judge Stem or appoint Judge Stem anew to serve as trust

advisor, it did not do so. (Nor should the district court do so in light of Judge

Stem’s bias against Fran as evidenced by his impassioned and partisan

6 testimony at the motions hearing.4) Although Appellees are correct that the

Order Appointing Receiver was a new and independent ruling, the order

gives effect to and necessarily relies on the county court’s void orders

appointing Judge Stem as trust advisor, thereby rendering the district court’s

order itself void.5

The impact of the district court’s acceptance of the appointment of

Judge Stem as trust advisor cannot be understated. Judge Stem was the only

witness at the hearing on the motion to appoint a receiver. See 2 RR 77-137.

Thus, the court’s findings in support of its appointment were based on the

testimony of Judge Stem. As a former judge and the purported trust advisor,

Judge Stem was permitted by the district court, over objection, to testify as a

legal expert on questions of law and the legal effect of the Trust document

4 For example, during the hearing, Judge Stem admonished Fran and her attorneys for filing the suit to remove his colleague, Mr. Malone, as Trustee, which he considered to be “ridiculous, baseless, [and] spiteful lawsuit conduct.” 2 RR 101.

5 Appellees criticize the cases that Fran cites to support her argument that any orders enforcing prior void orders are likewise void because the cases involve the enforcement of orders “issuing sanctions for failing to comply[] or requiring a payment of attorneys’ fees in connection with a void order.” Resp. Br. at 30-31. It is true that the two cases that Fran cites in her opening brief involve the enforcement of void orders imposing sanctions and ordering the payment of attorney’s fees. This should not be surprising. Enforcement cases are the most obvious place for this rule to be applied. However, Appellees do not explain to the Court or Fran why this rule of law should not control here.

7 itself, the propriety of the county court’s jurisdiction to appoint him as trust

advisor, the merits of Fran’s claims, and whether Fran’s attorneys violated

professional ethics. See 2 RR 79, 93-95.

The district court’s Order Appointing Receiver clearly accepts and

validates the county court at law’s orders appointing Judge Stem as trust

advisor as well as his decision to remove Fran as trustee of the Trust. This

was improper and renders the Order Appointing Receiver void.

D. The County Court Did Not Have Jurisdiction to Issue the Orders Appointing Judge Stem to Serve as Trust Advisor.

Appellees argue that the county court at law had jurisdiction over the

administration of the Trust under its original probate jurisdiction and its

ancillary jurisdiction. See Resp. Br. at 18, 36-39. Appellees are wrong, and

in the process, largely fail to address the arguments in Fran’s opening brief.

On March 8, 2022, the county court entered the first order appointing

Judge Stem as temporary administrator of Ms. Spanos’s estate and as the

trust advisor of the Trust. See CR 817-19. Judge Stem’s term as trust advisor

was set to expire on September 5, 2022. See CR 817. On May 18, 2022, the

county court at law discharged Judge Stem as the temporary administrator

and terminated the estate administration. CR 821-23. Notwithstanding the

8 end of the administration and any proceedings related to the estate, the

county court signed an order extending the appointment of Judge Stem as

trust advisor until he “either determines that there no longer exists a

necessity for a Trust Advisor, by agreement of the Parties, or if the Court, in

the best interest of the Trust, determines cause exists for the removal of the

Trust Advisor.” See CR 827-28.

1. The County Court Did Not Have Original Probate Jurisdiction Following the End of the Temporary Administration of Ms. Spanos’s Estate.

A county court at law has no jurisdiction to administer a trust. But, in

a county without a statutory probate court, like McLennan County, such a

court has the same original probate jurisdiction as county courts. See TEX.

GOV’T CODE § 25.0003(d). A county court at law may exercise its original

probate jurisdiction over all probate proceedings and “matters related to the

probate proceeding.” TEX. ESTATES CODE § 32.001(a).6

6 A county court at law exercising original probate jurisdiction has authority to rule on the following matters related to a probate proceeding: (1) an action against a personal representative or former personal representative arising out of the representative’s performance of the duties of a personal representative; (2) an action against a surety of a personal representative or former personal representative; (3) a claim brought by a personal representative on behalf of an estate; (4) an action brought against a personal representative in the representative's capacity as personal representative; (5) an action for trial of title to real property that is estate property, including the enforcement of a lien against the property; (6) an action for trial of the right of property that is estate property;

9 Thus, in March 2022, when the county court at law issued its original

order appointing Judge Stem to serve as trust administrator, the court

properly exercised its original probate jurisdiction over probate proceedings

and matters related to probate proceedings. Although the county court at

law properly exercised its jurisdiction to create a temporary administration

of Ms. Spanos’s estate and properly appointed Judge Stem as the estate

administrator, the court did not have jurisdiction to appoint Judge Stem as a

temporary administrator of the Trust. That issue is not a probate proceeding

and is not a “matter related to a probate proceeding.” See TEX. ESTATES CODE

§ 32.001(a); § 31.002(a), (b).7 (Because Ms. Spanos’s will was not admitted to

probate, the county court had no jurisdiction over the administration of Ms.

Spanos’s inter vivos trust. See TEX. ESTATES CODE § 31.002(b)(3).)8

(7) the interpretation and administration of a testamentary trust if the will creating the trust has been admitted to probate in the court; and (8) the interpretation and administration of an inter vivos trust created by a decedent whose will has been admitted to probate in the court.

7 Ms. Leuschner’s claims that Fran allegedly wasted estate assets, for example, was a claim within the county court’s original probate jurisdiction because it was a matter related to the probate proceeding. See TEX. ESTATES CODE § 31.002(a)(1); CR 806-07.

8 In her opening brief, Fran argued that one of the many reasons that the county court at law had no jurisdiction over Ms. Leuschner’s claims regarding the administration of the Trust was that the amount in controversy at issue here exceeded the limits of the county court at law’s amount-in-controversy jurisdiction. See App’t Br. at 16-18. Appellees responded that Fran failed to prove the amount in controversy. See Resp. Br. at 40-

10 2. County Court at Law No. 1 Did Not Have Pendent or Ancillary Jurisdiction Over the Administration of the Trust Either.

Statutory county courts at law exercising original probate jurisdiction

can also exercise “pendent and ancillary jurisdiction as necessary to promote

judicial efficiency and economy.” TEX. ESTATES CODE § 32.001(b). The county

court had no pendent or ancillary jurisdiction over Ms. Leuschner’s claims

in September 2022, when the county court at law extended Judge Stem’s

tenure as trust administrator because the probate proceeding was closed and

there was no longer a pending probate matter to which pendent jurisdiction

could attach.9

Appellees repeatedly argue that Ms. Spanos’s estate was never closed.

See Resp. Br. at 18-19, 41-42 & n.69. Citing Section 32.001(d), Appellees claim

that Ms. Spanos’s estate remains open because there “has never been a

41. Appellees’ responsive argument is dead wrong. But while researching an unrelated issue, the undersigned counsel discovered two cases holding that the limits on a county court’s amount-in-controversy jurisdiction, which would ordinarily control, are not applicable when a county court exercises its original probate jurisdiction. See, e.g., Womble v. Atkins, 331 S.W.2d 294, 299 (Tex. 1960); Matter of Estate of Rushing, 644 S.W.3d 383, 387 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2022, pet. denied). Regardless, this argument is not necessary for Fran to prevail because the county court certainly had no jurisdiction after May 2022— i.e., when the court extended the appointment of Judge Stem as trust advisor.

9 Fran conflated the terms ancillary jurisdiction and jurisdiction over matters related to a

probate proceeding on two pages of her opening brief. See App’t Br. at 20-21. Although the terms were erroneously labeled, the remainder of the arguments presented in Section II(A)(4) were otherwise correct.

11 decree of final distribution” and the county court at law’s order ending the

temporary administration of the estate “expressly contemplated collection

of assets or debts, and a possible future need to probate the will of [Ms.]

Spanos.” Resp. Br. at 42 (quoting TEX. ESTATES CODE § 32.001(d)). This

argument is off base.

First, on March 8, 2022, the county court at law ordered a temporary

administration of Ms. Spanos’s estate and appointed Judge Stem to serve as

temporary administrator. CR 817-19; see TEX. ESTATES CODE § 452.051(a). A

little over two months later, the court ended the temporary administration

and discharged Judge Stem as estate administrator. CR 821-23. The order

ending the administration reflects that Fran and Ms. Leuschner represented

to the county court “that based on their investigation to date it appears there

is no necessity of administration at this time and that [Fran] and [Ms.]

Leuschner, in their respective capacities, should be authorized to transfer

title to any titled assets via an Affidavit of Heirship or other legal means.”

CR 821. Based on this representation, the county court discharged Judge

Stem as administrator and terminated the temporary administration. CR

823. Thus, in May 2022, the administration of the estate was ended as wholly

unnecessary.

12 No proceedings or filings related to the estate were filed by either party

until this month—i.e., over three years later—when Vernon Leuschner, on

behalf of Ms. Leuschner, filed an application to probate Ms. Spanos’s pour-

over will and for the appointment of another temporary administrator. See

Tab A.10 This improper filing demonstrates that Appellees are well aware

that the probate proceeding and the estate were closed.

Second, courts exercising original probate jurisdiction may exercise

pendent or ancillary jurisdiction only when a “close relationship exists

between the non-probate claims and the matter pending in the probate

court” and doing so “will aid in the efficient administration of a matter

pending in the probate court.” Schuchmann v. Schuchmann, 193 S.W.3d 598,

603 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied); see In re Estate of Hallmark, 629

S.W.3d 433, 438 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2020, no pet.). A close relationship

between probate and non-probate proceedings exists, for example, when the

matters involve the same parties, the same causes of action, and the same

underlying facts. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Chapa, No. 13-22-00537-CV, 2024 WL

10Appellees represent to this Court that they “believe there is at least one asset that will have to be dealt with through probate.” See Resp. Br. at 18 n.69. However, Ms. Leuschner does not identify any assets allegedly requiring administration. CR 802-03.

13 2197216, at *5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg May 16, 2024, pet.

denied).

The County Court at Law No. 1’s exercise of jurisdiction over the trust

claims did not and could not have “aid[ed] in the efficient administration of”

any estate claims. (Nor would jurisdiction over Trust claims aid that court

in administering the one unidentified asset in Ms. Leuschner’s new motion

to probate the will.) As the parties and Judge Stem recognized a little over

two months after the creation of the temporary administration, there was no

need for an administration of Ms. Spanos’s pour-over will or estate. The

county court’s improper exercise of jurisdiction over the Trust thus did not

aid in the county court at law’s brief administration of the estate.

Third, even if the county court could have exercised any pendent or

ancillary jurisdiction over the Trust, the court lost the authority to exercise

pendent or ancillary jurisdiction no later than May 18, 2022—i.e., the date the

county court at law terminated the administration of Ms. Spanos’s estate.

Thereafter, there were no pending probate claims for any Trust issues to be

pendent or ancillary to. See, e.g., Lawton v. Lawton, No. 01–12–00932–CV,

2014 WL 3408699, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jul. 10, 2014, no pet.);

Barton v. Buchanan, Nos. 03–02–00596–CV, 03–02–00632–CV, 2003 WL

14 21939725, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 14, 2003, no pet.); Goodman v.

Summit at West Rim, Ltd., 952 S.W.2d 930, 933 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, no

pet.).11

The county court at law terminated the temporary administration and

discharged Judge Stem as the temporary administrator of the estate on May

18, 2022. CR 821-24. On that date, the probate proceeding ended, and the

county court at law lost any alleged pendent or ancillary jurisdiction over

any claims. See Goodman, 952 S.W.2d at 933; Lawton, 2014 WL 3408699, at *2.

Thus, the county court’s September 1, 2022, order extending the purported

appointment of Judge Stem as the trust advisor is not justified by the county

court’s exercise of pendent or ancillary jurisdiction. And Judge Stem’s

11 In their brief, Appellees attempt to undermine Fran’s reliance on the Goodman ruling by pointing out that Goodman interpreted the predecessor to Section 32.001 and because the court erroneously “noted that in Federal cases jurisdiction was supposedly lost over pendent claims if the underlying Federal jurisdiction bases is lost.” Resp. Br. at 42-43. Even ignoring the other cases cited by Fran to support this argument, Appellees’ arguments distinguishing Goodman are incorrect for at least two reasons. First, the language of the ancillary jurisdiction provision in former Probate Code Section 5A is identical to the current language of the ancillary jurisdiction provision in Section 32.001 of the Estates Code. See Molinet v. Kimbrell, 356 S.W.3d 407, 415 (Tex. 2011) (characterizing holdings interpretating identical, predecessor statutes as “instructive regarding our application” of current statute). Second, Goodman’s discussion of a federal court’s supplemental jurisdiction is dicta. Moreover, a federal district court’s exercise of its statutory supplemental jurisdiction is totally unrelated to a county court at law’s exercise of pendent jurisdiction when the court is asserting its original probate jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

15 continued service as the purported trust advisor, and his actions taken with

respect to the Trust after May 18, 2022, are void. See CR 827-28, 923.

Because the county court at law could not exercise jurisdiction over

Ms. Leuschner’s trust claims and, regardless, certainly could not exercise

pendent jurisdiction after May 18, 2022, its order extending the appointment

of Judge Stem as trust advisor, and the district court’s order approving and

enforcing the county court’s rulings and Judge Stem’s decisions made after

May 18, 2022, are likewise void. Thus, the district court’s ruling constitutes

an abuse of discretion that must be reversed.

II. THE COUNTY COURT’S ORDERS ARE VOID, NOT VOIDABLE, BECAUSE THE COURT HAD NO SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER THE CLAIMS RELATED TO THE TRUST.

Appellees brazenly state to this Court that the county court at law’s

orders were not void, but rather voidable; therefore, Appellees conclude that

Fran was required to directly appeal those rulings and cannot challenge their

validity here. See Resp. Br. at 17, 32, 34-36, 45. Appellees are wrong once

again.

It is true that voidable orders, unlike void orders, must be challenged

in a direct appeal. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 863 (Tex.

2010). However, Appellees ignore an important corollary of that rule, which

16 controls here: If a Texas court with “no jurisdiction of the parties or

property, no jurisdiction of the subject matter, no jurisdiction to enter the

particular judgment, or no capacity to act” issues an order, it is void, not

voidable. Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2005). A void order,

unlike a voidable order, is subject to attack in a new lawsuit. See Joachim, 315

S.W.3d at 863.

As previously explained, the county court had no jurisdiction over the

Trust and no jurisdiction to appoint Judge Stem to serve as trust advisor in

the first place. See App’t Br. at 13-25. Nevertheless, citing Parsons v. Parsons,

648 S.W.3d 354, 357 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2021, pet. denied) and In re

D.L.S., No. 05-08-00173-CV, 2009 WL 1875579, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas July

1, 2009, orig. proceeding), Appellees contend that the county court’s orders

are not “void on their face” as required to collaterally challenge an order and

must therefore be presumed valid because the county court recited that it

had jurisdiction in its orders. See Resp. Br. at 34-36. But Appellees are wrong

for at least two reasons: (1) jurisdictional recitations in an order issued by a

court of general jurisdiction are presumed valid and cannot be collaterally

attacked if the court that issued them had subject matter jurisdiction; and (2)

the county court’s order extending the appointment of Judge Stem as trust

17 advisor, which was issued after the end of the temporary administration,

does not contain a jurisdictional recital.

First, Appellees correctly cite several cases reciting the general rule

that judgments with jurisdictional recitations that are issued by courts of

general jurisdiction are presumed valid and that extrinsic evidence cannot

be used to establish otherwise. But unlike here, those cases do not involve

challenges to a court’s authority to act or its subject matter jurisdiction.

A party may collaterally attack an order issued by a court with no

subject-matter jurisdiction. See Browning v. Placke, 698 S.W.2d 362, 363 (Tex.

1985). The rule regarding the inherent validity of jurisdictional recitations

only applies when the court issuing the challenged order or judgment has

general jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Here, Fran challenges the county court at law’s jurisdiction to issue any

orders related to the administration of the Trust, specifically arguing that the

court had no subject matter jurisdiction to administer the Trust. The cases

cited by Appellees do not involve questions of a court’s subject matter

jurisdiction or authority to issue an order.

In Parsons, for example, the court of appeals expressly noted that the

parties had not challenged the issuing court’s jurisdiction. See 648 S.W.3d at

18 357; Solomon, Lambert, Roth & Assocs., Inc. v. Kidd, 904 S.W.2d 896, 901 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ); see also In re D.L.S., 2009 WL

1875579, at *2 (appellant could not collaterally attack default child support

order issued by court of general jurisdiction given the orders jurisdictional

recitations). Such cases do not involve a collateral attack on a void order.

Second, although Appellees contend that the county court at law’s

orders are not “void on their face” because the court recited in its orders that

it possessed jurisdiction, see Resp. Br. at 34-36, not all of the county court at

law’s orders regarding the administration of the Trust so state. One order

that is attacked in this appeal that does not include a jurisdictional recitation

is the county court’s September 1, 2022, order extending the term of Judge

Stem’s service as trust advisor. CR 827-28. Pursuant to that order, Judge

Stem purports to act as the trust advisor, and his authority to act as such was

recognized and accepted by the district court. CR 1292.

In sum, while Appellees state the correct jurisdictional-recitation rule,

that rule does not apply when the court has no subject matter jurisdiction

over the case. In such cases, the court’s order is void as a matter of law and

constitutes a reversable abuse of discretion.

19 III. FRAN DID NOT WAIVE AND IS NOT ESTOPPED FROM ARGUING THAT THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW AND DISTRICT COURT’S ORDERS ARE VOID.

Citing In the Interest of R.V., Jr., 977 S.W.2d 777 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

1998, no pet.) and For the Protection of S.M., 658 S.W.3d 876, 877 (Tex. App.—

El Paso 2022, no pet.), Appellees contend that Fran waived and is estopped

from arguing that the county court or district court’s orders are void because

she did not object to Judge Stem testifying at the motions hearing and agreed

to the county court’s orders appointing Judge Stem as trust advisor. See

Resp. Br. at 30, 45-46. Appellees are wrong, and their reliance on R.V. and

S.M. is misplaced.

Subject matter jurisdiction “is never presumed and cannot be waived.”

Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443–44 (Tex. 1993).

And the two cases relied upon by Appellees do not involve challenges to a

court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

In R.V., the father of a minor child waived any error arising from the

trial court’s pretrial ruling that he would have to assert his Fifth Amendment

right against self-incrimination on a question-by-question basis during trial

because the father failed to object to the trial court’s ruling and failed to get

a ruling from the court on his objection. See R.V., 977 S.W.2d at 780. R.V.

20 did not involve a challenge to the trial court’s jurisdiction. There was no

claim that the ruling of the district court, a court of general jurisdiction, was

void.

In S.M., a family member collaterally attacked an agreed protective

order, arguing that the district court that granted the protective order did

not have jurisdiction because it failed to make mandatory findings required

by the Code of Criminal Conduct and could not enter an agreed protective

order. See S.M., 658 S.W.3d at 879. However, the S.M. court did not address

the “jurisdictional” issue because the court of appeals determined that the

agreed protective order was not void. Id. at 880. The court held that the

version of the Code of Criminal Conduct then in effect permitted an agreed

protective order in family cases. Id. In so ruling, the S.M. court did reiterate

that a person cannot agree to a protective order, thereby doing away with

the need for proof at a hearing, and later attempt to avoid the consequences

of the protective order by relying on the alleged lack of proof. Id. The court

did not hold that a party collaterally attacking an agreed order waives any

challenge to a void agreed order issued by a court without subject matter

jurisdiction. Id. at 879.

21 IV. THE ORDER APPOINTING RECEIVER IS NOT SUPPORTED BY RELEVANT EVIDENCE.

Appellees contend that the Order Appointing Receiver was supported

by evidence of Fran’s past breaches of trust, the need to “resolve ongoing

litigation,” and conflict regarding the administration of the Trust. See Resp.

Br. at 15, 19-25. Appellees are incorrect.12

A. No Evidence Supports the Appointment of the Receiver Under Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 64.001(a)(6).

The district court cited Section 64.001 as one basis for appointing the

receiver to sell the Front 45 Acres. Appellees only attempt to justify the

ruling under Section 64.001(a)(6). This section permits the appointment of a

receiver “in any case in which a Receiver may be appointed under the rules

of equity.” Resp. Br. at 23.

As Fran explained in her opening brief, (1) a court may appoint a

receiver under Section 64.001(a)(6) only in “instances beyond” the five

subsections justifying the appointment of a receiver in Section 64.001(a)—

i.e., that subsection does not permit the appointment of an receiver in cases

12 Although legal and factually sufficiency challenges are not independent grounds for reversal for abuse of discretion, it is a relevant factor in determining whether the court abused its discretion. See Pickens v. Pickens, 62 S.W.3d 212, 214 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, pet. denied); In re Estate of Martinez, No. 01-18-00217-CV, 2019 WL 1442100, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 2, 2019, no pet.).

22 that would ordinarily be governed by one of the five preceding subsections;

and (2) this situation would ordinarily be controlled by Section 64.001(a)(3),

thereby precluding any appointment under Section 64.001(a)(6). See App’t

Br. at 33-35. Appellees wholly failed to respond to this argument or address

the supporting cases cited in Fran’s brief. See Resp. Br. at 23-25.13

B. There Was No Evidence Supporting the Appointment of a Receiver Under Texas Property Code § 114.008(a)(5).

Appellees also argue that Section 114.008 of the Property Code justifies

the appointment of a receiver “where a breach of trust has occurred or might

occur,” which permitted the trial court to appoint the receiver. Resp. Br. at

21 (emphasis in original). Appellees contend that there is “ample evidence

establishing that Appellant committed or threatened numerous breaches.”

Id.

Similarly, the district court made the following two findings and

conclusions:

13 Appellees point out that the cases cited in Fran’s brief interpret a former version of Section 64.001(a)(6) and argue that those cases are therefore inapplicable. See Resp. Br. at 34 & n.91. But when the Legislature amends a statute with language that is substantially the same, the new version conveys the same intent and meaning. See Walker v. Money, 120 S.W.2d 428, 431 (Tex. 1938). The former version of Section 64.001(a)(6) is identical to the current version of Section 64.001(a)(7). See Tab B. In addition, the new amendments to Section 64.001(a) took effect after the district court issued its Order Appointing Receiver. See Acts 2025, 89th Leg., ch. 73 (S.B. 2034), § 1, eff. May 19, 2025; Acts 2025, 89th Leg., ch. 956 (S.B. 17), § 2, eff. Sept. 1, 2025.

23 • [A] Receiver is necessary and appropriate for the purpose of securing and selling the Front 45 Acres, along with granting any easement(s) pertaining to the Front 45 Acres, so as to minimize harm to the Trust, Trust property, and beneficiaries of the Trust, and to effectuate the terms of the Trust in an efficient and expeditious manner . . . .

• Irreparable damage will ensue to the beneficiaries of the Trust unless there is an immediate sale of the Front 45 Acres pursuant to the terms of the Trust.

CR 1292 (emphasis added). Both the Appellees and the trial court are

incorrect; there is no evidence to support a finding of a potential breach of

trust or the two findings and conclusions.

No evidence demonstrated a threat of any potential harm to the Trust,

Trust property, or the beneficiaries of the Trust absent an immediate sale of

the Front 45 acres. Although Judge Stem speculated wildly (and incorrectly)

that, as a result of this litigation, there would be nothing left in the Trust to

distribute to the beneficiaries, he later admitted that he was personally

unaware of the Trust’s financial condition. See 2 RR 101, 119-20.

Moreover, Section 114.008 actually provides that a court may appoint

a receiver “[t]o remedy a breach of trust that has occurred or might occur.”

TEX. PROP. CODE § 114.008(a) (emphasis added). Appellees allege, and Judge

Stem testified, that Fran allegedly breached her duty of trust when she

24 served as trustee. See Resp. Br. at 21-23; 2 RR 705-06.14 However, there was

no evidence suggesting that the appointment of a receiver to sell the Front

45 Acres was necessary to remedy any past or potential breaches of trust by

Fran.

Fran is not currently recognized as trustee of the Trust. There is no

evidence that she might now somehow breach a duty of trust. How could

she? She is no longer in a position to do so since she is not currently

recognized as trustee of the Trust. There was no evidence that the

appointment of a receiver was necessary “to remedy” her alleged, past

breaches of trust. (Or Appellees have failed to point out any such evidence

to Fran or the Court in their brief.) The most that Appellees have alleged is

14 In reality, Appellees’ allegations of wrongdoing are rhetoric at best. Appellees cite to allegations of wrongdoing set forth in their petition in intervention and Ms. Leuschner’s application for the appointment of a temporary administrator and trust advisor as well as an email from their attorney to Mr. Malone as the “evidence” supporting the appointment of the receiver under the property code. See Resp. Br. at 21 & notes 80-85. That is not evidence. Appellees do cite Judge Stem’s characterization of Fran’s actions as trustee as “inappropriate” and his testimony that Fran was removed as trustee after allegedly committing a “multitude” of breaches of trust. Fran recognizes that the trial court could have believed Judge Stem. However, it must be noted that later in the hearing, Judge Stem admitted that his hearing testimony directly conflicted with prior statements that he made to Fran and her attorney (before she sought to remove his hand- chosen colleague as trustee) and that, during those statements, he blamed Appellees for Fran’s difficulty in administering the Trust. See 2 RR 103, 112. As for the allegation that Fran failed to disclose the existence of funds in a bank account to Mr. Malone, it is undisputed that the bank account at issue is set forth in Schedule A to the Trust itself. See 2 RR 134; CR 551.

25 that Fran’s “Motion to Re-Affirm itself is evidence that Fran intends to

contravene the Interested Trustee provision in the Trust in order to reach the

result she desires, which does not align with the Trust and would be a future

breach of trust.” Resp. Br. at 21-22. Of course, this is argument and

speculation and constitutes no evidence. See Fieldtech Avionics & Instruments,

Inc. v. Component Control.Com, Inc., 262 S.W.3d 813, 833 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth 2008, no pet.) (citing Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d

150, 164 (Tex. 2004)).

C. There Was No Evidence Supporting the Appointment of a Receiver Under the General Rules of Equity.

Appellees also argue that an equitable receivership was needed “to

resolve years long litigation and dispute[s] over the management of probate

property.” Resp. Br. at 23. The district court noted that there was an

“extraordinary controversy” surrounding the sale of the Front 45 Acres and

concluded that the appointment of a receiver was justified by that and the

“material risk of harm, injury, damage and/or loss to the Property and/or

Trust funds, as well as the various beneficiaries.” CR 1292.

As discussed above, there is no evidence to support the district court’s

finding of a material risk of any harm to Trust property, funds, or the various

26 beneficiaries. Moreover, as discussed in Fran’s opening brief, a court should

not appoint an equitable receiver unless evidence reflects “a threat of serious

injury to the applicant.” Benefield v. State, 266 S.W.3d 25, 31 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.); see App’t Br. at 37. Appellees’ brief ignores

this legal argument and the cited authorities.

“When a court appoints a receiver, the court has determined that

property should no longer be under the control of the parties but instead

within the custody of the court.” Gilbreath v. Horan, 682 S.W.3d 454, 552 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet. denied). If the passage of time alone or

a protracted disagreement between trust beneficiaries were sufficient to

justify the appointment of an equitable receiver, then the reality will be that

every sizeable or complex trust is likely to soon be under the supervision of

a Texas court. This result would transmute an equitable receivership from

the “harsh, drastic, and extraordinary remedy” it is intended to be into an

everyday occurrence. See Benefield v. State, 266 S.W.3d 25, 31 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.).

27 V. THE DISTRICT COURT’S ORDER APPOINTING RECEIVER IS OVERLY BROAD AND VIOLATES FRAN’S RIGHTS.

Appellees reject Fran’s argument regarding the overly broad scope of

the Order Appointing Receiver for two reasons. First, Appellees contend

that the Court should disregard Fran’s argument that the order technically

enjoins her from even filing this interlocutory appeal. Why? Because

Appellees have not yet challenged Fran’s right to do so in this Court. See

Resp. Br. at 26-27; CR 1296. It cannot be disputed, however, that the order

currently enjoins Fran from taking any action that indirectly hinders the

Receiver’s sale of the property, which would include this appeal.15

Second, Appellees reject Fran’s complaint that the order currently

requires her to pay the expenses incurred by the Trust in the ordinary course

of business—even though Fran is not currently recognized as trustee and is

not currently a signatory to the Trust’s bank accounts. According to

Appellees, “the Order only contemplates an efficient payment mechanism

to pay Trust expenses with Trust funds,” and they “proposed a

15 Appellees also disingenuously contend that “Fran admits the Order is not an anti-suit

injunction[] and does not preclude the filing of any litigation.” Resp. Br. at 27 & n.103. This is dead wrong. Fran explained that the district court’s order was “not technically an anti-suit injunction because [it] was not issued by a separate court”; however, Fran immediately observed that “the effect is the same” and the order “would bar Fran’s right to prosecute her appeal.“ App’t Br. at 44.

28 supplemental order to Judge Luna to modify the Order (if necessary) such

that the provision requiring Appellant to pay the Trust’s expenses from

Trust funds be modified to moot this issue.” Resp. Br. at 28. The fact remains

that the district court has not signed a supplemental order, and the order

currently requires Fran to pay the Trust’s bills even though she has no access

to Trust funds. If the Waco Court had not stayed the effect of the order

pending this appeal, the order would require Fran to pay Trust expenses

from her personal funds.

29 Respectfully submitted,

By: /s/ Rick Thompson Kirk L. Pittard State Bar No. 24010313 Rick Thompson State Bar No. 00788537 rthompson@dpslawgroup.com DURHAM, PITTARD & SPALDING, LLP P.O. Box 224626 Dallas, Texas 75222 (214) 946-8000 (214) 946-8433 (fax)

Craig D. Cherry State Bar No. 24012419 ccherry@cjsjlaw.com Ryan C. Johnson State Bar No. 24048574 rjohnson@cjsjlaw.com Scott H. James State Bar No. 24037848 sjames@cjsjlaw.com CHERRY JOHNSON SIEGMUND JAMES, PLLC 7901 Fish Pond Road, 2nd Floor Waco, Texas 76710 (254) 732-2242 (866) 627-3509 (fax)

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT

30 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

This document complies with the typeface requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(e) because it has been prepared in a conventional typeface no smaller than 14-point for text and 12-point for footnotes. This document also complies with the word-count limitations of Rule 9.4(i)(2)(D) because it contains 6,952 words, excluding any parts exempted by Rule 9.4(i)(1).

/s/ Rick Thompson Rick Thompson

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on October 3, 2025, a true and correct copy of the foregoing brief was served on the following counsel of record via electronic service, pursuant to the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Jim Dunnam Andy McSwain jimdunnam@dunnamlaw.com mcswain@thetexasfirm.com Andrea Mehta Mark E. Firmin andreamehta@dunnamlaw.com mfirmin@thetexasfirm.com Mason Vance Dunnam BEARD KULTGEN BROPHY BOSTWICK masondunnam@dunnamlaw.com & DICKSON PLLC DUNNAM & DUNNAM LLP 220 South 4th Street 4125 West Waco Drive Waco, Texas 76701 Waco, Texas 76710

Attorneys for Intervenors/Appellees Attorneys for Intervenor/Appellee Robert Spanos, Chrisopher Spanos, Vernon Leuschner and Nicole Spanos

/s/ Rick Thompson Rick Thompson

31 No. 15-25-00072-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTEENTH DISTRICT AT AUSTIN

FRANCES SPANOS SHELTON, Appellant, v. VERNON LEUSCHNER, ROBERT LEE SPANOS, CHRISTOPHER BLAKE SPANOS, KATHRYN NICOLE LAWRIE, AND KATHERINE LEUSCHNER, Appellees.

On Interlocutory Appeal from the 414th District Court of McLennan County, Texas, Cause No. 2024-3035-5

APPENDIX IN SUPPORT OF REPLY BRIEF

Tab A Application to Probate Will and for Appointment of a Temporary Administrator; Frances Spanos Shelton’s Response and Opposition to Applicant’s Application to Probate Wil and for Appointment of Temporary Administrator Tab B Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 64.001 (current & former versions)

32 TAB A Filed 9/26/2025 2:55 PM J.A. (Andy) Harwell County Clerk McLennan County, Texas By Cynthia Cunningham CAUSE NO. 20220135PR1 Deputy

IN THE ESTATE OF § IN THE COUNTY COURT

DOROTHY J. SPANOS, § AT LAW NO. 1

DECEASED § MCLENNAN COUNTY, TEXAS

FRANCES SPANOS SHELTON’S RESPONSE AND OPPOSITION TO APPLICANT’S APPLICATION TO PROBATE WILL AND FOR APPOINTMENT OF TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATOR

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

COMES NOW, Frances Spanos Shelton (“Shelton”) and files this Response and Opposition

to Applicant Vernon Leuschner’s (“Applicant”), as durable power of attorney for Katherine

Leuschner (“Mrs. Leuschner”), Application to Probate Will and for Appointment of a Temporary

Administrator (“Application”), and in furtherance thereof would respectfully show unto the Court

as follows:

I. SUMMARY OF RESPONSE

The undisputed facts and well-founded caselaw clearly demonstrate that Applicant’s

Application should be denied in its entirety, rejecting both his request to probate the will of

Dorothy Spanos (“Decedent’s Will”) and his request to appoint a temporary administrator. The

Application to Probate Will should be denied for multiple reasons:

1) The Court has lacked jurisdiction over Decedent’s estate since May 18, 2022, when it discharged the temporary administrator and concluded that no further administration was required;

2) Mrs. Leuschner indisputably waived her right to probate the Will on May 18, 2022, when she agreed that Shelton would offer Decedent’s Will for probate only if subsequent events made it necessary; and

RESPONSE AND OPPOSITION TO APPLICATION TO PROBATE WILL Page 1 of 16 AND FOR APPOINTMENT OF TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATOR In the Estate of Dorothy A. Spanos, Deceased 3) Applicant has failed to satisfy the stringent requirements for probating a will under Texas law.

Likewise, Applicant’s request to appoint a temporary administrator should be refused for

several reasons:

1) Applicant failed to follow requirements under Texas law in seeking a temporary administration;

2) A temporary administration is unnecessary for Decedent’s estate; and

3) Applicant’s requested powers for a temporary administration are impermissibly overbroad.

As a result, and consistent with the facts and law, Shelton asks the Court to wholly deny

Applicant’s Application.

II. BACKGROUND

Applicant filed his Application amid significant family conflict and omitted pertinent and

material details in a manner calculated to secure a favorable ruling. To summarize the procedural

history, Mrs. Leuschner, as an heir of Decedent, filed an application for Appointment of

Temporary Administrator and Trust Advisor on March 2, 2022, in the County Court at Law of

McLennan County, Texas, requesting the Court to appoint Retired Judge Robert Stem (“Judge

Stem”) as the Temporary Administrator of Decedent’s estate and Trust Advisor of Decedent’s

Living Trust (“Trust”). 1 See Exhibit A (Application for Appointment of a Temporary

Administrator and of a Trust Advisor). On March 8, 2022, this Court entered an order appointing

1 As mentioned, Applicant fails to inform the Court of the ongoing disputes at the trial and appellate court levels regarding whether this Court had jurisdiction over Decedent’s Living Trust, including whether this Court had jurisdiction to appoint Judge Stem as Trust Advisor. See Exhibit B (Shelton’s Mot. to Re-Affirm and/or Designate Trustee of the Dorothy Spanos Living Trust); Exhibit C (Brief of Appellant). Shelton incorporates the arguments from Exhibits B and C as if fully made herein and makes this Response subject to the relief sought related to Exhibits B and C. RESPONSE AND OPPOSITION TO APPLICATION TO PROBATE WILL Page 2 of 16 AND FOR APPOINTMENT OF TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATOR In the Estate of Dorothy A. Spanos, Deceased Judge Stem as Temporary Administrator and Trust Advisor until September 5, 2022. See Exhibit

D (Order Granting Temporary Administration). On May 19, 2022, this Court entered an Agreed

Order Approving the Discharge of Temporary Administrator and Termination of Temporary

Administration, finding that there was no longer a necessity of administration. See Exhibit E

(Agreed Order). Judge Stem, although no longer the Temporary Administrator, purportedly

remained a Trust Advisor under the Order Granting Temporary Administration, and this

appointment was purportedly extended by the court on September 1, 2022, just before its

expiration, and seemingly without proper jurisdiction to do so. Id.; see also Ex. D. 2 Nearly three

years later – on September 17, 2025 – Applicant filed his Application, requiring the instant

Response.

II. ARGUMENT & AUTHORITIES

Based on the law and evidence presented, Applicant’s Application is without merit and

lacks support to allow for the probate of Decedent’s Will by Applicant or the appointment of a

temporary administrator. Therefore, it must be denied, as detailed below.

A. The Application to Probate Will Should Be Denied.

As summarized above, the Application to Probate the Will should be denied due to a lack

of jurisdiction, the Applicant’s unquestionable waiver of the right to probate the Will, and the

Applicant’s noncompliance with the strict statutory requirements under Texas probate law.

i. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction.

A fundamental legal principle—that the Court lacks jurisdiction—requires the denial of

Shelton's Application. Applicant incorrectly argues that this Court has jurisdiction and Decedent’s

2 Notably, Shelton again refers this Court to the earlier-filed pleadings at the trial and appellate court levels regarding a lack of jurisdiction. See Exhibits B and C. RESPONSE AND OPPOSITION TO APPLICATION TO PROBATE WILL Page 3 of 16 AND FOR APPOINTMENT OF TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATOR In the Estate of Dorothy A. Spanos, Deceased estate remains open based on certain language in this Court’s May 18, 2022 Agreed Order, which

terminated Judge Stem’s temporary administration and granted Shelton the right to probate

Decedent’s Will, only if necessary. See Application at p. 2; see also Exhibit E. This claim is

mistaken for several reasons.

First, the Court’s jurisdiction ceased when Decedent’s estate was closed on May 18, 2022.

See Exhibit E. A court exercising probate jurisdiction under Texas Estates Code § 32.001 continues

to have jurisdiction until the temporary administrator is discharged and the administration is

closed. Davey v. Margarett Jordan Royalties, Inc., No. 12-13-00002-CV, 2014 WL 3939669, at

*4 (Tex. App.—Tyler Aug. 13, 2014, pet. denied) (citing Tex. Estates Code § 32.001(d)); see also

In re Blankenship, 392 S.W.3d 249, 257-58 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, pet. denied)(“An

estate is closed when the probate court signs an order discharging the administrator and closing

the estate, or when all of the estate’s property is distributed, the estate's debts are paid, and there

is no need for further administration.”); Dean v. Gill, 18 S.W.2d 784, 785 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

1929, no writ) (holding that an estate was closed out under the temporary administration when

there was no need for a permanent administration).

In this case, the Court not only entered an Agreed Order discharging Judge Stem as the

administrator, but also specifically included language that patently indicated the estate was closed:

“After diligently investigating the assets of the Estate and Dorothy Spanos Living Trust (“the Trust”) in cooperation with Frances Shelton, an heir of the Estate and Trustee of the Trust, and Mrs. Leuschner, the other heir of the Estate and a beneficiary of the Trust, the parties have been unable to discover debts owed by or to the Estate, or any assets remaining in the Estate beyond a few vehicles and watercraft, whose titles were not changed to the Trust prior to Decedent’s passing.”

Exhibit. E, at p. 1. The Court further found that, based on this investigation, it appeared that no

further administration or inventory was necessary, and it authorized the heirs “to transfer title to

RESPONSE AND OPPOSITION TO APPLICATION TO PROBATE WILL Page 4 of 16 AND FOR APPOINTMENT OF TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATOR In the Estate of Dorothy A. Spanos, Deceased any titled assets via an Affidavit of Heirship or other legal means.” Id. at pp. 1-2. Accordingly,

and based on the law, Decedent’s estate was closed when the Court discharged the temporary

administrator and terminated the temporary administration, found that all estate property had been

distributed except for limited titled property that could be easily “dealt with,” concluded that there

were no identifiable debts, and acknowledged that there was no further need for an administration.

Id.

Additionally, Applicant’s reliance on this Court’s order extending the purported

appointment of Judge Stem as Trust Advisor is erroneous. See Application, p. 2. As already argued

at length before the district court and appellate court, this Court’s September 1, 2022 Order

Extending Judge Stem’s appointment as Trust Advisor is void because this Court lacked

jurisdiction to appoint and/or extend Judge Stem’s appointment as Trust Advisor. See Exhibits C,

D and E. Any consideration of that void order is inappropriate because a void order has no force

or effect, confers no rights, and is a mere nullity. See Velasco v. Ayala, 312 S.W.3d 783 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009); In re Garza, 126 S.W.3d 268 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003).

In sum, the essential requirement of jurisdiction is absent in this case, requiring denial of the

Application.

ii. Katherine Leuschner Waived her Right to Probate the Decedent’s Will.

Should the Court hold contrary to the overwhelming law and facts that Decedent’s estate

is open and it has retained jurisdiction over it, Applicant is still prohibited from offering Decedent’s

Will for probate on Mrs. Leuschner’s behalf because she explicitly waived her right to probate the

Will. “Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a right actually known, or intentional conduct

inconsistent with claiming that right.” Ulico Cas. Co. v. Allied Pilots Ass’n, 262 S.W.3d 773, 778

(Tex. 2008). The elements of waiver include (1) an existing right, benefit, or advantage held by a

RESPONSE AND OPPOSITION TO APPLICATION TO PROBATE WILL Page 5 of 16 AND FOR APPOINTMENT OF TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATOR In the Estate of Dorothy A. Spanos, Deceased party; (2) the party’s actual knowledge of its existence; and (3) the party’s actual intent to

relinquish the right, or intentional conduct inconsistent with the right. Id. Although waiver is

generally a question of fact, it becomes a question of law “when the surrounding facts and

circumstances are undisputed.” In re General Elec. Capital Corp., 203 S.W.3d 314, 316 (Tex.

2006) (quoting Jernigan v. Langley, 111 S.W.3d 153, 156–57 (Tex. 2003)). “In determining if a

waiver has in fact occurred, the court must examine the acts, words or conduct of the parties, and

it must be ‘unequivocably manifested’ that it is the intent of the party to no longer assert the

right.” Enterprise–Laredo Associates v. Hachar's, Inc., 839 S.W.2d 822, 836 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio 1992), writ denied, 843 S.W.2d 476 (Tex. 1992). Here, the conditions for waiver have all

been met.

The first requirement of waiver is met because Mrs. Leuschner had a right to offer

Decedent’s Will to probate as an interested person. See Tex. Estates Code §22.018(1)(stating that

an interested person is an heir); see also Tex. Estates Code § 256.051(a)(stating that an interested

person may file an application with the court for an order admitting the will to be probate). Shelton

does not deny that Mrs. Leuschner initially had the right to probate the Will, but she was deprived

of such right due to her own actions, as further discussed below.

Mrs. Leuschner’s knowledge of her right to offer the Will for probate on March 9, 2022,

satisfies the second requirement for waiver. In her Application for Temporary Administration and

Appointment of a Trust Advisor, she stated that, “[a] will is not produced for probate because an

original copy of the purported will (“the Will”) is not under [her] control or in [her] possession.”

Exhibit A at p. 2. Clearly, Mrs. Leuschner knew she had a right to offer Decedent’s Will for probate

when she originally applied for a temporary administration and before she waived that right.

RESPONSE AND OPPOSITION TO APPLICATION TO PROBATE WILL Page 6 of 16 AND FOR APPOINTMENT OF TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATOR In the Estate of Dorothy A. Spanos, Deceased Mrs. Leuschner’s intent to relinquish her right to probate the Will meets the third and final

element of waiver. The May 18, 2022 Agreed Order, which was not only executed by this Court,

but was also agreed to as to form and substance by Mrs. Leuschner’s attorney on her behalf,

provides that “Shelton and Leuschner have agreed that in the event assets or debts of the Estate

requiring administration are discovered Shelton . . . will either offer the Will for probate, probate

the will as a muniment of title, or record a small estate affidavit, whichever is most feasible or

cost-effective.” Exhibit. E, at p. 1–2 (emphasis added). The Agreed Order’s unambiguous language

expresses Mrs. Leuschner’s intent to waive her right to probate the Will, or, at a minimum,

constitutes her intention to act inconsistently with that right.

Based on the above, Mrs. Leuschner unequivocally waived her right to probate Decedent’s

Will. Aside from Mrs. Leuschner’s waiver, the Agreed Order clearly and specifically gave Shelton

the sole right to probate the Will. Exhibit E, at p. 1-2. The Court certainly could have named Mrs.

Leuschner and given her the right to probate the Will as well, but it simply did not. Because the

elements of waiver have been satisfied, and because the Agreed Order was clear in its intent, the

Applicant is barred from probating Decedent’s Will, and the Application must be denied. 3

iii. Applicant Failed to Meet the Strict Requirements to Probate a Will Under Texas Law.

Crucially, the Applicant failed to satisfy several prerequisites for the probate of a will in

Texas. A copy of the Will was not filed within the four-year statute of limitations, and Applicant

failed to comply with the requirements for probating a Will that has not been produced. Notably,

a Texas trial court may be found to have lacked jurisdiction to admit a will to probate if the

3 Although Shelton believes Kathy Leuschner’s waiver is clear, to the extent the Court believes there is a fact issue regarding waiver, this Court should permit Shelton that opportunity to take the oral deposition of Kathy Leuschner before making any ruling on any part of the Application. RESPONSE AND OPPOSITION TO APPLICATION TO PROBATE WILL Page 7 of 16 AND FOR APPOINTMENT OF TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATOR In the Estate of Dorothy A. Spanos, Deceased applicant’s filing did not include all information mandated by the Texas Estates Code. See e.g.,

Marrs v. Marquis, 927 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1996, no writ)(where applicant to probate

will failed to meet statutory requirements in several respects and did not include required

information, appellate court held that the trial court inappropriately admitted

will to probate because an incomplete application did not establish the requisite jurisdiction to

probate the will).

First and foremost, the Applicant did not file the Will before the statute of limitations

expired. The Estates Code is clear that “a will may not be admitted to probate after the fourth

anniversary of the testator’s death unless it is shown by proof that the applicant for the probate of

the will was not in default in failing to present the will for probate on or before the fourth

anniversary of the testator’s death,” and that “[a]n applicant for the probate of a will shall file the

will with the application if the will is in the applicant’s control.” Tex. Estates Code § 256.003(a);

Tex. Estates Code § 256.053(a).

Here, the Applicant has control of the Will, or a copy thereof, having produced a copy of

it in a separate lawsuit concerning the Dorothy Spanos Living Trust. See Ex. G (05.22.25

Documents Produced by Applicant, LEUSCNER 01626-01634). Applicant made a glaring and

legally detrimental mistake by failing to file the Will with the Application, despite it plainly being

in Applicant’s control. Now, the four-year limitations period has passed, and the Court cannot

exercise jurisdiction over Decedent’s Will because it has not been filed with the Court. See Watson

v. Dingler, 831 S.W.2d 834, 839 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied)(where

statutory requirements not met for probate of will, including failure to file will with application to

probate will); see also In re Estate of Hartwell, No. 06-23-00054-CV, 2024 WL 105590 (Tex.

App.—Texarkana 2024, no pet.)(where grandson who had copy of will from time it was executed

RESPONSE AND OPPOSITION TO APPLICATION TO PROBATE WILL Page 8 of 16 AND FOR APPOINTMENT OF TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATOR In the Estate of Dorothy A. Spanos, Deceased but did not file application for probate until ten years after testator’s death could not rely on

testator’s comment that grandson’s father would know what to do with will and father’s assurances

that he was handling will).

Furthermore, despite filing an Application without a copy of the Will, Applicant did not

comply with Texas Estates Code § 256.054’s additional requirements for probating a will which

has not been produced. Predictably, Applicant failed to provide a reason for the Will’s non-

production. See Application; see also Tex. Estates Code § 256.054(1)(stating that “if an applicant

for the probate of a will cannot produce the will in court, the application must state: (1) the reason

the will cannot be produced…”). Applicant, of course, possesses a copy of the Will and therefore

could not adequately explain the inability to produce the Will. Applicant also failed to state the

name and address of “each person who would inherit as an heir of the testator in the absence of a

valid will,” as required by the law. See Tex. Estates Code § 256.054(3)(B); see also Application.

Accordingly, the Application is deficient and the Court cannot probate Decedent’s Will.

B. The Request to Appoint a Temporary Administrator Should be Denied.

Applicant’s request to appoint a temporary administrator should also be refused because

Applicant has failed to follow all mandatory requirements under Texas law in seeking a temporary

administration, a temporary administration is not necessary for Decedent’s estate, and Applicant’s

requested powers for a temporary administration are impermissibly overbroad.

i. Applicant Failed to Meet Precise Requirements for Appointment of Temporary Administrator Under Texas Law

Even if the Court improperly exercises jurisdiction over the Decedent’s estate and admits

her Will to probate, it should deny Applicant’s request for a temporary administrator because, like

the Application to Probate the Will, the request for a temporary administrator is facially deficient

RESPONSE AND OPPOSITION TO APPLICATION TO PROBATE WILL Page 9 of 16 AND FOR APPOINTMENT OF TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATOR In the Estate of Dorothy A. Spanos, Deceased and does not satisfy the specific requirements for such an appointment under Texas law. Neither

the Application nor Applicant’s verification contains the information required under Texas Estates

Code § 452.002.

Texas Estates Code § 452.002 requires an applicant seeking the appointment of a

temporary administrator to include the information specified by §§ 256.052-.054. As discussed in

detail above, Applicant has failed to provide such information, jeopardizing the jurisdiction of this

Court. Specifically, Applicant failed to file a copy of the Will with the Application pursuant to

Tex. Estates Code § 256.053(a), or to comply with Texas Estates Code § 256.054’s additional

requirements for probating a will that has not been produced. Applicant’s request to appoint a

temporary administrator is, therefore, insufficient and must be denied for that reason alone.

Texas Estates Code § 452.002 also requires the person seeking a temporary administration

to submit an affidavit including: (1) the name, address, and interest of the applicant; (2) the facts

showing an immediate necessity for the appointment of a temporary administrator; (3) listing the

requested powers and duties of the temporary administrator; (4) stating that the applicant is entitled

to letters of temporary administration and is not disqualified by law from serving as temporary

administrator; and (5) describes the property that the applicant believes to be in the decedent’s

estate. See Tex. Estates Code § 452.002(b)(3). Applicant in this case did not do so, thereby

committing a significant procedural error. Although the Application is verified, it does not include

the additional and compulsory affidavit and is facially deficient. Because of the plain language of

§ 452.002, the Applicant cannot credibly argue that his verification of the Application is an

affidavit. Section 452.002(b) provides that an application must be verified (452.002(b)(1)) and

include an affidavit (452.002(b)(3)). Because these requirements are listed separately, an affidavit

distinct from the verification is clearly required.

RESPONSE AND OPPOSITION TO APPLICATION TO PROBATE WILL Page 10 of 16 AND FOR APPOINTMENT OF TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATOR In the Estate of Dorothy A. Spanos, Deceased Even if the Court construes the verification attached to the Application to constitute an

affidavit under the statute, Applicant is still not in compliance with the law because the verification

and Application do not list the Applicant’s address – one of the essential pieces of information that

is statutorily required to be included in the affidavit. See Tex. Estates Code § 452.002(b)(3)(A).

Applicant’s omission of the statutorily required affidavit containing the required information is a

fatal defect, and the Court must deny the request to appoint a temporary administrator.

ii. Applicant Failed to Establish Necessity of Temporary Administration

Applicant has also failed to establish a critical component of a request for a temporary

administration – that a temporary administration is necessary. A temporary administration may be

appropriate when a permanent administrator or executor is not representing the estate and there is

(1) an immediate need for estate administration or (2) there is a pending contest to the probate of

a will. King v. King, 230 S.W.2d 335, 339 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1950, writ ref’d). A judge must

determine that a temporary administration is in the interest of the estate. Tex. Estates Code §

452.001. “The purpose for empowering temporary administrators was to provide a mechanism by

which the assets of an intestate decedent’s estate could be preserved until delivered into the control

of a permanent administrator.” Nelson v. Neal, 787 S.W.2d 343, 346 (Tex. 1990) (citing Ex parte

Lindley, 354 S.W.2d 364, 366 (Tex. 1962)). It was not intended to be a substitute for an executor

or permanent administrator.

Here, Applicant has not established there is an immediate need for estate administration.

Applicant asserts that, “a necessity exists for the administration of the Decedent’s estate because

estate assets are in danger of being lost or wasted due to limitations running on September 18,

2025.” See Application at p. 5. It is not only doubtful but also unclear how limitations running

RESPONSE AND OPPOSITION TO APPLICATION TO PROBATE WILL Page 11 of 16 AND FOR APPOINTMENT OF TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATOR In the Estate of Dorothy A. Spanos, Deceased places the only identified potential probate asset “in danger of being lost or wasted.” The mere

possibility of an unsubstantiated occurrence should not sway this Court to grant the Application.

Applicant further argues that, “Appointing a Temporary Administrator is in the best interest

of Decedent's estate because it will ensure that an impartial third party is in place to verify and

determine the assets of the Estate and timely transfer them to the Trust (ii) (sic) that assets are not

wasted or used in an impermissible manner, and (ii) that the wishes of the Decedent are honored

and her Will probated to effectuate those wishes.” Id. Applicant’s only argument against actually

following the Decedent’s wishes of naming Shelton as the executor is that Judge Stem, a man who

admitted under oath that he has been untruthful with beneficiaries of the Decedent’s Living Trust,

purportedly removed Shelton as Trustee of the Trust for her alleged inability to be impartial. 4

Conveniently, Applicant failed to mention that Judge Stem explicitly represented to Shelton that,

“[t]here wasn’t a cause here to remove you for cause,” that Applicant and others had been

“throwing laser beams” at Shelton, and that Shelton was “put in a horrible situation through no

fault of [her] own.” Exhibit F (Audio Recording, at 51:38–44, 54:45–48, 54:57–55:01 (Dec. 5,

2023)). Applicant’s only support for the accusation that Shelton is biased or otherwise unfit to act

as executor is based entirely on Judge Stem’s unreliable and conflicting statements.

Additionally, if Applicant is correct that the only remaining asset in Decedent’s estate is

worth approximately $40,000, the cost of re-investigating the probate assets would likely deplete

them, rendering the effort pointless. See Application at pp. 2-3. Such proposed action is contrary

to the best interests of the Estate. Applicant has pointed to no other circumstances that could

overcome the fact that paying another temporary administrator to completely redo the investigation

4 Shelton reiterates her arguments before the 414th District Court of McLennan County, Texas, and the 10th Court of Appeals, and incorporates them as if fully made herein. Exhibits B and C. RESPONSE AND OPPOSITION TO APPLICATION TO PROBATE WILL Page 12 of 16 AND FOR APPOINTMENT OF TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATOR In the Estate of Dorothy A. Spanos, Deceased that Judge Stem has already been paid to do would be detrimental to the Estate. For example,

Applicant has not pointed to a need to defend a claim against the estate or to continue operating

Decedent’s business. Nelson, 787 S.W.2d at 343–44 (where Court held temporary administrator

necessary because of need to defend wrongful death actions against estate); Bandy v. First State

Bank, 835 S.W.2d 609, 611–12 (Tex. 1992)(where Court held temporary administrator needed to

accomplish business purposes of estate such as taking charge of the business and its operations).

Accordingly, the Court should deny Applicant’s request for a temporary administrator.

iii. The Temporary Administrator’s Proposed Powers are Overbroad and the Court Lacks Jurisdiction over Some of the Requested Powers

The applicant's proposed scope of powers for the temporary administrator is impermissibly

overbroad. See Application at p. 5-6. When a court appoints a temporary administrator, the

temporary administrator’s powers must be “limited as the circumstances of the case require.”

Tex. Estates Code § 452.001. “[T]he temporary administrator is a creature of the statutes with only

such limited powers as the court deems necessary. His powers are shaped by the probate court to

fit the needs of each particular case. He has no vested interest or right in the position. His principal

object is to preserve the estate until it can pass into the hands of a person fully authorized to

administer it for the benefit of creditors, heirs, devisees and legatees.” Ex parte Lindley, 354

S.W.2d at 366 (citing Dull v. Drake, 4 S.W. 364 (Tex. 1887); Fenimore v. Youngs, 26 S.W.2d 195

(Tex. 1930)).

Here, Applicant requests that the temporary administrator be granted the power to “consent

to and obtain business and financial records, including business records of Spanos Management,

LLC, records from financial institutions, records from attorneys for the Decedent and medical

records of the Decedent.” See Application at p. 6. This request is excessive and does not fit the

needs of this particular case, as the law commands. Specifically, Applicant has identified one RESPONSE AND OPPOSITION TO APPLICATION TO PROBATE WILL Page 13 of 16 AND FOR APPOINTMENT OF TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATOR In the Estate of Dorothy A. Spanos, Deceased possible probate asset – a membership interest in an LLC and potentially a bank account of the

LLC – yet the Applicant requests that a temporary administrator have the power to obtain

Decedent’s medical records. See Application at pp. 2-3, 6. Decedent’s medical records are

irrelevant to the determination of whether her interest in Spanos Management, LLC, and its

associated bank account constitute probate assets.

Applicant also requests that the temporary administrator have the power to “consent to and

obtain records of the Nick L. Spanos Family Trust 1994 to determine the relationship between the

two trusts and other assets.” See Application at p. 6. Bewilderingly, by this request, Applicant

attempts to walk this Court into further error by inappropriately exercising jurisdiction over the

Nick L. Spanos Family Trust 1994 and the Dorothy Spanos Living Trust. The Court does not have

jurisdiction over either of the trusts, a fact clearly established in Shelton’s Motion to Re-Affirm

and/or Designate Trustee of the Dorothy Spanos Living Trust, and there is no means for the Court

to obtain it. See Exhibits B and C. Additionally, because the Decedent’s Will is a pour-over will

that directs all probate assets into the Dorothy Spanos Living Trust, the Nick L. Spanos Family

Trust 1994 has no plausible connection to the Will, and there is no reason for a temporary

administrator to have the power to seek information pertaining to it.

Applicant has requested impermissibly overbroad powers for a temporary administrator,

and they are not supported by the circumstances of the case, as the law requires. Accordingly, in

the unlikely event the Court exceeds its authority and jurisdiction and appoints a temporary

administrator, it should deny Applicant’s request to grant the temporary administrator the above-

discussed powers, and instead, should carefully tailor any powers to the facts and nature of this

proceeding.

RESPONSE AND OPPOSITION TO APPLICATION TO PROBATE WILL Page 14 of 16 AND FOR APPOINTMENT OF TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATOR In the Estate of Dorothy A. Spanos, Deceased III. CONCLUSION

Applicant’s Application to Probate Will and for Appointment of a Temporary

Administrator should be denied for a host of reasons. The Application to Probate Will should be

denied because: 1) Most importantly, the Court has lacked jurisdiction over this cause since the

estate was closed when the temporary administrator was discharged on May 18, 2022, and the

Court held there was no need for further administration; 2) Mrs. Leuschner’s waiver of her right

to offer Decedent’s Will for probate and her agreement that Shelton solely has such right prohibits

Applicant from probating the Will; and 3) Applicant failed to comply with the strict statutory

requirements for offering a will for probate.

Similarly, Applicant’s request to appoint a temporary administrator should be refused

because: 1) Applicant failed to follow the precise requirements under Texas law in seeking a

temporary administration; 2) A temporary administration is not necessary for Decedent’s estate;

and 3) Applicant’s requested powers for a temporary administration are impermissibly overbroad.

Hence, Shelton asks the Court to entirely deny Applicant’s Application.

IV. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Shelton asks the court to deny Applicant

Vernon Leuschner’s, as the durable power of attorney for Katherine Leuschner, Application to

Probate Will and for Appointment of a Temporary Administrator, and to grant Shelton any and all

other relief, in law and in equity, to which she may be justly entitled.

RESPONSE AND OPPOSITION TO APPLICATION TO PROBATE WILL Page 15 of 16 AND FOR APPOINTMENT OF TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATOR In the Estate of Dorothy A. Spanos, Deceased Respectfully submitted,

CHERRY JOHNSON SIEGMUND JAMES, PC 7901 Fish Pond Road, 2nd Floor Waco, Texas 76710 Telephone: (254) 732-2242 Facsimile: (866) 627-3509

BY: /s/ Craig D. Cherry CRAIG D. CHERRY State Bar No. 24012419 Email: ccherry@cjsjlaw.com RYAN C. JOHNSON State Bar No. 24048574 Email: rjohnson@cjsjlaw.com SCOTT H. JAMES State Bar No. 24037848 Email: sjames@cjsjlaw.com M. KATIE QUILLEN State Bar No. 24133047 Email: kquillen@cjsjlaw.com

ATTORNEYS FOR FRANCES SHELTON

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing instrument was served upon the

parties, or the attorney(s) of record for all parties to the above cause in accordance with the Texas

Rules of Civil Procedure on this 26th day of September, 2025.

/s/ Craig D. Cherry CRAIG D. CHERRY

RESPONSE AND OPPOSITION TO APPLICATION TO PROBATE WILL Page 16 of 16 AND FOR APPOINTMENT OF TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATOR In the Estate of Dorothy A. Spanos, Deceased TAB B § 64.001. Availability of Remedy, V.T.C.A., Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 64.001

Texas Statutes Annotated - 2024

Vernon’s Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated Civil Practice and Remedies Code (Refs & Annos) Title 3. Extraordinary Remedies Chapter 64. Receivership Subchapter A. General Provisions

V.T.C.A., Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 64.001

§ 64.001. Availability of Remedy

Currentness

(a) A court of competent jurisdiction may appoint a receiver:

(1) in an action by a vendor to vacate a fraudulent purchase of property;

(2) in an action by a creditor to subject any property or fund to his claim;

(3) in an action between partners or others jointly owning or interested in any property or fund;

(4) in an action by a mortgagee for the foreclosure of the mortgage and sale of the mortgaged property;

(5) for a corporation that is insolvent, is in imminent danger of insolvency, has been dissolved, or has forfeited its corporate rights; or

(6) in any other case in which a receiver may be appointed under the rules of equity.

(b) Under Subsection (a)(1), (2), or (3), the receiver may be appointed on the application of the plaintiff in the action or another party. The party must have a probable interest in or right to the property or fund, and the property or fund must be in danger of being lost, removed, or materially injured.

© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1 § 64.001. Availability of Remedy, V.T.C.A., Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 64.001

(c) Under Subsection (a)(4), the court may appoint a receiver only if:

(1) it appears that the mortgaged property is in danger of being lost, removed, or materially injured; or

(2) the condition of the mortgage has not been performed and the property is probably insufficient to discharge the mortgage debt.

(d) A court having family law jurisdiction or a probate court located in the county in which a missing person, as defined by Article 63.001, Code of Criminal Procedure, resides or, if the missing person is not a resident of this state, located in the county in which the majority of the property of a missing person’s estate is located may, on the court’s own motion or on the application of an interested party, appoint a receiver for the missing person if:

(1) it appears that the estate of the missing person is in danger of injury, loss, or waste; and

(2) the estate of the missing person is in need of a representative.

Credits

Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 959, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1985. Amended by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 1376, § 4, eff. Sept. 1, 1997; Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 1081, §§ 1, 3, eff. Sept. 1, 1999.

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES

2008 Main Volume

Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 1376, in subsec. (a), added new subd. (6), redesignated former subd. (6) as subd. (7), and made other nonsubstantive changes.

Section 6 of Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 1376 provides:

“This Act takes effect September 1, 1997, and applies only to a proceeding for receivership of the estate of a missing person that is instituted on or after that date. A proceeding for receivership of the estate of a missing person that is instituted before the effective date of this Act is governed by the law in effect on the date on which the proceeding was instituted, and the former law is continued in effect for that purpose.”

Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 1081 added subsec. (d); in subsec. (a)(5), inserted “or”; deleted former subsec. (a)(6); redesignated former subsec. (a)(7) as subsec. (a)(6). Prior to amendment, subsec. (a)(6) read:

© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2 § 64.001. Availability of Remedy, TX CIV PRAC & REM § 64.001

Vernon’s Texas Statutes and Codes Annotated Civil Practice and Remedies Code (Refs & Annos) Title 3. Extraordinary Remedies Chapter 64. Receivership (Refs & Annos) Subchapter A. General Provisions

V.T.C.A., Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 64.001

§ 64.001. Availability of Remedy

Currentness

(a) A court of competent jurisdiction may appoint a receiver:

(1) in an action by a vendor to vacate a fraudulent purchase of property;

(2) in an action by a creditor to subject any property or fund to the creditor’s claim;

(3) in an action between partners or others jointly owning or interested in any property or fund;

(4) in an action by a mortgagee for the foreclosure of the mortgage and sale of the mortgaged property;

(5) for a corporation that is insolvent, is in imminent danger of insolvency, has been dissolved, or has forfeited its corporate rights;

(6) for a single-source continuum contractor as provided by Subchapter B-2, Chapter 264, Family Code; or

(6) in an action by the attorney general under Subchapter H, Chapter 5, Property Code; or

© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1 § 64.001. Availability of Remedy, TX CIV PRAC & REM § 64.001

(7) in any other case in which a receiver may be appointed under the rules of equity.

(b) Under Subsection (a)(1), (2), or (3), the receiver may be appointed on the application of the plaintiff in the action or another party. The party must have a probable interest in or right to the property or fund, and the property or fund must be in danger of being lost, removed, or materially injured.

(c) Under Subsection (a)(4), the court may appoint a receiver only if:

(1) it appears that the mortgaged property is in danger of being lost, removed, or materially injured; or

(2) the condition of the mortgage has not been performed and the property is probably insufficient to discharge the mortgage debt.

(d) A court having family law jurisdiction or a probate court located in the county in which a missing person, as defined by Article 63.001, Code of Criminal Procedure, resides or, if the missing person is not a resident of this state, located in the county in which the majority of the property of a missing person’s estate is located may, on the court’s own motion or on the application of an interested party, appoint a receiver for the missing person if:

(1) it appears that the estate of the missing person is in danger of injury, loss, or waste; and

(2) the estate of the missing person is in need of a representative.

Credits

Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 959, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 1985. Amended by Acts 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 1376, § 4, eff. Sept. 1, 1997; Acts 1999, 76th Leg., ch. 1081, §§ 1, 3, eff. Sept. 1, 1999; Acts 2025, 89th Leg., ch. 73 (S.B. 2034), § 1, eff. May 19, 2025; Acts 2025, 89th Leg., ch. 956 (S.B. 17), § 2, eff. Sept. 1, 2025.

Notes of Decisions (587)

O’CONNOR’S CROSS REFERENCES See also Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code §§11.401-11.414; O’Connor’s Fam. Law Handbook, “Temporary Orders,” ch. 5-D, §1 et seq.

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