1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA
4 MATTHEW FOY,
5 Plaintiff, Case No. 3:23-cv-00039-SLG-KFR 6 v.
7 STATE OF ALASKA, DEPARTMENT OF CORRCETIONS et al., 8 Defendants. 9 10 SCREENING ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 11 Plaintiff’s Complaint alleging violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fails to meet 12 the pleading requirements for § 1983 claims. Accordingly, the Court orders that 13 Plaintiff’s Complaint be DISMISSED. However, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to 14 amend his complaint consistent with the instructions contained in this Order. 15 I. Procedural History 16 On February 23, 2023, Matthew Foy, a self-represented prisoner1 (hereinafter 17 “Plaintiff”), filed a Civil Cover Sheet and a Prisoner’s Complaint against the State of 18 Alaska, Department of Corrections, and two John Doe Corrections Officers alleging 19 violations of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (hereinafter “Complaint”).2 20 Defendants filed a Notice of Appearance and a Motion requesting a Screening Order.3 21 The Court now screens Plaintiff’s Complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 22 1915(e) and 1915A. 23 // 24 // 25
26 1 The Court notes that Plaintiff states on page one of his Complaint that he is filing “by and through undersigned counsel;” however, there is no other indication that Plaintiff has any 27 counsel of record. Therefore, the Court treats Plaintiff as pro se. 2 Docs. 1-2. 28 3 Docs. 3-5. 1 SCREENING REQUIREMENT
2 Federal law requires a court to conduct an initial screening of a civil complaint
3 filed by a self-represented prisoner. In this screening, a court shall dismiss the case
4 at any time if the court determines that the action:
5 (i) is frivolous or maliciou s; 6 (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or 7 (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from 8 such relief.4 9 To determine whether a complaint states a valid claim for relief, courts 10 consider whether the complaint contains sufficient factual matter that, if accepted 11 as true, “state[s] a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”5 In conducting its 12 review, a court must liberally construe a self-represented plaintiff’s pleading and 13 give the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt.6 14 Before a court may dismiss any portion of a complaint for failure to state a 15 claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must provide the plaintiff with a 16 statement of the deficiencies in the complaint and an opportunity to amend or 17 otherwise address the problems, unless to do so would be futile.7 Futility exists 18 when “the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not 19 possibly cure the deficiency[.]”8 20 // 21 // 22 4 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 23 5 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In making this determination, a court may consider “materials that are 24 submitted with and attached to the Complaint.” United States v. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 999 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Lee v. L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001)). 25 6 See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 26 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc)). 7 See Gordon v. City of Oakland, 627 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Albrecht v. Lund, 27 845 F.2d 193, 195 (9th Cir. 1988)). 8 See Schreiber Distributing Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 28 1986). 1 DISCUSSION
2 II. Complaint
3 Plaintiff’s Complaint provides an overly extensive narrative that is difficult to
4 parse. More importantly, it does not meet the pleading requirements for § 1983
5 claims. Therefore, the Court dismisses P laintiff’s Complaint with leave to amend. 6 The Court provides additional instruction as to claims Plaintiff may be attempting to 7 raise based on the Court’s reading of his Complaint and other filings. 8 Plaintiff is a pre-trial detainee at Anchorage Correctional Complex-East.9 9 Plaintiff cites Defendants as the State of Alaska, acting through its Department of 10 Corrections (DOC), and two individual John Doe Defendants, who Plaintiff claims 11 were employed by DOC and were responsible for overseeing inmates, including 12 Plaintiff, who was “housed in Booking Cell C.”10 Plaintiff generally claims Defendants 13 violated his rights under the Eighth “and/or” Fourteenth Amendments of the United 14 States Constitution.11 15 Plaintiff broadly alleges that he was housed in unsanitary, inhumane, and 16 torturous conditions, that he suffered from frostbite, and was denied medical 17 treatment.12 Plaintiff complains that he was not given any hot meals for the first 18 three days in confinement, was not informed why he was being confined, nor was 19 he permitted to make a phone call.13 Plaintiff also claims he filed grievances 20 regarding this conduct with the jail, as well as an “Ombudsman Complaint,” which 21 Plaintiff alleges is “ongoing.”14 Plaintiff further contends that he was only removed 22 from “Booking Cell C” after he disabled a “camera mounted on the ceiling, at which 23 point [his] jailers opened the tray slot, pepper sprayed [him] and removed [him].”15 24 9 Doc. 1 at 2-3. 25 10 Id. 26 11 Id. at 2-6. 12 Id. at 3. 27 13 Id. at 3-4. 14 Id. at 4. 28 15 Id. 1 In Claim One, Plaintiff faults Defendants for violating his “8th and/or 14th
2 amendment[]” rights by acting with “deliberate indifference and/or reckless
3 indifference” and “deliberately disregard[ing], ignore[ing], fail[ing] to treat and/or
4 prevent[] complete diagnoses and treatment” for his frostbite.”16 Additionally,
5 Plaintiff claims Defendants “subjected [him ] to torturous conditions, including sleep 6 deprivation and hunger, and placed [him] in a cell for three days without a working 7 toilet and disgustingly unhygienic conditions.”17 Plaintiff further states that 8 Defendants “have a policy or custom of deliberately disregarding prisoners’ 9 objectively serious medical needs, food needs and subjecting prisoners, such as 10 Plaintiff, to inhumane and torturous conditions.”18 11 In Claim Two, Plaintiff relies on the previous facts he provided to fault 12 Defendants for not exercising the duty of care “ordinarily exercised under the 13 circumstances, by jails and healthcare providers in the field of defendants’ 14 employees.”19 15 Plaintiff demands a trial by jury and seeks a declaratory judgment, as well as 16 punitive, compensatory, and general damages against all Defendants.20 Plaintiff also 17 requests “other relief which may be authorized under other causes of action” and for 18 the Court to award other relief as the Court deems appropriate.21 19 // 20 // 21 // 22 // 23 // 24 //
25 16 Id. at 5. 26 17 Id. 18 Id. 27 19 Id. at 7. 20 Id. 28 21 Id. 1 III. Legal Standards
2 A. Civil Rights Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
3 i. Elements of § 1983 Claim
4 Section 1983 is a federal statute that “is not itself a source of substantive
5 rights,” but provides “a method for v indicating rights [found] elsewhere.”22 6 Constitutional rights are those conferred by the United States Constitution to 7 individual citizens. Section 1983 can be used as a mechanism for enforcing the rights 8 guaranteed by a particular federal statute only if (1) the statute creates enforceable 9 rights and (2) Congress has not foreclosed the possibility of a § 1983 remedy for 10 violations of the statute in question.23 Section 1983 does not provide a cause of 11 action for violations of state law.24 In order to plead a proper § 1983 claim, a plaintiff 12 must allege plausible facts that if proven would establish each of the required 13 elements of: “(1) a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by 14 federal statute, (2) proximately caused (3) by conduct of a ‘person’ (4) acting under 15 color of state law.”25 16 ii. Analysis 17 Section 1983 requires that a defendant must be “acting under the color of state 18 law.”26 The question of whether a person who has allegedly caused a constitutional 19 injury was acting under the color of state law is a factual determination.27 A 20 defendant has acted under color of state law where he or she has “exercised power 21 22 23
24 22 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)) 25 23 Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997); see also Dittman v. California, 191 26 F.3d 1020, 1027-28 (9th Cir. 1999). 24 Galen v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 662 (9th Cir. 2007). 27 25 Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). 26 West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988). 28 27 See Brunette v. Humane Soc’y of Ventura Cty., 294 F.3d 1205, 1209 (9th Cir. 2002). 1 ‘possessed by the virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer
2 is clothed with the authority of state law.’”28
3 This essential element of the statute limits who may be a proper defendant
4 under § 1983. For instance, private citizens, state governmental agencies, and states
5 are generally not proper defendants in a § 1983 action.29 States have sovereign 6 immunity pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution, which makes 7 them immune from suit unless that immunity is waived.30 “States or governmental 8 entities that are considered ‘arms of the State’ for Eleventh Amendment purposes” 9 are not ‘persons’ under [§] 1983.”31 10 In this action, Plaintiff names the State of Alaska, Department of Corrections 11 (“DOC”) as a Defendant. Under § 1983, Plaintiff cannot sue the State of Alaska or 12 any of its governmental branches, agencies, divisions, offices, or departments, 13 including the DOC. This is because they are not considered “persons” under § 1983.32 14 In order to properly bring a § 1983 claim, Plaintiff must name a permissible 15 state actor defendant who caused him harm, indicate the capacity in which the 16 defendant acted, and state a corresponding demand for relief. In addition to DOC, 17 Plaintiff also names John Doe 1 and John Doe 2 as Defendants in this action. In a § 18 1983 suit, the “plaintiff may refer to unknown defendants as Defendant John Doe 1, 19 John Doe 2, John Doe 3, and so on, but he must [also] allege specific facts showing 20 how each particular Doe defendant violated his rights.” However, it is necessary
21 28 West, 487 U.S. at 49 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)); see also 22 Tongol v. Usery, 601 F.2d 1091, 1097 (establishing that when state officials are administering a federal funded program, the state officials are still acting under the color 23 of state law). 29 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Flint v. Dennison,488 F.3d 816, 824-25 (9th Cir. 2007); see also 24 Hale v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1398 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc). 30 In re New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921) (holding federal courts may not hear suits 25 against a state brought by their own citizens, “because of the fundamental rule of which 26 the [Eleventh] Amendment is but an exemplification.”); see also Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890). 27 31 Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997); quoting Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989)). 28 32 Id.; see also Hale, 993 F.2d at 1398. 1 that specific actions be attributed to each John Doe defendant so their identities can
2 be uncovered through discovery and to identify their liability.
3 Claims under § 1983 must also demonstrate causation, or show how the
4 alleged defendant, acting under color of state law, violated the plaintiff’s federal
5 rights. A person deprives another of a federal constitutional or statutory right, 6 “within the meaning of § 1983, ‘if he does an affirmative act, participates in 7 another’s affirmative act, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to 8 do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.’” There can be no liability 9 under § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a 10 defendant's actions and the claimed deprivation. The required causal connection 11 “may be established when an official sets in motion a ‘series of acts by others which 12 the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict’ 13 constitutional harms.” 14 Plaintiff Complaint fails to plead facts with sufficient specificity to both 15 identify the John Doe defendants and to explain how they proximately caused harm 16 to him. While Plaintiff does allege that by their inherent roles, John Doe Defendants 17 were responsibly for his care while he was in Cell Block C, that they acted with 18 deliberate indifference to his needs, and that such treatment was a “policy or 19 custom,” Plaintiff fails to meet the pleading requirements under § 1983 to specify 20 how specifically each Defendant Doe harmed him. 21 Plaintiff states that both John Doe Defendants were citizens of Alaska, 22 employed by the State of Alaska working for the Department of Corrections at 23 Anchorage Correction Complex-East, and “responsible for the care of inmates housed 24 in Booking Cell C.”33 Plaintiff further states that he was housed in Booking Cell C 25 starting on or about February 25, 2021, for three days. Plaintiff goes on to list a 26 number of complaints he has regarding his confinement, however, none of those 27
28 33 Doc. 1 at 2-3. 1 complaints are readily attributed to Defendants John Doe 1 or John Doe 2. While
2 Plaintiff states, for instance, that he “informed [his] jailers (John Doe 1 and John Doe
3 2) that [he] needed medical treatment as [his] feet were frostbitten[,]” he does not
4 say how either John Doe specifically violated any of his constitutional rights. Instead,
5 he says he “was refused medical treatmen t and left barefoot, in a filthy cell.”34 6 Further, while Plaintiff states “[f]or those three days [he] was ignored by [his] 7 jailers[,]” he does not state that his “jailers” remained the same Defendant John Does 8 for three consecutive days. It is unclear to the Court which specific jailers, or John 9 Does, Plaintiff alleges harmed him, or how specifically they harmed him. Rather, it 10 appears Plaintiff faults “Defendants” in the plural, including the impermissible party 11 – State of Alaska Department of Corrections, for his confinement, without providing 12 the specific details required for suits under § 1983. 13 As previously stated, when a plaintiff accuses a John Doe defendant of a § 1983 14 violation, it is imperative that specific actions be attributed to each John Doe so their 15 identities can be uncovered through discovery35 and in order to identify their 16 liability.36 To sufficiently plead his claim against his unidentified jailers, Plaintiff 17 must provide sufficient factual details to support the harm and legal violations 18 alleged. This means that Plaintiff must sequentially explain the events that occurred, 19 to the best of his recollection. Plaintiff must further link the actions by those he 20 21 22
23 34 Id. at 3. 35 See generally Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980) (the plaintiff should 24 be given an opportunity to identify John Doe defendants through discovery “unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover the identities”). 25 36 Dempsey v. Schwarzenegger, No. 09-cv-2921, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144416 at *6, 2010 WL 26 1445460 at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2010) (“A plaintiff may use Doe defendant designations to refer to defendants whose names are unknown; however, he must number them in the 27 complaint, e.g., ‘John Doe 1,’ ‘John Doe 2,’ so that each numbered John Doe refers to a different specific person. Plaintiff must identify how each such named Defendant is liable 28 for a constitutional violation.”). 1 alleges violated his rights – even if those John Does cannot be specifically named -
2 and how those actions resulted in injury or harm.
3 Finally, Plaintiff must indicate the capacity in which each defendant acted and
4 state a corresponding demand for relief. In a § 1983 action, a defendant may be sued
5 in either an individual or an official cap acity. For a defendant to be individually 6 liable under § 1983, that defendant must personally participate in an alleged rights 7 deprivation.37 “In a § 1983 action, the plaintiff must also demonstrate that the 8 defendant’s conduct was the actionable cause of the claimed injury.”38 A defendant 9 sued in their individual capacity may be held liable for money damages.39 10 Alternatively, in a § 1983 action, a plaintiff may sue a defendant in an official 11 capacity as an alternate way of pleading a claim against the governmental entity for 12 which that individual is an officer or employee.40 A plaintiff suing a defendant in 13 their official capacity is not required to allege the “named official’s personal 14 involvement in the acts or omissions constituting the alleged constitutional 15 violation.”41 Instead, a plaintiff must only (1) “identify the law or policy challenged” 16 and (2) “name the official within the entity who can appropriately respond to 17 injunctive relief.”42 However, a defendant sued in their official capacity may not be 18 sued for damages, only for injunctive relief.43 19 Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege sufficiently each of the required elements 20 of a § 1983 claim. As detailed below, Plaintiff appears to allege harms he suffered, 21 and identifies three potential defendants, one of whom is not a proper defendant 22 under § 1983. Furthermore, Plaintiff does not state how those defendants 23
24 37 Avalos v. Baca, 596 F.3d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 2010). 38 Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008). 25 39 See Mitchell v. Washington, 818 F.3d 436, 442 (9th Cir. 2016). 26 40 Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985); see also Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 27 (1991). 27 41 Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1127 (9th Cir. 2013). 42 Id. 28 43 See Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10. 1 proximately caused his injuries; that is, how those defendants are connected to the
2 harms he claims to have suffered. Plaintiff’s Complaint, as best the Court can
3 understand it, fails to provide even the minimal detail required for claims under §
4 1983 to provide the necessary link between the defendants and the harms alleged
5 and relief requested.44 6 B. Pleadings Requirements for Fourteenth Amendment Claims 7 i. Denial of Medical Care Claim 8 Individuals in state custody have a constitutional right to certain conditions 9 of confinement, including adequate medical treatment.45 For inmates serving 10 custodial sentences following a criminal conviction, that right is part of the Eighth 11 Amendment's guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment.46 However, pre- 12 trial detainees have not yet been convicted of a crime, so their rights arise under the 13 Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.47 Since Plaintiff’s Complaint is 14 difficult to parse, the Court offers the following guidance generally for pleadings 15 claims arising under the Fourteenth Amendment, by virtue of his pre-trial 16 confinement, that Plaintiff may be attempting to raise. 17 A pre-trial detainee has the right to needed medical care while in custody 18 under the Fourteenth Amendment. In order to prove a denial of needed medical care 19 under the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must show (1) each defendant made an 20 intentional decision with respect to the denial of needed medical care; (2) the denial 21 of needed medical care put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; 22 (3) the defendants did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, 23 even though a reasonable officer in the circumstances would have appreciated the 24 44 Additionally, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not contain a short and plain statement as 25 required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) that identifies defendants that are eligible for suit under 26 § 1983. 45 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976). 27 46 Id. 47 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535–36, 335 n.16, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979); see 28 also Sandoval v. Cnty. of San Diego, 985 F.3d 657, 667 (9th Cir. 2021). 1 high degree of risk involved—making the consequences of the defendant’s conduct
2 obvious; and (4) by not taking such measures, the defendants caused the plaintiff’s
3 injuries.48 The right to sufficient medical case includes a pre-trial detainee’s right
4 “to direct-view safety checks sufficient to determine whether their presentation
5 indicates the need for medical treatment.” 49 6 In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges he suffered frostbite, and that he was denied 7 medical care for his frostbitten feet for three days, forcing him to “soak them as best 8 I could in the filthy sink and to pick out the dead tissue with my fingernails.”50 This 9 description of Plaintiff’s alleged injuries is insufficient, and Plaintiff fails to meet the 10 elements of a properly pled claim. Plaintiff’s Complaint does not sufficiently state 11 how each Defendant specifically and intentionally acted to deny him medical care, 12 what medical care he required but was denied, what serious risk he faced as a result, 13 what “reasonable available measures” each Defendant did not take to abate that risk, 14 and what his ultimate injury was. Instead, Plaintiff merely asserts that he “was 15 denied early treatment and lost the chance of early treatment and cure” without 16 specifying what that early treatment or cure may have been.51 Likewise, Plaintiff 17 states that “[s]aid losses or harm were and are permanent and ongoing in nature,” 18 and that he “lost wages [and] suffered emotional upset”52 without specifying what 19 those ultimate loses or harm are. 20 Plainly stated, to sufficiently plead the elements of denial of medical care 21 under the Fourteenth Amendment, Plaintiff must specify how each defendant acted, 22 intentionally, to deny him medical care, what medical care he was denied, what 23 substantial risk of suffering serious harm he faced because of the denial of medical 24 care, what “reasonable available measures” each defendants did not take to abate
25 48 See Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2018); see also Sandoval, 26 985 F.3d at 657. 49 Gordon, 6 F.4th at 973. 27 50 Doc. 1 at 4. 51 Id. at 5. 28 52 Id. at 6-7. 1 that risk, and what ultimate injury Plaintiff suffered as a result. Plaintiff’s
2 Complaint – even when liberally construed - does not meet that standard.
3 ii. Elements of Conditions of Confinement Claim
4 To state a claim for unconstitutional conditions of confinement, a plaintiff
5 must plead facts that (1) the defendant ma de an intentional decision with respect to 6 the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (2) the conditions were not 7 necessary to serve the penological interest related to the confinement of the pretrial 8 detainee or the conditions were excessive as to the particular penological purpose; 9 (3) the conditions were objectively dehumanizing, uncivil, or unsanitary; and (4) the 10 defendant did not take reasonable steps to alleviate or remedy the conditions.53 11 The “‘mere lack of due care by a state official’ does not deprive an individual 12 of life, liberty, or property under the Fourteenth Amendment.”54 Thus, the plaintiff 13 must “prove more than negligence but less than subjective intent—something akin 14 to reckless disregard.”55 Courts have held “that [inmates] may not be deprived of 15 their basic human needs—e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable 16 safety—and they may not be exposed to conditions that pose an unreasonable risk of 17 serious damage to [their] future health.”56 18 Further, “conditions of confinement may be aggregated to rise to the level of 19 a constitutional violation, but ‘only when they have a mutually enforcing effect that 20 produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth, 21 or exercise.’”57 Unsanitary conditions, especially when coupled with other mutually 22 23
24 53 Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1068–71 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1125. 25 54 Id. (quoting Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330–31). 26 55 Id.; see also Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1124–25. 56 Jabbar v. Fischer, 683 F.3d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks 27 omitted). 57 Walker, 717 F.3d 119, 125 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 28 (1991)). 1 enforcing conditions, such as poor ventilation and lack of hygienic items (in
2 particular, toilet paper), can rise to the level of an objective deprivation.58
3 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants subjected him to “torturous conditions,
4 including sleep deprivation and hunger, and placed [him] in a cell for three days
5 without a working toilet and disgustingly unhygienic conditions.”59 Plaintiff further 6 claims he was not given toilet paper or soap so he had to “defecate on the floor and 7 wipe [himself] with [his] underwear,” he was only given cold meals, and he was 8 pepper sprayed.60 Additionally, Plaintiff claims he was denied medical care for his 9 frostbitten feet for three days, forcing him to “soak them as best I could in the filthy 10 sink and to pick out the dead tissue with my fingernails.”61 11 Liberally construed, Plaintiff alleges facts that if proven would support the 12 third element of this claim, that the conditions he was exposed to at Anchorage 13 Correctional Complex-East were objectively dehumanizing, uncivil, or unsanitary for 14 Fourteenth Amendment purposes. However, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to meet the 15 remaining elements, i.e. (1) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect 16 to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (2) the conditions were not 17 necessary to serve the penological interest related to the confinement of the pretrial 18 detainee or the conditions were excessive as to the particular penological purpose; 19 and (4) the defendant did not take reasonable steps to alleviate or remedy the 20 conditions.62 21 As with his general claims under § 1983 and specific medical care claims under 22 the Fourteenth Amendment, Plaintiff must state with greater specificity the identity 23 and roles of each John Doe in this case. Further, Plaintiff must specify what the 24 58 See id. at 127–28 (collecting cases); see also Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 30 (C.A.2, 25 2017). 26 59 Doc. 1 at 5. 60 Id. at 2-5. 27 61 Id. at 4. 62 Castro, 833 F.3d at 1068–71; see also Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1125; McGilbra v. Washoe Cnty., 28 2022 WL 19406896, at *3 (D. Nev., 2022). 1 intentional decision each defendant made with respect to the conditions under which
2 he was confined; how the conditions were not necessary to serve the penological
3 interest related to his confinement or the conditions were excessive as to the
4 particular penological purpose; and what reasonable steps Defendants could have,
5 but did not take, to alleviate or remedy the conditions.63 6 CONCLUSION 7 As currently pled, Plaintiff fails to meet the pleading requirements under § 8 1983 and therefore fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff 9 may offer some facts in his Complaint that, upon amendment in accordance with the 10 directions in this Order, may rise to sufficiently meet the elements of potential 11 claims under § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment. However, as currently pled, 12 Plaintiffs claims fail to meet those pleading requirements. Therefore, the Court 13 dismisses Plaintiff’s Complaint but grants him leave to amend. 14 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: 15 1. This action is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND for failing to state a claim 16 upon which relief may be granted. 17 2. All pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT. 18 3. Plaintiff has until July 31, 2023, to file one of the following: 19 a. Amended Complaint, in which Plaintiff would resubmit his claims to 20 the Court after correcting the deficiencies in accordance with this 21 order. An amended complaint would replace the current complaint 22 in its entirety.64 23 b. Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, which would inform the Court that 24 Plaintiff no longer wishes to pursue his lawsuit and would dismiss 25 the entire action. 26 27 63 Id. 28 64 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 and Local Civil Rule 15.1. 1 4. Any amended complaint should be on this Court’s form, which is being provided
2 to Plaintiff with this Order. An amended complaint will replace the prior
3 complaint in its entirety.65 Plaintiff must include all of the claims he seeks to
4 bring in an amended complaint. Any claims not included in the amended
5 complaint will be considered waived. 6 5. If Plaintiff does not file either an Amended Complaint or Notice of Voluntary 7 Dismissal on the Court form by July 31, 2023, this case could be DISMISSED WITH 8 PREJUDICE under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A dismissal in this manner will 9 count as a “strike” against Plaintiff under § 1915(g).66 10 6. At all times, Plaintiff must keep the Court informed of any change of address. 11 Such notice shall be titled “NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS.” This notice must 12 not include any requests for any other relief, and it must be served on all 13 Defendants or Defendant’s attorney who make an appearance in this case. Failure 14 to file a notice of change of address may result in the dismissal of this case under 15 Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 16 7. The Clerk of Court is directed to send Plaintiff the following forms with this 17 Order: (1) form PS15, with “FIRST AMENDED” written above the title “Prisoner’s
18 65 See Local Civil Rule 15.1. Plaintiff should make no reference to the initial Complaint or 19 other documents. The Court cannot refer to a previous pleading in order to make an amended complaint complete. That is, any defendant not named or claim not re-alleged is 20 generally waived. But see Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 925-28 (9th Cir. 2012) (“For claims dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend, we will not require that 21 they be repled in a subsequent amended complaint to preserve them for appeal. But for any 22 claims voluntarily dismissed, we will consider those claims to be waived if not repled.”) (emphasis added). An amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to 23 any prior pleading. This is because an amended complaint supersedes (takes the place of) an original complaint. See L.Civ.R. 15.1(a) (“amended pleading must not incorporate by 24 reference any prior pleading, including exhibits”); see also Valadez-Lopez v. Chertoff, 656 F.3d 851, 857 (9th Cir. 2011) (“It is well-established that an ‘amended complaint supersedes 25 the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent.’”) (citations omitted). 26 66 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) prohibits a prisoner who files more than three actions or appeals in any federal court in the United States which are dismissed as frivolous or malicious or for 27 failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, from bringing any other actions without prepayment of fees unless the prisoner can demonstrate that he or she is in 28 “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 1 Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights” Under the Civil Rights Act 42 U.S.C. §
2 1983; (2) form PS11, Application to Waive the Filing Fee; (3) form PS09, Notice
3 of Voluntary Dismissal; (4) form PS23, Notice of Change of Address; and (5) the
4 District Court’s handbook, “REPRESENTING YOURSELF IN ALASKA’S FEDERAL COURT.”
5 6 DATED this 30th day of June, 2023 at Anchorage, Alaska. 7 s/ Kyle F. Reardon 8 KYLE F. REARDON 9 United States Magistrate Judge District of Alaska 10
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