Fraley v. Encompass Indemnity Company

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Washington
DecidedMay 9, 2025
Docket2:24-cv-00278
StatusUnknown

This text of Fraley v. Encompass Indemnity Company (Fraley v. Encompass Indemnity Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fraley v. Encompass Indemnity Company, (E.D. Wash. 2025).

Opinion

1 FILED IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 2 May 09, 2025 3 SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6

7 KATHLEEN FRALEY, NO. 2:24-CV-0278-TOR 8 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL 9 v. SUMMARY JUDGMENT, MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME, AND 10 ENCOMPASS INDEMNITY MOTION TO EXPEDITE COMPANY, a Illinois corporation, 11 Defendant. 12

13 BEFORE THE COURT are Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary 14 Judgment (ECF No. 16), Defendant’s Motion for Extension of Time (ECF No. 21), 15 and Defendant’s Motion to Expedite (ECF No. 20). This matter was submitted for 16 consideration without oral argument. The Court has reviewed the record and files 17 herein and is fully informed. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s Motion 18 for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 16) is GRANTED, Defendant’s Motion 19 for Extension of Time (ECF No. 21) is GRANTED, and Defendant’s Motion to 20 Expedite (ECF No. 20) is GRANTED. 1 2 BACKGROUND

3 This case arises out of the destruction of Plaintiff’s home after it was burned 4 down on August 18, 2023, by a wildfire, the Gray Fire, started near Medical Lake, 5 WA. ECF No. 1 at ¶ 10. Plaintiff’s home was insured by Defendant Encompass

6 Indemnity Company (“Encompass”). Id. at ¶ 8. Plaintiff reported the loss to 7 Encompass on August 19, 2023. Id. at ¶ 11. The parties do not dispute that the 8 wildfire was a covered peril under Plaintiff’s policy with Encompass, and she is 9 entitled to coverage for the loss of her home. Id. at ¶12. Plaintiff now brings

10 claims against Encompass alleging breach of contract, violation of the Washington 11 Consumer Protection Act, RCW § 19.86, bad faith, violation of the Insurance Fair 12 Conduct Act, RCW § 48.30, and negligent claim handling. Id.

13 DISCUSSION 14 As an initial matter, Defendant filed an untimely response to Plaintiff’s 15 motion and now moves for an expedited, after the fact, extension of time to file its 16 response. ECF Nos. 20, 21. Plaintiff agreed to stipulate to the motion so that the

17 issue may be decided on the merits. ECF No. 21 at 4. Therefore, the Court grants 18 Defendant’s motion for extension of time to file a response and the associated 19 motion to expedite.

20 1 Plaintiff moves for summary judgment only as to the application of the 2 Estimated Residence Value Adjustment (“ERVA”) coverage provision within her

3 policy with Encompass. The parties disagree on how the provision is to be 4 interpreted and applied. 5 1. Summary Judgment Standard

6 The Court may grant summary judgment in favor of a moving party who 7 demonstrates “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the 8 movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In ruling 9 on a motion for summary judgment, the court must only consider admissible

10 evidence. Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002). 11 The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of showing the 12 absence of any genuine issues of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

13 317, 323 (1986). The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to identify 14 specific facts showing there is a genuine issue of material fact. See Anderson v. 15 Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). “The mere existence of a scintilla 16 of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be

17 evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id. at 252. 18 For purposes of summary judgment, a fact is “material” if it might affect the 19 outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id. at 248.

20 // 1 2. Analysis 2 Although Defendant challenges the relevance of certain facts submitted by

3 Plaintiff, the parties agree on the facts essential to the disposition of the current 4 motion before the Court. The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff’s policy with 5 Encompass for her home included ERVA coverage. The issue presented boils

6 down to a pure question of policy interpretation which is a question of law 7 appropriate for summary judgment. McDonald v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 119 8 Wash. 2d 724, 730 (1992). 9 Under Washington law, the terms of a policy must be construed by a court as

10 a whole and should be given a “fair, reasonable, and sensible construction as would 11 be given to the contract by the average person purchasing insurance.” Sears v. 12 Grange Ins. Ass’n, 111 Wash. 2d 636, 638 (1988). “If the language on its face is

13 fairly susceptible to two different but reasonable interpretations, the contract is 14 ambiguous, and the court must attempt to discern and enforce the contract as the 15 parties intended.” Feenix Parkside LLC v. Berkley N. Pac., 8 Wash. App. 2d 381, 16 386 (2019). However, Washington law requires ambiguities be construed in the

17 insured’s favor. Id. 18 The ERVA coverage provisions at issue here are located in H41-C, 19 Amendment of Elite Home Provisions, under section two of Limit of Liability.

20 ECF No. 11-13. Section two states that if at the time of a covered loss the insured 1 a. Maintained coverage on the dwelling at 100% of its replacement cost as determined by our estimate completed and based on the 2 accuracy of information you furnished, or confirmed for, us; 3 b. Accepted the General Provisions-Home, 18. Estimated Residence Value Adjustment provision, agree to accept each 4 annual adjustment in the estimated residence value shown on the Coverage Summary, and pay any additional premium charged; 5 and c. Notified us within 90 days of the start of any alterations to the 6 covered real property which increases the replacement cost of the dwelling by 5% or more; 7 then, if at the time of a covered loss the estimated residence value 8 indicated on the Coverage Summary is less than the current replacement cost for the covered dwelling, we will: 9 a. Increase the estimated residence value indicated on the Coverage 10 Summary available for the covered dwelling loss to equal the then current replacement cost of the dwelling; 11 b. Increase the Property Location Limit to reflect the same 12 percentage of the new estimated residence value as calculated under provision a. above. 13 Under no circumstance will the new adjusted Property Location Limit reflect a higher percentage of the new estimated residence 14 value than the percentage shown on the Coverage Summary as the location limit percentage; and 15 c. Adjust the Segment premium from the time of loss for the 16 remainder of this policy period based on the increased limit of liability. 17 Current replacement cost does not include any additional costs 18 necessary to comply with any ordinance or law that regulates the construction, repair or demolition of the real property. 19

20 1 The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff met the three prerequisites; the 2 dispute is only on the narrow issue of when the adjustment in the estimated

3 residence value occurs. Plaintiff contends that any adjustment in the estimated 4 residence value occurred at the time of the loss, i.e., on August 18, 2023, when her 5 house burned down, thus obligating Defendant to adjust and payout the higher

6 estimated residence value. ECF No. 16 at 15. Defendant argues the adjustment 7 does not apply until after the house is rebuilt. ECF No. 18 at 6.

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Related

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Robin Orr v. Bank of America, Nt & Sa
285 F.3d 764 (Ninth Circuit, 2002)
State v. Rood
573 P.2d 1325 (Court of Appeals of Washington, 1977)
Sears v. Grange Insurance Ass'n
762 P.2d 1141 (Washington Supreme Court, 1988)
Montana Headlight Oil Co. v. State
112 P.2d 541 (Washington Supreme Court, 1941)

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Fraley v. Encompass Indemnity Company, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fraley-v-encompass-indemnity-company-waed-2025.