1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 JAMES FOX, Individually and on No. 2:24-cv-01001 WBS CKD Behalf of the Class, 13 Plaintiff, 14 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: v. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND 15 AND DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO GENWORTH LIFE AND ANNUITY STRIKE 16 INSURANCE COMPANY, a Virginia Corporation, 17 Defendant. 18 19 ----oo0oo---- 20 Plaintiff James Fox filed this putative class action in 21 state court, alleging various state law violations in connection 22 with the cancellation of life insurance policies. (Docket No. 1 23 at 10-40.) Defendant Genworth Life and Annuity Insurance Company 24 removed to federal court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness 25 Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d). (Id. at 1-5).) Before the 26 court are plaintiff’s motion to remand based on a lack of 27 equitable jurisdiction (Docket No. 44) and defendant’s motion to 28 strike the class action allegations (Docket No. 39). 1 I. Procedural Background 2 Plaintiff’s original complaint, filed on February 28, 3 2024, and removed to this court on April 3, 2024, brought claims 4 for (1) declaratory relief, (2) breach of contract, (3) unfair 5 competition, and (4) bad faith. (Docket No. 1.) 6 On October 15, 2024, the court granted defendant’s 7 motion to stay because a then-pending appeal, Small v. Allianz 8 Life Insurance Company of North America, 122 F.4th 1182 (9th Cir. 9 2024), would decide an important issue pertaining to recovery 10 under California Insurance Code §§ 10113.71 and 10113.72, the 11 statutes at issue in this case. (Docket No. 23.) 12 Following the decision in Small, in which the Ninth 13 Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of class 14 certification, 122 F.4th at 1197, defendant filed a motion to 15 lift the stay, which the court granted. (Docket No. 32.) 16 Plaintiff then amended his complaint to remove three of his four 17 claims, leaving only the claim brought under California’s Unfair 18 Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. (First 19 Am. Compl. (“FAC”) (Docket No. 37).) 20 II. Motion to Remand 21 Plaintiff’s counsel has strategically amended the 22 complaint in an attempt to deprive this court of equitable 23 jurisdiction, presumably in response to the ruling in Small. 24 Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corporation, 971 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 25 2020), similarly involved a plaintiff who had strategically 26 amended the complaint to leave only claims for equitable relief. 27 There, the Ninth Circuit held that “traditional principles 28 governing equitable remedies in federal courts, including the 1 requisite inadequacy of legal remedies, apply when a party 2 requests restitution under the UCL . . . in a diversity action.” 3 Id. at 844. This holding rested on longstanding Supreme Court 4 precedent requiring that federal courts apply the “traditional” 5 rules governing equitable jurisdiction, including that a “plain, 6 adequate and complete remedy at law must be wanting.” Id. at 840 7 (citing Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105-06 8 (1945)). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 9 dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim for restitution under the UCL 10 due to the availability of an adequate legal remedy. Id. at 845. 11 See also Guzman v. Polaris Industries Inc., 49 F.4th 1308, 1313 12 (9th Cir. 2022). 13 Relying on Sonner and arguing that his complaint does 14 not plead the inadequacy of legal remedies, plaintiff moves to 15 remand on the ground that this court lacks the power to grant 16 equitable relief. However, as this court has previously stated, 17 “it is unclear why Sonner would vitiate the court’s already- 18 established CAFA jurisdiction” such that remand is appropriate. 19 Fust v. Gilead Scis., Inc., No. 2:23-cv-2853 WBS DB, 2024 WL 20 732965, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2024) (citation modified). 21 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit clarified that Sonner “did not indicate 22 that [plaintiff’s] failure to plead an inadequate remedy at law 23 deprived the district court of jurisdiction over her complaint,” 24 but rather that dismissal was not error under those 25 circumstances. Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp. (“Sonner II”), 26 49 F.4th 1300, 1303 (9th Cir. 2022). 27 Contrary to plaintiff’s argument, remand is not 28 permitted under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), which authorizes a district 1 court to remand a case to state court due to either lack of 2 subject matter jurisdiction or defects in the removal procedure. 3 See Polo v. Innoventions Int’l, LLC, 833 F.3d 1193, 1196 (9th 4 Cir. 2016) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)). While a court must 5 possess equitable jurisdiction in order to grant equitable 6 relief, the Ninth Circuit has made clear that “[e]quitable 7 jurisdiction is distinct from subject matter jurisdiction.” See 8 Guzman, 49 F.4th at 1314. “Subject matter jurisdiction regards 9 ‘whether the claim falls within the limited jurisdiction 10 conferred on the federal courts’ by Congress, while equitable 11 jurisdiction regards ‘whether consistently with the principles 12 governing equitable relief the court may exercise its remedial 13 powers.’” Id. (quoting Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 14 754 (1975)). 15 It is undisputed that this court has subject matter 16 jurisdiction pursuant to CAFA because there are at least 100 17 class members, the parties are minimally diverse, and the amount 18 in controversy exceeds $5 million. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). 19 Plaintiff has not amended the complaint in a manner that 20 eliminates CAFA jurisdiction, nor has he identified any defects 21 in removal. Cf. Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 22 U.S. 22, 30 (2025) (when a plaintiff amends the complaint in a 23 manner that eliminates the jurisdictional basis on which removal 24 was premised, the court loses subject matter jurisdiction and 25 must remand). See also Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. 26 Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014) (“[N]o antiremoval presumption 27 attends cases invoking CAFA, which Congress enacted to facilitate 28 adjudication of certain class actions in federal court.”). 1 Although some district courts have applied common law 2 principles of abstention in order to decline jurisdiction and 3 remand cases seeking equitable relief unavailable in federal 4 court, see, e.g., Ruiz v. The Bradford Exch., Ltd., No. 3:23-cv- 5 01800, 2024 WL 2844625, at *4 (S.D. Cal. May 16, 2024) 6 (collecting cases), plaintiff has not cited -- and the court is 7 unaware of –- any authority requiring remand under these 8 circumstances. See Fust, 2024 WL 732965, at *3 (“[P]laintiffs 9 offer no binding authority requiring remand at the pleading stage 10 for lack of power to grant equitable relief.”). To the contrary, 11 other judges of this court have reasoned that dismissal, not 12 remand, is the appropriate course of action when the district 13 court lacks equitable jurisdiction. See Demaria v. Big Lots 14 Stores, No. 2:23-cv-00296 DJC CKD, 2023 WL 6390151, at *8 (E.D. 15 Cal. Sept. 29, 2023); Lopez v. Cequel Commc’ns, LLC, No. 2:20-cv- 16 02242 TLN JDP, 2021 WL 4476831, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ----oo0oo---- 11 12 JAMES FOX, Individually and on No. 2:24-cv-01001 WBS CKD Behalf of the Class, 13 Plaintiff, 14 MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: v. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO REMAND 15 AND DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO GENWORTH LIFE AND ANNUITY STRIKE 16 INSURANCE COMPANY, a Virginia Corporation, 17 Defendant. 18 19 ----oo0oo---- 20 Plaintiff James Fox filed this putative class action in 21 state court, alleging various state law violations in connection 22 with the cancellation of life insurance policies. (Docket No. 1 23 at 10-40.) Defendant Genworth Life and Annuity Insurance Company 24 removed to federal court pursuant to the Class Action Fairness 25 Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d). (Id. at 1-5).) Before the 26 court are plaintiff’s motion to remand based on a lack of 27 equitable jurisdiction (Docket No. 44) and defendant’s motion to 28 strike the class action allegations (Docket No. 39). 1 I. Procedural Background 2 Plaintiff’s original complaint, filed on February 28, 3 2024, and removed to this court on April 3, 2024, brought claims 4 for (1) declaratory relief, (2) breach of contract, (3) unfair 5 competition, and (4) bad faith. (Docket No. 1.) 6 On October 15, 2024, the court granted defendant’s 7 motion to stay because a then-pending appeal, Small v. Allianz 8 Life Insurance Company of North America, 122 F.4th 1182 (9th Cir. 9 2024), would decide an important issue pertaining to recovery 10 under California Insurance Code §§ 10113.71 and 10113.72, the 11 statutes at issue in this case. (Docket No. 23.) 12 Following the decision in Small, in which the Ninth 13 Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of class 14 certification, 122 F.4th at 1197, defendant filed a motion to 15 lift the stay, which the court granted. (Docket No. 32.) 16 Plaintiff then amended his complaint to remove three of his four 17 claims, leaving only the claim brought under California’s Unfair 18 Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. (First 19 Am. Compl. (“FAC”) (Docket No. 37).) 20 II. Motion to Remand 21 Plaintiff’s counsel has strategically amended the 22 complaint in an attempt to deprive this court of equitable 23 jurisdiction, presumably in response to the ruling in Small. 24 Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corporation, 971 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 25 2020), similarly involved a plaintiff who had strategically 26 amended the complaint to leave only claims for equitable relief. 27 There, the Ninth Circuit held that “traditional principles 28 governing equitable remedies in federal courts, including the 1 requisite inadequacy of legal remedies, apply when a party 2 requests restitution under the UCL . . . in a diversity action.” 3 Id. at 844. This holding rested on longstanding Supreme Court 4 precedent requiring that federal courts apply the “traditional” 5 rules governing equitable jurisdiction, including that a “plain, 6 adequate and complete remedy at law must be wanting.” Id. at 840 7 (citing Guar. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105-06 8 (1945)). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 9 dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim for restitution under the UCL 10 due to the availability of an adequate legal remedy. Id. at 845. 11 See also Guzman v. Polaris Industries Inc., 49 F.4th 1308, 1313 12 (9th Cir. 2022). 13 Relying on Sonner and arguing that his complaint does 14 not plead the inadequacy of legal remedies, plaintiff moves to 15 remand on the ground that this court lacks the power to grant 16 equitable relief. However, as this court has previously stated, 17 “it is unclear why Sonner would vitiate the court’s already- 18 established CAFA jurisdiction” such that remand is appropriate. 19 Fust v. Gilead Scis., Inc., No. 2:23-cv-2853 WBS DB, 2024 WL 20 732965, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2024) (citation modified). 21 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit clarified that Sonner “did not indicate 22 that [plaintiff’s] failure to plead an inadequate remedy at law 23 deprived the district court of jurisdiction over her complaint,” 24 but rather that dismissal was not error under those 25 circumstances. Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp. (“Sonner II”), 26 49 F.4th 1300, 1303 (9th Cir. 2022). 27 Contrary to plaintiff’s argument, remand is not 28 permitted under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), which authorizes a district 1 court to remand a case to state court due to either lack of 2 subject matter jurisdiction or defects in the removal procedure. 3 See Polo v. Innoventions Int’l, LLC, 833 F.3d 1193, 1196 (9th 4 Cir. 2016) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)). While a court must 5 possess equitable jurisdiction in order to grant equitable 6 relief, the Ninth Circuit has made clear that “[e]quitable 7 jurisdiction is distinct from subject matter jurisdiction.” See 8 Guzman, 49 F.4th at 1314. “Subject matter jurisdiction regards 9 ‘whether the claim falls within the limited jurisdiction 10 conferred on the federal courts’ by Congress, while equitable 11 jurisdiction regards ‘whether consistently with the principles 12 governing equitable relief the court may exercise its remedial 13 powers.’” Id. (quoting Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 14 754 (1975)). 15 It is undisputed that this court has subject matter 16 jurisdiction pursuant to CAFA because there are at least 100 17 class members, the parties are minimally diverse, and the amount 18 in controversy exceeds $5 million. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). 19 Plaintiff has not amended the complaint in a manner that 20 eliminates CAFA jurisdiction, nor has he identified any defects 21 in removal. Cf. Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 22 U.S. 22, 30 (2025) (when a plaintiff amends the complaint in a 23 manner that eliminates the jurisdictional basis on which removal 24 was premised, the court loses subject matter jurisdiction and 25 must remand). See also Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. 26 Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 (2014) (“[N]o antiremoval presumption 27 attends cases invoking CAFA, which Congress enacted to facilitate 28 adjudication of certain class actions in federal court.”). 1 Although some district courts have applied common law 2 principles of abstention in order to decline jurisdiction and 3 remand cases seeking equitable relief unavailable in federal 4 court, see, e.g., Ruiz v. The Bradford Exch., Ltd., No. 3:23-cv- 5 01800, 2024 WL 2844625, at *4 (S.D. Cal. May 16, 2024) 6 (collecting cases), plaintiff has not cited -- and the court is 7 unaware of –- any authority requiring remand under these 8 circumstances. See Fust, 2024 WL 732965, at *3 (“[P]laintiffs 9 offer no binding authority requiring remand at the pleading stage 10 for lack of power to grant equitable relief.”). To the contrary, 11 other judges of this court have reasoned that dismissal, not 12 remand, is the appropriate course of action when the district 13 court lacks equitable jurisdiction. See Demaria v. Big Lots 14 Stores, No. 2:23-cv-00296 DJC CKD, 2023 WL 6390151, at *8 (E.D. 15 Cal. Sept. 29, 2023); Lopez v. Cequel Commc’ns, LLC, No. 2:20-cv- 16 02242 TLN JDP, 2021 WL 4476831, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2021); 17 see also Guzman, 49 F.4th at 1312 (where the district court lacks 18 equitable jurisdiction over a claim, it is “required to dismiss” 19 that claim). The court finds these cases persuasive. 20 Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion to remand will be 21 denied. 22 III. Motion to Strike 23 Defendant has moved to strike the complaint’s class 24 action allegations pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25 12(f), which permits the court to “strike from a pleading an 26 insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, 27 or scandalous matter.” “Motions to strike should not be granted 28 unless the matter to be stricken clearly could have no possible 1 bearing on the subject of the litigation or unless prejudice 2 would result to the moving party from denial of the motion.” 3 Harper v. Charter Commc’ns, LLC, No. 2:19-cv-00902 WBS DMC, 2020 4 WL 916877, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2020) (quoting Delgado v. 5 Marketsource, Inc., No. 17-cv-07370, 2019 WL 1904216, at *3 (N.D. 6 Cal. Apr. 29, 2019)). 7 Defendant does not establish that the class allegations 8 are “redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous” as 9 required by Rule 12(f), but instead argues that the allegations 10 should be stricken because class certification is purportedly 11 precluded by the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Small, 122 F.4th at 12 1198-1202. But as this court has previously stated, “motions to 13 strike class allegations are disfavored because a motion for 14 class certification is a more appropriate vehicle for arguments 15 pertaining to class allegations.” Harper, 2020 WL 916877, at *5 16 (quoting Olney v. Job.com, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-01724 LJO SKO, 2013 17 WL 5476813, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 30, 2013)). 18 The Supreme Court has explained that “an order striking 19 class allegations is functionally equivalent to an order denying 20 class certification” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 21 Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 582 U.S. 23, 34 n.7 (2017) (citation 22 modified). Striking class allegations under Rule 12(f) based on 23 the relatively scant briefing before the court would seem to defy 24 the Supreme Court’s directive that district courts conduct a 25 “rigorous analysis” of the elements required for class 26 certification under Rule 23, which is not a “mere pleading 27 standard.” See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 28 350-51 (2011). See also Baker, 582 U.S. at 31–33 (appealability IE I OEE ODEN SN NO
1 of order striking class allegations is governed by Rule 23(f)); 2 Vinole v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 571 F.3d 935, 941 (9th 3 Cir. 2009) (“A defendant may move to deny class certification 4 | before a plaintiff files a motion to certify a class” under Rule 5 23.). Accordingly, defendant’s motion to strike will be denied. 6 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to 7 remand (Docket No. 44) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED. 8 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant’s motion to strike 9 (Docket No. 39) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED. 10 | Dated: August 18, 2025 □□□ ak. Ad. tt 11 WILLIAM B. SHUBB 1D UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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